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
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


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









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# THE PAGET PAPERS









W. & A. N. Co. N.Y.

JANE, COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE.

THE  
**PAGET PAPERS**

DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER  
CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE

RIGHT HON. SIR ARTHUR PAGET, G.C.B.

1794-1807

[*WITH TWO APPENDICES 1808 & 1821-1829*]

ARRANGED AND EDITED BY HIS SON

THE RIGHT HON. SIR AUGUSTUS B. PAGET, G.C.B.

LATE HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR IN VIENNA

WITH NOTES BY

MRS. J. R. GREEN


*TWENTY-FOUR PORTRAITS*

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL II.


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1896



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# THE PAGET PAPERS

## VIENNA

### (1.) THE PEACE OF AMIENS: 1801-1803

ÆTAT. 30 TO 32

ON the close of his mission to Palermo, Mr. Paget was appointed to succeed Lord Minto in the Mission to the Court of Austria, and after paying a short visit to Vienna in May and June, on his way to England, he returned there to take possession of his new post in September following.

Although the Preliminaries of Peace had not yet been signed, he was enabled, in virtue of a passport furnished by M. de Talleyrand, to travel through France. Shortly after his arrival in Vienna he addressed a letter to Lord Hawkesbury, giving some curious and interesting details as to what he had seen and heard during his journey.

Count Louis Cobentzl, who had been sent to Paris on a special mission the previous year, returned to Vienna and resumed his duties as Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, shortly after Mr. Paget's arrival, and it was with this Minister that Mr. Paget transacted the diplomatic business committed to his charge during nearly the whole of his residence at the Court of Austria.

In the year 1802 I am confronted with one of those serious breaks in the official correspondence to which I referred in the biographical Memoir. From Mr. Paget's arrival in Vienna in 1801, and during the years 1802 and 1803, I have found scarcely any record of the despatches which he addressed to the Foreign Office, with the excep-



tion of that containing an account of his journey through France, though there are a few addressed to him from the Secretary of State, Lord Hawkesbury, which afford a clue to the negotiations on which he was then employed. This vacuum, however, appears to me to be of less importance from the fact that, in consequence of the Peace of Luneville and the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens, there was a suspension of hostilities, not only upon the Continent, but between Great Britain and France.

Diplomacy, however, was not idle during this period, but the scene of its operations was not principally at Vienna. It will be recollected that only the Preliminaries of Peace had been signed between Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto in October 1801; and the definitive Treaty was negotiated at Amiens by the Marquis of Cornwallis as principal Plenipotentiary on the part of Great Britain. After a very laborious negotiation, Peace was signed on the 29th of March 1802.

Nevertheless, the aggressive and absorbing policy of the First Consul had been, and was still, steadily pursued. The Bavarian, Helvetian, and Ligurian Republics, whose right to adopt whatever form of government they might think fit had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Luneville, had been compelled to form their Constitutions so as to render these States subservient to France. The Cisalpine Republic was in the same way remodelled by Napoleon, and on the 11th of September 1802 he annexed Piedmont to the French Republic, on the plea that the absence of any stipulation in its favour in the Treaties of Luneville and Amiens was equivalent to a permission for its absorption by France.

In spite of the indignation excited throughout Europe, the formation of a coalition against France was prevented by the antagonism between Austria and Prussia on the question of the indemnities to be assigned to the Sovereigns and Princes who had been despoiled of their territories on the left bank of the Rhine—indemnities which were to be provided out of the possessions of the Ecclesiastical Princes. In negotiations for the settlement of this question France supported the pretensions of Prussia, with whom a Treaty was signed on the 23rd of May 1802, by which, in return for the large acquisitions re-

ceived, the latter Power guaranteed the French possessions in Italy. According to a letter from Lord St. Helens to Mr. Paget (March 16, 1802), it would seem that the claims of Austria were sustained at Paris by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

But this was not the question which the most attracted the attention of the British Government at this moment.

First, there was the mission of Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt and Syria, which Napoleon afterwards avowed to Lord Whitworth had been undertaken for a military purpose; and then the affairs of Switzerland, which country had been the scene of internal dissensions and conflicts by the revolt of the cantons against the Central Government established by Napoleon at Berne. General Rapp, aide-de-camp to Napoleon, arrived at Lausanne on the 4th of October with a proclamation which announced to the Swiss people the resolution of the First Consul to become the mediator in their differences, and directly menaced the liberties of the Swiss, and their right to decide upon their form of government which had been guaranteed to them by the Treaty of Luneville.

The conduct of the British Government is well shown in the correspondence of that month. It would seem that the Imperial Cabinet was in no haste to reply to the overtures made to it on the part of the British Cabinet, and it is to be presumed that, when its answer did come, it was not such as to encourage England to proceed further, and unsupported by any other Powers, in this business. At all events, a French force of twenty thousand men, under General Ney, entered Switzerland, and occupied without resistance Soleure, Zurich, and Berne.

Another negotiation with which Mr. Paget was charged at this time was to obtain the assent of the Imperial Government to the 10th Article of the Treaty of Amiens, which placed the Knights of St. John of Malta under the joint guarantee of Austria, Russia, and other Powers named in the instrument, on the fulfilment of which condition the island was to be evacuated by the British garrison. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg took offence at the wording of the 10th Article, and it was probably owing to the difficulties raised by the Russian Govern-

ment that the Cabinet of Vienna, which had at the outset shown a favourable disposition to comply with the demand addressed to it, subsequently also raised objections. These, however, were eventually overcome by Mr. Paget.

The maintenance of a peace threatened on every side by dangers of so formidable a kind had been doubtful from the first; and the year of 1803 was rendered memorable by the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens, and the renewal of hostilities between Great Britain and France, which were destined only finally to terminate with the Battle of Waterloo and the exile of Napoleon to St. Helena.

It had been for some time evident that the First Consul, although professedly desirous of maintaining peaceful relations with England, was taking every measure with a view to the renewal of the war, while at the same time he was openly violating his Treaty engagements by his invasions and annexations in the Low Countries, Italy, and Switzerland, whose independence had been guaranteed by the Treaties of Luneville and Amiens. While engaged in these operations, he was loud and bitter in his complaints against England, partly for the violent attacks against his person in the English press, but more especially in the French press published in London, and also on account of the delay by the British Government in carrying out the evacuation of Egypt, Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope.

Matters were brought to a crisis by the First Consul's arrogant and intemperate address to the British Ambassador, Lord Whitworth, before the diplomatic body assembled at the Tuileries.

There were, indeed, two occasions on which the First Consul addressed the British Ambassador in the presence of his colleagues. On the first occasion, after vehemently declaiming against England for the non-fulfilment of her Treaty engagements by not evacuating the places above mentioned, he declared he would rather see her in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine than leave her in that of Malta. Egypt, he said, he might easily have retaken, but that he did not think it worth the risks of a war, since, sooner or later, Egypt must belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish Empire or by some arrangement with the Porte.

“What have I to gain,” he inquired, “by going to war? A descent upon your coasts is the only means of offence I possess, and that I am determined to attempt and put myself at its head. I am well aware of the risks of such an undertaking, but you compel me to incur them. I will risk my army, my life in the attempt. I know the probability is that I myself and the greatest part of the expedition will go to the bottom. There are a hundred chances to one against me, but I am determined to make the attempt, and such is the disposition of the troops, that army after army will be found ready to engage in the enterprise.” After continuing for some time longer in the same strain, and asserting that he himself had scrupulously fulfilled his treaty obligations by the evacuation of Naples, Tarentum, and the Roman States, he proceeded to say:—“Peace or war depends upon Malta. It is in vain to talk of Piedmont and Switzerland. They are mere trifles, and must have been foreseen when the Treaty was going forward. You have no right to speak of them at this time of day. I do not pretend to say this mission of Colonel Sebastiani was mainly commercial—it was rendered necessary, in a military point of view, by your infraction of the Treaty of Amiens;” and he ended with the following words:—“For myself my part is taken; I would rather put you in possession of the heights of Montmartre than of Malta.”

On the second occasion (March 14) he went straight up to the British Ambassador, and, with a severe air, addressed him:—“So you are determined to go to war. We have already fought for fifteen years. I suppose you want to fight for fifteen more. The English wish for war, but if they are the first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to put it into the scabbard. They have no respect for Treaties. Henceforth they must be shrouded in black crape. Wherefore these armaments? Against whom these measures of precaution? I have not a single ship of the line in the harbours of France; but if you arm, I shall arm also. If you insist upon fighting, I shall fight also. You may destroy France, but never intimidate it. If you would live on terms of good understanding with us you must respect Treaties. Woe to those who violate them! They shall answer for the consequences to all Europe.”

It is easy to imagine the effect produced in England by this violent outburst, accompanied, as it was, by the most menacing attitude of the First Consul towards the British Ambassador. The national feeling of indignation and resentment was further intensified when it became known that, in a message to the Legislative Body, the First Consul had made the assertion that England single-handed was unable to contend against France.

Lord Hawkesbury, in very temperate language, fully justified the conduct of the British Government on the ground of the extension of power and territory made by France in various quarters, particularly in Italy. "But," he added, "His Majesty would have been willing to have overlooked these acquisitions for the sake of not disturbing the general peace of Europe, and was prepared to have acted up to the very letter of the article regarding the evacuation of Malta, when his attention was arrested by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani on Egypt, which discloses views utterly inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Amiens."

After two months' fruitless negotiations Lord Whitworth demanded and received his passports on the 12th of May, and the French Ambassador embarked from Dover on the 18th of that month.

Between the first and second addresses of the First Consul to the British Ambassador, a message had been sent by the King to both Houses of Parliament, announcing that, "as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, His Majesty had judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions," &c., &c. This address was supported by Mr. Fox, and was adopted unanimously by both Houses; the Militia was called out; ten thousand additional men were voted for the navy; sixteen line-of-battle ships were placed in commission; Lord Nelson was appointed to the command of the Mediterranean Fleet; Lord Keith and Sir Sydney Smith likewise received commands; and other measures for meeting the coming war were adopted amidst the enthusiasm of the nation. It was to these armaments the First Consul referred in his second address to Lord Whitworth.

War was declared immediately after the departure of the Ambassadors.

News, even of the most important nature, did not travel rapidly in those days, and the first intelligence of the departure of Lord Whitworth from Paris on the 12th of May was communicated to Mr. Paget in a note from the Vice-Chancellor, Count Cobentzl, dated the 21st. In a further note, dated June the 3rd, Count Cobentzl encloses some numbers of the *Moniteur* containing an account of the negotiations, together with the King's message to Parliament. His Excellency also sent a semi-official publication announcing the capture of two French ships by two English frigates in the Bay of Audierne, but no mention is made of the odious and atrocious measures adopted by the First Consul in consequence, viz., the arrest and imprisonment of all the English, not only in France, but in all the territories occupied by the French armies, which was an act not only at variance with the comity of nations and international usage, which always respects private individuals and allows them a certain time to leave the country at war with their own, but which for petty vindictiveness and spite has never been paralleled in the history of warfare amongst civilised nations. Many of the persons thus arrested only recovered their liberty on the invasion of France by the Allies in 1814.

It does not appear that Mr. Paget was instructed to solicit the alliance of Austria for Great Britain against France, and he was careful, as will be seen from his despatches, to avoid taking any initiative on the subject himself.

He was evidently much impressed by the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Austrian Empire at that time, as well as by the apathy of some, and the apparently French leanings of others, of the Austrian Ministers.

It will be observed that Mr. Paget reports Count Cobentzl as having declared "that it had become hopeless and impossible for Austria, single-handed, to resist France" (a sentiment which was evidently shared by Lord Whitworth, as may be seen by some of his letters); "that every effort imaginable had been made by the Emperor to connect himself more closely than ever with Russia,

but that those advances have been uniformly received with the most discouraging coldness and indifference," &c., &c.

The same plea may probably be advanced in extenuation, to a certain degree, of the conduct of Austria, which called forth the later censures of Mr. Paget during this and the following years; though, on the other hand, strong grounds of suspicion as to the duplicity of the policy of the Austrian Cabinet at this particular moment were not wanting, as may be seen from the letters from Mr. Maurus of the 28th of January, and from Mr. Drake of the 5th of February, 1803.

The natural alliance for Austria, in resisting the French invasion of the North of Germany, was of course with Prussia; but this latter Power, as already stated, had, in pursuit of its self-aggrandising ends, signed a Treaty (May 28, 1802) with France by which, in return for the territory acquired, she guaranteed the French possessions in Italy. The day, however, was not far distant when Prussia was to pay the full penalty of the perfidious policy she had uniformly pursued, with the exception of a short period, since the commencement of the war in Europe against the aggressions of France, and which she continued to pursue for the next two years.

Besides the despatches and letters connected with these transactions, others of a miscellaneous character, including some from the Prince of Wales, are given, and a long and interesting letter from Lord Minto, commenting upon the state of parties in England and the general feeling in regard to the peace with France.

Frequent allusions occur in the letters of some of Mr. Paget's colleagues to the *bulletins* which he was in the habit of sending them. These *bulletins* consisted in reports which he received from secret agents whom he employed in France to furnish him with information of what was passing in that country—the proceedings and intentions of the Government, &c. I have found a great number of these *bulletins*, but besides their having no particular interest at this time, they are too voluminous for publication in this collection of Papers.

I insert a letter from Mr. Broughton, Mr. Paget's agent at the Foreign Office, which gives an idea of the immense

strain there was upon the private resources of diplomatists in those days, by reason of the constant arrears in the payment of their salaries; and not only this, but by the enormous sums they had to disburse by sending their own servants as couriers, which were frequently not repaid to them for upwards of a twelvemonth after they had been spent. I can myself recollect the time when our "extraordinary disbursements" on the public account were not repaid until several months had elapsed after sending in the accounts. But all this has long since been changed.

The correspondence contains also letters from Queen Caroline of Naples to Mr. Paget. I give them, not because of any intrinsic value or importance attaching to them, but because, first, they will afford a specimen of the Royal orthography, and, second, because they are a corroboration of what has already been stated, viz., that, however strong Her Majesty's feelings against Mr. Paget may have been during the early period of his residence in Palermo, he had been fortunate enough to overcome them, and to acquire for himself the warmest and often-repeated expressions of Her Majesty's esteem and gratitude. In writing of the Queen of Naples I have, of course, adhered to the appellation "*Queen Caroline*," by which Her Majesty is habitually designated, but it will be remarked that in all her letters to Mr. Paget Her Majesty signs herself simply "*Charlotte*."

## CORRESPONDENCE

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[Private.]

VIENNA, 14 Sept. 1801.

MY LORD,—Agreeably to the wish expressed by Your Lordship to me previous to my departure from England, that I should transmit to you such remarks as it should come within my observation to make on my passage through France, I shall now do myself the Honor of obeying in the best manner I can, Your Lordship's Commands.

It may not be improper to say in the first place a



word or two upon my reception at Calais. As soon as my arrival was known, the Commissaire du Gouvernement and the General Commandant de la Place came down to the Pier to receive me. The latter accompanied me to the Antichamber of my apartment at the Inn. In the course of our walk the General expatiated upon the Horrors of War and the advantages of Peace, that it was a lamentable consideration that two great Nations *which loved and respected each other*, and which were only separated by a few leagues of Sea, should be thus harassing each other by a continual state of Warfare.

Mr. Menyand came very shortly afterwards to the Inn and told me, in a very high and impertinent tone, that the Vessel could by no means be allowed to come into the Harbour, that independent of other Reasons, the Master of her had behaved in a most unaccountable and insolent manner to the Crew of the French Boat which had been sent off to her. Not particularly admiring the manners of this Gentleman, I probably shewed it, for upon taking his leave, which he did immediately, he came up to shake me by the hand, and asked if he could be of any further service to me. While they were getting the carriage on shore I went to the Theatre; as soon as the General I have mentioned above perceived me, he quitted his seat and came into the box, and sat by me during the representation. We had a great deal of light sort of conversation which it would be tedious to relate, and the intended expedition against England was of course one of the topics.\* Among other things, he observed that it would be impossible for us to blockade the French Ports during the Gales of wind in the winter. I assented to this, and added that we should even probably be driven off their Coast the next equinox, and that there could not be a more favorable moment for the French to attempt the invasion. He said: "Oh, cela c'est une autre affaire: nous irons quand nous pourrons, sauf la reception que vous nous donnerez."

I will now observe that the Joy of the Inhabitants of

\* Mr. Paget was in Calais in the first days of September, a fortnight after the bold attempt of Nelson, commissioned to watch the French coast, to cut the Boulogne flotilla out of the harbour. Unsuccessful as the attempt was, it did much to destroy confidence in the possibility of the invasion of England, and to open the way for peace.

Calais when they heard that an English Minister had arrived was as perceptible, as was their Depression when they learnt that my mission was not to Paris. On my journey thither nothing remarkable occurred. I found the road considerably better than I had expected, which was the case throughout, and the Country as far as I am able to judge in a very good state of Cultivation. I cannot help thinking that I discovered some difference in the population, and in several of the towns through which I passed, I noticed many houses of different descriptions uninhabited. At one or two of them which had formerly boasted of their silk and velvet manufacturies, I heard complaints of the total stagnation of trade. The harvest had in general been extremely abundant, except in the neighbourhood of Strasbourg, where at least one half of it has been destroyed by mice.

I arrived at Paris very early in the morning of the 3rd. In the course of it I left my card with Mr. Talleyrand and a message to thank him for my Passport. Mr. Méry had nothing to transmit to the office, except the letter which I had the honor of sending by the last messenger. In the two days I remained there I saw Count Louis Cobentzl\* and Mr. de Kalitcheff.† By the former particularly of these, who is a very old acquaintance of mine, I was received with every mark of Friendship, and he seemed to seize with eagerness this first opportunity of making the strongest protestations of the friendship and good Dispositions of the Emperor towards His Majesty. He acquainted me that he had every reason to suppose that Bonaparte considered the moment of attempting the Invasion as past, and in fact, notwithstanding the enormous sums which had been employed towards that object, that the preparations were by no means in a sufficient state of forwardness for it. From Count Cobentzl I learnt little more worth mention. I found Mr. Kalitcheff's ideas upon the same subject exactly corresponding. In talking upon the affairs of Italy, He informed me that he had no longer any hope from his interference in favor of the King of Sardinia, that Bonaparte, knowing that the Restoration of that Sovereign was so favorite an object in England, refused it to Russia

\* Austrian Envoy.

† Russian Envoy.

with a view of being able to extort enormous sacrifices from us for it. Mr. de Kalitcheff expressed his entire ignorance of any arrangement having taken place between the Emperor of Russia and the French Government upon the subject of the treaty of Florence \* and the occupation of the Ports in the Kingdom of Naples by the French Troops during the war between France and England. I think it right to mention this, as the day before I left England, Prince Castelcicala mentioned the circumstance with a considerable degree of uneasiness and alarm. I understood from Mr. de Kalitcheff that Duroc † had declared to his Government *Qu'il n'avait rien à espérer ni à craindre de la Russie*. He further acquainted me that he had the best ground for supposing that, notwithstanding the engagement the King of Prussia might have entered into with the Emperor of Russia to evacuate Hanover, he had pledged himself to Bonaparte to keep possession of it.

Bonaparte lives in a constant state of fear and apprehension for his life, which fears are heightened by Fouché, ‡ who has attained and maintains his influence over him by the occasional discoveries of pretended Plots and conspiracies against him. Sieyes § has been heard to say that the present Government will not last the winter. This I have heard *from more than one authority* since my arrival here, and this Fouché, I have also heard, is a likely man once more to revolutionize France. As far as I could judge from the conversations I allowed myself to have with different people whom chance threw in my way upon the road, Bonaparte is generally liked—that is, the people live in dread of a change of Government, because they think that it cannot be brought about but by revolutionary means. All the French Princes, except the Prince de Condé, are more or less ill thought of, Monsieur less so perhaps than the rest. A Peace with

\* See Mr. Paget's letter of April 18, 1801, and note.

† Bonaparte's favourite aide-de-camp. He was French Envoy at Vienna in 1800, and was the bearer of the First Consul's felicitations to Alexander on his accession in 1801.

‡ Minister of Police—one of the most cruel and vindictive members of the Convention. Minister of Police under Bonaparte, and also under the Restoration.—A. P.

§ Abbé Sieyes, a strong adherent of the Revolution, voted the death of Louis XVI., and was colleague of Bonaparte in the Consulate.—A. P.

England is the universal wish : that which has taken place on the Continent is talked of with comparative indifference.

The Churches are by no means generally frequented, and the reason assigned to me for this was that since the right acquired by the priesthood to marry, the people are averse to hearing the Scriptures administered to them by persons who by such an act have rendered themselves unworthy of the office ; but disregard for religious ceremonies has become a habit.

I have thus submitted to Your Lordship the few cursory remarks which my quick journey through France allowed me to make, having been, exclusive of the two days I passed at Paris, little more than nine days on the road from England to Vienna. This consideration therefore will, I trust, stand my excuse for the small degree of Interest which they contain.—I have, &c.

(Signed)      ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord St. HELENS to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

[*Cipher.*]

ST. PETERSBURG, 24 July 1801.

DEAR SIR,—I am thoroughly assured that Count Panin\* has nothing more at heart than to revive the understanding which formerly subsisted between this Court and that of Vienna, and that he has attended very particularly to that object in the instructions prepared for Count Rasoumoffsky, as well as in the answer that has been returned to the overtures that have been brought hither by Prince Schwarzenberg. I must mention, however, that in framing these views he seems to have placed his principal reliance on the support and good disposition of Count Trauttmansdorf, and that he and all the other members of this Government continue to entertain a strong and seemingly incurable prejudice and aversion against M. Thugut, so that if the Court of Vienna are seriously desirous of reviving a cordial Union and intimacy with this Cabinet, it will be incumbent upon them to take such steps as may effectually show that the latter has been deprived of that influence over the Austrian Councils, which he is still

\* He had been Paul's Vice-Chancellor, but fell into disgrace. In March 1801 Alexander again made him Vice-Chancellor. He was devoted to the English alliance.

supposed to possess, through the channel of Count Colerado. Count Rasoumoffsky has been directed to hasten the preparations for his journey to Vienna. He will probably set out in a very few days.—Believe me, &c.

(Signed) ST. HELENS.

*From Mr. THOS. JACKSON to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

NAPLES, Aug<sup>t</sup> 11th 1801.

I shall in a few days expect to have the pleasure of hearing from you by a safe occasion, and that you will let me a little into the secret of the politics of the Emper<sup>r</sup> of Russia; by degrees all his five demands\* of Bonaparte seem to be slipping thro' his fingers, & the first Consul is carrying all his points; there is hardly an inch of ground or a bit of silver or gold in all the South of Europe which is not at his disposition—is all this to last eternally? Allow me also to entreat you to inform me what is become of our negociations with France; all the world says they go on, but I confess my fears that they have gone off and that the difficulties which arose in the discussions were too great to be surmounted.

*From Lord KEITH to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ALEXANDRIA, Sept., 4th 1801.

MY DEAR PAGET,—You will be glad to hear that the french Gen. Menou Capitulated on the 2<sup>d</sup> and that our troops have got the principal Posts we are now settling the means of removing the french and taking poss<sup>n</sup> of the Ships in the Harbour, they gave us no trouble upon the whole things have turned out pretty much as I have frequently told you they Must, the Public Despatch goes by Sea and your Brothers in the frigate, You may write me at Corfu or Malta from one of those places I will drop you a line ere long—I am ever, &c.

KEITH.

I have not Coppies enough of the terms to send one they are long.

\* Known as Kalitcheff's Articles. The demands were that the five smaller Powers over which Paul posed as Protector should be left untouched or indemnified—Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, Sardinia, and Naples. Malta and Egypt were also referred to. All were included in a subsequent convention, October 11, 1801.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord ST. HELENS.*

[Private and Confidential.]

VIENNA, 18th Sept. 1801.

MY DEAR LORD,—I came thro' France to this place, & had the satisfaction of passing two days with a very old, & I am confident a very valuable friend of your's at Paris, I mean Mr. Merry. He has I find very little to do with the present negociation between England & France, as it is carried on almost entirely between Lord Hawkesbury & Otto, but his *séjour* at Paris is certainly of the last importance for our Government. He has excellent channels for information, which we were sadly in want of. The Expedition against England is supposed to be laid aside for the present. Bonaparte at one moment certainly thought most seriously about it, but has never been able to get his preparations in sufficient forwardness. The Expense he has been at is enormous. Bernadotte was to have sailed from Brest to make an attack upon Ireland—Massena was to have gone straight up the Thames—& Augereau to have made an attack upon some more eastward point; about 50,000 men were to have been employed upon these two last expeditions. Bonaparte, had Massena made his landing good, was immediately to have set out to have taken upon himself the chief command. Mr. Merry suspects that there is some sad foul play going on in our Fleets. The French, it is thought, have our private signals—Talleyrand has been heard to say that he has every determination of our Cabinet in eight days. If all this is true, it is very bad; it is however well to know it. . . .

I will now relieve you my dear Lord by saying one word about Thugut. I really believe that you may consider him *comme mort* for the moment, at least so I am informed by an authority which I cannot call in question. At the same time nothing can well be more precarious than the state of the Archduke Charles's Health,\* and I

\* After the fruitless negotiations at Rastadt, the Archduke Charles defeated Jourdain in a series of engagements culminating in Stockach. Later on, in opposing Massena, he showed the greatest military talents; but his health gave way, so as to make him physically unable to conduct operations. He was not a favourite with the Court party, and, to be rid of him, he was appointed Governor of Bohemia, where he remained during the whole of 1800.

think that *the thing* remains between Thugut & Him, tho' Cobentzl \* certainly sets up for himself, & he has talents & address to favor his pretensions. Are things to be allowed to remain as they are? is the Country, the Hands, and the Money, & in general the resources of the whole of Italy, to be allowed to remain at the disposition of Bonaparte? Can you send me no consolation upon these subjects? Here alas! I find none. Pray let me hear from you my good Lord by the return of East, whom you will send back at yr own convenience. Excuse this scrawl & believe me ever &c. ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord St. HELENS.*

VIENNA, 18 September, 1801.

If there is really no other impediment in the way of a renewal of the close connection which existed formerly between this Court and that of St Petersburg, than the Influence which the Baron de Thugut may be supposed to have over the Austrian Councils, that objection ought in reason not to be dwelt upon. I do not expect that an opinion from myself, who have been here but four or five days, can carry much weight with it, but according to the information I have received from, I should imagine, the best informed persons, I should really suppose that Count Panin need, for the present, have no alarm upon that subject. Nothing can be more decided than the dismissal of Baron de Thugut from the Emperor's Councils, and it can have escaped the observation of no one that this Government has been directed for some time past by the open and avowed enemies of that Man, at the head of whom is the Archduke Charles. With regard to the idea of Mr Thugut's still possessing Influence through the Count Colleredo, I can only say that I do not find that that idea is entertained here. On the contrary, the re-

When Hohenlinden demoralised the Austrian forces Charles was recalled to the command, and he reformed and inspirited the army and stopped the advance of the French. This achievement, though now obscure, was so appreciated then that, on the suggestion of the King of Sweden, the Diet of Ratisbon wished to confer on him the title of "Saviour of Germany," but Charles refused to accept it.

\* Count Louis Cobentzl, who had been sent to Paris on a special mission the previous year, became Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs shortly after this.

verse is supposed by many to be the case. Such a channel would at all events not be very formidable, as Count Colleredo is, I understand, nearly in a state of dotage.

The attention of this Court is at this moment entirely directed to the formation of a new Ministry. I learn that the Archduke Charles will be at the Head of the Military and Naval Department, Count L. Cobentzl, who returned yesterday from Paris, will have the foreign Department, and Count Colleredo that of the Interior. If this arrangement should be fixed and really acted upon, it would be extremely favourable, in one sense, to the wishes of Count Panin, for the Archduke may certainly be considered at this moment as the leading man in this Empire.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[Private.]

VIENNA, 23<sup>d</sup>. Sep<sup>r</sup>. 1801.

MY LORD,—I believe that I have already acquainted your Lordship that during my Mission at Munich, I had very frequent opportunities of seeing the Archduke Charles, and that I uniformly experienced from him the strongest marks of confidence & friendship. I have therefore since my arrival here felt most extremely anxious to renew my acquaintance with His Royal Highness; contrary however to my wishes, it has not been till this day, in my power to have that Honor.

Lord Minto and myself were with His Royal Highness this morning. The reception He gave us, as well as His conversation during the Interview was extremely gracious & polite. I thought however that I discovered something like coldness in his manner towards me; I therefore contrived to be one Instant alone with Him afterwards, when He was again what I used to find Him. I made the best apology I could, for not having been with Him before to-day, & expressed my hope that I should be allowed occasionally to see him. H.R.H. answered in the most friendly manner—"Vous me ferez un vrai plaisir, mon cher, & j'espère que nous serons toujours sur le même pied que nous avons été." I mention this circumstance to yr. Lp. because the Archduke Charles is supposed at this moment to be the leading man in this Empire, & I wish that I may not be wrong in drawing a favourable conclusion from it.



*From Mr. THOS. JACKSON to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

NAPLES, Oct. 2nd. 1801.


I learn that Prussia has given a Note to the Emp<sup>r</sup>. of Russia of all her losses on the Rhine "en se remettant entièrement à la Cour de Petersb<sup>g</sup> pour l'arrangement de ses compensations." If this be true, you will no doubt have heard it long ago.

I lately rec<sup>d</sup>. a letter from an intelligent correspondent who has been travelling all the summer through Switzerland, Italy, & the Venetian States, and he tells me that he everywhere heard the same language and hopes expressed, viz. that the peace between England & France, and the influence of the former, would restore with their ancient governments their liberty, tranquillity, & safety; every body feels that England alone holds in her hands and has vigour and sense for effecting anything with France; all the continental arrangements hitherto made are universally considered as merely provisional. I heard with great pleasure the present influence of the Archduke Charles, of which I have no doubt that the Austrian Monarchy & the Army particularly will feel the good effects, and I flatter myself that your former acquaintance with H.R.H. while you were at Munich will be of use to us. I look forward to the moment when the tyranny of the french, under which all Italy at present groans, shall yield to the influence which I have not a doubt that Austria must sooner or later resume.

With my Letters to Ld. H. which accompany this you will find a *rapport sur Bonaparte* which will probably agree with the ideas you seem to have formed, during your late visit at Paris, as they do with those which I have long entertained of a man whose ambition is boundless and who employs war, peace, negociation, alliances, alike in his one great object, the destruction of the existing order of things in every Country of Europe; the paper above-mentioned concludes with a phrase well worthy the attention of the great Powers, & should induce them to understand each other a little better than they have hitherto done: "le jour où les Rois voudront être quelque chose les Consuls ne seront plus rien."



ALEXANDER I. CZAR OF RUSSIA



*From Lord ST. HELENS to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

Moscow, 14th October, 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,—I avail myself of the opportunity of a Messenger whom the Count de Sauran \* is dispatching to Vienna to acquaint you that the change in this Ministry, which has been for some time foreseen and apprehended, has just taken place, Count Panin having yesterday tendered his resignation, † which was immediately accepted: and M. de Kotschubei is appointed to succeed him. I do not imagine that this change will make any material alteration in H. Imperial M.'s general system of Foreign Politics; ‡ and am thoroughly persuaded that it will not impair in the slightest degree his friendly dispositions towards England: however I lament it very much on many accounts, public as well as personal, as I have a variety of businesses in hand, § some of which that were of a very pressing and important nature were nearly adjusted, but must now be recommenced almost *ab ovo*, and moreover remain in suspense till the new Ministers can have leisure to attend to them. I speak of the Ministers in the plural Number, because, tho' M. de Kotschubei succeeds to the labouring oar, the Portefeuille is it seems to remain with the Vice Chancellor Prince Kourakin, who, in Count Panin's time, held his Office merely *ad honores*, but is now disposed to take upon himself as large a share of the Business of it as he can conveniently manage. . . .

The Festivities of our coronation have been extremely brilliant, and that of yesterday evening in particular, which was given by Count Scheremetieff, may be termed an Arabian Nights Entertainment, as in point of splendour and magnificence it equalled and even went beyond what the most fertile imagination could conceive or picture. These raree-shews have attracted hither a numerous flight

\* Austrian Minister at St. Petersburg.

† Panin had incurred the distrust of the Czar and the anger of Denmark and Sweden for the Maritime Convention which he concluded with Lord St. Helens, June 17, 1801. It ended rupture with England by abandoning the principles of the Armed Neutrality and the Convention of 1800.

‡ See Lord St. Helens' letter of October 29.

§ Settling compensation to merchants, and the Supplementary Articles which were signed in October.

of young Englishmen, most of whom will probably migrate to Vienna in the course of the Winter; so that it is perhaps not amiss that I should acquaint you that you will find them in general very well bred and tractable and right-headed; and such, in short, as you will be well-pleased to produce by way of specimens of our rising generation. . . .

The C. de Sauran is negotiating here a renewal of the Treaties of Alliance and Commerce between this Court & that of Vienna, both which will probably be brought to a speedy conclusion, but the *efficacy* of the former will I fear be somewhat weakened by the recent change in the Ministry.\*

*From Chevalier D'ITALINSKY to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

PALERME, 16 Octobre 1801.

MON VERITABLE ET TRES CHER AMI,— . . . Je puis vous donner deux nouvelles d'ici, le premier est que les troupes francaises dans le Royaume de Naples forment un fardeau qui écrase le gouvernement; elles coûtent immensément, la cour est obligée de mettre de nouveaux impots, et de surseoir la paye de la plus part de ses employés, ce qui cause un mécontentment terrible et universel. Le Roi de Sardaigne paroît avoir désespéré de se voir rétabli dans ses etats, il se dispose à partir pour la Sardaigne.

Il a fait prier l'empereur d'ordonner à Mr. Sorokin de l'y conduire sur une de ses frégates, ce qu'il lui a accordé; j'ai été chargé de communiquer à Mr. Sorokin l'assentiment de S. M. l'empereur. Nous avons été à la veille d'un événement terrible, qui devoit avoir lieu à Catane, un tas de scelerats avoit formé le projet d'y égorger l'archeveque, les magistrats et toute la noblesse, et de s'emparer des effets publiques ainsi que du bien des particuliers; cette infernale conspiration a été découverte, et déjà presque tous les complices sont au pouvoir de la justice.

\* Panin had aimed at alliance with Vienna, London, and Berlin.

*From Lord ELGIN to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

[Secret.]

Oct. 20.

DEAR PAGET,—My letters to-day chiefly contain the very tedious details of a negociation, which has ended in my proceeding to Egypt. The fact is, That from ignorance of the wishes of Government and the feelings of the Turks, some arrangements have been made there injurious to our credit, and contradictory to our System. Hutchinson \* is (I suppose) gone with the army, leaving Egypt in Disgust. The Pasha & Vizir at Loggerheads—and under these circumstances, I find myself in possession of secret but very ample instructions from home, given upon the Porte's soliciting my advice & assistance in settling their affairs as well as our's in Egypt. This is entirely to yourself. The reason assigned by the Porte & me is, That I go, in consequence of some contradictory orders received for the troops destined for the defence of Egypt & any parts of Turkey which may be menaced: and for the purpose of settling all the accounts and details connected with the Grand Expedition. . . .—  
Yours. E.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Mr. T. JACKSON.*

VIENNA, 26 October 1801.

There arrived here this morning a Neapolitan Courier from London, who brings an account of the Ratification of the Preliminaries.†

I am informed that the Joy of the People demonstrated upon this occasion in London has been universal; it is said that the carriages of Mr. Otto & of the French officer who brought the Ratification from Paris were drawn by the Populace. I had rather that such an attention had been shown to Mr. Addington or L<sup>d</sup> Hawkesbury.

\* General Lord Hutchinson, who succeeded Sir R. Abercrombie in command of the army in Egypt.—A. P.

† For a general peace signed in London October 1.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to H.M. the QUEEN OF NAPLES.*

*No date.*

MADAME,—Je prie humblement Votre Majesté d'agréer mes remercimens de la lettre obligeante qu'elle a daigné m'écrire, ainsi que de l'avis qu'Elle m'a donné de l'expédition d'un Courier pour Naples dont avec Sa permission je profiterai. Mais, avec la déférence la plus respectueuse, je prends la liberté d'observer à Votre Majesté qu'il est probable que Son Ministère à Naples aura appris la nouvelle de la signature des Préliminaires avant que ce Courier ne puisse la lui apporter, et qu'il est à présumer qu'il y a des Articles qu'il seroit important à Votre Majesté de savoir, qui sont ignorés de M. Champagny \* ou dont jusqu'à présent il a jugé à propos de se taire.

Je suis avec le plus profond Respect, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord St. HELENS to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*Moscow, 29th October 1801.*

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . I have had of late a great deal of business upon my hands, but of a most uninteresting kind, as it related solely to the adjustment of some points of Maritime Law, which had been left for ulterior arrangement by the Convention of the 17 June; and which I have at length settled, *tant bien que mal*, in the shape of some additional articles. I dispatched these to England last Night by Messenger, together with the accession of the Court of Denmark, † which has at length consented, tho' with a very ill grace, to adopt the whole of what has been arranged here without any undue reserves or restrictions. Sweden, however, continues to run sulky; tho' it is difficult to ascertain the motives of a backwardness so evidently prejudicial to her own Interests, and by which too she is the only sufferer. ‡

I am very sorry that in the Postscript to my last, I led

\* French Envoy at Vienna.

† Signed October 23, 1801.

‡ This was the English view. The Convention was practically dictated by Lord St. Helena. Prussia had abandoned her pledge only to negotiate in concert with Sweden.

you into an error relative to the state of the negotiations between this Country and Austria; which I now find to be by no means so far advanced as I had been induced to suppose. Had Count Panin indeed remained in Office, there can be no doubt that the two Courts would very soon have re-established their former connexion and Intimacy, (N.B. The Overtures and Advances made to this Court by the Austrian Government have not amounted to a direct proposal for the renewal of former Treaties, so that in that respect they have kept their dignity unimpaired) and that upon this basis a system of Alliances might generally have been formed which might have furnished an effectual counter-poise to the Power of France. But the Change which has taken place in this Government has naturally altered these voluntary dispositions, since the language held both to Count Sauran and myself by the present Ministers has uniformly been that in the present unsettled state of the Politics of Europe, the Emperor wishes to see his way more clearly into the Dispositions of the several Powers before he can venture to contract any positive engagements, and the only specifick object that M. de Sauran has obtained has been the promise of the good offices of this Court in engaging the K. of Prussia to accommodate upon reasonable terms his differences with Austria relative to the affairs of Munster and Cologne.\* It is impossible however to suppose that this Court can long persevere in their present system of inactivity and irresolution, as the course of events must ultimately point out to them the necessity of their adopting a line of conduct more suitable to the Emperor's situation and his real Interests and Dignity, but the first impulse to this change must come *from without*, and in this respect perhaps the reports of Count Razumofsky may be essentially useful, as he appears to entertain very just notions respecting the part which this Country ought to take in the general concerns of Europe, and his opinions and advice would naturally have very great weight with the Comte de Kotschoubey, with whom he is very closely connected in Alliance and Friendship. In mentioning this, however, I must particularly request (tho' the caution is probably superfluous) that you will

\* See letter of Lord St. Helens, February 9, 1802.



not let Count Razumofsky perceive that I have expressed myself in any respect to the disadvantage of the Emperor's present Ministers, as it would certainly be repeated to them, and the intimation, however delicately conveyed, would necessarily prevent my being as well with them in future as I now am, and naturally wish to continue. In truth, they are both (namely P. Kourakin & M. de Kotschoubei) very well disposed men, and the latter is by no means deficient in political talents; so that it may be hoped that he will improve as he becomes more practised in business, and more awake to the importance of the Functions that he has undertaken.

You will be able to form some notion of the fearful interval that separates us here from the rest of the habitable world, when I inform you that we have but just received the news of the signature of the Preliminaries between England and France, and are still ignorant of the particulars of them. The only articles of which I have any knowledge are those relative to Malta, the outlines of which were transmitted to me some time ago with an Instruction to propose to this Court an eventual arrangement, in virtue of which, on our relinquishing the Island to the Order of St John of Jerusalem, the Emperor was to take upon himself (*moyennant Finance*) the care of providing the requisite means for its defence against any sudden Invasion, and for maintaining the Order in a state of Independence. I accordingly set on foot a Negotiation to that effect, which was on the eve of being concluded agreeably to the wishes of H.M.'s Government, when the unfortunate event of Count Panin's Resignation produced the above mentioned revolution in the polity of this Court; \* in consequence of which I was informed that H.I.M. had determined to decline entirely the proposal in question; † partly on account of the difficulty of maintaining a body of his Troops in so distant a Quarter, and partly from his apprehension of the political embarrassments in which this measure would probably involve him from the umbrage & jealousies which it was likely to excite

\* Panin desired to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The Emperor and Kotschubey were opposed to him on this point.

† The Emperor had already definitely refused in July. He had proposed the neutrality of Malta, or its occupation by the King of Naples, until the restoration of the Order. Panin had already lost influence in July.

in France and Spain, as well as at Constantinople. We must therefore now bethink ourselves of some other expedient, and perhaps the least ineligible will be our endeavouring, thro' the influence of this Court, to cause the nomination of a new Grand Master to fall upon some trustworthy person, and furnish him on his reinstatement with such supplementary means, as, added to the resources of the Order, might enable him to maintain his Island in a respectable state of defence. For the rest, I am sensible that this is but a part, and a very small part, of the numerous list of objects which it will be necessary to secure in order to consolidate this same Peace, which has burst in upon us thus unexpectedly, and which I sincerely hope will be lasting; tho' I am afraid it will be a long time before we reap the full benefits of it by the reduction of our Force and Expenses within the compass of the Ordinary Peace Establishment.

*From H.R.H. the DUKE OF YORK to the*  
HON. ARTHUR PAGET.

OATLANDS, *November 20, 1801.*

DEAR ARTHUR,—Nothing but an extraordinary press of business arriving, as you may easily conceive from the present situation of affairs and the numberless arrangements necessary to be made in consequence of the Preliminaries of Peace being signed should have prevented me from returning you before now many thanks for your very obliging Letter upon the surrender of Alexandria.\*

This event is certainly most honourable to His Majesty's Arms, and the compleat defeat and surrender of the flower of Buonaparte's Troops which had for so long a time borne everything before them in Europe, and were considered by many as invincible, achieved by an Army inferior in numbers, must reflect the highest credit upon them in the eyes of all Europe.

I am at present a good deal employed with Lord Chatham in endeavouring to correct the numberless defects which this war has proved to every body to exist in the firelock of the Infantry as used in this country, and understanding that a new Pattern is introduced into the

\* September 1.

Austrian Army, I am very anxious to see one of them before any thing is positively determined about our new Pattern. Will you therefore do me the favour if possible to procure me one, and send it over to me as soon as you can.—Believe me ever, Dear Arthur, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK.

*From Lord ELGIN to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

CONSPLE., Dec. 3, 1801.

DEAR PAGET,—The contents of my letters of this day will naturally point out to you the importance of communicating them not only to England without delay, but also to Lord Cornwallis, Ld St. Helens, & I think also to Berlin. My reason for adding Berlin is a supposition that altho' our friends there would not do anything to oppose France while at war, yet she might on so imminent a danger as that which now threatens Turkey recollect Her old alliance & the inconvenience of this Empire being cut up for Her neighbours, and on that ground direct M. Knoblesdorff to encourage the Porte to resist. The same thing may be applicable to Sweden. I do not write to either places from my ignorance whether in fact so gross an insult to England as M. Marcow \* has continued to make will have been ratified at Petersburg, which you probably may know: if so, pray act upon it. I have another acknowledgement to offer which is really not on the score of idleness, but from a great anxiety to save the S. wind for my Janissary to reach Varna. Were he delayed this night he might easily be a fortnight longer on his Journey. I therefore have resolved on sending him off, without making out letters for Lord Cornwallis or Ld St. Helens, and on begging you to allow copies to be made at Vienna. I really won't abuse this act of your good nature.

The Letters to Ld C. ought certainly to go immediately & by messenger, tho' if possible without its being known that the letters are from hence. The annexed letter to

\* Russian Ambassador sent by Alexander to Paris on the recall of Kalit-scheff after the death of Paul. He had signed (October 8) a secret agreement with France, guaranteeing the mediation of Russia for the conclusion of a separate peace, without the participation of England, between France and Turkey. See letter of February 9, 1802.

Ali Effendi is also of a secret & pressing nature tho' written before To-morrow's overture.

Pray let Ld St. Helens hear likewise, as soon as possible. Adieu.—Yours very faithfully.

(Signed) ELGIN.

*From Lord MINTO to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

[Private & confidential.]

EDINBURGH, 4th. Jan<sup>y</sup>. 1802.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . It would be very much my wish to send you information, or at least notions that you might think interesting. I know by my own experience how acceptable at Vienna, any thing authentick on a state of things so unusual from England would have been. But I really cannot say that I have been able to collect much light, or to dispel much of the obscurity which hung over the political atmosphere of England when I left you. I have learnt very little that was new, & I have had no reason to change any material opinion which I brought home with me. You know what my feelings were concerning the preliminaries from the day on which I became acquainted with them. I retain those sentiments after all that I have happened to hear in support of that treaty, & I have reason indeed to entertain my first opinions with the greater confidence, as I find them countenanced by several of the most able & weighty men in the country. If I were to speak of the sincere opinion of that part of the publick whose opinions are of any value on such a subject, I should say that a dissatisfaction with the peace is the prevailing sentiment. But, independent of the reasons which give popularity to any peace after a burthensome war & of those which ensure a concurrence in Parlt<sup>t</sup> with any important measure of the Government for the time being, there is one circumstance in the present transaction which has naturally induced a greater appearance of support, & less appearance of opposition, than according to my notion of the publick mind is quite genuine. I mean the part which Mr. Pitt has thought himself obliged to take on the occasion. The only quarter from which a parliamentary opposition to the peace could possibly come was that of the old ministry. The new ministers are themselves the Authors of the measure &

the old opposition could not, as friends of the French Revolution or consistently with the fundamental points of their past conduct, do otherwise than applaud any peace. The support given to the measure by Mr. Pitt, & even the previous sanction which it must be supposed to have rec<sup>d</sup> from him, does not leave the numerous party which composed his administration, or adhered to it, in a situation to pronounce openly or vigorously their disapprobation, if such should be their real sentiment. Accordingly that party is divided—some follow Mr. Pitt in a direct support of the Peace—others who in their hearts condemn it I know have refrain'd from an open opposition to it, & have absented themselves from Parl<sup>t</sup> that they might avoid the necessity of violating either their opinion on so important a question, or their attachment & gratitude to Mr. Pitt. I could name several persons of very great weight who have taken this line. I will indeed venture in strict confidence to mention L<sup>d</sup> Cambden & Canning in this number, & there are others. The opposers of the peace then could only be those of the late ministry & its supporters who remain, after deducting the personal adherents of Mr. Pitt. The number who shew themselves therefore on this question are not many. Lord Grenville is at their head. Windham has also taken a lead, & these opinions naturally include the description of persons who have been call'd alarmists, that is to say those who saw, in the beginning of this contest, danger from the principles of the French Revolution, & who now are strongly impress'd with the danger that has since arisen from the power of the French Republick—& these are sentiments in which your humble servant has always partaken, & in which he is more than ever confirm'd by the present situation of affairs & course of events. But however prevalent I may conceive a real disapprobation of the peace to be, I can have no doubt of its obtaining the formal sanction of a great majority in Parl<sup>t</sup>. It must be hazardous to speak of the private sentiments of our good King on this subject, & it would hardly be justifiable to do it, if I were in the secret, which I by no means boast of being. Being, however, accusom'd to speak without reserve to you, I should venture to say that I have brought away from his closet the impression that he may have

found himself compelled by *all* the circumstances of the time, to give way on this point & assent to a peace; but that both peace in general & the particular conditions of this treaty were a violence to his genuine sentiments & feelings. England being left to stand single in the war is one circumstance on which he relies, but I could perceive that this was not the only species of necessity to which he yielded. The change of ministry & all the circumstances which attended that event left him little choice either as to the composition of his new Government or as to the system of measures he should pursue. Government & indeed the real power of the country were essentially weaken'd by that event. The prosecution of the war became perhaps impossible, & peace therefore became necessary. I own amongst the many reasons which make this peace hateful in my eyes is the reflexion that it probably wounds the feelings, as it is certainly in contradiction with all the known & rooted opinions as well as with the mind & character, of our firm old master. I think it right, at the same time, to say distinctly that I am not now reporting opinions which the King expressed to me, but merely the impressions which I rec<sup>d</sup> from the colour of his conversation, combined with all one knew before of his habitual sentiments. On the change of ministry, from which mischief has so plentifully devolved, I can really give you nothing which I can even myself depend upon. I have not been able to arrive at any clear notion or any fixed opinion on the subject. You have indeed been in England yourself since that period, & had better opportunities than me of learning the interior of this mystery, which is impenetrable to the world without. There is a variety of opinions supported by various & contradictory accounts of facts. Some assert that Mr. Pitt was not bound by any engagement to the Irish Catholics which should force him to bring forward that question in circumstances so unfavourable, & that too little regard was shewn to the King's private opinions, both in the former communication with the Irish Catholics & in the measure which Mr. Pitt insisted on proposing. Others assert that Mr. Pitt's Government was bound in honour, if not by a formal engagement, to propose some measure favourable to the Irish Catholics

who had been induced by that expectation to support the Union, & whose support did in effect carry that important transaction. It is also said that no neglect was used towards the King, & that the strong part taken by His Majesty on the Irish question, which made the retreat of Mr. Pitt & his colleagues unavoidable, may be ascribed to the approach of the King's malady, which began already to operate, although it did not break out openly till a short time afterwards. I confess I am myself inclined to the latter opinion, both on the balance of testimonies, and because it seems to me the most natural or rather the only natural account of this extraordinary & otherwise inexplicable transaction. For it is impossible to imagine events so fraught with evil & ruin, without supposing malady in one quarter or other, & that calamity occurred so immediately afterwards, that there is no great strain in carrying it back a week or ten days. But to return to the peace, I must own for one that besides the conditions, such as we know them, I think the mode of conducting the negotiation very faulty, & I apprehend very strongly that this will be perceived in the definitive treaty. The preliminary Articles were not only silent on many interesting points, but they were obscure & equivocal on those even which they profess<sup>d</sup> to settle, as in the case of Portuguese integrity:—was it probable in the spirit which was to direct our negotiation, that a doubtful article should obtain a favourable interpretation in the subsequent proceedings? We appear to have accepted of separate unauthenticated assurances in lieu of formal stipulations. If we suffer by this it will have been with our eyes open, for such assurances are the very bait with which Talleyrand & Bonaparte have caught their gulls all round Europe in our presence. But what I think most improvident & what has already produced the most mischievous consequences, has been the want of those precautions in the Armistice which were necessary for keeping things in some degree as they were during the negotiation of the definitive treaty. By this omission the Enemy has gain'd an immense & perhaps decisive advantage in the case of the treaty breaking off & a renewal of the war, & by that very circumstance they have gain'd an immense advantage in the treaty itself, for it is become

infinitely more hazardous to renew hostilities than it was to continue them. The expedition from Brest to the West Indies is a strong illustration of this objection. It is the fashion to say that the French Expedition ag<sup>t</sup> the negro revolt in St. Domingo \* is beneficial to our own Islands; but this benefit might probably have been retarded without much inconvenience till the actual signature of Peace, & altho' the expedition should not be diverted in the first instance to any other purpose than that which is profess'd, yet the existence of that body of troops within a few days' sail of Jamaica, or the certainty of their arrival at such a position, is a powerful weapon at Amiens, & one which we have ourselves most complaisantly put into the hand of our enemy.

With regard to party politicks nothing seems yet settled into anything like system. The new ministry have indicated a wish to strengthen themselves by some accession or other. There is reason to believe that they have look'd to the opposition benches for that purpose, & I consider the accession of some persons of that description as still in agitation. Mr. Tierney & Mr. Grey have both been mention'd. Mr. Grey was understood to have declined pretty early overtures, but the issue of these speculations may still be considered as doubtful. Nothing could be more interesting to the country, & indeed to all other countries, than to know the part which Mr. Pitt is likely to take. I mean whether there is any probability of his resuming his former situation, or whether he will remain out of office. But, as yet, I do not find any fixed opinion, & if his present professions should decide it we have no reason to expect his return to the ministry. I am one of those who lament most cordially his retreat, & I own that I shall never think the world secure without the support of this Atlas. At the same time I see many obstacles in the way of his restoration to power, amongst which the difference between the King & him on the Irish Catholick question, & I fear still more, perhaps, a personal disinclination of the King towards him, are difficult to be

\* The expedition against Toussaint Louverture did not verify these fears. It deepened disaffection among the negroes and wasted some of the best French troops. The plague broke out among them, and killed the best French admiral, La Touche Treville, and twenty generals. The Haytiens regained independence in 1803.



got over in the present moment. There are, as I have already mentioned, various persons who will agree in opposing the Peace. Lord Grenville, Lord Fitzwilliam, Mr Windham, & others will find themselves acting together on that question, but hitherto there is no connexion beyond that point which can be considered as establishing or even as aiming at the establishment of a systematick opposition, or regular party professing any particular principle or object. Such I mean is the case at this moment. There is, at the same time, undoubtedly a possibility that the leading principle in which they agree at present, that is to say a strong jealousy of the alarming power of France, & a strong opinion that energy & courage affords the only protection ag<sup>t</sup> this danger, while a temporizing conceding system must encrease it. I say there is a possibility that the present agreement, in so capital a feature of the politicks of the period we have before us, may lead to a more general connexion. This however can as yet be only speculation, for nothing of the sort exists at present, such will be the state of domestick politicks at the meeting of Parl<sup>t</sup> after the recess. Parl<sup>t</sup> has been adjourn'd from week to week, as it is said, on account of the insubordination of the fleet at Bantry bay,\* but it is not proposed to do business of importance till the beginning of February. I doubt very much whether the contents of these three sheets will reward you for reading them, but in truth it is nearly impossible to send you anything either new or certain in the present moment, & such as it is I beg you to accept of this letter at least as a testimony of good will & of the sincere & cordial regard with which I shall ever remain,—My Dear Sir, affectionately & faithfully yours, MINTO.

*P.S.*—I need not say that this letter is strictly confidential.

*From Mr. BROUGHTON† to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

DOWNING STREET, *Jan'y. 19<sup>th</sup> 1802.*

DEAR SIR,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of the assignment of your appointments at Vienna duly executed

\* Meeting of the squadron under Admiral Mitchel, December 1801.

† His agent at the Foreign Office.—A. P.

in my favour, for which I beg to express my acknowledgments.

I now inclose the Statement of our account Current, in as far as regards Your Appointments previous to your being nominated to Vienna. The actual Balance against you on that Head is £7217, 3s. 6d. But you will perceive from the accompanying Statement of Credits due to you that the account in Question may be considered as liquidated provided Your Extr<sup>r</sup> disbursements (of which I entreat you to send me an account) amount to £500.

With regard to Your Mission at Vienna, the amount of Annesteiner's Bills which became due on the 14th Instant for £1500 is at present the only charge against you, except<sup>s</sup> for Newspapers and other trifling objects; whilst the Arrears due to you from Government on that Mission amount to about £2300, so that there would be a surplus, admitting that all your appointments were paid up to the 5th Ins<sup>t</sup> of £800 or thereabouts.

I trust you will have received my letter by Arndt in which I communicated to you the result of my Conversation with Mr. Vansittart respecting your Claims for an extra<sup>r</sup> allow<sup>ce</sup>, and the little success resulting from it. I have not yet found a favorable opportunity to speak to Lord Hawkesbury, nor do I entertain any very sanguine hope from the interview. Indeed I much doubt whether His Lordship will be prevailed upon to recommend the allowing any large sum to you, and I am convinced that an application to Mr. Addington would be more likely to succeed. The Head of this Department appears to be extremely averse to *encrease the Burthens of the People* by extraordinary Disbursements.—I remain, &c.

CHA<sup>s</sup> R. BROUGHTON.

*From Mr. TYRWHITT to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

WELBECK STREET, Jan. 22, 1802.

DEAR ARTHUR PAGET,—As I think it probable from the Illness of Mrs. Fitzherbert, the Prince will not be able to write by Morand, I am determined at least not to let the occasion slip myself.

All that I anticipated at Vienna has absolutely taken place, & language cannot convey to you the warmth &

affection with which our Friend expressed himself concerning you. I arrived on Sunday, & had not been alone with him two minutes before, laying hold of my hand in the old way, He exclaimed, "What the devil can be the Reason why Arthur has never written one word to me." On my explanation of circumstances he was perfectly satisfied. This leads me direct to the three Points—He undertakes (and *entre nous* seems highly pleased you have placed such confidence in him) the whole arrangement of Sackville Street—He muttered to himself the Manner He should do it, & in my life I never heard expressions, (difficult rather you will allow immediately to hit upon) more suited to the occasion, & so likely to do the Business in that handsome manner you would wish it to be done. He prefers waiting till people come to Town, to avoid writing. The Boys dined at Carlton House yesterday, & he asked when the Person was coming up from the country, & the reply was in a fortnight.

As to Leave of Absence, He means to see Addington, himself, & has forbid me to speak to him upon the subject; I have been in Downing Street this morning & not one word of course escaped my Lips, but a *deal of Abuse* of your manner of conducting your important Mission. A. seems to have a sincere Regard for you. I reckon you quite sure of gaining the Point. The third Point was included in a general conversation upon various Topics respecting you, in the course of which I dropped an Idea that I thought a Georgium Sidus would not look amiss upon you. He exclaimed "God damn you, leave that to me, & if I could manage to steal that intended for Aly Bey (S<sup>r</sup> R. Ainsley) no Man I should like to give it to better,—but Hey! what sort of a woman is she, has she B. & B.—Who is she like?" when I told him, "by God, Whiskers, not amiss either." Now I come to mention, I am sure I do not know your manner of wearing your watch, but a chain was ordered *sur le Champ*, & in two days I shall see him with it. Adolphus dined with him yesterday, & you seem a very great Favourite of his indeed. You will find in his Letter he deprecates as He told you he should in the strongest manner your ever indulging at any Time even for a Moment an Idea of quitting your *Métier*. He used all the Arguments I did,

but in a much more forcible manner, in one word it is quite impossible to do Justice to or to describe the warmth of his Feelings for you. He never looked better or stouter. Mrs F. has had a very narrow escape. *On dit* matters are as hot as ever, but I do not believe it. I described Hardenberg, & was fully & ably supported by Prince Adolphus who has the highest opinion of his character, in such a manner that I am fully convinced were he to come in this country he would enjoy the Confidence of the P. There can be no harm, as the most inviolable secrecy is promised, in his conveying to the P. through you by Letters the political situation of Hannover—nothing will be more acceptable, & I know it will never be forgotten; it is quite astonishing how quick & alert He is upon this Topic.

Pray make my best Remembrance of every kind to H. & tell him I shall write to him the moment the Conversation respecting Hannover has taken place which I am shortly to have with the P.; it is now impossible hardly to get at him at all—He is up by nine, out at breakfast in Tilney Street, where He stays till dinner Time. There is a grand attack meditating from the united Powers of L<sup>d</sup> Fitzwilliam, Carlisle, & the Grenvilles, *cum multis aliis*, against the Ministry upon the peace Establishment which is shortly to be moved. The Civil List debate comes on after the Recess on the 4 Feb. which will also be interesting. I shall send you an account by the earliest conveyance—give me a Line after you have received *the* Epistle, & command ever yours sincerely,

THO<sup>s</sup>. TYRWHITT.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to General Sir JOHN ACTON.*

VIENNA, January 23, 1802.

SIR,—I have had the honor to receive from L'Abbé Giansanté your Excellency's letters of the 11th ultimo, and I beg you to accept my best thanks for the very obliging manner in which your Excellency has had the goodness to convey to me the condescending and flattering sentiments which His Sicilian Majesty has been graciously pleased to express towards me.

The Abbé Giansanté presented to me at the same time

on the part of the King of Naples a snuff box with His Sicilian Majesty's Portrait enriched with Diamonds. It is impossible for me to express how sensible I feel of this particular token of His Sicilian Majesty's gracious remembrance of me. I shall take the liberty of requesting your Excellency to present my most humble respects to His Sicilian Majesty and to assure him that I shall always consider it as a part of my public Duty, in which I shall be assisted by my private feelings, to promote to the utmost extent of my power the common Interests arising out of the intimate connection which so happily subsists between Their Sicilian and Britannic Majesties.

I beg your Excellency to be persuaded of the respect and esteem, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From H.R.H. the PRINCE OF WALES to the  
Hon. A. PAGET.*

MY DEAREST ARTHUR,—I have but two complaints to make of you, the first, that you have so long left me in suspense whether you have entirely forgotten me from your long & persevering silence, & secondly from what I learn from Tom Tyrwhitt that you could for one moment possibly doubt the full extent of that sincere affection I bear you, and which entitles you to every thing that friendship can claim from one Man to another. Believe me that there is not anything I am not ready, under that word, friendship, to risk or attempt for you, either to secure your happiness or peace of mind. With respect to the charge I have receiv'd respecting *Sackville Street*, I will certainly do everything I can to serve you, but I am confident your wishes are, that it should be managed with all the delicacy that so painful a task will admit. I am afraid it will be some weeks, if not months before I shall be able to accomplish the point owing to the absence of the parties from London, in the meantime if it is really & seriously *your wish* that a *final conclusion* (as deliver'd to me by Tyrwhitt) should be drawn to *everything*, do you not think it would be more delicate, more proper, & more honourable (as well as most necessary to save you all further trouble & uneasiness) to convey to me in a parcel to be deliver'd to myself, & then again to be deliver'd

solely by me to the trustees concern'd, all Letters, Papers, & Pictures that you may now have in your possession. You may depend upon it that I shall use the best of my endeavours to wound as little as possible either your feelings or those of others. It is a painful task I cannot but acknowledge, my dearest Arthur, to be under the necessity of giving pain to those one both respects & loves, but I again repeat that my friendship for you will make me waive all other considerations, at the same time I can not help thinking the task once perform'd, I am serving others also who till then must remain in ignorance of the true state of your situation & sentiments. I have not as yet been able to see Addington, but I will not the first moment I do, cease urging Him to obtain leave of absence for you from Lord Hawkesbury. Thus briefly do I write to you merely to set your mind at ease, & in order that you may never again have any foolish fancies or doubts about me, *car je suis toujours de loin comme de prés.* Many thanks for your delightful Snuff Box, & now God bless you.—Ever most affectionately yours,

GEORGE.

CARLTON HOUSE, Feb. 2<sup>d</sup> 1802.

P.S.—Don't forget my commissions, & among the rest pray try whether you can pick me up a Polish, an Hungarian, or a Turkish Horse or two. When you see Hardenberg, pray tell Him how happy I shall be to make his acquaintance, & indeed that of every one you approve.

*From Mr. TYRWHITT to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*Sunday evening, Feb. 7, 1802.*

DEAR ARTHUR P.,—I dined with the Prince *tete a tete* the day on which he wrote you your Letter, & after it was finished He read it to me, & I confess I think it is one you will not dislike—soon after He had sealed it, He was taken ill suddenly, complaining of excruciating Torture in one of his Feet—I requested him to send for Keat the Surgeon, (as He had had a small prick from His spur & which I thought had gone deeper than was apprehended) but in Spite of K's applications the Pain continued & has

confined him to his Bed ever since—I am convinced it is a visit from that cursed of all Visitors the gout, but the Faculty will have the complaint to be & so term it “a spasmodic affection.” by the way both his Feet are much swelled & inflamed, & so is one of the Hands. He was very low yesterday & made me stay with him till 11 at night. This morning I think his Spirits are much better, but I by no means think all is right. You will observe not one word is said in your Dispatch of the *Vis à vis*—upon my saying I had a Commission from you to procure you one “By God, Whiskers, I do not think He will hate it because I have used it, do you think He will.” I without hesitation accepted it, & it will be ready for Morand on Tuesday. He thinks the Snuff Box beautiful & I saw it by his Bed side this morning: believe me, whenever He mentions you, it is in such warm terms that no language I am master of can convey. At Times, I think the Heat for —— not so strong; at others, I think I am wrong; but upon the whole I do not know whether it is not upon the Turn. I understand I am excluded from her Shop *d jamais*. My *Deuil* will not cost me much. There is a deal of Bustle going forward in the political world. Tomorrow the Speaker is to acquaint us He has accepted the Irish Seals, & Abbot is to tell us how reluctant He is to *fill* the Chair; rumour says Vansittart goes to Ireland, & G. Tierney to the Treasury—in a supplement to this before Morand goes you shall know all. The P. is working hard to effect a grand Junction of Parties, but I do not think one that will embrace all can take place—indeed Fox puts himself out of the Question, as He is going to travel.

There is another Rumour which gains credit also, but which I confess for one has none with me, which is, that His Majesty has said the pressure of affairs is too much for him & that He wishes to have an Assistant. Whatever takes place, one Thing I know you will be glad to be assured of, that the Prince is determined to support the Government. As I am certain there will be No. 4 I shall only say, I am now Your Excellency's most sincerely,

(Signed) TYRWHITT. No. 3.

*From Lord ST. HELENS to the Hon. ARTHUR PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURGH, 9th Febr. 1802.

It is most certain that the political Jockey-ship of that Arch-Trickster, M. de Talleyrand, was never more fully displayed than in his artful management of the Peace between France and Turkey,\* for which he contrived to make three distinct bargains, with England, with Russia, and with the Porte itself, obtaining from each a valuable consideration in Exchange for a mere non-entity, being the supposed *lien* of the French upon Egypt, from whence they had been completely driven long before the signature of any of these Treaties. And the embarrassments occasioned by this stroke of Machiavelism have been rendered doubly perplexing by the preposterous conduct of M. de Marcoff and Genl Tamara in demanding that according to the strict letter of the engagement between France and Russia, the latter should not only begin anew her Negotiations with the Porte,† but transfer them to Constantinople. Fortunately the Ministers here are much too right-minded to concur in so absurd and extravagant a proposal. However, they are still desirous that Russia should have an ostensible share in the final termination of a Business in which she has so near an Interest, and they therefore propose, by way of Mezzo Termine, that this intended new Treaty should be negotiated and signed *at Paris* by the Turkish Ambassador there, under the Direction of C<sup>t</sup> Marcoff and Mr. Jackson, and under His Majesty's and the Emperor of Russia's joint mediation and guaranty. I have submitted this expedient, by the desire of this Court, to His Majesty's Ministers, who, I should imagine, will be disposed to adopt it; more especially as it is understood that the Treaty in question is to contain a distinct

\* Preliminary Treaty between France and Turkey, October 9, 1801; definitive Treaty signed June 25, 1802. The French were to enjoy commercial advantages in the Levant, and the right to enter the Black Sea; and Turkey was to agree to the Treaty of Amiens. Coming after the evacuation of Egypt, these were startling concessions. Talleyrand had played on the pride of the Turks by calling them to join the Council of civilised peoples who had united in the Treaty of Amiens.

† The Russian Ambassador in London was opposed to the Russian intrigues at the Porte, and considered the Russian diplomatists there as mere "agents of Napoleon." His brother, A. R. Woronzow, made Chancellor early in 1802, had in 1801 declared against guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey.



reference (as circumstances may require) either to the 5th Art. of the Preliminaries of the 2<sup>d</sup> October or to its corresponding stipulation in the Def: Treaty between His Majesty & the French Government. I purpose communicating these particulars to L<sup>d</sup> Elgin by a Mess<sup>r</sup> who will be dispatched from hence to Constantinople in a few days; however, you may as well mention them to him when you have an opportunity of writing to him; and you may at the same time very safely assure him that the sentiments of the Russian Ministers with regard to Turkish Politics are in perfect unison with those of His Majesty's Government, and that nothing can be further from their thoughts than the joining with France in any Project for the dismemberment of that Empire.\* By the way, I observe by my last letter from L<sup>d</sup> Hawkesbury that L<sup>d</sup> Elgin's misgivings on this last head have made a very sensible impression in England, and I am therefore particularly anxious to remove the Prejudices which he seems to entertain against his Russian Colleague, who is in reality a sincere well-wisher to the Interests of England as opposed to those of France; and in his Dispatches, which I often see, takes every opportunity of pointing out the benefits that must accrue to this Country from the continuance of our present ascendancy over the Turkish Councils.

M. de Sauran's Dispatches by this Mess<sup>r</sup> no doubt relate chiefly to the affair of the Indemnities;† but I do not imagine that they contain anything very important or satisfactory on that head; as, tho' the dispositions of this Court towards Austria are still as friendly as can be wished, I do not find that they have had any, even the slightest, degree of success either in attempts to engage the Prussian Cabinet to reduce its pretentions within a

\* Bonaparte had proposed that England should keep her conquests, and France hold Egypt.

† The discussions as to the "Indemnities" arose out of the proposed adjustments by which small states (lay and ecclesiastical) were to be given as compensation to Austria and Prussia for the Rhine Provinces and the Netherlands. The Treaty of Amiens settled that the bishoprics of Trient and Brixen were to be Austrian; Tuscany and Modena, wrested from Hapsburg House, were to be replaced by the Electorate of Salzburg and the Breisgau. Prussia was to receive Paderborn and Hildesheim, and the town of Mainz; Bavaria, the bishoprics of Würzburg, Bamberg, and Augsburg; Nausseau, Orange, Fulda, and other ecclesiastical fiefs.

more moderate compass.\* They are accordingly (as I ventured to predict in my last) most heartily sick and weary of the task that they have undertaken, and look forward with much eagerness to the prospect of being released by the removal of the negotiation to Paris—an Event which can hardly fail of taking place very speedily since it seems to be so anxiously desired by all the Parties interested. I have been fortunately relieved from any direct concern in this business by the arrival of a Minister from His Majesty's Electoral Government, whose principal Commission is to endeavour to obtain for H.M., thro' the good offices of this Court, either the whole of the Bishoprick of Hildesheim, in exchange for a reasonable Equivalent, or an indemnification for the loss of his Paramountship over that Bishopric in the event of its being secularised, and assigned to one of the *ousted* Lay Princes. As matters now stand it seems to be destined to the Prince of Orange; but there is every reason to fear that it will ultimately fall to the lot of that very worst of all possible neighbours, the Gov<sup>t</sup> of Prussia.

*From Lord ELGIN to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

PERA, Feb<sup>y</sup> 18, 1802.

DEAR PAGET,—It has been good humoredly represented to the Turkish Government that your communication at Vienna of the Porte's disavowal of the absurd Separate Treaty between France & Turkey had been made with a view to exult over what is styled a *tour de force* of the British Influence here. I had no difficulty in satisfying the Ministers, that your object solely was to obtain for them from the Austrian Cabinet an unbiassed opinion on the cunning artifice of M. Talleyrand, & upon the Principle how far it would be sound Policy to shew a timid compliance with the Demands of the French when those Demands were in themselves unjust & improper.

\* Alexander and Napoleon had proposed to act as mediators between Austria, Bavaria, and Prussia *re* indemnities. The Diet, or rather a committee or deputation of the Diet, was given plenary powers to decide these questions October 8, 1801.

*From M. D'ITALINSKY to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

PALERME, ce 20 Fevr. 1802.

Pour revenir sur le sujet de l'Europe, nous voyons tout extremement en noir. Bonaparte ne perd pas de vue vos établissemens aux Indes orientales, il veut absolument vous y ruiner. Il s'occupe des mesures à prendre pour réussir; maitre absolu de toute l'Italie il veut l'être de la Méditerranée; il tache de s'y approprier les îles, qui ont des ports, et qui peuvent lui servir pour faire une chaîne des postes militaires d'une facile communication entre eux, il (a) déjà l'île d'Elbe, il a résolu d'escamoter Malte; on a intercepté une lettre où il est dit, que les anglais sont bêtes, les Russes fourbes mais seront dupés, Malte sera une colonie de 20 mille françois, les Maltois seront transportés ailleurs &c. &c. Après avoir tout préparé Bonaparte attaquera la Porte, où pour la conquérir toute, ou pour s'emparer de la Syrie et pour recouvrir l'Egypte; voilà comme nous voyons ici les choses, dites moi, si jamais vous pourrez faire tant que de m'honorer de votre écriture, dites moi ce qu'on pense à Vienne, ce que vous pensez des projets du premier Consul.

*From Mr. DRUMMOND \* to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

NAPLES, March 3rd 1802.

The Sicilian Parliament is to be assembled on the 8th of this month. Its duration is to be extended beyond the usual period, but as soon as it breaks up the King is to return hither. I am glad that he has been at last persuaded to take this measure, though I much fear he has delayed it too long. I have reason to believe the scheme for separating Naples from Sicily is by no means abandoned. The Spanish Court has succeeded in establishing a double marriage between the two families.† The friendship of Spain is, however, very suspicious, and not the less so that both the Queen and the Prince of Peace ‡ have held

\* Minister at Naples.

† See letters of the Queen of Naples of September 29 and October 22.

‡ The notorious Godoy, who as Court favourite and Prime Minister, led to the degradation of Spain, and prepared the way for Napoleon's intervention in 1808.

the strongest language in speaking of the French. In a letter addressed by her Catholic Majesty to the Queen of Naples, she says that the interest of Europe requires that all the branches of the House of Bourbon should be united, and, with the assistance of Austria and England, should endeavour to restrain the ambition of France. The Prince of Peace writes in the same style. But when I recollect that the marriage between the Hereditary Prince and the Infanta was proposed by the Citizen Alquier,\* I have my suspicions that the language of the Court of Madrid has been not only permitted but recommended by the citizen Lucien Bonaparte.† I am the more confirmed in this, that an invitation has been sent to their Sicilian Majesties requesting them to go to Spain,‡ and making it a point that the Hereditary Prince should go and reside there until the infanta, his intended bride, shall be marriageable. You will easily see that this is a manœuvre to get the Prince into proper training, in case it shall be his fate to ascend the throne. It is decided that he is to go in the month of May, and I imagine the King will be induced to accompany him. In the meantime General Murat is to honour Naples with a visit. The object of this visit is not declared. If he do not rivet the old chains of the Neapolitans, he will certainly forge new ones for them. The Government here gives it out that he only comes to ask a little money, and if he ask nothing else they may be very well satisfied. But Murat knows very well that the treasury is pretty nearly drained. He knows too perhaps the disaffection of the people, and their dislike and contempt for their present rulers. There are many things in this country which may interest him; and it is not a little remarkable that within these two last months the French have been employed in surveying all the coast from Ancona to Tarento. In case they should think of passing the Adriatic, this may be very useful to them, and must facilitate their progress eastward, the idea of which they have never abandoned any more than they have forgotten for a moment their views upon Italy.

\* Baron Alquier, French Envoy at Naples; formerly at Madrid.

† French Ambassador at Madrid.

‡ The policy of Bonaparte was to drive the Austrian House out of Italy, and substitute the influence of the Spanish House, which he did not dread.

I hope soon to see M. d'Italinski here. We have a little Tartar colony now at Naples, but as I am not very partial to any tribe of barbarians, I hope these Cossacks will soon take their departure. Mr. Hayter \* has commenced his labours at Portici, but I cannot predict success.

Lord Keith and General Fox continue at Malta. The expense there is enormous. Malta is to be garrisoned by Neapolitan troops.† It has been agreed that the French should pay one half, and our Government the other. I have endeavoured to persuade General Acton that the King of Naples would do better to pay the whole than to give the French an opportunity of buying the army when they please. Of this he seems to be convinced, and has, I believe, offered to our Cabinet to have the article in the treaty changed accordingly.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to H.M. the QUEEN OF NAPLES.*

*March 8, 1802.*

MADAME,—Le Bruit dont Votre Majesté m'a fait l'honneur de me parler ne m'est point encore parvenu, & je crois que Votre Majesté peut se tranquilliser là-dessus. Il n'y a pas de ville où il court tant de bruits absurdes & denués de fondemens. Avec cela je ne suis pas sans inquiétudes sur le sort de l'Italie, puisque son existence actuelle ne dépend malheureusement que du caprice d'un seul homme qui se propose peut-être de former une chaîne de Républiques depuis Spartivento jusqu'au Texel.

Si jamais je reçois des nouvelles qui puissent intéresser Votre Majesté elle peut être persuadée que je ne manquerai pas de les lui transmettre.

Je dois prévenir Votre Majesté que je ne pourrai expédier mon Courier que demain—& Je La supplie de recevoir l'expression de mon respectueux dévouement.

(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

\* Employed by the Prince of Wales to decipher the papyri found at Herculaneum in 1752.

† By the Treaty of Amiens, Malta was to be restored to the Order, the English troops withdrawn, and 2000 Neapolitan troops placed there for a time.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord St. HELENS.*

VIENNA, 8th March 1802.

I understand that there is much difficulty in the Negotiations at Amiens respecting Malta—We wish it to be garrisoned by Neapolitan Troops; Bonaparte is desirous that it should be restored immediately & unconditionally to the Order. If so, it is surely extremely essential that Hompesch\* should not succeed to the S. Ministry, in which Intrigue he is supported by Bonaparte. In this as in all other affairs relating to Malta, the C<sup>t</sup> of Vienna has already engaged duly to act in strict conjunction with that of Petersburg.

*From Lord St. HELENS to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURG, 16 March 1802.

I thank you very cordially, my Dear Sir, for your two letters of the 6th and 8th March, which arrived yesterday morning. I observed (for the first time) that the Seals of both of them as well as of all their enclosures had undergone the fiery ordeal of some Imp of the Vienna State Inquisition, and I own that the circumstance has given me much concern: for tho' neither of your Packets contained a single syllable that we c<sup>d</sup> have wished to conceal from the Austrian Government, the being subjected to this sort of *eaves-dropping* is extremely unpleasant; and no less inconsistent with that liberal confidence which ought to prevail in the mutual dealings of two Courts that are so closely connected, and have so much reason to rely on each other's political views and sentiments. I mention this however merely to put you upon your guard, and not by way of suggesting any remonstrance upon the subject; which I think had better be spared: and I have accordingly abstained from touching upon it to the Count de Sauran. This goes by a Neapolitan messenger: and I have therefore reason to hope that you will receive it *at first hand*.

I am pretty well assured that these last Dispatches to

\* Hompesch had been Grand Master of the Order, and had been brought over by the French to surrender Malta in 1798.

Count Sauran relate almost entirely to the old story of the German indemnities : with regard to which it appears that the Court of Vienna now acquiesces entirely in the plan proposed from hence ; and the present object therefore is to engage the Russian Ministers to recommend it to the 1st Consul, and in such terms as may induce him to adopt it, by evincing the fixed resolution of the Emp<sup>r</sup> their Sovereign to oppose any arrangement less favourable to the Interests of the House of Austria. In fact this has already been done ; and tho' C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl seems to think that M. de Marcoff's \* conduct in the business has been somewhat lukewarm, the truth really is that he has exerted himself in it to the utmost, tho' to very little effect or purpose, the Chief Consul having intimated to this Court, as he had before done to that of Vienna, that they have been reckoning without their Host in supposing that France would blindly acquiesce in a plan so ill-suited both to her own convenience, and to the views and interests of Prussia : and that he is therefore preparing to bring forward a scheme of a very different description ; the particulars of which will be disclosed when he shall have adjusted certain other points of business that he considers as more immediately pressing, namely his Treaty with England, and the arrangements now depending in Switzerland and Italy. I can assure you that this is the sum and substance of the communications brought by a Messenger from C<sup>t</sup> Marcoff who arrived here two days ago ; and you are too well acquainted with the temper of this Court to suppose that it can easily brook such cavalier treatment, or a tone so replete with arrogance and conscious superiority. Accordingly I can plainly perceive that the Russian Ministers are seriously bethinking themselves of embodying such a league of defence amongst the leading Powers of Europe † as may effectively blunt the Thunders of this self-created Jupiter : and I think it by no means impossible that they may bring forward a plan for that purpose in the course of the coming summer. It is however at present merely in embryo, and it would be advis-

\* He was charged with the negotiations concerning the indemnities.

† This took form in 1804, when Alexander, influenced by the Abbé Piatoli, despatched Novossiltzow to Pitt, suggesting a supreme Christian court for Europe. The plan of Piatoli was the germ which ultimately developed into the Holy Alliance.

able therefore that you shd say nothing on the subject to C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl till you hear from me further—more especially as tho' England would probably be disposed to take part in such a system of union, (on her being assured that its duties and burthens would be more equitably apportioned than in the late coalitions), it seems by no means advisable that she should take a leading share in its original promotion. I am very much obliged to you, my dear Sir, for your French Bulletin, which is by far the best that I have hitherto seen, and I should therefore be glad if you would continue to send it me as occasions may offer; or even by the post, if you should yourself have no objections to that mode of conveyance from motives of delicacy towards the Austrian Gov<sup>t</sup>. I observe that this Journal, like all the other French Papers of every description, is very bitter upon poor Marcoff: \* and indeed it seems pretty evident that a variety of stories to his prejudice have been purposely trumped up with the view of procuring his recall, or inducing him from disgust to a voluntary resignation of his Employment. His superiors have however now determined to support him, which I am the better pleased to observe as in case of his removal he would probably be succeeded by a far less trust-worthy person, *videlicet*, the Baron de Krudener; who amongst his other bad qualities has that of being Anti-Anglican *j'usqu' au bout des ongles*. From your description of M. Italinski he certainly would be by far the fittest man that the Emp<sup>r</sup> could have for the post in question; and your suggestion concerning him shall certainly not be thrown away; tho' I am afraid that he is not yet of a sufficient calibre to be a candidate for an employment of that magnitude. By the way, Mr. Drummond writes me word that Gen<sup>l</sup> Borordin has applied to succeed him in his present post: but I imagine that this is a mistake, as I have not heard that there is any intention of removing him.

I am rejoiced to hear of the reconciliation between Lord Elgin & Tamara: and the more so as (between ourselves) their bickerings had very near produced a serious misunderstanding between the respective Governments. †

\* He had been sharply reprehended by Bonaparte in January.

† Lord Hawkesbury had made formal complaints of intrigues of Russia at the Porte.



With regard to the affair of Malta, it seems to have been settled in as far as concerns the negotiations at Amiens agreeably to the plan proposed from hence, and tho' I have not yet heard who is to be the new Grand Master of the Order in virtue of the *congé d'élire* which has been delegated to the Pope, I believe that Hompesch's re-establishment is quite out of the Question.

You will be glad to hear that the Court of Sweden, after having exhausted every resource and every subterfuge of procrastination and tergiversation, have at length agreed to accede to the Convention of St. Petersburg,\* and the different instruments are now transcribing and will be signed the day after tomorrow. Tho' this business hardly deserves the name of a Negotiation, I never was engaged in one that put either my patience or my temper to so severe a trial. Adieu my D<sup>r</sup> S<sup>r</sup>, &c. S<sup>r</sup> H.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord ST. HELENS.*

VIENNA, April 1, 1802.

MY DEAR LORD,—As I cannot prudently take upon me to send by this Messenger a copy of Lord Elgin's last despatches to the office, I must confine myself to informing your Lordship that, finding all his endeavours to counteract the pressing demands made by the French Chargé d'affaires to the Ottoman Government for the ratification of the Treaty signed at Paris unlikely to succeed, His Lordship presented on the 7th of March a note to the Porte stating, that if the Ottoman Gov<sup>t</sup> departed from its engagements towards His Majesty contracted by this Ratification of the Preliminaries signed in London, by acceding to the act required of them by France, that then His Majesty would consider Himself as released from all the ties & obligations imposed upon him by His Alliance with the Porte, and that he (Lord Elgin) should consider his functions with regard to that alliance as at an end.

His Lordship informs Lord Hawkesbury that this note produced an immediate effect on the Councils of the Porte, who the next day declared to him officially their resolu-

\* Sweden signed the Convention of June 17, 1801, on March 30, 1802 The trade of the Baltic was thrown open to the English.

tion to adhere to their engagements with England, and to abandon all idea of ratifying the Preliminaries signed by Ali Effendi and M. de Talleyrand.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord St. HELENS to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURG, 10th April, 1802.

MY DEAR SIR,—... I believe that the Dispatches brought hither from Vienna by the present Messenger were written without any other specifick object but that of keeping alive the confidential Intercourse which has been so happily established between the two Governments, and of soliciting the continuance of the Emp<sup>r</sup> Alexander's good Offices in the affair of the Indemnities, as well as his eventual support against the future encroachments and other inimical designs of France. And I have no doubt that the answer which he carries back will be found sufficiently satisfactory in both these points; tho' it will perhaps be mixed up with some friendly reproaches on the subject of the late reply of the Austrian Cabinet to the First Consul's Communication relative to the Italian Republic.\* For I know that the style and strain of that paper are considered here as being much too submissive and complimentary, and that it is earnestly wished here that the language and conduct of Austria, in her future dealings with France, may be such as to manifest her determination to support her dignity and just rights with a proper degree of firmness and energy. In saying this however I cannot but be aware that great allowances are to be made for the extremely embarrassing and difficult circumstances in which Austria is forced with respect to France; neither perhaps can it be truly alleged that Russia herself has not manifested towards the 1st Consul the same sort of over-strained complaisance which she blames in her Ally; tho' she has in reality full as much reason to complain of his proceedings, and can have no prudential motives to dissuade her from risking the consequences of a serious explanation.

I have nothing to communicate to you in the way of

\* The Italian Republic had been proclaimed on January 25.

news except the arrival of a fresh Diplomatical Colleague in the person of Gen<sup>l</sup> Hedouville. As he arrived only 24 hours ago I have not yet had time to make much acquaintance with him, but from the little conversation that we have had, I am inclined to think that whatever his military talents and acquirements may be he is a mere novice in Diplomacy,—a science in which he is not likely to make much proficiency under the tuition of Bonaparte, whose system seems to be to keep the political Agents he employs abroad in a state of absolute ignorance as to the real secret of his views and actions. From what I can learn the Russian Ministers have no great reason to be satisfied with the result of their first interviews with this Minister, as he does not appear to have been charged with any positive or satisfactory explanation relative to the several points now in agitation between the two Governments.

*From Mr. MERRY \* to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

PARIS, April 26th 1802.

I completed the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Amiens Treaty† with France, Spain, and Holland, four days ago. From the Manner in which the Austrian and Russian ‡ Ministers now express themselves on the subjects of the Arrangement we have made for Malta, I must conclude that it has not been agreeable to their respective Governments. That Island, notwithstanding that we took Four Months at Amiens to dispose of it in a secure Manner, and were nearly continuing the War on account of it, will, I am afraid, still give us a great deal of trouble.

Here there is just now nothing new beyond what you will read in the Papers of the re-establishment of the Church. But at the Thuilleries there is something new on every Audience Day to make it reach the regular System of a Court, and their Approaches are carried on with perfect Quietness on the Part of the Spectators.

\* Succeeded Mr. Jackson as temporary Acting Minister in Paris.

† Signed on March 27.

‡ Russia complained that her protectorate over Malta and the conditions she demanded had been wholly ignored in the Treaty. She objected to rank merely as one of the six guaranteeing Powers.

*From Lord ST. HELENS to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURG, 1st May 1802.

I have received, my Dear Sir, since my last, the pleasure of your two letters of the 1st of April, with the accompanying papers relative to the proceedings of the French in Helvetia. It is, to be sure, no less provoking than painful to see that upstart Government hector and domineer it at so prodigious a rate both in that country and elsewhere. But these are grievances which must be suffered to take their course, since it would be downright Quixotism on our part to attempt to prevent or redress them. Indeed, the natural determination of our Government to avoid intermeddling with these outlying Foreign concerns is very plainly manifested by the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, as well as by some very striking and significant expressions in the (probably circular) Dispatch which I received from Lord Hawkesbury along with his Official Communication of that Treaty. And, in truth, this system seems to be the wisest and most judicious that we could pursue in the actual circumstances of Europe—that is to say, in as far as any general system of Theory can possibly be applicable to so uncertain and fluctuating a Science as that of Foreign Politicks.

I am afraid that the Business of Malta is as much at sea as ever, notwithstanding all the pains and labour bestowed upon it by the Plenipotentiaries at Amiens, who by the way seem to have acted somewhat injudiciously in giving to that subject a degree of apparent importance which it by no means deserved by placing in the body of the Treaty a series of insignificant Details which would more properly have been reserved for a separate Convention.

Be this as it may, the Court of Russia appears determined to refuse its accession and garanty to the said proposed arrangement, under the plea or pretext that in framing the Clauses in Art. X. which relate to this particular point, sufficient attention was not paid to the Emperor's Dignity, and besides this, the Russian Ministers either are, or affect to be, so much dissatisfied with the Conduct of the contracting Parties in appearing to set

aside the mode proposed from hence for the Election of the new Grand Master of the Order, that they have seriously in contemplation the breaking off all connection between the Russian Priory and the Body of the Order by creating the former into an independent and separate Community. There seems to be likewise great reason to believe that the conduct of Russia in this particular will be imitated by various other Powers concerned, and particularly by *Austria*. In these circumstances therefore how is it possible to suppose that the miserable remnants of the Order, after being thus stripped of perhaps nine-tenths of the Revenues that constituted its principal supports, can be in a condition, either three months hence, or at any future period, to take upon themselves the charge of maintaining and defending a possession like Malta, where the mere expense of repairing the Fortifications would probably absorb more than the whole national revenue of the Island? And to entrust its Defence to Naples alone would surely be the height of imprudence, not to mention that the introduction of the Neapolitan Garrison is expressly stated to be merely a temporary expedient. How these Difficulties will be solved I cannot presume to foretell. But according to the Dictates of common sense the only effectual method of neutralising the Island, and allaying those jealousies and bickerings which while it remains in its present state it is sure to excite and keep alive, seems to be the dismantling its Fortifications. I have indeed long had *in petto* another (perhaps much more eligible) expedient, namely the making over to us this possession in exchange for Gibraltar—an exchange, the advantages of which to all parties I think that, were it necessary, I could easily demonstrate. But a Negotiation to that effect, tho' it might perhaps have been brought to bear some months ago, is certainly now no longer upon the cards.

*From Mr. JACKSON to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

NAPLES, May 17th, 1802.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . I do not wonder at the attention which you tell me is paid to the affair of the indemnities, and I do not expect that Bonaparte will ever find a moment

of leisure to attend to it, as I am fully convinced that his design is to keep all he can for himself and to indemnify no one; in the mean time he uses the word *indemnité* as a mode of embroiling the principal Continental Powers with each other, and besides keeping possession of the greatest part of Italy, &c. &c., he will not fail to turn their quarrels to his own advantage hereafter—in other words to the advantage of Revolution, Atheism, and Jacobinism. He has lately told the Emperor of Russia that he wishes to see the King of Sardinia indemnified in Germany for the loss of Piedmont: perhaps you can inform me where such an indemnification is to be found, after the Stadtholder & the Grand Duke of Tuscany shall have rec<sup>d</sup>. theirs, supposing them ever to receive it, which I very much doubt.

I have heard of a letter which has been written by Louis XVIII. to Bonaparte in a most humble strain begging for some provision for himself & family! Can you conceive such *bassesse*? or that this prince should have been so ill-advised as to commit his dignity so egregiously: I understand that the answer of Bonaparte is in a strain of much affected moderation, professing his readiness to provide *pour sa Majesté* on condition he consents to retire to Moscow. . . .

*From Lord St. HELENS to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

St. P., 31st May 1802.

You will no doubt have heard long ere this that Bonaparte has at length thought fit to make known his Sovereign will and pleasure respecting the adjustment of the German indemnities,\* and his award seems to have been upon the whole very satisfactory to this Court, as he adopts *in toto* the arrangement proposed by Russia on behalf of all her immediate *protégés*, namely the Gt D. of Tuscany, the Elector of Bavaria, the Duke of Wirtemberg, and the Margrave of Baden. Indeed with regard to this last-mentioned Prince he seems to have been disposed to extend his bounty far beyond either the claims or the fondest wishes of the Margrave or his protectors; since, after stating that on account of the

\* A Convention was signed on June 4 by Markoff and the French plenipotentiary.

impoverished condition of the Sees of Treves and Cologne, it will be impossible to preserve both those Electorates, he has offered to fill up the vacancy which will thus be made in the Electoral College by the nomination of the aforesaid Margrave to that Dignity, and to endow it with a suitable encrease of Territory and Revenues. This proposal however, which the Emperor Alexander naturally viewed in its true light of a bribe tendered to himself, has been decidedly rejected by this Court; so that the said Electoral Bonnet which the Chief Consul seems quite resolved to pluck from the Brow of one or other of the above-mentioned Arch Bishops will of course be added to the general scramble. For the rest, it should seem from the tenor of the same decree, that Prussia will be permitted to acquire the whole allotment that she had carved out for herself, with the exception only of the districts in Franconia; a circumstance which I most sincerely and deeply lament on the King's account, as not only Hildesheim but Osnabrucke are included within that allotment, and I know how much he had at heart the preserving his rights to these Territories, and how grievously his feelings will be affected on finding them thus irrecoverably lost to himself and his Family.

I am very much obliged to you for your kind attention in sending me the Constantinople Papers enclosed in your last: tho' with all the information and lights that they furnish I find it extremely difficult to unravel the strange puzzlement in which L<sup>d</sup> E. appears to have entangled himself: and that too with his eyes open; since as you justly observe, nothing could be more clear and explicit, more fraught with prudence and enlightened views, or more easy to obey and enforce than the instructions with which he had been furnished. Indeed on reading the Dispatch from Lord H. on that subject which you have had the goodness to send me I could not help exclaiming "*O si sic omnia!*" For (*between ourselves*) I am at this moment very much out of charity with his Lordship on account of a most imprudent step that he has lately taken in causing to be inserted in the *London Gazette* an extract from a Dispatch of mine reporting the substance of something that I had learnt from the Count de Kotshubey (relative to the armed neutrality) which was

most assuredly neither communicated to me by that Minister nor reported by myself with the most distant view to its being thus publicly divulged. You will easily suppose therefore what C<sup>t</sup> K.'s feelings and complaints must have been on finding his name so cruelly and unjustifiably committed: and indeed the affair has been likewise deeply resented in a much higher quarter; so that tho' it is now in a train of being settled (*tellement quellement*) and has fortunately not produced any personal distaste between C<sup>t</sup> K. & myself, I am afraid it will make a lasting impression, and prevent for a long time to come the re-establishment of that confidential Intercourse which it is so desirable that we should maintain with this Court. . . .—Ever most affectionately yours,

ST. HELENS.

*From Lord HAWKESBURY to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

[No. 2.]

DOWNING STREET, June 10th 1802.

[Lord Hawkesbury first mentions that Baron Nicolai \* has spoken to him of difficulties started by the Czar on the 10th and 19th Articles of the Treaty of Amiens. Lord St. Helens has therefore been instructed to explain that the principal objection urged by Russia—"viz., that the Election of a Grand Master which had taken place under the Auspices of the Emperor of Russia was set aside—is evidently founded on a Misconception of the 10th Article. The first Paragraph stipulates that the Knights of the Order, whose *Langues* shall continue to subsist after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty, are invited to return to Malta as soon as that exchange shall have taken place. They shall there form a general Chapter, and shall proceed to the Election of a Grand Master to be chosen from amongst the Natives which preserve *Langues*; if no such Election shall have been already made since the Ratification of the Preliminary Articles of Peace. These last words were intended to refer to the Contingency of an Election having taken place on the Continent, in consequence of the Proclama-

\* Count Worontzow, angered at the neglect of Russia by England in the Treaty of Amiens, had taken a prolonged leave from his Embassy, and was replaced by the Chargé d'Affaires, Baron Nicolai.



tion of the Emperor of Russia, which Election, if it should have happened, was to be considered as valid. His Majesty has therefore no hesitation in saying that He shall be ready to consider the Proceeding as a valid Election, and that any one of the Individuals who were then named, and who may be selected by the Pope and confirmed as Grand Master, His Majesty will acknowledge, and will be ready to put him in possession of the Island of Malta, provided he will engage to carry into effect the Stipulation of the 10th Article."

Lord Hawkesbury therefore hopes that the Emperor of Russia will be satisfied as to "the only objection of Moment that has been offered, and will now readily accept the Guaranty of the Island of Malta, and that the Emperor of Germany will make no further difficulty in acceding to the invitation" which will be officially sent (in conjunction with the French Minister) to become one of the guaranteeing Powers. Lord Hawkesbury encloses "the Copy of a Dispatch upon this Subject written to Mr. Merry," and has "reason to hope that the French Government will interpret the 1st Paragraph of the 10th Article in the same manner as His Majesty has done." If the Emperor consents to become "a Guarantee to the arrangement respecting Malta," Intelligence is instantly to be sent to Sir Alexander Ball, Minister Plenipotentiary to the Order of S. John of Jerusalem, "as the Evacuation of the Island by His Majesty's troops will depend on the Notification being made in the Island that the Two Imperial Courts accede to the Guarantee."]


*From H.R.H. the PRINCE OF WALES to the  
Hon. ARTHUR PAGET.*

CARLTON HOUSE, June 27th 1802.

DEAREST ARTHUR,—I send you the enclosed Letter the contents of which I know not, but am only to desire that you will read it over patiently. I have done everything you have desired & with as much delicacy as the Subject would admit of. Everything is therefore now settled if you wish it to remain so, & you will never be troubled any more, in which case I doubt not that you will forward to me as soon as possible the packets which both Tyrwhitt & I



CHARLES, LORD HAWKESBURY



mentioned to you in our former Letters. How are you going on? I never hear from you, but I trust you nevertheless do not forget me. If you do, you are very ungrateful as no one can love you more truly or more sincerely dear Arthur, than your ever affectionate

(Signed) GEORGE.

*P.S.*—Do not forget my Commissions. Chig\* Bathurst & myself never hold a little Club together that we do not lament each time that you do not make one with us.

*From Lord HAWKESBURY to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

[No. 3.]

DOWNING STREET, 28th June 1802.

SIR,— . . . I send you inclosed for your Information the copies of a Note which Mr Merry delivered to the French Minister on the 8th of this Month, and of the Answer which has been returned to it by M<sup>r</sup> Talleyrand.

You will lose no Time in communicating these Papers to the Austrian Ministers, and in expressing to them His Majesty's Desire that, as the French Government have entirely acquiesced in the Arrangement respecting Malta proposed by His Majesty's Government, the Emperor of Germany will not only himself accept without Delay the Guaranty of the Island of Malta, but will use His Influence with the Emperor of Russia to induce that Sovereign to adopt the same Measure on His Part. As the Principal Objection advanced by the Russian Government against the Arrangement in the Treaty of Amiens is now satisfactorily removed, there is every Reason to hope that the Emperor of Russia will make no further Difficulty on the Subject.—I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

*From H.M. the QUEEN OF NAPLES to the  
Hon. A. PAGET.*

July 19, 1802.

Hier au moment de partir je reçus encore en Voiture le Courier avec la nouvelle de l'arrivée du Roi à Naples le 27 Juin au milieu des acclamations d'un peuple infinis cella hatra mon retour Je reviendrois de Presbourg

\* Mr. Chester.

dimanche à diné, et je compte mardy à midy expédier un Courier à Naples si vous voudrez vous en servir quatre batimens Anglois ont accompagné le Roi à Naples ce qui m'a fait grand plaisir Adieu Conte sur mon Eternelle Reconnoissance. (Signé) CHARLOTTE.

*From Lord St. HELENS to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ST PETERSBURGH, 1st August 1802.

MY DEAR SIR,—I received the Night before last, from M. de Sauran, your very interesting packet of the 20th July, and had the satisfaction to observe that (*pour le coup*) its 3 Seals had been religiously respected.

I contemplate not only with admiration but with some degree of envy the very able and successful manner in which you have conducted your Negotiation relative to Malta, and particularly that part of it which depended upon Citizen Champagny.\* For tho' his running restive just at the last and after you had coaxed him on so cleverly almost to the end of the race was, to be sure, somewhat provoking, I am at a loss to conceive by what species of rhetorick you persuaded him to proceed so far, since, according to the strict line of his duty, he certainly ought not to have taken a single official step in the business, without a more direct warranty than that of Talleyrand's Correspondence with our friend Merry. With regard to the Austrian Ministers, nothing can be more truly handsome or praise-worthy than the attention that they have shown upon this occasion to the wishes of H.M.'s Government, which indeed have been so completely fulfilled by the Instrument that you have sent home that, in as far as they are concerned, the business may be considered as finally adjusted, and in the most satisfactory manner possible.

I am sorry to inform you, however, that nothing can be more completely the reverse of all this than the conduct of the Court of St. Petersburg; which, after keeping us in suspense during almost six weeks from the arrival of our last explanations, has at length thought fit to declare in the most peremptory terms,† that the Emperor will neither

\* French Ambassador in Vienna.

† On this very day, August 1.

accede to, nor guaranty, nor, in a word, take any part or concern whatsoever in our late arrangement with respect to Malta. And the only ostensible reason assigned for this strange determination, is H.I.M.'s being bound in honor, and by his regard for consistency, to adhere to his former resolution on this subject, notwithstanding our having entirely removed the sole, or at least most material plea on which that resolution had been founded, by H.M.'s unqualified offer to adhere implicitly to the Scheme that had been proposed from hence for the Election of the new Grand Master of Malta. As the French Minister here, Gen<sup>l</sup> d'Hedouville, who has not yet received a single line of Instructions on this business from the Chief Consul, was by no means disposed to act on it, like Citizen Champagne, without a positive authorization; and as my own Instructions, as well as the nature of the affair, rendered it indispensably necessary that he should join with me both in the applying to the Government for their accession and guaranty, and in the communicating to them the above mentioned concerted explanations; my *office* in those subjects, tho' long since prepared, has not yet been given in, and consequently the Communication which I have now received, and which is merely verbal, ought not perhaps in strictness to be considered as definitive. However, I am but too well assured that the said joint Official Invitation, should it ever be presented (which I much doubt) will produce no change in the dispositions of this Court, and accordingly my report of what has passed, which I am just going to send to Lord Hawkesbury by Messenger, is conceived in such terms as must necessarily convince him of the hopelessness of any further applications here, and of the consequent expediency of his concerting such new arrangements with France, as this change in the state of things may be found to require. . . .

I am well assured (strange as it may seem) that the Emperor, whose resolution in this affair was taken in direct opposition to the advice of his wisest Counsellors,\* was influenced by a single and most unworthy consideration, namely the prospect of saving to his treasury a sum of about 40,000*£* St\* which it costs him annually to

\* This was immediately before a change of Ministry. See Sir J. Warren's letter, October 12.

maintain the branch of the Order established here, and which he hopes to retrench one day or other by detaching himself gradually from all connection with the Establishment at large. This however I mention to you only in confidence, as an insinuation of this sort would be the more felt by the Russian Ministers, as they cannot but be conscious that this proneness to over-economy is a prime feature in their Master's Character and the leading spring of almost all his actions.

*Aug. 4th, 1802.*

[A despatch from Lord Hawkesbury to the Hon. A. Paget enclosed the draft of an Act of Acceptance, on the part of the King, of the Emperor's accession to the 10th Article of the Treaty of Amiens, which was to be signed by Mr. Paget in virtue of the full powers despatched with it, and exchanged for the Act of Accession of His Imperial Majesty.]

*From the QUEEN OF NAPLES to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*Sept. 29th. 1802.*

Je ne veux pas manquer d'un Courier qui va a Vienne pour renouveler les assurances de ma sincere et eternelle Reconnissance pour toutes les attentions que vous avez eue pour moi et dont je ne perdrois jamais le Souvenir, Je suis avec mes trois Enfans tristement a Portici où je vis tres retiré depuis la 23 de 7<sup>bre</sup>. au Soir je suis separé probablement pour la vie de ma chère fille Antoinette\* qui est parti pour Sa destinée il m'en a couté l'impossible et je ne puis encore me remettre des raisons majeures m'ont empeché de l'accompagner mais cella m'a été et est extrêmement douloureuse, j'espère que dans l'eloignement et peu de rapport ou nous sommes vous ne m'oubliez point et vous ressouviendrez quelquefois de Celle qui sera toujours avec bien de la Reconnissance votre affectionnée

(Signed) CHARLOTTE.

J'ai reçus le 30 au Soir la cruelle et malheureuse nouvelle de la perte de ma bien chere fille Louise ce nouveau malheur me plonge avec mes Enfans dans la plus profonde et

\* Married Crown Prince of Spain.

juste douleur, Je vous remercie de l'intérêt que vous me marquez d'y prendre par votre lettre du 20 de 7<sup>bre</sup>. Je vous remercie aussi du buletin et vous prie de me les vouloir continuer quand vous en aurez. ConteZ sur toute ma Reconoissance avec laquelle je suis votre triste mais attachée.

Je vous prie d'envoyer quand vous ecrivez en Angleterre cette lettre au Prince de Castelcigala Ministre du Roi en Angleterre et d'avance je vous en remercie.

*From Lord HAWKESBURY to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*[Most secret and confidential.]*

DOWNING STREET, Oct. 10th, 1802.

[In this despatch Lord Hawkesbury directs Mr. Paget "to ascertain with as much precision as possible, the Sentiments of the Austrian Government relative to the affairs of Switzerland, especially whether they have afforded or, in any event, intend to afford to the Swiss Cantons any effectual assistance in their opposition to the menaces or hostility of France;" in which case he was to acquaint the Austrian Cabinet with the dispositions of the British Government, as recorded in an enclosed despatch.

The enclosed despatch, from Lord Hawkesbury to Mr. Merry, states "that it has been judged expedient to send Mr. Moore directly to Berne to acquire information respecting the state of Swiss Affairs, to acquaint the Government of the Cantons with the Remonstrance which His Majesty has already ordered to be made in their favour, and in the event of a French Army being sent to coerce them, and of their being disposed and in a condition to make any effectual Resistance to such a force, to afford them pecuniary Succours. . . .

"If you shall find the means of doing it with discretion, it is desirable that you should convey to the Public in general, and particularly to the Parties in opposition to the French Government, the Sentiments of universal indignation which the conduct of the French Consul has produced in this Country, and the sympathy which the British Nation feel in the cause of the Swiss Cantons."

The following note from Lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto \* was also enclosed :—]

\* Who had negotiated the terms of the Amiens Treaty.



October 9, 1802.

Lord Hawkesbury has received His Majesty's commands to communicate through Mr. Otto, to the French Government, the sentiments of deep regret which have been excited in His Majesty's mind by the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic People,\* which was published by authority in the *Moniteur* of the 1st instant, and by the representations which have been made to His Majesty on this subject on behalf of the nation whose interests are so immediately affected by it. His Majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss Cantons have for some time past been exposed, but He can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their antient Laws and Government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other Powers.

The Cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess in the same degree as every other independent State, the right of regulating their own internal concerns, and the right has moreover, in the present instance, been formally and explicitly guaranteed to the Swiss Nation by the French Government in the Treaty of Luneville, conjointly with the other Powers who were parties to that engagement. His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal Government without the interposition of any Foreign Powers, and with whatever regret His Majesty may have perused the late proclamation of the French Government, He is yet unwilling to believe that they will farther attempt to controul that independent Nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights. His Majesty thinks Himself called upon by His Regard for the general interests of Europe, and by His peculiar Sollicitude for the happiness and welfare of the Swiss Nation, to express these His Sentiments with a frankness and sincerity which He feels

\* On October 4 the Proclamation from the First Consul was read at Lausanne by General Rapp.

to be due to His own character, and to the good understanding which He is desirous of preserving with the Government of France.

*From Admiral Sir J. WARREN \* to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

[Private.]

ST. PETERSBURGH, *October 12th, 1802.*

DEAR SIR,—I take the opportunity of Comte Sauran's departure for Vienna, of returning my best thanks for the many acts of friendship & kindness I experienced from you when in the Mediteranean & of informing you of my arrival here, in a situation I by no means expected when we had the pleasure of seeing each other off Palermo. You will no doubt have been informed of the great change which has taken place in this Country among the Ministers, & of the new Administration lately formed here: † a circumstance that I most earnestly hope may prove more favourable to the renewal of the ancient system of amity which should naturally exist between the two Imperial Courts. I learn with much satisfaction that the demand for the Guarantee of the Bavariañ Treaty ‡ has been received with much coolness here, & will not possibly be attended to. For the situation of everything here I refer you to Comte Sauran who will of course communicate them to you. . . .—I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

*From the QUEEN OF NAPLES to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

PORTICI, *le 22 Octobre 1802.*

Je profite du depart d'un Courier pour vous écrire et remercier de votre lettre du 20 7<sup>bre</sup>. et de tout ce que vous me dites, mon fils § est retourné le 19 Octobre de Barcelone avec sa petite Épouse de 13 ans, il a été 28 jours en tout hors de la maison, et a acquis tant de connoissances

\* Succeeded Lord St. Helens at St. Petersburg. He had been in command of a detachment of the British fleet in the Mediterranean. A letter of Lord St. Helens' of August 1, just before leaving St. Petersburg, states that the arrival of Sir J. Warren was delayed by his election for Nottingham.

† The Czar's young admirers, Czartoryski, Novossiltzow, and Stroganow, gained the chief influence. Czartoryski, who had been Minister at Turin in 1797, was attached to the Foreign Office. Woronzow still was Chancellor.

‡ See Mr. Drake's letter, February 5, 1803.

§ See Mr. Drummond's letter of March 3.

de la famille ou il a pris son Epouse, et donnée son intéressante sœur qu'il ne les oubliera de Sa vie, rien au monde ne pouvoit faire sur lui l'impression que lui a laissé le voyage, ma chere et malheureuse Antoinette se Conduit a merveille, Dieu veuille la benir, fortifier et preserver de tout mall, Je suis si occupée de mes Enfans que je n'ai la tete a rien d'autres. Veuillez me continuer vos nouvelles et contez sur mon Eternelle Reconnissance.—Votre Sincere Amie,  
(Signé) CHARLOTTE.

Je vous prie d'envoyer cette lettre a Londres a notre Ministre.

Come nous envoyons un Courier à Londres en peu de jours j'enverrois alors la lettre dont je vous parlois cy dessus.

*From Prince PAUL ESTERHAZY \* to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*Oct. 24, 1802.*

I am very sorry to have received your letter so late (only at one o'clock past mid-night). It will be a great pleasure for us to see you at Eisenstadt to morrow, and particularly for me to go a shooting with you. My father is extremely sorry, he cannot have to morrow the pleasure of meeting you here, his presence being necessary at Vienna. Should it be too late to send your Relay to Wimpassing you'll find there four of my father's horses. In the expectation of seing you to morrow,—Your most faithful Friend and Servant,  
PAUL ESTERHAZY.

*EISENSTADT, 24 Oct.*

I am desired by my dear mother to tell you that she will be verry glad to see you.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Count COBENTZL.*

*VIENNE, le 29 Octobre 1802.*

MONSR. LE COMTE,—L'Importance de la communication verbale que j'eus l'honneur de faire à V.E. le 21 du courant me faisoit espérer qu'elle mettroit de l'empressement à y

\* Afterwards Ambassador in London.

repondre.\* V.E. ne m'ayant rien communiqué depuis, je me vois obligé, pour ma décharge et pour éviter une plus longue perte de tems, de représenter par écrit que je suis disposé à croire que tout délai ultérieur pourroit occasionner des inconveniens que V.E. en sa sagesse désireroit sans doute éviter.

Il y a des circonstances où la maturité de la reflexion ne nuit pas à la promptitude de la decision et nous nous trouvons, Mr. le Comte, précisément dans une de ces circonstances. Sa nature moins que toute autre ne souffre pas que cette résolution soit différée, et je supplie V.E. d'examiner avec candeur si S.M. L'Empereur n'a pas un intérêt particulier à ne pas faire attendre sa réponse. V.E. doit être persuadée qu'en mettant autant d'Instance dans ma demande, je n'ai pas moins en vue les intérêts de S.M.I. que ceux de mon Gouvernement.

Je me félicite d'avoir cette occasion pour renouveler à V.E. l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Count COBENTZL to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

VIENNE, le 29 Octobre 1802.

MONSIEUR,—L'objet de la dernière communication verbale dont vous avez été chargé est trop important pour qu'il ait été possible d'y faire réponse avant mûre deliberation. Je dois recevoir encore ce matin, où du moins je l'espère, les ordres de Sa Majesté à cet égard. Je ne manquerai pas de m'en acquitter avec toute la promptitude possible, et peut-être dans la journée serai-je mis à même d'en conférer avec vous. Au plus tard, ce sera pour demain dans la matinée.—J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS C. COBENTZL.

*From Mr. THOS. JACKSON to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ROME, October 30th 1802.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . I should wish much to know a little of the history of the late important changes at Petersburg & I shall be much obliged if you will take the trouble to enlighten my darkness : I wish there may be a change of

\* See Lord Hawkesbury's Most secret and confidential, October 10, 1802.

measures as well as men as I shall have no hope of any check to the insatiable ambition of Bonaparte until I see a real and cordial union between the two Imperial Courts & England.\*

You will see that the poor innocent Infant of Parma has been sent to his long home & the french have laid their clutches upon his dominions: † we are in trembling expectation of seeing Tuscany, the States of Rome & Naples share the same fate.

On the election of the Grand Master of Malta the Pope sent a Knight & a Messenger to England to inform the Balio Ruspoli that the choice had fallen upon him: upon their arrival at Paris they were told by M. Talleyrand that their proceeding to London was unnecessary as the first Consul w<sup>d</sup> send a messenger of his own to inform the B. Ruspoli. The Knight of Malta & the Pope's Legate were at the same time told that they might write to the Grand Master by Bonaparte's Courier & enjoin him to come without delay to Paris from whence he might proceed to Toulon where a french Squadron was ready to convey him to his destination and that he was above all to avoid having any communication with the British Ministers previous to his departure!!—Believe me most sincerely yours,

THOMAS JACKSON.

*From the QUEEN OF NAPLES to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

NAPLES, le 9 Novembre 1802.

Je vous suis bien reconnoissante pour l'obligeante lettre et Buletin que vous m'avez envoyé par le dernier Courier en date du 23 Octobre Je suis bien reconnoissante à cette attention et ressouvenir de votre part, ‡ l'occupation de Parme, et l'agregation de les Etats a la Republique françoise, ne peut qu'infiniment interesser nous tous en Italie. Dieu veuille nous preserver de nouveaux desastres, et croyez moi toujours avec bien de la Reconnoissance votre Sincere Aimée,

(Signé) CHARLOTTE.

\* The Czar held that England in the Peace of Amiens had separated her interests from those of the Continent.

† On October 11, 1802, on the death of Ferdinand de Bourbon, Duke of Parma, father of the King of Etruria, the French seized Parma. A French Resident had governed since May 1801.

‡ The Duke of Parma had married her sister.

*From the QUEEN OF NAPLES to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*Dec. 23rd, 1802.*

Je profite de l'occasion de Ce Courier qui retourne a exprimer a ma chere fille les plaisirs infinis que j'ai eue de ses heureuses Couches, j'en profite dis-je pour vous assurer de ma constante sincere Estime Je vous souhaite une heureuse nouvelle année, et tous les bonheurs imaginables come le sincere Estime et Reconnoissance que vous m'avez inspire me fait vous desirer. Nous sommes tous en famille à Caserte, les hommes vont à la chasse les femmes promener, moi je garde beaucoup la maison il y a cet hiver beaucoup d'Anglois à Naples que quand j'yrois en Ville j'espere de voir, la personne qui vous interesse se porte bien, elle est venue le Septieme jour de Sa crise a Caserte, pour se faire voir, elle promet beaucoup. Je souhaite pour son bonheur qu'elle le tiene, au reste c'est par elle que vous saurez tout. Je suis a un des bouts de l'Europe et ne sait rien qu'apres tous les autres du Continent, mes sentimens sont inchangeables & mes vœux toujours les meme pour le vrai bien come ils ne changent point en Politique Sentimens malgré tant de differentes Circonstances. Je conserve aussy de meme ceux de la Reconnoissance pour Ceux qui ont temoigne de l'interet a nos Affaires et c'est avec ces Sentimens que je suis pour la vie,—Votre reconaissante,

(Signed) CHARLOTTE.

Je vous prie d'envoyer par la premiere occasion qui passe par l'Allemagne ce paquet a notre Ministre le Prince de Castelcigala. J'abuse de votre Complaisance mais j'y compte.

*From Lord WHITWORTH to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*PARIS, January 18, 1803.*

The Bavarian Minister is throwing fire and flame, and declares that the Elector will not give up his Bishoprick of Eichstadt, unless dispossessed by force. Such a measure may have succeeded with the King of Prussia, but His Electoral Highness will gain nothing by resistance.\*

\* In August 1801 France and Russia ordered the Diet to complete their deliberations on the indemnities in two months. The Recés, however, did

Count Marcoff has made very serious representations on the conduct and doctrine of Col. Sebastiani \* in the Seven Isles.† And he is assured that the zeal of that Gentleman shall be restrained, and things left as they were—that is to say I believe in the utmost confusion & disorder. This Government however promises not to interfere.

I hope something in the shape of an indemnity may be obtained for the K. of Sardinia: you know perhaps that the Siennese has been offered. It is endeavoured to add to this Piombino, and perhaps the Isle of Elba, which would make altogether an object worth acceptance. . . .

I see no reason since I have been here to change the opinion I have ever had, as well as yourself, of the person who has got to the top of the ladder here. I have however gained one object, & that is the conviction that he is not so dangerous as some people are inclined to believe him at home. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico habitat* is perfectly verified in his person.

*From Prince ESTERHAZY ‡ to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*January 19, 1803.*

Je saisis avec bien du plaisir l'avantage que me procure Lord Whitworth dont je vous joins la lître, de rapeller a votre souvenir, et ma personne, et les mots d'écrits que vous m'avez promis, et dont je ne vous tiens pas quitte. J'ay appris avec satisfaction que vous vous portiez bien, et que peutêtre nous nous verions à Londres, ce qui seroit trop heureux pour moi. Nous sommes ici tous en bone santé et nous amusons beaucoup de tant de nouveaux que nous voyons journellement. S'il y avoit ici des comissions à remplir pour vous, je vous demande la préférence pour

not take place until February 25, 1803. Cologne became French. Prussia obtained the chief share of the spoils, gaining, in addition to Paderborn and Hildesheim, part of Münster. Thus, for forty-eight German square miles and 150,000 inhabitants, she got 221 square miles and 500,000 inhabitants. She also tried to hold all Münster.

\* Sent on a military mission from France to Egypt and Syria.

† The independence of the Ionian Islands was declared by the Treaty of Amiens.

‡ Austrian Ambassador in Paris.

l'exécution, l'exactitude que j'y mettrois me feroit esperer votre pratique.

Agréez que je vous réitere les assurances des sentiments de la plus haute consideration et de l'amitié la plus sincere et inalterable avec laquelle je suis,—Votre très dévoué Serviteur et ami, (Signé) ESTERHAZY.

*From Mr. MAURUS \* to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

RATISBON, *Jan<sup>y</sup> the 28th 1803.*

MY DEAREST SIR,—I have but just time before the setting out of the Post to inform you that Mr. de Buhler † has received a despatch from Mr. de Marcoff at Paris, in which the latter desires him not to be too forward in the affairs of the deputation, as he (Mr. de Marcoff) after signing his accession to the Convention of the 26 Dec. ‡ has discovered another secret Convention between France and Austria, the three principal articles of which are — 1. Austria acknowledges the King of Etruria. 2. Consents to the Incorporation of Piedmont. 3. Leaves France at Liberty to do with Switzerland as it pleases. What Austria gets in return is not said. Marcoff expresses his indignation in the strongest terms.—I remain, &c. MAURUS.

*From Mr. DRAKE § to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

MUNICH, *Feb<sup>y</sup> 5th 1803.*

You are so well acquainted with the Characters of the principal Actors on this Scene and with their mode of transacting Business, that you will not have been surprized at their having been so completely duped and sacrificed in the Negotiations which led to the late Convention between Austria and France. The Elector, much as he was hurt at being stripped of the Bishoprick of Eichstadt, must however be contented to sit down quietly under his loss,

\* Charged with the care of British interests at Ratisbon.

† Russian Envoy in Bavaria, now made Minister Extraordinary at Ratisbon for settling the indemnities.

‡ Two Conventions were signed in Paris in December 1802 between France and Austria. By the first, December 26, the indemnities of the various branches of the Austrian House were fixed.

§ British Minister in Munich.



and to accept the territory of Nuremberg in Lieu of It. He has submitted the Hardship of his Case to the Courts of Berlin and Petersburg, requesting their good offices & Protection. He has not as yet received any answer from the latter, and I have reason to believe that the Consolation which the former has offered him consists wholly of fair Words, and common Place Assurance of Attachment &c., on which little or no Hope of any Official Interference can be grounded. Very sanguine Expectations are entertained here of a more favourable Answer from Petersburg, an opinion being generally prevalent that that Court will not ratify the Act of Accession of Mr. Marcoff, as it is supposed that two Secret Articles (such as they are understood to be) are in direct contradiction with the views and Intentions professed repeatedly and publicly by that Court.

The Austrian Minister here has requested a Passage for a Body of Troops to take Possession of Eichstadt, but the Elector has very adroitly eluded a Compliance with the Demand for the present, by notifying to Mr. de Buol that He had written an Answer on the Subject to the Emperor himself; and that therefore it would be disrespectful not to wait for His Imperial Majesty's Reply. This Delay will afford the Bavarian Minister a chance of securing the Sentiments of the Emperor of Russia on the several Points connected with the Convention before he may be again pressed for a Decision. These sentiments of the Court of Petersburg are impatiently expected both here and at Ratisbon, and it is probable that no further Progress will be made in the final Settlement of the Indemnities till their Arrival.

*From Mr. THOMAS JACKSON to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ROME, *Feb<sup>y</sup> 24th 1803.*

Although I have good reason to think you are as well informed of the situation of His Sard<sup>a</sup> Majesty's affairs as myself I will not omit to mention that the first Consul, moved by the reiterated solicitations of Russia (and more probably by the hope of obtaining the guaranty of that Court of his usurpations in Italy) has at length consented to give His Sard<sup>a</sup> Majesty what he calls an indemnity for

the loss of his continental Dominions on both sides the Alps. This Indemnity consists of the country of the Presid<sup>y</sup> and the Siennese. Nothing is yet settled in this business. The King I believe would accept this offer on condition of its being called an *establishment*, and not by way of an Indemnity for a renunciation to which he will not without the greatest difficulty be brought to consent. We are waiting for the ideas of the Court of Petersburg on this business which will necessarily have great weight.

It is whispered that Austria has consented in a secret Article of the late Treaty with France to guarantee the present state of Italy, the possession of Piedmont by France, the King of Etruria, &c. &c.

*From Admiral Sir J. WARREN to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

[Private.]

ST. PETERSBURGH, *March 7th*, N.S., 1803.

Since the Delivery of the Ratification of the Indemnities which was sent from Paris by a Clerk of Confidence in Mons<sup>r</sup> Talleyrand's office to be exchanged here, as a mark of attention to the Emperor, & the usual presents of Boxes, &c., nothing particular has occurred. I am happy to say however that this administration seems to entertain more favourable sentiments than heretofore towards Austria, and as they are less embarrassed with French Connections, I do hope upon the arrival of Comte Stadion that the ancient Relations between the two countries may again be renewed; to which object no efforts that it may be in my power to bestow shall be wanting.

The Dispute with the King of Sweden relative to the frontiers\* here may produce much disagreeable altercation, if not more unfavourable events, as there is much acrimony on this side from that King's having interfered with the Duke of Mecklenburg relative to an old claim of some of his Territories, lately preferred by the King of Sweden; & which the Court of Berlin have taken as against the latter. In consequence of the new Prince of Sweden having been created Grand Duke of Finland,† the Governor of Wyburgh has been named by Russia Governor of Finland, and a General Mayenfeldt has lately left

\* In Finland.

† He was said to have been christened by this title.

this Capital to take upon himself the command in that country. . . .—I have the honour, &c.

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

*P.S.*—I trust you will be enabled to ascertain : Whether the First Consul's favourite project respecting Turkey \* has at last made some impression at Vienna, & whether it has obtained any stipulation or place among the Secret Articles of the Convention signed at Paris.

*From MR. TALBOT to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

PARIS, the 12 March 1803.

DEAR PAGET,—I have been waiting with the utmost impatience to have it in my power to return a satisfactory answer to the enquiries enclosed in your letter, but hitherto to very little purpose ; for nobody here can give me the smallest information respecting the English Lady of 74 years of age who has eloped with the French Emigrant Priest. If she were but 17 there might be less difficulty in making her out, and I might be induced to go in person to seek her in the purlieus of the Palais Royal ; but under the present circumstances I must act by proxy. . . .

I am charged by a young lady, Miss Seymour, who is here with Lord & Lady Cholmondeley, to convey to you the avowal of her most *ardent love*. I told her that I should certainly obey her Commands, and literally in those words. She finds, however, some, but it is her only, consolation for your absence in the presence of a Gentleman not from Tripoli, but from Tunis, one of our colleagues at Paris. She thinks him your very image, and perhaps he might be something like you were he shaved of a very fine black beard which I presume it would be no easy matter to prevail on him to part with, certainly if he were aware how much that operation would tend to identify him with you in Miss Seymour's affections we should see him smack smooth to-morrow ; but fortunately for you it does not as yet seem to have occurred to him, and I shall beware of suggesting it to him until I hear from you on this subject.—Believe me, &c.

J. TALBOT.

\* Bonaparte was pressing plans for the partition of Turkey, which Russia now resisted.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

VIENNA, 14 Mar. 1803.

MY LORD,—I take the liberty of humbly submitting to Y<sup>r</sup> L<sup>p</sup> a request of being allowed to be absent from here a few weeks, in order to go to England upon my private affairs—and I make this request with greater confidence, having never yet been absent from any post which has been confided to me by His M<sup>y</sup>. . . .

Y<sup>r</sup> L<sup>p</sup> may be persuaded that however great the necessity of my presence in England may be I should only avail myself of this leave in the case of my absence being in no way prejudicial to the interests entrusted to me.\*—I have the honour, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[Private & Confidential.]

VIENNA, March 26, 1803.

MY LORD,—Uncertain as I am at this moment as to the situation of affairs between England & France, I am led to offer one or two ideas in addition to what I have had the honor to submit in my despatch.

Should a rupture take place, and the assistance of this Country be required, I should humbly recommend that His Majesty should write a letter to the Emperor, conceived in such strength of terms as His Majesty's age and experience, and the importance of the occasion, will fully authorize. In delivering this letter, I should have the fairest opportunity of speaking in the most unreserved manner to His Imperial Majesty and of pointing out the defects of His Ministers, and of the system pursued by them.

The person who is supposed to have the greatest degree of influence over the mind of the Emperor is his Confessor. I am inclined to think that use might be made of him.

I am decidedly of the same opinion with respect to the person who has the greatest influence over the Arch Duke Charles.

I think, however, that nothing can contribute so largely

\* The leave was granted, but he did not go to England till the autumn.—A.P.

towards effecting any good here as the co-operation of Russia.

Your Lordship will, I am persuaded, do justice to the motives by which I am actuated in humbly submitting these few hints.—I have, &c.

(Signed)      ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord WHITWORTH to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

PARIS, Sunday 10th Apl. 1803.

I am sorry to think that the picture you draw of the Court where you are is but too true; you are in no need of one from me of this—its policy and its measures are too well known. We have, that is you & I, never vary'd in our opinions of them, or of those who conduct them. I hope and trust however that they will find at least one Country both ready and able to check their Career. Such is the object of the present discussion; which, if not speedily terminated in a manner satisfactory to us, as affording that Security which the position of France renders indispensable, must be productive of a war between the two Countries. I will hope for the honour of the Court of Vienna, and I really believe it would be the case, that if we are once more obliged to take the field it would feel the fetters by which it is bound with a twofold anguish. I should for my own part be sorry however that that Country or any other should be drawn into it. We will shew these Gascons\* *que l'Angleterre peut seule lutter contre eux*—I think we might enter the lists without fear of the result.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[No. 14.]

VIENNA, 19 April 1803.

MY LORD,—I mentioned in my last that the French Ambassador had informed His Imperial Majesty's Minister that his Government might perhaps find it necessary to call upon the Court of Vienna as one of the Guarantees of the order of Malta to interfere in the affairs pending

\* Referring to First Consul's message to Legislative Body mentioned in introduction to this year's correspondence.—A. P.

between England & France, but that this intimation was to be considered as private & unofficial.

I have since learnt from the Vice Chancellor that Mr. Champagny has desired to be informed of the Sense which this Court attaches to the Act of Accession to the 10th Art. of the Treaty of Amiens,\* & that to this application He had replied that it was the Emperor's Intention to observe a strict Neutrality, that whenever any distinct proposition might be made to His I. M<sup>y</sup> arising out of the accession He had given that He should be ready to answer to it. The act in question it was observed was in itself imperfect inasmuch as the acceptance of it had not been ratified by G<sup>t</sup> Britain, & it was further remarked that the accession of other Great Powers to the first Article was still wanting.

Such is the statement which has been made to me by C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl of what has passed between himself & the French Ambassador.

The Declaration that "it was the Emperor's intention to observe a strict neutrality" seemed to me so wholly superfluous and unasked for by anything which had been stated to have been said by the French Ambassador, that I could not avoid observing to C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl that it had probably been made in answer to some other distinct & important overture which I had got to learn. From the explanation however he gave, as well as from the information I have received from other quarters, I am led to believe that what I have above related is the substance of what has hitherto been treated between them, that the result is not less ambiguous & inconclusive, & that the declaration in question was in fact a spontaneous & unguarded effusion of the Vice Chancellor's private sentiments.

Tho' I have always been in the habit of seeing C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl very constantly, the importance of the moment has naturally led me of late to visit him more frequently than usual, and it is lest your Lordship should suppose that the above expression (of which I have already said so much) might have been thrown out in reply to any observations I might at any time have made, I think it my duty to state explicitly that I have been particularly

\* Signed in Vienna August 1802. Cf. pp. 55, 57, 58, 60.

cautious in never having allowed an expression to escape me which could by any means be construed into a wish of what is vulgarly denominated "drawing this Country into a War." Independent of higher considerations of duty, I have been silent upon principle. I wish not to tire y<sup>r</sup> L<sup>p</sup>'s patience by going into any length of reasoning upon this Subject. I will merely lay down one opinion, which is "that no overtures will be favourably listened to by this Government until they feel themselves exposed to some pressing danger, and that whenever that moment arrives, the overtures will come from hence."

I hear from a variety of quarters that the Archduke Charles \* has lately held a very firm & honorable language in speaking of the important events of the moment, & I have no objection, as a testimony in favor of that officer, to acquaint y<sup>r</sup> L<sup>p</sup> that General Meerfeldt is one of the Channels thro' which the information has reached me.

The Emperor has at length been induced to give His Ratification to the Plan of Indemnities, that is, to those points which were concluded at the epoch of the Convention signed at Paris last Dec<sup>r</sup>;† the rest will remain a matter for future deliberation. . . .

In addition to the contents of Mr. Stratton's dispatches, I feel it incumbent upon me to inform y<sup>r</sup> L<sup>p</sup> that it has come to me from very good authority that the French Ambassador at the Porte is very assiduously seconded in all his negotiations by the Prussian Minister, in testimony of which the K. of Prussia has received the thanks of the French Government.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord WHITWORTH to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

PARIS, Apr. 29<sup>th</sup> 1803.

MY DEAR PAGET,— . . . This may possibly be the last letter which I shall have to write you from hence. I repeated two days ago the Conditions which we con-

\* By his reformation of the army from 1802 to 1804, when he was War Minister, the Archduke prepared the way for a vigorous defence, but he steadily opposed offensive war or the provocation of war.

† Count Cobentzl, after a violent altercation with Talleyrand, yielded to the threats of the French Minister in signing the Convention.

sidered as indispensable with a view to our security, and at the same time declared that I was ordered to leave Paris on Tuesday next, (it is to day Friday) unless those Conditions were accepted. The chief of these is a temporary possession of Malta, (for ten years), and the acquisition of another point in the Mediterranean, which by the expiration of such a term might perhaps be made tenable.

I can scarcely form an opinion on the result. When I consider the dangers of all kinds, both public and private, which must accrue to this Country & Government from a renewal of war, I am inclined to think well of it; but when I recollect the untractable character with which we have to do, I am almost inclined to despair. Three days will now decide the question. I am sure we shall have the hearty good wishes of the Court where you are, and in truth it would be almost unreasonable to expect more under the present circumstances.

*Au revoir* here or in England. In the mean time believe me, &c. (Signed) WHITWORTH.

*From* MR. CHARLES STUART\* *to the* Hon. A. PAGET.

LONDON, Saturday 30th April 1803.

DEAR SIR,—That you may not remain ignorant of the present state of our Negotiations, I hasten to transmit by Paul some Particulars most confidentially communicated to me, and which you may rely upon to be authentic, though few People here are acquainted with the Truth.

When Lord Whitworth brought forward the Propositions of Ministry to the French Government, it appears that he solely insisted upon the total Cession of Malta, or the Admission and Continuance of a British Garrison provided it were restored to the Order, withholding the Instructions which authorized him to offer the Acknowledgment of the King of Etruria &c. in return for a mere temporary Possession of the Island.

At a Conference where these Points were in Discussion Joseph Bonaparte, lamenting that his Brother would scarcely be persuaded to accede to such Terms, required to know if the Possession of Malta during twenty years

\* Afterwards Lord Stuart de Rothsay.



would satisfy our Government. Upon this Lord Whitworth sent a Courier to London, whence, after a Cabinet Council, Shaw was dispatched on Saturday night bearing the following definite Instruction. First to demand the unqualified Cession of Malta during ten or twenty years, then to enter into a separate Negotiation tending to secure an adequate Indemnity for the Losses of the King of Sardinia, & offering on our Part to acknowledge the Kings, Republics, & Usurpations of Bonaparte in Italy; & should he refuse acceding to such Simple Conditions, Lord Whitworth is directed to quit Paris in seven Days. Shaw is expected to return on Monday, & Tatten's Motion comes on on Tuesday, when many (relying upon Reports that a second Negotiation to bring the Old Ministers into Office has failed) conceive the Minority will swell to 150, though the Intelligence in my preceding Page ill agrees with so unfavourable a conclusion.

I hope I shall receive Orders to set off to-morrow, & remain, &c. CH. STUART.

*P.S.*—Since writing the above, farther Dispatches have been received from L<sup>d</sup> Whitworth which, strange to say, wear every appearance of immediate war. The First Consul has excluded Joseph Bonaparte from the Conferences, & declares that he will rather consent to a total than a Temporary cession of Malta, alleging the former to be a voluntary, the latter an extorted Act. . . . Talleyrand seemed considerably alarmed when L<sup>d</sup> Whitworth declared his Intention of quitting Paris.

However inconsistent all this may appear, I assure you the Dispatches upon which I found my letters are not less contradictory. The general Impression in the Office is that we may very shortly expect a recommencement of Hostilities. . . . C. S.

*From Mr. B. GARLIKE \* to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURG, 5 May 1803.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . This Court does not appear unwilling to interpose its good-offices between our Govern-

\* Secretary of Legation at St. Petersburg.

ment, and that of France, in order to prevent a rupture ;—and requires from both of them such a full statement of the ground of their differences, as may enable the Emperor to devise the means of reconciling us ; as far as a willingness may be shewn to admit His interference.

There can be little doubt that the Russian Government is already well acquainted with the nature of our apprehensions, as to the views of France :—and that they are aware too of the difficulty of effectually interfering, otherwise than by countenancing the measures we may be obliged to adopt in order to secure some further check against French encroachment. . . .

Bonaparte does not revoke one jot of His pretensions on Turkey, and the vanity of the F. nation is such that they conceive those pretensions to be founded in justice. If Malta is our security in that quarter,\* we can consent to no halving or quartering of that possession ; and as we have armed, I hope and pray that we may soon declare our resolution never to abandon that island. . . .—  
I am, &c. (Signed) B. GARLIKE.

[A despatch from Mr. William Hamilton to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Yannina, May 6, conveys a message from Ali Pacha, Governor of Albania and Beglerbey of Roumelia, “one of the most powerful and energetic Pachas in European Turkey.” † In case of a rupture between England and France, he desired to confirm his friendship with England, and asserted his hostility to Russia and France ; he offered the port of Palormo for the use of troops ; in a few days he could raise 30,000 troops, and would quickly be joined by as many more. He was perfectly independent of the Turkish Government, and he asked for an English resident at Yannina.]

\* The decision to keep Malta was only made in the spring of 1803, in consequence of Sebastiani's reports on the French projects in Egypt and the European provinces of Turkey.

† Bonaparte had opened intrigues with him in 1798. At this time there was a proposal that France should help the Sultan to reduce him “to that state of subjection which the general welfare of the Turkish Empire required.”

*From Count COBENTZL to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*May 21, 1803.*

C'est pour satisfaire à l'engagement que j'ai pris envers Monsieur Paget que je dois Malheureusement lui annoncer qu'un courier arrivé hier au soir a apporté la nouvelle que Lord Whitworth avoit quitté Paris le 12 de ce mois. je prie Monsieur Paget d'Agréer l'Assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

(Signed) COBENTZL.

## VIENNA

### (2.) RISE OF THE THIRD COALITION: 1803-1805

ÆTAT. 32 TO 34

I MUST again repeat that this is not intended as, and has no pretension to be, an historical work; otherwise it would be necessary to give an account of the measures taken by the First Consul, on the renewal of the war in 1803 and subsequently, for carrying out his intended invasion of England,—the enormous forces, both naval and military, collected by him in the ports and along the coasts from Brest to the Texel; his fortifications of the coasts; his creation of a stupendous arsenal at Antwerp; and, not confining myself to the acts of the French Government only, I should have to enter into some detail as to what was passing in the other States of Europe, as well as to dilate upon the patriotic spirit and warlike enthusiasm which was aroused throughout Great Britain,—the enrolment of the Militia and Volunteer forces—the increase of the navy, as well as of the regular army—all the measures, in short, entailing vast expenditure which were taken by the Administration, without a murmur or a dissentient voice being raised, either in Parliament or in the country, in order to meet the impending danger. For all such details, as well as others bearing upon the situation of affairs in Europe, the reader can refer to the numerous Histories of that time.

My sole business is to deal with my father's career and the correspondence which I have before me, touching only upon such other events as may be necessary to explain the principal topics referred to in it.

Mr. Paget went to England, on leave of absence, in the autumn of 1803. On the 4th of January 1804 he was sworn in a member of the Privy Council, and he shortly

afterwards returned to Vienna to resume his diplomatic duties.

He had hardly arrived when he received intelligence of the well-known most infamous and iniquitous act amongst the many deeds of outrage, treachery, and violence which disgraced the career and character of Napoleon, viz., the seizure by a detachment of French troops, under the command of General Coulaincourt, of the unfortunate Duc d'Enghien at Ettenheim, on the territory of Baden, and his mock nocturnal trial by a military tribunal in the fortress of Vincennes, when, contrary to the convictions of his judges, he was condemned, as a conspirator against the life of the First Consul, and shot by a file of infantry in the trenches of that fortress.

It is easy to imagine the indignation aroused throughout the civilised world by this criminal proceeding. Not only was the public conscience revolted by the murder which had been committed, but there was not a Power which did not feel that there was an end to the independence and safety of every country, if so glaring an infraction of international law as the invasion of a neutral and pacific State, and the arrest and carrying off from within its territory of persons to whom it was affording hospitality, were allowed to pass with impunity.

But notwithstanding the universal abhorrence created by this daring and unprecedented act, such was the terror inspired at that time throughout Europe by Napoleon, that only two Powers, Russia and Sweden, had the courage to protest against it.

A sharp exchange of notes, replete with mutual recriminations, took place between the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, M. d'Oubril, and M. de Talleyrand, which ended in the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two Powers—M. d'Oubril leaving Paris at the end of August, and the French Chargé d'Affaires St. Petersburg about the same time. When the assumption of the imperial title of Napoleon was notified to the Court of St. Petersburg, the Emperor Alexander refused to recognise it.

The protest of Sweden was addressed to the Court of Bavaria—the King of Sweden, as Duke of Pomerania, having a voice in the Diet of the Empire at Ratisbon—

but it was answered by a series of notes, of the most offensive and insulting character to the person and dignity of the Swedish monarch, inserted in the official part of the *Moniteur*; and on the 7th of September an official note in which Napoleon, who had already proclaimed himself Emperor, was designated as *Monsieur* Napoleon Buonaparte, was sent in by the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, announcing the termination of all diplomatic communication between the two Governments, a circumstance which was taken advantage of by the British Government for concluding a Treaty of Alliance with Sweden.

Mr. Paget's despatches, and his communications, both verbal and in writing, with Count Cobentzl, afford ample testimony as to the strenuous efforts which he made to arouse the Austrian Cabinet from its apathy, and to make an attempt, while there might be yet time, to save the life of the unhappy Prince who had been captured; and when that was no longer possible, by reason of his execution, to enter its protest against the violation of international law which had been committed by the invasion of the Electorate of Baden; but all that he could and did say was received with the most stoical indifference by the Austrian Vice-Chancellor.

It may be as well to state here that the French Government, as a set-off to its own infamous proceedings, accused Mr. Drake, the British Minister at Munich, and Mr. Spencer Smith, the Chargé d'Affaires in Wurtemberg, not only of fomenting revolution through their secret agents in France, but of *instigating the assassination of the First Consul*. This latter charge was forcibly rebutted in a note from Lord Hawkesbury, which was published, and it was subsequently admitted to be false by Napoleon's most faithful adherents, amongst others by M. de Bourrienne, his Private Secretary.

Judging the pacific conduct of Austria at this juncture by the light of subsequent events and history, it would perhaps be fair to assume that it was mainly attributable to a desire to avoid doing anything which might expose the Empire to the further enmity of France before it had somewhat recovered, which it had not then done, from the disasters which had befallen it in the campaign prior

to the Treaty of Luneville, and it would be difficult to contest the validity of this argument. There may, however, have been, and probably were, subsidiary motives for this policy; for instance, the desire for the support of France in the settlement of the question of the Equestrian Order, and the anxiety of the Emperor Francis to secure the recognition of France to his assumption of the *hereditary title of Emperor of Austria*. Both these topics are referred to in Mr. Paget's despatches; and his despatch of the 2nd of April contains a full report of a rather serious altercation he had with Count Cobentzl in reference to the political system of Austria at that time, while a later despatch gives an account of a personal explanation he had had with the same Minister, who had complained to the Russian Ambassador of Mr. Paget's change of tone since his recent return from England.

It must have been gratifying to Lord Hawkesbury to be assured at the conclusion of Mr. Paget's report that the Vice-Chancellor had expressed his satisfaction at what had passed at this interview, but it will probably strike most people that Count Cobentzl must have been possessed of a nature which was very easily pacified, and of the most forgiving disposition.

Mr. Paget had doubtless very strong grounds for the censures which he passed upon the system pursued in Austria at that time, and the manner in which affairs were conducted by Count Cobentzl. It will be seen, indeed, that he and Count Rassoumoffsky, the Russian Ambassador, agreed in the opinion that no change for the better was to be hoped for until there was a change of persons in the Austrian Cabinet.

Early in May 1804 a change of Government took place in England, the causes which led to it being the extreme dissatisfaction of Parliament and the country at the way in which the naval and military forces of the country had been allowed to dwindle during the Peace, under the Administration of Mr. Addington. Especially there were loud complaints as to the inefficient state of the navy, under the management of Lord St. Vincent; marine stores had been sold and dissipated out of the royal dockyards, and when war broke out the navy was found in an unprecedented state of dilapidation. In these cir-

cumstances all eyes were again turned to Mr. Pitt, who, on the 15th of March, made a speech in which he commented with great severity on the administration of the navy, in which he was supported by Mr. Fox and Mr. Sheridan. The Ministerial majority went on steadily declining until it was reduced to thirty-seven, a majority considered *in those days* so feeble that, with the feeling of the country evidently against them, the Ministry resigned on the 12th of May. That was not the age in which a Prime Minister vaunted his intention to remain in office if even his majority were reduced to one. Mr. Addington (commonly called the "Doctor") was replaced by Mr. Pitt as Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Harrowby succeeded Lord Hawkesbury as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Lord Melville became First Lord of the Admiralty instead of the Earl of St. Vincent.

On the 4th of June, Lord Harrowby informed Mr. Paget that the King had been graciously pleased to confer upon him the Order of the Bath. It appears that, in former times, when a diplomatic servant of the Crown received this Order while he was abroad in the discharge of his duties, it was customary for the King to address a letter to the sovereign to whom the future knight was accredited, requesting that sovereign to act on his behalf and to perform the ceremony of investiture. Such a letter was now transmitted by Lord Harrowby from George III. to the Emperor Francis, which Mr. Paget was desired to deliver at an audience, and he was enjoined that the ceremony was to be performed according to the form observed on the occasion of Mr. Whitworth's investiture by the Empress Catherine.

Sir A. Paget had an audience of the Emperor on the 23rd of July for the investiture, and in a despatch of that date he gives an account of a conversation he had with His Imperial Majesty on political matters at the conclusion of the ceremony.

In the month of June an overture was made by the Court of St. Petersburg to ascertain the disposition of the British Government in regard to aiding, by subsidies, a possible alliance against France between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. In one of his despatches (dated



July) Lord Harrowby assumes it to be a condition *sine quâ non* to obtaining the concurrence of Austria in this agreement, that there should be a change in the persons comprising the Austrian Cabinet, and that the Archduke Charles should be got to support the proposed alliance. Accordingly instructions are given to Sir A. Paget to unite his efforts with those of the Russian Ambassador to secure this object.

It is now necessary to refer to an occurrence which had the effect of arousing even Prussia from its grovelling attitude of subservience to France, viz., a farther outrage upon neutral territory and the kidnapping of a diplomatic representative.

On the night of the 24th of October a detachment of French soldiers, under the command of General Trève, crossed over the Elbe from Harburg into the neutral territory of Hamburg, proceeded to the house of Sir George Rumboldt, the British Chargé d'Affaires, situated about a mile from the town, broke into the house, arrested Sir George Rumboldt, who was immediately sent off with his papers to Paris, where he was lodged in the Temple prison. Sir A. Paget and Mr. F. J. Jackson, the British Minister at Berlin, lost no time in addressing the most energetic remonstrances to the Governments to which they were accredited, and both these Governments protested at Paris—the King of Prussia as “Director of the Circle of Lower Saxony,” and the Emperor of Austria as “Chief of the Empire of Germany.” The result was that Sir George Rumboldt was set at liberty, after an examination of his papers, which were found to contain nothing compromising either his Government or himself in any of the designs attributed to them by Napoleon.

It was the practice of Napoleon, particularly at moments when he was meditating some new conquests, which, as he said, “were periodically necessary in order to captivate the French people and keep them in good humour,” to endeavour to persuade the world that he had nothing so much at heart as to live in a state of peace with all his neighbours.

Acting, therefore, on this principle—in order the better to conceal his designs, and aware, by the reports of his diplomatic agents, that a coalition was forming with a

view to resist his further aggressions—he addressed a letter to the King of England, early in the month of January 1805, deprecating the renewal of the war between France and England.

The King returned an answer through Lord Mulgrave to M. de Talleyrand, stating that His Majesty, however animated by the same desire for peace, could not entertain the proposal which had been made to him without communicating with the Powers with whom he was allied, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, to whom the letter from Napoleon was duly communicated. The good offices of the King of Prussia were invoked by His Imperial Majesty in order to ascertain whether the Emperor Napoleon was still in the same pacific sentiments, and whether he would cause passports to be sent enabling a Russian plenipotentiary to proceed to Paris. Passports were sent to Berlin, but Napoleon left Paris before the envoy could arrive. He had, in fact, proceeded to Italy, where, in the midst of festivities and pageants, he occupied himself in still further augmenting his dominions. He assumed the title of King of Italy, incorporated the Ligurian Republics with the French Empire, and took possession of Genoa, where he built an arsenal and erected fortifications. In short, his acts were such as to make every State which had hitherto preserved its independence tremble for its existence.

Amongst the documents of this year is the copy of an autograph letter from the King of Sweden (Gustavus IV.) to the King of Prussia (Frederick William III.) returning the Order of the Black Eagle, accompanied by a dignified and spirited rebuke, which, it may be hoped, must have caused, at least momentarily, a pang of shame in the breast of His Prussian Majesty.

The negotiations between England and Russia for the formation of a coalition to resist the further encroachments of France and for the restoration of the Balance of Power in Europe, commenced in London by an overture coming from the Russian Cabinet, were reopened in the autumn of 1804 at St. Petersburg by Lord Granville Leveson Gower, who had been appointed His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at that Court. At last, on the 11th of April 1805, a Treaty of Alliance was signed with Russia

The adhesion of the Court of Austria to this Treaty was announced on the 7th of July by Count Cobentzl to Count Rassoumoffsky, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, and subsequently by declarations exchanged at St. Petersburg on the 28th of July between Count Stadion, the Austrian Ambassador, with Lord G. Leveson Gower and Prince Czartorisky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Declaration of the 7th of July is not forthcoming, but it may be gathered from what is said about it in the documents connected with it, that it stipulated that before proceeding to hostilities an effort should be made to arrive at an understanding with Napoleon by negotiation—Austria specifying the modifications which she required in the then existing territorial arrangements, which were agreed to by Russia and also by Great Britain, with certain amplifications, and she (Austria) undertaking the office of mediator, as it appears she did, but of course without leading to any satisfactory result.

I do not think I ought to close the chapter relative to this period of my father's residence in Vienna without making some mention of the famous German publicist, M. de Gentz, a few of whose letters, out of a large number I have found, I have added to the correspondence as illustrative of the relations which existed between him and Sir A. Paget.

It may perhaps be convenient for some readers to have a few particulars relative to M. de Gentz' career.

He was born at Breslau in 1764, and was originally employed as Secretary in the War Department at Berlin, but his talents as a writer were so conspicuous that he was soon called upon to exercise them in a far wider field. He gradually became the confidant of almost all the Cabinets of Europe, who had recourse to his powerful pen for drawing up their public manifestoes and declarations in any important crisis. He was in Vienna at the time of Sir A. Paget's arrival, and remained there, off and on, during the whole period of his residence there as Minister.

It was, no doubt, from M. de Gentz that Sir A. Paget received a great deal of the valuable secret information which he was in the habit of transmitting to his Government. I have found several of his reports upon the

internal organisation and administration of the Austrian Empire, and upon other matters of interest at that time, but they are too voluminous to appear in the present publication.

In 1804 M. de Gentz paid a visit to London, and was furnished with a strong letter of recommendation by Sir A. Paget to Lord Harrowby, with whom he was in frequent communication, and who wrote to him after his departure. It was M. de Gentz who composed the Prussian manifesto against France in 1806, and that of Austria in 1809 and 1813. He visited the headquarters of the Prussian army just before the battle of Jena, and drew up that remarkable report entitled "*Journal de ce qui m'est arrivé de plus marquant dans le voyage que j'ai fait au Quartier Général de S. M. le Roi de Prusse le 2 Octobre 1806 et jours suivans.*" The first forty-three pages of the copy of this report, which I possess, are in Sir A. Paget's handwriting, which has made me reflect sometimes whether the report itself was not, considering their great intimacy, originally communicated to him before being otherwise made use of.

M. de Gentz was the Protocolist of the Congress of Vienna in 1814, and of that of Paris in 1815. He was the most determined adversary of the French Revolution, and was the author of several remarkable works, amongst which may be named "*Le Système de l'Equilibre Européen,*" "*Sur la Morale des Révolutions,*" "*Sur la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme.*" M. de Gentz died in 1832.

At the end of the correspondence of this year I venture to place together two letters, written at different times, in which Sir A. Paget treats of his own private affairs. The first, of August 18, 1805, is written to his mother, and in it he explains the circumstances of his attachment to the Princess Leopoldine, daughter of Prince and Princess Esterhazy, and sister of Prince Paul Esterhazy, who was afterwards (sometime in the 'thirties) Austrian Ambassador in London. The marriage was opposed by the parents on both sides, principally and solely, I may say, on the part of Lord and Lady Uxbridge, on the ground of difference in religion; though there was another objection on the part of the Esterhazys, and it gave rise to a long and rather acrimonious correspondence between them and

Sir Arthur—acrimonious at least on their part—viz., that he had committed the unpardonable offence, in Austrian eyes—though I believe, with us, it will be considered to have been in accordance with the usual course followed in cases of “true love”—of endeavouring to ascertain the sentiments of the young lady before speaking to her parents. Sir Arthur’s defence against the accusations brought against him is contained in a letter which he addressed on the 30th of January 1805 to Princess Esterhazy, and I think it will be generally considered to be as remarkable for lucidity of statement as for brilliancy and dignity of literary composition.

Princess Leopoldine was eventually married to Prince Lichtenstein, and became the mother of the charming and accomplished Princess Lory Schwarzenberg, for many years the well-known leader of Vienna Society.

## CORRESPONDENCE

*From Mr. T. JACKSON to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

ROME, June 13th 1803.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . Two days ago I had the pleasure to receive news of the 7th, and hope with all my heart the intelligence or rather the report of Russia’s taking Hamburg will be confirmed; if the Emperor does not do it the Consul infallibly will, for as long as he is not opposed he will certainly continue to be progressive.\* The Duke of Cambridge has a tremendous game to play & I shall be anxious to know what are his means, as well as the success which I wish him of his operations against the invader.†

Here in Italy the plot begins to thicken: the French troops, after being quartered some days in the Pope’s States at Ancona, &c., began their march towards the

\* The war opened with the march of French armies on Hanover and Naples.

† The Duke of Cambridge capitulated at Suhlingen, June 3, 1803, and General Mortier overran Hanover. George III. refused to ratify the convention distinguishing between his position as King of England and Elector of Hanover, and Mortier thereupon insisted upon absolute surrender.

Kingdom of Naples on the 12th. Gen<sup>l</sup> S<sup>t</sup> Cyr who commands them wrote to the Gov<sup>r</sup> on the frontier to inform him of his object, and rec<sup>d</sup> for reply that the king of Naples had determined to be neuter, that the entry of the French troops w<sup>d</sup> be a direct violation of the neutrality, but that having neither the will nor the means of resistance he s<sup>d</sup> not attempt any. The French troops are called 15,000 Infantry and 2000 Cavalry.

Here in the Roman States there are many appearances & promises of neutrality, and it is certain that hitherto none of the rigorous measures w<sup>b</sup> have been put in execution ag<sup>t</sup> the English elsewhere have been required of this Government. The Queen Regent of Tuscany has acted with becoming wisdom & spirit in refusing to arrest our Countrymen at Florence: \* they are about thirty, who have rashly in my opinion determined to wait the return of a Messenger from Paris; L<sup>d</sup> Oxford, Lord Mountcashel, Gen<sup>l</sup> Morgan & several other families of distinction are of the number. The Queen has also refused a demand w<sup>b</sup> has been made by the French of three hundred thousand Piastres.

Pray have the goodness to tell the Gentlemen who are at the head of the Austrian affairs that there is at this moment a Squadron of eighteen Algerine cruisers in the Adriatic, committing the most dreadful depredations both at sea and ashore; to say nothing of the danger of their landing the plague in Italy: you may hint to them, that this is their first appearance in the Adriatic, that it is solely to be attributed to the Austrians having neglected the Venetian marine, and that during the existence of the Venetian Republic, these freebooters never dared shew themselves in that sea.—Believe me, &c. T. JACKSON.

*From the Hon. A. PAGET to LORD HAWKESBURY.*

VIENNA, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1803.

MY LORD,— . . . I am relieved from the irksome duty of again entering into any details upon the state of this Country, by the simple reference to its conduct with regard to the actual situation of affairs in the North of Germany—for I certainly state facts without exaggeration

\* According to Bonaparte's order for the arrest of all English travellers in territories occupied by French armies.

when I say that not even a remonstrance has been made by the Court of Vienna to the French Government against the Invasion of Hanover.

It is, I apprehend, superfluous in me to say that I have allowed the late painful moments to pass over without making any official representation with respect to the degree of Interference which, according to my views of the subject, it has become the duty of this Court to apply in the present general State of affairs, but to those of Germany in particular. I have however lately had various conversations upon these points with the Vice Chancellor, & the conclusion to be drawn from His language is that it had become hopeless and impossible for Austria single handed to resist France, and that every effort imaginable has been made by the Emperor to connect Himself more closely than ever with Russia, but that these advances have been uniformly received with the most discouraging coldness & indifference.\* He has even insinuated to me that a proposal made from hence some time ago to the Court of Petersburg with a view to provide against this very Eruption of the French into Germany had met with the same disheartening reception.

Such are the general grounds of defence upon which the Emperor's Ministers rest themselves for the present unaccountable & incredible apathy of this Court, but I own that I cannot bring myself to give credit to the above statement—nor can I be satisfied with it as long as I know that with 25,000 French Troops in the Electorate of Hanover & as many on their March to seize upon the Kingdom of Naples, there are persons of this Government who still think that the reduction which has lately taken place in this Army has not been sufficient.

I must now take notice of an Edict respecting the Neutrality of the Ports of this Country, as it is termed, which will soon be published. . . .

I have had the good fortune to procure a copy of this new Edict, & upon examination I have the satisfaction to find it with the exception of one or two Points very admissible. There is in it however nearly the same Clause respecting prizes which was one of the principal points of

\* Russia's relations with England were rather strained at this time. Serious negotiations about the war only began in 1804.

Contention on [a former] occasion,\* & which I shall probably have much difficulty about upon the present occasion.

There is another subject to which I must make some allusion. Two considerable encampments were to have been formed, one in the neighbourhood of Vienna, the other in Gallicia. The latter, at which between 30 & 40,000 men were to have been assembled, has been countermanded in consequence, as C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl has informed me *confidentially*, of a Meeting which it was thought might have taken place in that Country between the Two Emperors having been given up, but I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that the above change in the military dispositions has taken place at the express representation of the French Government.

The Ignorance in which this Government is with respect to the movements of the French in Italy is beyond credibility. It is only known in general that a French Army was upon the point of entering the Kingdom of Naples.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From H.M. King LOUIS XVIII. to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

A VARSOVIE, ce 20 Juillet 1803.

M. l'Evêque de Laon ne m'a pas laissé ignorer, Monsieur, les offres que vous lui avez faites en apprenant l'ordre rigoureux qu'il a reçu.† J'y suis profondément sensible, mais ce n'est pas seulement de la reconnaissance qu'elles m'inspirent, il est un autre tribut que je dois à la générosité d'un *truly free-born Englishman* et à la noble fierté du représentant d'un grand Roi. Tous les sentimens que ces mots expriment, vous les avez excités en moi ; recevez en donc, je vous prie, Monsieur, l'assurance bien sincère et soyez également persuadé de tous ceux qui vous sont purement personnels. (Signé) LOUIS.

*From Lord PAGET to the Hon. ARTHUR PAGET.*

IPSWICH, *Sept. 28th*, 1803.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—If I do not hear of a further postponement of the party, I shall dine at Wrotham on

\* Referring to an earlier edict which was never published.

† See the letter of the Bishop of Arras to Mr. Paget, October 31.



Friday. By the arrangements that I shall make I can be at Ipswich in 6 hours after the intelligence of the 1st movements of the Foe are known. Now there are certain little previous ceremonies attending an attack of the nature of that expected which pretty well precludes the possibility of surprise. *Ergo* I shall have no scruple in shooting & dining with you *each day*, even tho' I shd. think it necessary to spend the nights here under arms.  
—Ever Affecy. Yours, (Signed) PAGET.

*From Mr. JOHN KEMBLE to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

*Thursday, Oct. 13th, 1803.*

MY DEAR SIR,—Your note catching me the moment I am going on the Stage and I can only tell you how sorry I am that my Box is engaged.

Mr. Brandon is at my Elbow, and says that he will keep you the Box next but one to the Stage on the King's side of the Theatre, if you can come before the first Act is over.—I am, my dear Sir, your very obedient Servant,  
(Signed) J. P. KEMBLE.

*From the COMTE DE CONZIÉ \* to the Hon. A. PAGET.*

LONDRES, No. 66 GEORGES STREET, MANCHESTER SQUARE,  
*Le 31 Xbre. 1803.*

MONSIEUR,—J'ay l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence, que M. l'Archeveque de Narbonne vient de recevoir une lettre officielle de M. Vansittart, qui lui annonce, de la part de M. Addington, que six des évêques françois, qui sont menacés de perdre leur asile en Allemagne et en Espagne, seront admis en Angleterre, et qu'ils y recevront les memes secours dont jouissent ceux de nos collegues qui y resident depuis plusieurs années.

M. l'Evêque de Laon, qui a deja été, d'une maniere si touchante, l'objet de votre interet, a acquis le droit d'être le premier des six qui seront admis en Angleterre; mais, attendu que sa santé a été fort alterée depuis qu'il a été obligé de se refugier à Cracovie, je propose à votre Excellence de lui continuer ses bons offices à l'effet d'obtenir d'être autorisé à lui faire remettre dix livres sterlins par

\* Bishop of Arras.

mois jusqu'à ce qu'il soit assez bien retabli pour pouvoir se rendre de Cracovie à Londres.

Je présume que votre Excellence voudra bien s'employer aussi pour obtenir que l'époque où le traitement, accordé à nos six collègues, commencera, soit tellement fixée, qu'ils y trouvent les moyens de subvenir aux frais d'un voyage très long, qu'aucun d'eux ne seroit en état d'acquitter.

Si votre Excellence veut bien m'informer de ce qu'elle aura obtenu à ce sujet, je lui en serai très obligé.

Ce sera toujours avec la plus grande satisfaction que je verrai naître des occasions de vous renouveler l'assurance et l'hommage des sentimens de haute considération avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur, votre très humble et très obeissant serviteur,

LE COMTE DE CONZIÉ, Eveque D'Arras.

*From Lord HAWKESBURY to the Right Hon. A. PAGET.*

[Most Secret and Confidential.]

DOWNING STREET, 10 March 1804.

[He urges the importance of using every effort to obtain information as to the exact state of the negotiation depending between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna.

When Count Markoff \* quitted Paris, he received orders from his Court to return home by the way of Vienna, and to ascertain the sentiments and dispositions of the Austrian Government. He wrote to Count Woronzow, the Russian Ambassador, that he had had several satisfactory conferences with Count Cobentzl. It was said that an armed mediation formed part of the plan under the consideration of the two Imperial Courts. The extreme unwillingness of the Chancellor Count Woronzow † to give to Sir John Warren any explanation on the state of the discussion subsisting between the two Governments made it extremely probable that those discussions turned upon points which might excite the jealousy of His Majesty's Government. The pecuniary succours which the Imperial Courts might be led to expect from this country in the event of a Con-

\* Recalled at the end of 1803, in consequence of the growing anger of Alexander with Bonaparte.

† Czartoryski became Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1804; and from that time serious negotiations began for common action against France.

tinental war arising out of a new confederacy\* would otherwise induce them to conciliate the confidence of His Majesty's Government.

It was therefore necessary to procure information as to the negotiations, and particularly whether the idea of an armed mediation has ever been entertained by them; whether, if entertained, it still continues to form a part of their system, and what in that case are the nature of the conditions which would be proposed to the belligerent powers. Sir A. Paget might convey in dignified and temperate terms some degree of dissatisfaction at the secrecy and reserve observed towards His Majesty's Government. His Majesty feels that in opposing the power of France he is sustaining the cause of all Europe, and this consideration gives him a stronger claim to the confidence of those powers whose interests are so materially advanced, and whose safety is improved by his separate exertions.]

*From Mr. ARBUTHNOT † to the Right Hon. A. PAGET.*

DOWNING ST., 12th March 1804.

Nothing has taken place since you left us, except the sad result of all our fine Projects for the re-establishment of the Bourbons,‡ & of the particulars of the discovery you must know more than we are as yet acquainted with. We have only learnt from the *Moniteur* that Moreau is arrested,§ & that Pichegru || is in flight. You may easily figure to yourself the consternation spread among Pichegru's friends by this melancholy intelligence. As for the poor Baron de Roll,¶ he is like a Man distracted, & I am told that Monsieur is, if possible, still more wretched. They will still however persuade themselves that the game is not lost, but I own it is impossible for me to join with

\* England offered a subsidy on two conditions objected to by Russia: (1) that Austria and Prussia should *both* first join the alliance; (2) the *status quo* should be established after the war.

† At that moment one of the Under-Secretaries of the Foreign Office; afterwards Ambassador at Constantinople.—A. P.

‡ Conspiracy of Georges, Polignac, &c.

§ Arrested February 15.

|| Arrested February 28.

¶ A Hanoverian officer in the service of England, very intimate with the Paget family.—A. P.

them in these sanguine Expectations. Since the first news was received we have not been able to obtain any secret information, so we are of course remaining in the most perplexing doubt & anxiety, & are of course greatly apprehensive for poor Moreau's safety. There are those who are willing to believe that Buonaparte will not dare to execute him, but he has proved his power by arresting him, & he will not act consistently with his well known violence of temper if he sh<sup>d</sup> refrain from seizing the opportunity of dispatching a Rival, from whom, while life remains, danger must naturally be expected. . . .

There is another subject which likewise occupies much of our attention. We have been led to believe that the Ports of France & Boulogne in particular, can be rendered useless to the Enemy by the Act of sinking old Hulks in the Entrance of the Harbours. Long before you receive this, it will be known to you whether this measure has succeeded, for the preparations are all compleated & probably the attempt has ere now been made.

It would be rather amusing to shut in the First Consul's Flotillas &c., & it w<sup>ld</sup> with a vengeance retaliate upon him his threat against us of closing *hermetiquement* the Ports of the Continent.

Our beloved Sovereign (as you will certainly learn from other quarters) is advancing to a perfect recovery. I trust in God that we shall not much longer have reason to be anxious about him, but I cannot help being sorry to perceive that there are Persons who doubt of his being in that favourable State which is reported by the Physicians. At the same time I am for my own part perfectly inclined to believe that these apprehensions respecting the King proceed chiefly from the extreme want of confidence in our present Ministers.

With all that belongs to this subject you are to the full as well acquainted as I am myself. The general feeling seems to be that they cannot stand long. One bad Omen against them is that their friends who continue to give *good Ministerial Votes* (as Mr. Yorke called them) join as readily as the rest in bursting into fits of laughter whenever the Doctor \* gets up to speak. He is in truth a lost Man in the House of Commons, & as contempt is

\* Addington : his father had been Chatham's physician.

the worst evil that can befall a Man, I sh<sup>d</sup> think it scarcely possible that a poor wretch so universally despised & laughed at can continue much longer to govern the most high minded Nation that now exists on Earth. At the same time it must be owned that he has something to hope from the thorough right feeling which seems to pervade the whole body of the People. As chosen by the King, & as appearing to possess His exclusive Confidence, there is certainly a willingness to support him, not, God knows, for his own Merits, but merely for the sake of not disturbing the general tranquillity by hazarding such a Convulsion as a forced Change of Ministry might now occasion. One cannot but admire the Principle which has induced the Nation to bear with the most inefficient Cabinet that ever cursed a Country, but the day must, I sh<sup>d</sup> think, arrive when the great talents of our great Statesmen are to be called into action, & whatever may be the result, for my own interests, I cannot but look forward to that day with panting eagerness & impatience.

. . . I do not know what you will think of it, but I confess for my part that I do not view with the same alarm the idea now entertained of an Armed Mediation. Let Europe be armed up to the teeth, & the effect will be as good for us as it must be pernicious to our enemies. The Mediators may propose what they please, but there need be no apprehension of their going to war with us because we may think their terms inadmissible. They must be sufficiently aware that danger to the Continent springs from France & not from England, & I cannot but imagine that the great Powers of Europe when well prepared for War will have the Courage to hold such language to the First Consul as must be essentially advantageous to our Common Interests. . . .

*March 13th.*

Last night we received the fatal news of poor Pichegru's arrest. I cannot dwell on this subject, for it is too shocking to think of.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[No. 1.]

VIENNA, 21st March 1804.

MY LORD,— . . . It would appear that the theatre will be again thrown open at Ratisbon\* under the patronage and management of the 1st Consul, and that scenes similar to those of last year, which all just and thinking men in Europe shrank from with disgust, are likely to be brought forward for the practical establishment and consolidation of a fresh system of injustice and oppression, and for the further demolition of the Laws, Constitution, and Dignity of the Empire. Such at least are the views of the French Government. It remains however still to be seen whether the Emperor of Russia will waive the demand he had made, that the various points at issue between the Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria and other Princes, should be negociated at Vienna, or whether he will accede to the proposal of the 1st Consul that these negociations should be transferred to Ratisbon, and this decision is awaited with a considerable degree of anxiety.—I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

VIENNA, 23rd March 1804.

[The Right Hon. A. Paget, in a despatch to Lord Hawkesbury, announces the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien on March 15, and continues:—]

It is too atrocious to require any comment from me. But we must wait to see how this direct violation of territory and infraction of the law of nations and of every other hitherto (except by that nation) respected barrier between Civilisation and Barbarism will be borne by the two Imperial Courts.

I do not like to throw out anything like false hope, otherwise I might be tempted to say that the Court of Petersburg,† as far as I have ground for judging, is not

\* On October 8, 1801, the Diet of Ratisbon appointed a deputation of eight members representing the great German Powers to settle indemnifications and changes of territory. The Emperor Francis delayed, and the deputation only met in August 1802. Bonaparte was then able to dominate the Council, and he procured five treaties in favour of his own claims. The sittings lasted until February 1803.

† M. d'Oubril was instructed to express to the First Consul the "grief and surprise" of the Czar, and on 12th May he presented a note protesting against

this moment quite in a humour to brook the above insult.

And with respect to that of Vienna, I will only observe (with the most anxious prayer that I may soon be enabled to say better things of it) that on Sunday last, the Emperor paid a congratulatory compliment to the French Ambassador upon the plot against the 1st Consul's life having been discovered and frustrated.—I have the honour to be, &c., &c. (Signed) A. PAGET.

*From the Right Hon. ARTHUR PAGET to Count COBENTZL.*

[*Copia.*]

VIENNA, March 22, 1804.

MONSR. LE COMTE,—Le Gouvernement Francais ayant depuis quelque tems publié officiellement des nouvelles extrêmement à notre désavantage au sujet de la guerre qui s'est faite aux Grandes Indes, je crois faire plaisir à V.E. en lui apprenant que je viens d'être instruit, par l'arrivée d'un Courier, que non seulement toutes ces nouvelles sont fausses et controuvées mais qu'après deux victoires signalées, remportées le 11 & 23 Septre par le Général Wellesley sur les armées combinées de Dowlut Rao Scindiah et le Rajah de Bevar, une troisième complètement decisive a été obtenue par le Général Lake, et suivie d'un Armistice entre le Principal Chef des Mahrattes & les armées Britanniques.—J'ai honneur, &c.

(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

VIENNA, 2nd April 1804.

MY LORD,—Before I left England I felt it my duty to state unreservedly to Your Lordship the small degree of expectation I entertained of finding any favourable change in the Politics, or even the disposition of this Government.

I have now to perform a Duty, the fulfilment of which is as irksome to myself, as the consideration and result of it will be repugnant to your Lordship's Sentiments.

the violation of neutral territory. Alexander further erected a monument to the Duke in Petersburg, with the inscription, "Quem Corsica bellua immamiter trucidavit."

It may not be improper that I should, in the first instance, lay before your Lordship a succinct account of the last negotiations which have taken place at Paris between the Austrian, Russian, and French Ministers relative to the affairs of Germany.

On the 29th February, Count Philip Cobentzl\* presented a note to Mr. Talleyrand accompanied by a memorial upon the affairs of the Equestrian Order.† In this note a communication is made to the French Government of the *Rescrit Conservatoire* issued by the Emperor; it is stated that His Imperial Majesty looked with confidence to the support of the 1st Consul in the measure which the late conduct of several Princes in Germany had obliged him to adopt, and that this Union between Himself and the French Government had become of infinite importance for the preservation of that order and Tranquillity which had lately been established under the auspices of the Mediating Powers.

This note is conceived in the humble tone of a person soliciting the Protection and good offices of his Superior.

The Memorial is drawn up in a rather more dignified strain. The circumstances which led to the emanation of the Conservatorium are fully and ably exposed, and the absurd and even disgusting conduct of the Court of Berlin upon that occasion is analysed with a considerable degree of perspicuity and address.

On the same day, the 29th February, Mr. Oubril, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, likewise presented a note in which he sets forth the advantage which would result from the Intervention of the Mediating Powers for the management of the differences which had arisen out of the execution of the last *Recés de l'Empire*,‡ and finishes by proposing that the question respecting the Equestrian order should be discussed at Vienna.

\* Brother of the Vice-Chancellor.

† There was a dispute between the Emperor of Austria and the Elector of Bavaria relative to their rights of jurisdiction over certain nobles belonging to what was called the Equestrian Order. The Elector, considering them as his subjects, had summoned them to meet him at Bamberg to adjust certain differences which had arisen between himself and them. They refused, and applied to the Emperor, who supported their pretensions to independence of the Elector's Government. Upon this the Elector appealed to the First Consul, and the Emperor Francis did the same.—A. P.

‡ The registration of the resolutions of the Diet as to the indemnities.



To the latter of these notes an *immediate*, and I believe verbal answer was given, that the First Consul would send Instructions to General d'Hedouville at Petersburg.

On the third day, the Imperial Ambassador and the Russian Chargé d'affaires received official answers to their respective notes.

In the report that has reached me through a private channel it is said, "Ces deux pièces sont écrites du style le plus menaçant et le plus insolent. Le Premier Consul y parle absolument le langage d'un maître absolu, d'un maître gravement irrité par la mauvaise conduite de ses Sujets. Il dit entre autre à M. d'Oubril que les démarches des Princes de l'Empire ne servaient que de prétexte aux mesures violentes de l'Empereur, que celui-ci avait seulement pour but d'étendre sa puissance en Allemagne, que telle avait toujours été le système et la marche de la Maison d'Autriche, que le Consul ne souffrirait jamais que l'Electeur de Bavière ne fut opprimé par l'Empereur, et qu'il voulait absolument que l'affaire fut traitée à Vienne."

The answer given to Mr. de Cobentzl is even more violent; among others is the following remarkable passage, "que le premier Consul n'ignorait pas que les armemens de la Cour de Vienne étaient provoqués par les Intrigues et le Crédit de l'Angleterre, que c'était Elle que portait l'Empereur à des démonstrations pour paralyser les efforts et diviser l'attention du Gouvernement Français, mais que le Premier Consul entendait que la tranquillité de l'Empire ne serait troublé sous aucun prétexte."


My information proceeds to state that to this note Count Cobentzl returned a very spirited reply, "dans laquelle," it is said, "en justifiant l'Empereur, il est même allé jusqu'à avancer que l'Europe serait bien heureuse si le premier Consul était dans des dispositions aussi pacifiques que celle de ce Souverain."

These communications were followed by a note presented to the Diet of Ratisbon by the French Minister, which, as it has been published, I need not take further notice of.

During these transactions the Prussian Minister at Paris has been employed in instigating the French Government to this violent conduct against this Court by the most unbecoming and even outrageous language,



FRANCIS II,  
EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.



which has been followed up by a very inflammatory note delivered at Ratisbon by the Minister from the same Court, the Count de Goertz.

On the 23rd ultimo I had the honour to acquaint Your Lordship in a dispatch sent by Mr. Elliott, Junior, of the accounts that had been transmitted to this Court of the outrageous proceedings of the French in the Electorate of Baden.

I will very fairly own to Your Lordship that from the information I received on my return to Vienna with respect to the temper and disposition of the Emperor's Ministers, to the very little, if any, amelioration that had taken place in the Financial System, to the state of their negotiations, and I may add to the language held in the War Department—from the consideration of all and each of these subjects as they presented themselves to me, my hopes of being able to effect a favourable change in the sentiments of this Government, of awakening their attention to the very extraordinary posture of affairs in Europe, I may say of even obtaining a serious and attentive hearing to the suggestions such a posture of affairs would prompt me to deliver, became so faint that until the above epoch I had scarcely brought a single subject of importance under discussion between the Vice Chancellor and myself.

With a view of observing as much order as possible in regard to time, it is in this place that I should inform Your Lordship that in the first four or five days after my arrival here, I had one or two very long conversations with the Russian Ambassador, the result of which I may confine to two separate points. The first, that the Emperor of Russia had entirely opened his eyes with respect to the conduct and views of the French Government, and a very favourable disposition on the part of His Imperial Majesty had succeeded that blindness: the second is, his, Count Rasoumoffsky's, conviction that for the purpose of deriving any good from this country, a change in the Emperor's councils had become indispensably necessary, and the removal of Count Cobentzl most particularly so. In delivering this opinion he appeared to me to be speaking the sentiments of his Court.

I trust that this intelligence will afford Your Lordship some degree of satisfaction. My view of the subject is

too well known to Your Lordship to make it necessary for me to say one word with respect to the part I took in these conversations. About that time Count Rasoumoffsky dispatched a confidential person to Petersburg, and I have no doubt that the dispatches of which he was the Bearer were very much to the purpose.

On the day after the accounts had been received here of the irruption of the French into Germany, and of the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien, I waited upon the Vice Chancellor and, having made a few strong prefatory remarks upon the nature of the event which had taken place, (all of which were most perfectly thrown away) I proceeded to inform him that from the Protection which His Majesty had constantly afforded to the Princes of the unfortunate House of Bourbon, I had no hesitation in assuring him for the Emperor's information, that the King would learn with pleasure any steps that his Imperial Majesty might in his wisdom be disposed to take for the release of that unhappy Prince.

There is nothing in Count Cobentzl's answer to this communication at all worth recording. It was at once evident that he at least would think it prudent not to interfere in the business. I nevertheless thought it my Duty to present a note upon the subject, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose, marked A.

About the same time I received the enclosed Papers marked C. D. and E. the contents of which I take the liberty to recommend to Your Lordship's particular attention. They contain the whole of the intelligence which has hitherto reached us respecting that most infamous transaction.

Upon the receipt of the Paper marked C, I lost no time in drawing up and presenting to this Government the enclosed note B. which, as it is a state Paper of some importance, will I most humbly hope, not meet with the disapprobation of His Majesty's Government.

The above Papers were sent here to Baron Armfelt by the King of Sweden.

I had yesterday another interview of nearly two hours with the Vice Chancellor, and for the greater part of the time the conversation was sustained on both sides with a degree of heat which I never on any former occasion witnessed.

I opened the discussion by saying that, from the deep interest which His Majesty had constantly manifested in the affairs of Germany, I felt myself called upon to desire I might be informed of the measures which the Emperor might determine to pursue in consequence of the outrage which had been committed by the French in Germany. Count Cobentzl replied that His Imperial Majesty would certainly on this, as on all other occasions, make every communication to His Majesty which the friendship subsisting between the two Courts required—that the Emperor had hitherto come to no resolution on the affair to which I alluded; the nature of it, he admitted, was truly serious, but that as it only regarded the Emperor in his quality of *Chef de l'Empire*, He could take no step until the Empire had been consulted.

This was precisely the answer that I was prepared to receive. It appeared to me, therefore, superfluous to dwell longer at that moment upon a subject upon which no satisfaction whatever was to be derived, than to expose unreservedly the sense I entertained of this unheard-of Insult.

I now proposed to myself to enter into a calm, dispassionate, and friendly discussion upon the politics of this country. I therefore prefaced by requesting the Vice Chancellor, in case any observation not quite consonant with His feelings or in any way disagreeable to him should fall from me, to impute it to zeal and friendly disposition on my part. I then began by declaring to him that I could not reflect without considerable uneasiness and dissatisfaction upon the very slight degree of intercourse which had for some time existed between the two Courts, and that I could not help attributing it to a want of confidence on the part of this Government. Without allowing me to proceed further, Count Cobentzl asked me with an unbecoming degree of warmth, whether I was authorized by my Government to make *this reproach*, that it was not language to be held to a great Court, etc., that if it was to be considered as official he should not lose one instant in making a formal report of my communication to the Emperor, and of taking His Imperial Majesty's commands.

I stopped the Vice Chancellor to inform him that I was

not aware of having used any expression which warranted the manner in which he had thought proper to interrupt me, and begged that he would be so good as to allow me to repeat what had fallen from me, and that he would attend to it. This repetition had the same effect. He again asked me whether I was authorized to make this declaration, etc. To this second interpellation, which I requested might be the last, I desired him once for all to recollect that it was the King's Minister who was addressing him, that neither my instructions or inclination led me to make use of offensive language, that I was persuaded that mine could not bear any such construction, and that if he proposed that the conversation should be carried on as it had begun, I conceived that it could lead to no good purpose whatever, and had therefore better be terminated. During this altercation, which was carried on with much mutual asperity, Count Cobentzl talked of Ink and Paper to take down my words, an idea in which I strenuously encouraged him, but which he thought proper to abandon.

I therefore once more returned to the charge with these words: "*Mon Gouvernement voit avec peine qu'il n'existe pas entre les deux Cours ce degré de confiance et d'intelligence que le bien-être de l'Europe et leur intérêt commun exigent dans la crise actuelle.*" I told him that I had certainly derived some sort of satisfaction from the warmth he had manifested at the imputation, but that I must still think that the want of confidence was on the side of this Government, and having again requested that the discussion might go on with calmness and moderation, I observed that this was not the only cause of the concern I experienced, for that it was generally considered that the confidence, the absence of which I lamented, was placed in the French Government.

I did not, from the agitation the Vice Chancellor had been in, expect this intimation to pass unnoticed. He however denied it both with temper and force, and protested in the most solemn manner that nothing like intimacy subsisted between this Court and the French Government. With regard, he observed, to the want of confidence of which I complained he was at a loss to discover upon what ground I had made the accusation, as

nothing could be more remote from the Emperor's sentiments and intentions. After a considerable deal of discussion and, at moments, of altercation, in the course of which he said that he understood it to have been the wish of the English Government to avoid a continental war, he asked whether I had any specific proposition to make to him.

The communication alluded to by Count Cobentzl, I informed him, was perfectly fresh in my memory, the more so as I was the very person by whom it had been made, but I begged leave to explain to him what the real nature of that communication was, and it was this: that although the English Government never had it in contemplation, in consequence of the rupture with France, to involve this or any other country in a continental war, that on the contrary, as I had expressly stated, His Majesty would, as far as his single exertions might avail, do his utmost to secure the independence and even the tranquillity of the Continent, still that it was of the utmost importance that the most unlimited and unre-served friendship and confidence should subsist between the two Courts.

This declaration I avowed myself to be most ready to renew to him. With regard to any proposition I had to make, I most undoubtedly had a most distinct and important one, and it was contained in the very renewal of the above declaration.

And here I begged the Vice Chancellor clearly to understand that I was not come to solicit one handful of assistance for the defence of Great Britain, but that I was undoubtedly come as the Minister of a Friendly Power to advise and consult with him upon the calamities and dangers to which the Continent became daily more exposed by the unmeasured insolence and ambition of the French Government, and upon the best mode to be adopted for checking the evil before it became too great to contend with.

Having said this, I submitted to Count Cobentzl whether it was not rather for him to come forward with some specific proposition to the Courts of both London and Petersburg. I fully explained to him that it was by no means my advice that any absolutely hostile demon-



stration (although I at the same time fully trusted that the late daring and unheard-of provocation on the part of the French would not pass unnoticed) should be made without a prior understanding having been established between the three Courts, but that I had no hesitation in saying that not one moment should be lost in the adoption of this previous step.

In answer to this the Vice Chancellor contended that any such concert would be a direct violation of their system of neutrality, from which the Emperor would not easily be brought to depart; that it was a wise system not to talk before the means of supporting your language were proved to exist; that this country was not in a situation to go to war; that although their present situation was unquestionably a bad one, still that it was not desperate, and that by endeavouring to better it a worse might, and probably would, succeed; that the French had a 100 thousand men in Italy; that their whole force now upon the coast might at a moment's notice be equally turned against this country; that the Austrian army *was at this moment upon the Peace Establishment*, etc. etc. What astonishing confessions to succeed each other!!! These and similar arguments was I doomed to the pain of listening to.

Finding all I had hitherto said of no more avail, and having, I may say, made no more impression than if I had addressed myself to the Winds, I endeavoured to move this miserable Minister by carrying his attention to one or two other very important considerations.

I endeavoured to make him understand the advantages that might result to this Country in the event of a successful termination of the present contest on the part of England. I attempted to make him sensible that under such circumstances the order of things might, under the influence and even direction of Great Britain, be totally changed on the Continent, that the views of the House of Austria in Italy might either be accomplished or frustrated, and in general that the pretensions of Powers might be upheld or resisted according to their Merits. I gave him further distinctly to understand, that if he thought the assistance of England was to be had whenever their own particular interest might force

them to solicit it, such a speculation was altogether erroneous and impolitic.

Having dwelt largely upon these points—the nature and extent of which seemed much beyond Count Cobentzl's calculations—I thought it my Duty to put him upon his guard against a system which circumstances might render it indispensable to create between the Courts of London, Petersburg, and Berlin.

I have already gone into so much detail, that it would be an abuse of Your Lordship's time and patience to consume any more of them by a recital of the Vice Chancellor's answers and observations upon the different topics I have just alluded to. I will therefore, for this time, dismiss the subject by declaring that I never witnessed the display of so much ignorance, weakness, and pusillanimity on the part of any individual calling himself a Statesman.

The circumstance I am about to mention, if it really happened, took place before my arrival here, and it is otherwise of so delicate a nature, that without better proof than that of which I am in possession I should not think of offering the information as authentic.

It is very strongly suspected that the intelligence of Pischegru's being at Paris, was transmitted by Count Cobentzl to the French Ambassador here, and it is thought that he received it from Count Starhemberg.\* The dates of the arrival of this Minister's Courier, of the immediate departure of one sent by Mr. Champagny † (who was his own nephew), the time of Pischegru's arrest, etc. have been compared, and tend to confirm the suspicion. There is one very curious circumstance attending this business which I mention most confidentially, and that is that the Baron Armfelt, the Swedish Minister, did on the day before yesterday in a conversation he had with the Emperor's confessor, actually denounce Count Cobentzl to him as having been guilty of the above transaction, with an offer to prove the fact if called upon (in which, I suspect, he has pledged himself rather too far). The Confessor (who is said to be well disposed) listened with indignation, and promised to carry the information the next day to the Emperor.

\* Austrian Ambassador in London.

† French Ambassador in Vienna.

I turn with pleasure from the subjects upon which I have been writing to one from which, without feeling too sanguine, I cannot contemplate (considering the source from whence it comes) without the hopes of shortly seeing a change in the situation of affairs, and in order to do proper justice to what is to follow, it is necessary that Your Lordship be informed that Count Rasoumoffsky is, I think without exception, the most reserved and the most cautious man in politics I ever had to deal with. He is withal a man whose political principles I hold to be irreproachable, and under the present circumstances it may not be misplaced to add that we live upon terms of the utmost friendship and confidence.

He arrived here one month ago from Petersburg, and notwithstanding the reports which were circulated to the contrary, I have every reason for supposing that he has the honour to enjoy the good-will and confidence of His Sovereign.

In the former part of this Despatch Your Lordship will have seen what this Minister had said to me respecting the present feelings of the Emperor of Russia with regard to France, and I have now to acquaint Your Lordship that since that day, and particularly since the accounts from Carlsruhe, the Russian Ambassador has more than once expressed to me his conviction that in the course of two or three months a rupture will take place between Russia and France.

I find him very much disposed to think that in case any effort should fail in creating a change either in the men who compose this Government or in their measures, recourse will be had to the Court of Berlin who *will be forced* into a coalition.

Your Lordship will observe however that these are hitherto but opinions; they have indeed come to me through another very safe channel, and for many considerations they do not appear to be altogether without weight. I sincerely trust that Your Lordship's accounts from Petersburg may confirm them. At all events I can foresee no circumstances under which, for the safety, honour, and independence of the Continent, this Government, as it is now composed, ought to exist, and with these sentiments which are, I fear, unalterable, will it, in order to

arrive at any salutary end, be an indispensable duty to act.

It only remains for me to apologize to Your Lordship for the unreasonable length of this letter.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) A. PAGET.

A.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Count COBENTZL.*

VIENNE, le 27 Mars 1804.

Le soussigné E.E. & M.P. de S.M.B. auroit peut-être gardé le silence au sujet de l'événement incroyable qui vient de se passer dans l'Electorat de Baden, s'il ne croyoit avoir un Intérêt particulier à attirer l'attention du Ministère de S.M.I. sur un fait aussi contraire aux Droits des Nations.

Mais c'est moins en ce moment pour le Droit des gens outragé, pour le territoire Allemand violé, pour la Dignité de l'Empire insultée, que pour répondre à l'Intérêt constant manifesté par le Roi Son Maître pour l'Illustre & malheureuse Maison de Bourbon que le Soussigné croit prévenir les ordres de Son Gouvernement en s'adressant à S.E. Mr. le Vice Chancelier de Cour & d'Etat, pour l'assurer que le Roi apprendra avec plaisir toutes les démarches que S.M. l'Empereur jugera, en sa sagesse, devoir faire pour obtenir la liberté du Prince Infortuné, victime aujourd'hui d'une violence qui ne doit pas rester impunie.

Il profite avec plaisir de cette occasion pour renouveler à S.E. les assurances de sa considération distinguée.

B.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Count COBENTZL.*

March 29, 1804.

Aussi longtems que le Gouvernement Francais s'est borné à publier dans son Journal officiel d'atroces Calomnies contre l'Angleterre, Le Soussigné Envoyé Extra : & Min: Plen: de S.M.B. n'a pas cru nécessaire d'opposer à ces Injures autre chose que le mépris qu'elles meritoient.

Aujourd'hui qu'on emploie la même arme auprès des Gouvernements, aujourd'hui que le Gouvernement Français ose, dans ses notes officielles présentées aux Cours Etrangères, accuser le Cabinet Britannique d'avoir eu part aux complots que poursuit le Gouvernement Français, Le Soussigné croit devoir rompre un Silence qui passeroit peut-être pour un assentiment à ces assertions fausses & scandaleuses.

Quelle doit être la faiblesse de la Cause, lorsqu'on est obligé d'avoir recours à de pareils moyens pour la soutenir?

Pour justifier l'enormité sans exemple qui vient d'être commise dans l'Electorat de Bade, des pièces officielles contiennent des phrases suivantes :—

*Note de M. Talleyrand à Mr. le Baron d'Edelsheim.*

"S.A. y trouvera des preuves nouvelles, et évidentes du Genre de Guerre que le Gouvernement Anglois poursuit contre la France.

"et pour eux-mêmes à lier des intrigues dont l'Angleterre profite; et qu'elle étend et dirige au gré de ses detestables projets."

*Rapport du Grand Juge.*

"Il existe dans Offenbourg &c. un Comité soudoyé par le Gouvernement Britannique &c. Sa destination est de chercher par tous les moyens possibles à exciter des troubles dans l'intérieur de la France."

*Lettre de Mr. Talleyrand à Mr. le Baron d'Edelsheim.*

"Lorsque le Premier Consul par l'arrestation successive des Brigands que le Gouvernement Anglois a vomis en France &c. a connu toute la Part que les Agens Anglois d'Offenbourg avoient aux horribles complots tramés contre sa Personne et contre la Sureté de la France," &c. &c.

L'Intention du Soussigné n'est point d'entrer dans de fastidieux détails sur une querelle dans laquelle les Français n'ont jusqu'à présent prodigué que des injures, et qui se décidera les armes à la main, si les Puissances éclairées sur le sort qui les attend, ne cherchent à terminer une lutte qui influe déjà si gravement sur le monde entier; il se bornera à dire que l'insinuation "du Genre de Guerre que le Gouvernement Anglois poursuit" dérive sans doute du système que la France avoit adopté pour faire revolter en pleine paix les Sujets de S.M.B. en Irlande; et à l'égard "de ses detestables projets" ils ont jusqu'à présent, à

attendre l'effet des longues Jactances du Gouvernement Francois qui le menace sans cesse de sa destruction.

Il est dit "*qu'il existe dans Offenbourg un comité soudoyé par le Gouvernement Britannique &c.*"

Le Soussigné oppose à cette assertion sa dénégation formelle, et il demande si dans cette circonstance on peut ajouter quelque foi aux paroles d'un Gouvernement qui viole à main armée le territoire d'un Prince ami, pour enlever les personnes contre lesquelles il n'y avoit ni jugement ni même accusation ; qui demande l'arrestation de deux Individus, et qui sans attendre la réponse, peut être même avant la communication de sa demande, fait entrer militairement ses Troupes et enlever un très grand nombre de Gens—Quel peut être le motif d'une pareille conduite, si ce n'est que le Ministère Francois s'attendoit bien que S.A. l'Electeur de Bade, toujours juste, exigeroit pour faire arrêter ceux à qui il avoit accordé un asyle, des preuves que les Francois n'étoient pas en état de donner.

On trouve encore le passage suivant—"Lorsque le Premier Consul par l'arrestation successive des Brigands que le Gouvernement Anglois a vomis en France &c. a connu toute la part que les Agens Anglois d'Offenbourg avoient aux horribles complots tramés contre sa personne et contre la sureté de la France"—comme si les efforts des Francois pour secouer le Joug de l'Insupportable Tyrannie et de l'odieuse Inquisition, sous lequel ils gémissent, pouvoient être regardé comme l'ouvrage d'un Gouvernement étranger ; comme si l'Angleterre qu'on accuse de ne pas vouloir la paix, devoit chercher à se défaire d'un Homme qui seul a voulu, veut, et voudra la Guerre—Puisse-t-il, pour le Repos de l'Europe, dans le délire de son ambition trompée se borner à ses menaces contre l'Angleterre.

Le Soussigné a cru indispensable de faire l'exposé cy dessus, persuadé que S.M. l'Empereur prendra une vive part aux événemens inouis qui y ont donné lieu.

Il a l'honneur d'assurer Son Excellence Mr. le Vice Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat de sa considération très-distinguée.

(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

VIENNE, le 29 Mars 1804.

## C.

[Copie.]

Le Soussigné Ministre des Relations extérieures de la République Française a l'honneur d'adresser à Mr. Le Baron d'Edelsheim Copie d'un Rapport que le Grand Juge a fait au premier Consul.\* Il prie S.E. de placer cette pièce importante sous les yeux de S.A.S. l'Electeur de Bade, Son Altesse y trouvera des preuves nouvelles et évidentes du genre de Guerre que le Gouvernement Anglais poursuit contre la France, et elle sera douloureusement étonnée d'apprendre que dans ses propres Etats à Offenbourg il existe une Association d'Emigrés Français qui sont au nombre des plus actifs instrumens de toutes ces trames abominables.

Le Soussigné est chargé de demander formellement que les Individus qui composent ce comité d'Offenbourg soient arrêtés et livrés avec tous leurs Papiers aux Officiers Français, chargés de les recevoir à Strasbourg.

La Réclamation Officielle que le Soussigné présente à cet égard dérive du Texte même de l'Art. I. du Traité de Luneville, et quand il s'agit d'une conspiration d'Etat dont les Faits connus ont déjà excité l'Indignation de l'Europe, les rapports particuliers d'Amitié et de bon voisinage qui subsiste entre La France et S.A.S. Electorale ne permettent pas de douter qu'elle ne soit empressée d'exécuter à la Réquisition du Gouvernement Français cette Stipulation Capitale du Traité de Luneville, et de concourir d'ailleurs à donner plus de Moyens de dévoiler une Machination qui menaçait à la fois la Vie du Premier Consul, La Sureté de la France, et le Repos de l'Europe.

Le Soussigné est chargé de plus, de demander que par une mesure générale et irrévocable tous les Emigrés Français soient éloignés des Pays qui composent l'Electorat de Bade ; leur Séjour dans la partie de l'Allemagne la plus rapprochée de la France ne peut jamais être qu'une cause d'inquiétude, une occasion de trouble, et pour eux mêmes une excitation à lier des intrigues dont l'Angleterre profite et qu'elle étend et dirige au gré de Ses détestables projets.

\* *Vide Lit. D.*

Et si l'on considère que les Emigrés qui se trouvent encore hors de France sont tous des Hommes conjurés contre le Gouvernement actuel de leur ancienne Patrie ; des Hommes qu'aucune Circonstance, aucun Changement n'ont pu rapprocher, et qui sont dans un perpétuel Etat de Guerre contre la France, il est évident qu'ils sont de ceux qui aux termes du Traité de Luneville ne doivent trouver ni Azile ni Protection dans les Etats Germaniques, Leur Exclusion est donc de Droit rigoureux. Mais quand on ne devrait l'attendre que des Principes et des Sentimens connus de S.A.S. Electorale, on ne douterait pas qu'Elle ne mit du Soins à éloigner de Ses Etats des Hommes aussi dangereux, et à donner ainsi au Gouvernement Français une preuve de plus du Prix qu'Elle attache aux relations parfaitement amicales que tant de circonstances ont contribué à établir entre la France et l'Electorat de Bade.

Le Soussigné attend donc avec toute confiance la détermination qui sera prise par S.A.S. Electorale sur les deux demandes qu'il a été chargé de lui faire parvenir ; et il saisit cette Occasion de renouveler à M. Le Baron d'Edelsheim l'assurance de sa Haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MARC (?) TALLEYRAND.

D.

*Copie du Rapport fait au Gouvernement de la République  
par le Grand Juge Ministre de la Justice.*

CITOYEN PREMIER CONSUL,—Il existe dans Offenbourg Electorat de Bade et tout à portée des Départemens du Rhin, un Comité soudoyé par le Gouvernement Britannique. Ce Comité est composé d'Emigrés Français, d'Officiers Généraux Chevaliers de St. Louis &c. &c. ; Sa Destination est de chercher, par tous les moyens possibles, à exciter des troubles dans l'Intérieur de la République.

Il a pour principal Agent, un Emigré nommé Mucey, personnage connu depuis longtems par Ses intrigues, et par la haine implacable qu'il a vouée à son Pays.

Ce Misérable est chargé par le Comité d'introduire en France et de faire circuler avec Profusion des Mandemens incendiaires des Eveques rebelles, ainsi que tous les Libelles



infames qui se fabriquent dans l'étranger contre la France et Son Gouvernement.

Le nommé Trident, Maitre de Poste aux Lettres a Kehl, est l'homme qu'emploie la Comité pour faire parvenir Sa Correspondance aux affidés qu'il a dans Strasbourg; ces affidés sont connus, et les Ordres sont donnés pour leur Arrestation.

Mais je ne pense pas qu'il faille des Bornes à cette Mesure, la Tranquillité publique ainsi que la Dignité de la Nation et de son Chef sollicitent la destruction de ce Foyer d'intriguans et de Conspirateurs qui existent dans Offenbourg, et qui viennent avec impudence braver la République et Son Gouvernement pour ainsi dire à leurs Portes. Il faut aussi que l'une et l'autre soient vengés par leur prompt punition.

Je vous propose en conséquence, Citoyen Premier Consul, de faire demander a S.A.S. l'Electeur de Bade l'Extradition immédiate de Mucèy, Trident, et de leurs complices.—Salut et Respect. (Signé) REGNIER.

PARIS, le 16 Ventose XII.

Certifié Conforme Le Secretaire d'Etat.

(Signé) HUGUES MARET.

### E.

MONSIEUR LE BARON,—Je venais de vous adresser une Note dont l'objet etait de demander l'Arrestation du Comité d'Emigrés Français residans a Offenbourg, lorsque le Premier Consul par l'Arrestation successive des Brigands que le Gouvernement Anglais a vomis en France, ainsi que par la Marche et les Resultats des procédures qui s'instruisent ici, a connu toute la Part que les Agens Anglais d'Offenbourg avaient aux horribles complots tramés contre Sa Personne et contre la Sureté de la France. Il a appris également que le Duc d'Enghien et le General Dumouriez étaient a Ettenheim, et comme il est impossible qu'ils se trouvent dans cette Ville sans la Permission de S.A. Electorale, Le Premier Consul n'a pu voir sans la plus profonde Douleur qu'un Prince auquel il s'étoit plu à faire ressentir les Effets les plus spéciaux de l'Amitié de la France ait pu donner refuge à ses plus cruels Ennemies, et

les ait laissé tramer paisiblement des conspirations aussi inouïes.

Dans cette circonstance extraordinaire le Premier Consul a cru devoir ordonner à deux petits Détachemens de se porter à Offenbourg et à Ettenheim pour y saisir les instigateurs d'un crime qui par Sa Nature met hors du Droit des Gens tous ceux qui sont convaincus y avoir pris part.

C'est le General Caulincourt qui est chargé à cet egard des ordres du Premier Consul ; vous ne pouvez pas douter qu'il ne mette dans leur Execution tous les Égards qui peut desirer S.A. Electorale. Ce sera lui qui aura l'honneur de faire parvenir à votre Excellence la lettre que j'ai été chargé de lui écrire, Recevez M. de Baron, l'Assurances de ma haute Consideration.

CH. MARC. TALLEYRAND.

PARIS, 20 ventose XII.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[No. 4.]

VIENNA, 3 April 1804.

MY LORD,—I was upon the point of dispatching Sparrow last night, when I heard that accounts had been received here of the Duke D'Enghien's condemnation.

I was with the Vice Chancellor this morning, who seemed not to be acquainted with the execution of that unfortunate and illustrious person.

I can hardly suppose that Your Lordship will not be informed of this most cruel event, but I think it right to transmit herewith the intelligence which has just reached me upon the subject.

From Count Cobentzl's language this morning, I cannot help thinking that he begins to consider a continental war not impossible, perhaps even not improbable.

In speaking of the expedition against England, he said that, as far as he was able to judge, it appeared to him every day more problematical, for that, had it been considered practicable, the execution of it would have been attempted ere this. His notions upon the subject are, I conclude, formed upon the intelligence which has arrived from Paris.

Of what passes between the Vice Chancellor and the

French Ambassador little or nothing transpires, but I very much suspect that in their last conferences the latter has been using the most violent language, and has, among other things, demanded to what object the recent armaments of Austria were destined (Your Lordship will observe that no such armaments exist), and that two regiments which have been lately sent into Suabia should be immediately ordered back—a demand which the Vice Chancellor tells me has been peremptorily refused.

I cannot, upon the whole, help thinking that the French Government are now endeavouring to find out a pretext for coming to an open quarrel with the Court of Vienna. From the nature of this opinion, I am not disposed to hazard it lightly. It is one which is by no means confined to myself, and it may not be uninteresting to know that the Russian Ambassador has, in his last dispatches, written in this very sense to the Court of Petersburg.

It certainly appeared to me that the language of the Vice Chancellor since our last interview is somewhat altered, for when I again advised him this morning to come to a confidential and unreserved explanation with His Majesty and the Russian Government upon the present posture of affairs, he by no means shunned the idea as on the former occasion. I understood from him that ample instruction to that very purpose had been sent to, and acted upon, by Count Starhemberg (during my absence, as he said), and he even hinted that although undoubtedly the King's Ministers had uniformly expressed themselves in the most friendly terms towards this Court, on the present occasion however they had not manifested any very strong desire to meet that question.

I am obliged to own to Your Lordship, as I did pretty strongly to Count Cobentzl, my profound ignorance of the whole of this transaction, the truth of which I am exceedingly disposed to doubt.

In the present state of things I shall be most anxious to receive Your Lordship's instructions.

A circular letter has been received by the French Ambassador (I believe yesterday) which he has communicated to this Court, and to some of the other Ministers, (in which number the Russian is not included) containing an accusation against Mr. Drake, His Majesty's Minister at

Munich, by which he is charged, as I understand, with having conducted a conspiracy directed against the Government of France and the life of the Consul. I am in momentary expectation of receiving this piece.

There is a report of 150 French troops having arrived at Padua (General Bellegarde's head-quarters) and that a passport had been demanded for their route to Venice which had not been granted. Of this circumstance I cannot at this moment venture to say more.

Mr. de Frunil, a Major General in the Austrian service, has, it is confidently affirmed, been arrested at Paris.—I have the honour, &c. (Signed) A. PAGET.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[No. 5. Cipher.]

VIENNA, 9th April 1804.

The intelligence mentioned by Your Lordship to have been received respecting a negociation between the two Imperial Courts for an armed mediation \* is, I have no hesitation in declaring, totally destitute not only of every foundation, but even of any appearance whatever of probability that I can discover, for after having given the subject the most serious consideration and attention of which I am capable, I feel myself at a total loss to determine what demonstration on the part of the Court of Vienna has been the ground for such a supposition. Surely it cannot have been a series of acts of unexampled weakness and humiliation towards the French Government which led to the conclusion.

The Prussian † and French Ministers here have, I know, of late demanded in a pretty high tone the object of these armaments of the Court of Vienna. They have been told, and I am grieved to say, been truly told that no armaments exist. I mentioned this the other day. I am now compelled to repeat it, and, if any proof should be wanting to corroborate this dismal assertion, I have the mortification of knowing beyond the possibility of a doubt that on the 22nd of last month the Emperor wrote (or at least

\* See Lord Hawkesbury's despatch of March 10.

† In 1806 the King of Prussia reminded Napoleon of the services he had rendered him—"Who stifled the cry of indignation raised through Europe at the murder of a prince who thought himself safe in a country of whose government I again was a member"? (Jackson's Diaries, ii. 13).

signed) a letter to the Archduke Charles in which he stated to His Royal Highness that the exigencies of the State required a reduction of five millions of florins in the expenses of the army.

Your Lordship does me the honour to inform me that Count Markoff had in his letters to Count Woronzow, the Russian Ambassador, expressed himself very well satisfied with the result of the conferences he had held with the Vice Chancellor Count Cobentzl.

This, I will also own to Your Lordship, has been a matter of no small surprise to me. First because it is to me inconceivable that any man in his senses, and having the honour and welfare of his country at heart, can have derived any sort of satisfaction from the result of a conference with Count Cobentzl, and next because from the information which has come to me upon that particular subject, I had been led to believe that Count Markoff had expressed himself very differently.

I believe that I may take upon myself to assure Your Lordship that Count Markoff was not charged with any special commission for this Government. He was undoubtedly instructed to gain every information as to what might be the several sentiments and disposition of the Court of Vienna, but so far from having brought forward any negociation for an armed mediation on the part of the two Courts, in conversation he had with me and one or two persons to whom he spoke with unreserve, even confidence, he distinctly gave it as his opinion that the best system of policy for the Court of Petersburg to adopt at the present moment was to concert its own measures with the utmost secrecy independently of the Courts of Vienna or Berlin, and not to declare the object of them until they were ripe for execution.

This I understand to have been the individual opinion of that Minister.

In the satisfaction of my own mind I should not have thought it necessary to make any communication to this Government on the subject of Your Lordship's dispatch to me, but upon one of such magnitude I should perhaps have been liable to reprehension had I confined myself to the proof (strong as it unquestionably is) I have just had the honour of submitting to Your Lordship.

I accordingly determined to see the Vice Chancellor, and to represent to him the notions which had gone abroad respecting a Negotiation between the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg, and upon requesting to be informed as to the nature and state of it, he without hesitation informed me, and authorized me to state unequivocally to Your Lordship, that no such negotiation did exist, or had ever been proposed by either the Emperor, or the Emperor of Russia, which declaration has since been confirmed to me by the Russian Ambassador.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[No. 6.]

VIENNA, 9th April 1804.

MY LORD,—The situation of affairs upon the Continent becomes every day more critical and more tremendous. Every day produces some new act of encroachment and infamy on the part of the French Government, and every day exhibits the incapacity, the weakness, and I fear, in many instances, the treachery of those men whom sovereigns have had the imprudence to place, and have the blindness to maintain, in the direction of their Governments.

In the three weeks I have been returned to Vienna have I seen treaties broken, territory violated, the rights of nations trampled upon, murder even committed, without having as yet discovered the slightest indication of any disposition on the part of the Emperor's Ministers to check the progress of this monstrous hostility, much less to avenge the insults which have been daily and directly levelled at the Imperial Crown.

It will be irksome to Your Lordship, it is I am sure painful to me, to revert again and again as I am compelled to do to the necessity of operating a change in the Emperor's Councils. But the danger is in my opinion so pressing—I see ruin so fast approaching—that I cannot any longer conscientiously withhold from Your Lordship's superior judgment the consideration of the only step by which there is the least probability of saving this country.

Alone and unassisted I cannot pretend to accomplish it. I have always had this opinion, and I am now more than ever confirmed in it. It is indispensable not only that I should be supported by the Minister from Russia (because it is to Russia that from habit as well as system this Court is used to look with a sort of submission and deference) but that he, rather than myself, should appear to take the lead in such an undertaking.

Count Rasoumoffsky feels upon the subject as I do, but he has no authority to act, and, notwithstanding the repeated representations he has made to that effect to his Court, he does not seem to have much expectation of receiving any.

Under these circumstances I take the liberty of respectfully submitting to Your Lordship whether an attempt should not be made to prevail upon the Russian Government to instruct their Ambassador at this Court to demand, in connection with me, the dismissal of Count Cobentzl.

I am aware that the point is a delicate one, and that to conduct such a negotiation will require the utmost address and dexterity, and this appears to me to be the great difficulty attending it.

I am not less aware that for a Foreign Power to interfere to this extent in the concerns of another Government is in itself a matter of still greater delicacy, but on the other hand I have no scruple in saying that the state of degradation into which Count Cobentzl has already brought, and will most infallibly further plunge, this country, renders such an interference, on the part of those Powers who have an interest in the welfare of the Continent not only warrantable but indispensable. Common measures will not avert the dreadful evils with which the present times are pregnant.

Persuaded as I am that a declaration made by the Russian Ambassador and myself not to treat any longer with the present Vice Chancellor would be attended with the best effect, I am equally so, that unless such a declaration is made, and made promptly, here at least we have nothing but destruction to look forward to.—I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[No. 8.]

VIENNA, 11th April 1804.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter \* stating to have been written by Count Cobentzl, the Imperial Ambassador at Paris, in answer to a communication made to him by Mr. Talleyrand, a copy of which I herewith transmit.

The first of these Papers was presented to the public in the Frankfort Paper of yesterday.

It seemed to me to contain insinuations, if not imputations, altogether so illiberal and so injurious and unjustifiable, that I thought it my duty to demand of the Vice Chancellor whether the letter was in fact the production of the person to whom it was ascribed. I accordingly presented the enclosed note.

I had also an interview with the Vice Chancellor yesterday morning, in order to express to him the very great surprise and dissatisfaction with which I had read the letter in question, and it is with additional concern I am obliged to say that these sensations were considerably increased by Count Cobentzl's informing me that the conduct of the Imperial Ambassador on this occasion had met with the Emperor's entire approbation.

The Vice Chancellor justified the letter upon the grounds that it contained purely the condemnation of any Government or any Minister who acted in violation of the Laws of Nations, and contended that it did not contain the slightest imputation upon any particular Government or any particular Minister. He added that he had already seen too many proofs of the justice of His Majesty's Government to doubt that it would be seen by them in the same point of view.

Upon this, as upon almost all other political questions, I found myself at the widest possible distance from the Vice Chancellor's opinion.

It does seem to me that Count Cobentzl's letter is a direct, and, if so, a most serious, imputation upon the King's Government.

\* I have found no copy of this letter. It was probably the answer on the subject of the charge brought by the French Government against Mr. Drake and Mr. Spencer Smith.—A. P.



I cannot admit that the situation of this Country demands a blind and unlimited acquiescence and consent to every proposition made by the French. At least that spirit of condescension ought to be confined to affairs in which their own interests and concerns are involved. To extend it to questions in which the loyalty and honour of other great and powerful nations are attacked cannot be justified by any circumstances.

This letter is one of the most gratuitous acts of indecorous complaisance of any which is upon record. It cannot be turned into any different construction than that which I assign it. The words *se permettent* in contradistinction to *se permettraient* carry with them its condemnation.

I entreat Your Lordship to compare the tenor of this letter of the Imperial *Ambassador* with that presented on the same occasion by the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*. Some of the expressions in the latter are, to be sure, extremely vague and superfluous, but the contrast still remains very striking.

An Austrian Courier who arrived yesterday from Paris has, I have reason to believe, brought some intelligence very disagreeable to this Government. I did not learn any particulars yesterday respecting it from Count Cobentzl, but he seemed a good deal disturbed.

Count Rasoumoffsky's intelligence by the same Messenger very much corroborates the opinion that a storm is gathering which will probably burst upon this country.

Letters received here both from Paris and Holland, but particularly the latter, contain conjectures that the expedition against England is laid aside for the present, as it is stated.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

*P.S.*—Not having received at two o'clock this afternoon any answer from the Vice Chancellor to my note of yesterday, I sent him the enclosed letter, the answer to which I have likewise the honour to transmit. The lateness of the hour prevents my adding more.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Count COBENTZL*

[Enclosure No. 1.]

Le Soussigné Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de S.M. le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande a l'honneur d'envoyer cy joint Copie d'une lettre écrite par Mons<sup>r</sup> le Comte de Cobentzl, Ambassadeur de S.M. L'Empereur près la Republique Francoise, qui se trouve insérée dans le Journal de Francfort.

Cette lettre étant de nature à exciter l'attention serieuse de son Gouvernement, le Soussigné se hâte de demander à S.E. Mons<sup>r</sup>. le Vice Chancelier si la Copie en est fidèle, afin qu'il puisse en instruire Sa Cour.—Il s'empresse de renouveler, &c. (Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

VIENNE, le 10 Avril 1804.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Count COBENTZL*

[Enclosure No. 2.]

VIENNE, le 11 Avril 1804.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,—La demande qui se trouve renfermée dans la note que j'eus l'honneur de remettre hier à V.E. n'exige en reponse qu'une simple affirmative ou negative.

Je desire pouvoir transmettre cette Réponse par la Poste d'aujourd'hui à ma Cour, et c'est à cet effet que je me vois contraint de solliciter d'érêchef V.E. de vouloir bien me la faire parvenir.—Agrêez Monsr. le Comte, &c. (Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Count COBENTZL to the Right Hon. A. PAGET.*

[Enclosure No. 3.]

VIENNE, le 11 Avril 1804.

MONSIEUR,—La Note que vous m'avez envoyée hier a été portée sur le champ, comme elle devoit l'être, aux pieds de l'Empereur; c'est lorsque Sa Majesté m'aura donné ses ordres, et conformément à ce qu'il Lui plaira de me prescrire, qu'il y sera fait réponse.

Agrêez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée. (Signé) LOUIS COBENTZL.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[Cipher.]

VIENNA, 14th April, 1804.

MY LORD,—On the evening I had the honour of last writing to your Lordship, I was informed by Count Rasoumoffsky that the Vice Chancellor had that same day spoken to him of what had passed between us relative to Count Cobentzl's letter; that he had complained bitterly of the language I had used on that occasion, and of the note I had presented; that he had lamented to him the Alteration he had perceived in my conduct since my return, which he could account the less for as it did not correspond with the friendly terms in which His Majesty's Government had invariably expressed themselves towards this Court. He could not, he said, help considering my conduct as personal to himself, and that he was convinced my object was his overthrow; but that I was deceived if I expected to succeed in it, as the Emperor would in that case certainly support him, &c. . . .

The next day, therefore, I called upon the Vice Chancellor, and upon this occasion heard from him nearly everything that had been reported to me by the Russian Ambassador.

To the hints he threw out of my conduct being personal against him, I made no reply whatever. I intimated however that there were one or two points in the conversation he had had with Count Rasoumoffsky upon which I should withhold any observation.

I admitted to its full extent the truth of all he said with respect to the change which had taken place in my language, but I explained to him in the most conciliatory manner the causes which had led to this change. I enumerated the series of atrocious acts which had been exercised against civil Society by the French Government during the short period since my return to Vienna. I then appealed to him whether I could conscientiously allow them to pass unnoticed.

I observed that I had for two whole years viewed with silence the System which this Government had thought it prudent to adopt towards France, but that circumstances having rendered the continuation of that System

so fatal to the interests of this Country and of Europe, retrospectively considered, it might appear to him to be wise and provident, but I could not, consistently with my duty, withhold from him the opinion and advice I had at different times enforced of late.

I begged him once for all to be convinced that no other than motives of the purest Friendship towards this Country actuated me in my conduct on the present as on all other occasions, and that I should ill acquit myself of the trust reposed in me were I to be guided by any other sentiments.

It does not appear necessary that I should trouble your Lordship by this opportunity with any further details of this conversation. I will therefore only add that the Vice Chancellor at the close of it, expressed the very great satisfaction he had derived from this Interview.—I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

*From Sir J. WARREN to the Right Hon. A. PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURGH, April 16th, 1804.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . With respect to the state of affairs here I am happy to say there is much good will towards us: and I can assure you from undoubted authority that H.I.M. adheres most firmly to his first Resolution respecting the German business: & that all Negotiations on this head should be carried on at Vienna, & to *preclude as much as possible French Interference & all the Ratisbon manœuvres played off hertofore*. An answer to the effect of the first part of this statement has been returned to the French Minister: & I should suppose has before now also been communicated in a similar shape to the Austrian Government. Now with respect to other matters give me leave to say that this Court are not well satisfied at the Hesitation & backwardness of Austria to unite upon the general points and propositions that have been made them: and if the Austrian Government hang back or temporise at so interesting a moment, whatever fine propositions Mons<sup>r</sup> De Cobentzell may have received from France, they will never again have so fair an opportunity but fall into the hands of the French Monster who will soon Devour them, either by Direct or indirect means as best suits their palates. If Austria wants sub-

sidies to enable her to move I suppose you are authorised to employ them, but I hope Mr Cobentzell will not suffer these affairs to sleep. There has been some idea at home that Austria & Russia were forming something like an armed Coalition or Mediation: & I trust you will be enabled to learn if anything of that sort has been in agitation or the proposals from Russia to Vienna. I believe that as far as it is possible to ascertain they were only with some Local alterations the old ones contained in the last Treaty existing between the two powers.

The King of Naples has had some assurances of protection & I am doing all it is possible to do on my side to render them effective & I know you will wish me success in so good a work. . . . —I am &c.

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

*From Lord PAGET to the Right Hon. A. PAGET.*

IPSWICH, April 20th, 1804.

Alas! what sad events have taken place since we parted. Is it in human nature to submit to the indignities offered & horrors committed by the most savage Devil that ever disgraced human nature? Bad as my opinion is of almost all the Governments upon the Continent, I can hardly conceive it possible that these late acts should not rouse them to desperation. God grant it may be so, for as I begin to despair of seeing the Foe here where they would be annihilated, I must hope to be enabled to meet him upon his own Dunghill.

I trust that Our Doctor\* is upon his last legs. He made a bad division the other night & tho' he affects confidence, yet I think that he is tottering. We *must* have Pitt. Would you believe it, my Father is extremely anxious that I sh<sup>d</sup> not oppose the Minister under the mistaken notion that to oppose him is to oppose the King. I have written, however, to explain the impossibility of my remaining in Parliament upon any other terms. The time draws near when you promised to return. I wish that you may have been enabled to make a satisfactory arrangement by the prescribed time, that you may yourself be the bearer of welcome News, & that

\* Mr. Addington.

in consequence of it your next may be the last journey that it will be necessary for you to make *vid* Hanover, &c. But alas! it is poor lean Hope, not confidence. We live in cursed times & the provoking thing is that they might easily be improved. Two years' hearty cooperation, possibly much less, might free Europe. *J'enrage*—I long to see your Notes. The first time I go to town I will make a point of it.

*From Sir JOHN B. WARREN to the Right Hon. A. PAGET.*

*St. PETERSBURGH, April 29th, 1804.*

Since my last letter was begun the departure of the Courier Courvoisier from hence for London prevented me stating to you the very great sensation which the Death of the unfortunate Duke D'Engien created & the universal Horror and Detestation the circumstances which were the cause of it occasioned. You will observe that a Public Mourning has been ordered here & observed most strictly. I must just mention that Hedouville in his last conference with P. Czartoryski,\* & which he demanded for the express purpose of communicating all the complots & projects sayed to have existed at Paris & ending with Mr. Drake's correspondence, sayed "*Le premier Consul est poussé au Bout*"—I suppose meaning this as a set off or apology for all the abuse against England & the fusillades that had taken place.

It is whispered that the Prince ventured to answer to this part of the General's address, but when he was proceeding to state the situation of France & Russia, the Prince told him that he had the Emperor's orders not to enter into any further discussion with him on that subject, as H.I.M. found it could be of no use as the First Consul already was acquainted with the Emperor's expectations, & the General added in that case it was not probable the two countries could long remain in a state of amity.

It is sayed a Declaration either has or will be published from hence addressed to the Diet of Ratisbon by the Emperor of Russia,† calling upon the Chief of the Roman

\* As Minister for Foreign Affairs he urged Alexander to oppose Napoleon on behalf of the principles of 1789, which Napoleon had betrayed.

† This was done on May 6, 1804.

Empire and the several Princes to stand forward in the support of all public right, as well as their own individual one, so grossly invaded upon a late occasion. You will know all this where you are, & I hope persuade our old friends to second this virtuous and amiable Emperor in the Defence of everything most dear to mankind.—Ever, my dear sir, &c.

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[Separate. Secret and Confidential.]

VIENNA, May 1804.

MY LORD,—I see by a Dispatch of the 2<sup>d</sup> of this Month from Champagny to Talleyrand that his language here after the arrival of his last Courier has been considerably softened. One must attribute this change to the apprehension of a Rupture with Russia.

Champagny went so far as to tell the Vice Chancellor that the First Consul would not oppose any acquisitions this Court may be able to obtain by amicable arrangement, but that in the present posture of affairs the least indication of a change in the Military System could not but be viewed with the most jealous eye by the French Gov<sup>t</sup>. Nothing could be more pacific & humble than Cobentzl's Answer.—I have the honor, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From COUNT COBENTZL to the Right Hon. A. PAGET.\**

May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1804.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer ci-joint à Monsieur Paget le passeport qu'il m'a demandé, pour que Mr. Spencer Smith puisse se rendre directement de Baden à Carlsbad; je suis peiné de ce que les circonstances ne permettent pas qu'il puisse venir à Vienne, et me privent ainsi de la satisfaction de le voir; mais Mr. Paget en a senti lui-même l'impossibilité, et par conséquent je compte sur lui et sur ses bons sentiments, pour engager Mr. Smith à profiter le plutôt possible de son passeport sans passer par ici. Je suis bien fâché de ce que Monsieur Paget ne veut pas venir dîner Samedi en petite société, et avec des jolies

\* This letter is a proof that, whatever their political differences may have been, they had not in any way impaired their social relations.—A. P.

femmes ; je suis trop vindicatif pour ne pas m'en ressentir, et en l'invitant à un grand dîner et avec de vieilles femmes, ma vengeance sera complete.—Je le prie d'agréer l'assurance de ma considération très-distinguée.

(Signé) COBENTZL.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[No. 12. Cipher.]

VIENNA, 16 May 1804.

[He states that messengers had arrived from Russia with instructions as to the equestrian order, and other points in litigation between this Court and some of the German Princes ; that the Court of Petersburg completely disavows all that had been advanced by the French Minister at Ratisbon ; and that one of the messengers carried orders to the Russian Ambassador to suspend all further proceedings relative to it. He continues :]

He was also the Bearer of the note which has since been presented at the Diet. In communicating this note to the Emperor's Minister, the Russian Ambassador was, I have reason to think, and it is probable, compelled to use the very strongest language to prevail upon them to support it at the Diet.

The consequence was that a note has been sent from hence to be delivered at Ratisbon. . . .

It is with deep concern that I am under the necessity of noticing that the Russian Ambassador has, ever since the arrival of these last Couriers, shewed the most marked silence towards me. Your Lordship will, from the nature of your advices from Petersburg, be able to judge how far my conjecture may be correct. To me, who on a former occasion had to congratulate myself on the great degree of friendship and confidence which subsisted between that Minister and myself, it appears evident that he is acting according to instructions.

It is denied that any official communication has been made here relative to the change of Government in France,\* but I know that exactly the same formalities have been gone through by the French Ambassador, as when the Consulship for life was announced. I own to Your Lordship that it never occurs to me to describe the

\* The decree of the Senate in May giving Bonaparte the title of Emperor.



impression which such and such an act of the French Government, however remarkable or atrocious it may be, has made here. My reasons for this are unfortunately too obvious.—I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HAWKESBURY.*

[No. 13. Cipher.]

VIENNA, 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1804.

MY LORD,—I have still to notice that the strictest silence is observed towards me, both by the Vice Chancellor and the Count Rasoumoffsky, respecting the negotiations which are at this moment on foot between the two Imperial Courts,\* a conduct equally unaccountable and impolitic, if the object of them is such as the late declarations made by the Emperor of Russia both at Paris and Ratisbon leave little room to doubt of.

In a conversation I had this morning with Count Cobentzl I informed him that it was as little becoming my situation as it was compatible with my inclination to pry into the secrets of this Cabinet, but that as it was notorious that negotiations, probably of much importance, were at present carrying on between the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg, it did appear to me to be a matter worthy of comment that not a syllable had hitherto been said respecting them to me.

The Vice Chancellor, with some degree of embarrassment, admitted the fact that negotiations were pending, but that they were not by any means in a sufficient state of forwardness to be communicated. He also fully admitted that supposing them to end in a coalition against France, the assistance of England would in that case be resorted to.

Upon this, as upon one or two former occasions, I pointed out to him the fallacy of this reasoning, and the erroneous supposition that the resources of England were to be had whenever it might please the Continental Powers to solicit them.

\* Russia proposed to create a barrier against France by forming a new Confederation of the German States, Austria and Prussia standing as independent Powers separate from the Confederation, and with their territories enlarged. If Turkey broke up or joined France, Russia and Austria might claim part of its dominions.

The fact is that the very idea of war so appals the senses of this Government, that their combinations do not certainly at this moment extend beyond the means to be employed for getting themselves well or ill, it is immaterial which, out of the present scrape.

In the meantime I apprehend that they are very vigorously pressed by the Russian Government, and it has also come to my knowledge that the French Ambassador has expressed himself pretty strongly respecting the Emperor's last communication to the Diet.

*From Lord HARROWBY \* to the Right Hon. A. PAGET.*

DOWNING STREET, *June 4, 1804.*

SIR,—I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the King has been graciously pleased to nominate you one of the Knights Companions of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; and I most heartily congratulate you on this distinguished mark of His Majesty's favour.

I send you by this Messenger the Ensigns of that Order, together with His Majesty's dispensation under the Seal of the Order, by which you are authorized to wear the Star, without waiting for an Installation; and as it is requisite that you should be knighted, and invested with those Ensigns, I have it in command from His Majesty to direct you to ask an Audience of the Emperor of Germany, in which you will deliver the inclosed letter from His Majesty, and accompany it with a proper compliment expressive of the King's sincere and constant Friendship for His Imperial Majesty, and His desire to cultivate and improve the good understanding so happily subsisting between the two Courts. I also inclose you a copy of His Majesty's letter, as it may be proper for you previously to acquaint the Austrian Ministers with the object of this Audience.

In order to prevent any irregularity with regard to the ceremony of knighthood and Investiture, I send you a copy of one which was observed upon a similar occasion at St. Petersburg.

From the gracious treatment which you have received from the Emperor, there is every reason to believe that

\* He succeeded Lord Hawkesbury on Pitt's resuming office in May.

His Imperial Majesty will see with pleasure the distinguished mark of the King's approbation which is now transmitted to you; and I feel a particular satisfaction that it falls to my lot to notify it to you.—I am, &c.

(Signed) HARROWBY.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to Lord HARROWBY.*

[Separate, Secret & Confidential.]

VIENNA, June, 1804.

MY LORD,—From the various Pieces of decyphered Correspondence from different Places which I have lately obtained, it appears that there is a great degree of Inveteracy & Jealousy on the part of the French Gov<sup>t</sup> towards Russia; almost the whole of that part of General Brune's Correspondence with Talleyrand which has fallen into my hands speaks with the greatest uneasiness at the Intimacy which appears to subsist between Italinsky \* & Stratton. The Reis Effendi is spoken of by him as devoted to us.

I see by a letter from the Prussian Ministers to C<sup>t</sup> Keller that the language which the French Ambassador has been instructed to hold here of late in consequence of the supposed Armaments of Austria has been most violent. Among other things he was instructed to tell C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl that the Court of Vienna was deceived if they imagined that the 1st Consul was exclusively taken up with his preparations against England, for that the event might prove that he had 60,000 French which could be at Munich before the Austrians.

I have very little of Champagny's correspondence, & that little is uninteresting; one letter contains an assurance from C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl to that Minister that the Court of Vienna pays neither Capital or Interest of its Debt to England.—I have the Honor, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

*From the Right Hon. A. PAGET to LORD HARROWBY.*

[Private.]


VIENNA, 17 June, 1804.

MY LORD,—At almost any other epoch in History had things gone the length they have done between Russia

\* Russian Minister at Constantinople.



DUDLEY, EARL OF HARROWBY



and France, a rupture between these Powers would have been deemed inevitable. It is the universal and decided opinion of the Russian Embassy at this Court that it is so.

The system which in such an event, the real interests of this country would lead the Government of it to adopt, is too plain to admit of any difference of opinion. What will be their system is what I tremble for.

In the first instance they will put in practice every means of which negotiation is susceptible in order to maintain their neutrality, and when driven to make a choice in their alliance, according to the opinion I entertain of the Emperor's present Minister, I have no hesitation in saying that they will declare for France. If then, as is not unreasonable to suppose, Russia and Prussia should unite, the consequences to this country may be most calamitous.

In the meantime they are taken up with their negotiations relative to the recognition of the new form of Government in France, and not contented with the disgrace of a simple acknowledgement, I have no scruple in saying that it will be clogged with conditions unheard of in point of Baseness.

If I did not offer to pledge my credit for the veracity of it, Your Lordship would have every right to call in question the information, when I assert (and my pen almost shrinks from the record of so ignominious a transaction) that one of the conditions exacted by this Court is that the French Government shall guarantee the succession of the Imperial Dignity to the present Imperial Family. The other condition relates in all probability to the acquisition of territory in Italy.

[A copy was sent to Sir A. Paget of the despatch from Lord Harrowby to Count Woronzow of June 26,\* in reply to Prince Czartoryski's proposal of the scheme of alliance against France desired by Russia. Its tenor was an acceptance in principle of the Russian proposal. Lord Harrowby promised pecuniary aid to Austria, Prussia, and Russia if they would enter into a defensive

\* Published in collection of State Papers. The Russian overtures were handed in at London on June 26. This was the beginning of the Third Coalition.

alliance, the terms of such aid and its apportionment to be arranged later. He suggested two and a half millions for Austria, a million for Prussia, "as that Power has remained unexhausted by the late war," and a million to Russia. If only two Powers joined, a larger sum was to be given to each.]

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord HARROWBY.*

[No. 17.]

VIENNA, 23rd July 1804.

MY LORD,—At the audience to which I have alluded in the preceding Dispatch,\* I had a long and so far interesting conversation with the Emperor, that it gave me some insight into His Imperial Majesty's private sentiments with regard to one or two of the important objects upon which the public attention is at this moment particularly fixed.

The result was such as has left an impression of the deepest concern on my mind.

The first topic which came under discussion was the change of Government which has lately taken place in France, and this subject, far from creating any emotions of alarm, or indignation, or even distrust, appeared to be viewed by His Imperial Majesty rather as one out of which much good might arise, as one which would have the tendency of ensuring tranquillity to Europe, of securing the present Sovereigns on their thrones, and of consolidating the rights of their legitimate successors.

Against such doctrines, promulgated under neither constraint or menace, much did not appear could be done in a single and accidental conversation. Still I did not omit the opportunity of disclosing frankly to the Emperor the totally different opinions I had formed upon the subject; it was however obvious that this was to produce no other certain effect than that of lengthening the conversation.

His Imperial Majesty next spoke with some degree of asperity of the late conduct of the Court of Petersburg, which He condemned upon the principle that it is better policy for a Nation to support silently an Injury than to retaliate with threats which it may either not be its Intention, or that it may not be in a situation, to act up to; that in the present instance the Court of Peters-

\* When he was invested with the Order of the Bath.

burg would have acted with more prudence and with a better chance of attaining its end, if previously to its late declarations at Paris \* and at Ratisbon † it had concerted its measures with the other great Courts (I shall have occasion before I finish this Dispatch to shew the degree of benefit which arises out of proposals for concert made to the Court of Vienna); that with regard to the intention Mr. d'Oubril had manifested of quitting Paris ‡ he conceived it to have been rash and inconsiderate in the extreme, and here His Imperial Majesty spoke in terms of high panegyric of the conduct of his own Ambassador, and of the other Foreign Ministers who had united in order to prevail upon the Russian Chargé d'Affaires not to leave that capital.

Had the result of this conversation been in any respect satisfactory, I should have made a point of giving it more in detail to Your Lordship, to whom it can now be of little interest to know that upon most, if not the whole of what fell from the Emperor, it was my lot to differ.

I shall close the account of it by adverting to one further point upon which I am not disposed to lay much stress.

I asked the Emperor whether, supposing a most perfect understanding to be established between His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia for the restoration of the balance of Power in Europe, His Imperial Majesty would consent to take a part in such a system. The Emperor's answer was: You know from experience that I have never been backward upon any occasion.

Little of importance has been going on here of late. Upon a former occasion I had the honour of informing Your Lordship of the principal and very degrading condition upon which the Court of Vienna offered to acknowledge the title with which the Chief of the French Government had thought proper to invest himself. I shall now beg Your Lordship's attention to some details upon the same subject. But I will just, in the first place, say that the acknowledgement has not yet taken place.

When the overtures were first made by Mr. Champagny to the Vice Chancellor, he was ill in bed with a violent fit

\* May 12. See Sir A. Paget's despatch of August 4.

† May 6. See letter from Sir J. Warren, April 29.

‡ See Sir A. Paget's despatch of August 4.



of the gout. Whether his sufferings had deprived him of his senses, or whether they had taught him to apply the same degree of patience to moral hardships, I have not ascertained, but it is certain that the first idea which this monstrous demand suggested to his imagination was the *Parity of Rank*. I have already acquainted Your Lordship, and I have now to repeat that the first condition proposed by Monsieur de Cobentzl, was not the evacuation of Italy by the French Troops, nor of Switzerland, nor of Holland, nor the re-establishment of the King of Sardinia's Monarchy, none of these or other such *inferior points*, but nobly and at once that the Imperial Dignity should by Bonaparte be acknowledged hereditary in this Family.

This at first sight might appear worth asking for; to overturn one of the first fundamental principles of the Constitution of Germany by rendering its elective Crown hereditary in the present Imperial Family would have been an enterprise worthy of a bolder and abler Minister than Count Cobentzl. His ambition stopped far short of such an achievement. He simply asked that the present King of Hungary and Bohemia should be made Emperor of the hereditary States, or more properly speaking that that Dignity should be guaranteed to his successors. This was the price he put upon his act of recognizance,\* and to these terms did the French Government seem not unwilling to subscribe.

By some unaccountable accident which it is not necessary to examine into, the French Ambassador at this Court mistook, or feigned to mistake, the nature of the proposition which had been made to him. In consequence therefore of his reports to His Government, he received instructions to accede to the demands which he conceived

\* The Emperor's problem, it must be remembered, lay in his twofold position. By his hereditary position he was ruler of a number of states not necessarily held together except by the personal tie. As the elected head of the German Powers he was supposed to represent the universal Empire of Rome, although the title by which he was commonly called was Emperor of Germany. During the wars against France, Austria, however, lost her commanding position in German councils, and Francis feared lest on his death the Electors might choose the Prussian King as their Emperor, and that his states would consequently be left without any supreme authority binding them together. If, on the other hand, the title of Emperor of Austria were given to him, the kingdoms and duchies would naturally fall together under the Imperial sway. The question was made yet more difficult by Bonaparte's attitude towards the ancient Imperial title and tradition.

had been addressed to him, and to signify to the Court of Vienna that the French Emperor would use his influence that at the next election of an Emperor the choice should fall on His Imperial Majesty's successor.

I have now to make good the promise contained in the former part of this Letter.

About this time, an overture was made upon this very subject to this Court by the Russian Ambassador, the object of which was that the two Imperial Courts should act conjointly upon the question of acknowledgement, which should in no case be acceded to until the French Government had entered into certain engagements demanded by the Confederate Powers.

What these engagements were to be is, I am sorry to say, very little to the purpose. They went however to the Emancipation of Italy and the Re-establishment of the King of Sardinia, but they were plausibly rejected in the first instance by this Government. The decision to acknowledge the new form of Government in France is beyond all doubt taken. It is intended nevertheless, and to answer what good purpose (considering the character of these Ministers) I am not enlightened enough to understand, to gain as much time as possible. Accordingly supposing the ultimate demands of this Court to be complied with, which are, I have reason to believe, comprehended in the above statement, and of which there seems reason to entertain but little suspicion, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris is instructed to conclude nothing until final orders shall be transmitted to him from hence.

These final orders I have not much hesitation in saying he will not be allowed for any considerable length of time to languish after.—I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

*From Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

[Most secret and confidential. Separate.]

DOWNING STREET, July 24, 1804.

SIR,—A communication was made to me yesterday by Count Stahremberg of the steps which have taken place at Vienna respecting the late change in the French

Government. He was directed to assure me that the acknowledgement of the hereditary Sovereignty in the Buonaparte \* family had been extorted by menaces of immediate war—that as to the title of Emperor the object of Austria had been to gain time, in order to learn the determination of Russia—that the Emperor had for that purpose required in return to be acknowledged as hereditary Emperor of Austria—that France had not objected in case the title of Emperor of Germany should pass to some other family †—and that for the purpose of gaining still more time, the original claim would be explained and repeated. The idea of entering into a bargain of this nature with Buonaparte is thoroughly revolting; but there may be some advantage in the time which has been, or may still be gained even by such an expedient, if Russia should in the meanwhile have proposed such effectual and immediate assistance in case of a rupture as to encourage the Court of Vienna in a conduct less humiliating. Count Stahremberg added that he had been directed to state in case any overtures should be made by His Majesty (which the Court of Vienna are led to expect) with the view of assuming the Imperial title himself, in order to preserve his equality of rank with France, that the Emperor of Germany would willingly acquiesce in it. As he was positively directed not to state this unless an opening was given by ourselves from His Majesty, you must consider the communication as perfectly confidential. I told Count Stahremberg in reply that I had received no orders to make any overtures upon the subject, nor did I think it probable that I should ever receive any, but that I had no difficulty in stating to him, as my private opinion, that it would be much more desirable, under the present circumstances, for an Emperor to change his title for that of King, than for a King to adopt the name of Emperor.

\* This spelling, discarded on that ground by Bonaparte, was used to stigmatise his Corsican origin.

† The only title that menaced Bonaparte's claims was that of the head of the Holy Roman Empire, in vulgar phrase, Emperor of Germany. He could not, therefore, permit a possibility of a hereditary Emperor of Austria becoming an elected Emperor of Germany. By transferring the title to a weaker Power its prestige would be lessened. The problem was finally closed when, as a necessary consequence of the Treaty of Presburg (December 1805), the Emperor was obliged by Napoleon in August 1806 to withdraw all claims and abandon all connection with the Holy Roman Empire. This was done by the declaration of Vienna, August 6, 1806.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord HARROWBY.*

[No. 28. Cipher.]

VIENNA, 4th August, 1804.

MY LORD,—It is probable that Count Woronzow will have communicated to Your Lordship the last Memorial presented by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris. Lest that should not be the case, I think it my duty to inform Your Lordship that I had a glimpse of it yesterday.

Mr. D'Oubril begins by stating that he had been reprimanded by his Government for having transmitted Mr. Talleyrand's answer to his Note respecting the Seizure and execution of the Duc d'Enghien, that piece having been considered by the Emperor of Russia as indecent and inadmissible.

The Memorial which is long and extremely well drawn up, concludes by a notification that Mr. D'Oubril is instructed to leave Paris unless the four following conditions are accepted :

First : The evacuation of the Kingdom of Naples by the French Troops, accompanied by a Guarantee not again to enter it.

Second : That all affairs respecting that Kingdom shall be treated and settled by the Russian and French Governments.

Third : That a proper indemnity shall be granted to the King of Sardinia.

Fourth : The evacuation of the North of Germany by the French troops.

In Mr. Talleyrand's answer above adverted to, a most indecent allusion is made to the Emperor Paul's death,\* in which the English name is traduced in the most unbecoming and atrocious manner.

The Russian Ambassador has made a communication of this Memorial to the Austrian Government, which, it is hardly necessary to say, has produced no change whatever in the sentiments of these Ministers.

\* On May 16, 1804. "If, when England planned the murder of Paul I., supposing the plot had been made known, and that it was further known that the authors of that crime were at a league from the frontier, would not pains have been taken to arrest them?" The Russian reply said, "This indecent note brings a father's death to the recollection of his illustrious son merely to pierce his heart."

I have to confirm the contents of my last Dispatch, with the addition that the French Ambassador is authorised to sign an Act of Guarantee by which the Imperial Dignity is to become hereditary in this Family.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord HARROWBY.*

[No. 22.]

VIENNA, 12th August 1804.

MY LORD,—At an interview I had yesterday with Count Cobentzl, he informed me that he should in the course of two or three days dispatch a Courier to Count Stahremberg with instructions to that Minister to make a confidential communication to Your Lordship of the late determination of this Court both with regard to the hereditary Imperial Dignity in this Family,\* and to the acknowledgement of the same in the Family of Mr. Bonaparte.

As I am fully persuaded that Your Lordship will be very well pleased to be spared by me any detail respecting these odious proceedings, I will merely say that Count Cobentzl, after a great deal of excellent reasoning to prove how much the welfare of Europe depended upon the same Rank and Dignity being settled and made permanent in the House of Austria, as had been acknowledged in the Person and Family of Mr. Bonaparte, concluded by observing that His Majesty very nearly enjoyed the title of Emperor, because (I beg Your Lordship to attend to the reasons) His Majesty's Parliament is an Imperial Parliament.†

The reply which I should have been disposed to make to the above discourse would infallibly have occasioned a violent altercation between the Vice Chancellor and myself, and as this could have produced no good effect whatever I preferred remaining quite silent, until he spoke of the King's title, when I thought it right to say that I had never heard that His Majesty had had it in contemplation

\* On August 11, 1804, by a pragmatic sanction, Francis was proclaimed hereditary Emperor of Austria.

† Cobentzl meant to urge that, while England did already possess a common bond to hold its kingdoms together in the Imperial Parliament, Austria had to seek a corresponding bond in the Imperial House. It is the more significant that Burke elaborates the same idea of the Imperial Parliament in the speech on American Taxation, 1774.

to alter his title, and that I would take upon me further to add that of all others His Majesty would consider the present moment as the most objectionable for any such change.—I have, &c.

A. PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord HARROWBY.*

[No. 20.]

VIENNA, 18th August 1804.

MY LORD,—Within these three days the Russian Ambassador has received instructions to make a communication to this Court, in answer to one which has been delivered by Count Stadion \* at Petersburg relative to the acknowledgement of the new form of Government in France.

The object of these instructions is to strengthen as much as possible the disposition which this Court had originally apparently shewn to reject the pretensions of the new self-created Emperor.

In them a sort of displeasure appears on the part of the Court of Petersburg, that this Government should have entered into a Negotiation with France alone, respecting the new hereditary Dignity in this Imperial Family.

Finally it is declared that the Emperor of Russia will never consent to acknowledge Mr. Bonaparte as Emperor until the four conditions stipulated in Mr. D'Oubril's last note, and mentioned in my Dispatch No. are fulfilled.

Nothing can be firmer and more proper than the language in which this Dispatch to Count Rasoumoffsky is drawn up, and the whole evinces a considerable degree of animosity on the part of the Russian Government against that of France,—among other expressions, Bonaparte is called the Corsican Emperor.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord HARROWBY.*

[No. 21.]

VIENNA, August 1804.

MY LORD,— . . . The establishment of an intercourse of the most confidential nature between the Russian Ambassador and myself appeared to me to be a preliminary step of the greatest importance, with a view to all future

\* Count Stadion, the Austrian Minister in Russia, afterwards known for his efforts to do for the reorganisation of Austria what Stein did for Prussia.

negotiation, and no other mode occurred to me so likely to lead me to the attainment of this indispensably necessary object as an open and liberal communication to Count Rasoumoffsky of the purport of the instructions with which Your Lordship has honoured me.

I am not fearful of incurring Your Lordship's disapprobation for having done so, when I inform Your Lordship that in return for this mark of confidence the Russian Ambassador unreservedly informed me that a negotiation is actually on foot at this moment between the two Imperial Courts, and that it was conducted with so much secrecy that on his side he alone, unassisted by any individual of the Embassy, carried on the correspondence with Petersburg.

Your Lordship will observe that the Count Rasoumoffsky, animated by the same motives which led me to him, entrusted me with the above communication, not having been instructed to do so by his Government.

I shall now state to Your Lordship such information respecting this important affair as I received from that Minister, and which may be divided into three heads: First, that there is at this moment a negotiation pending between the two Imperial Courts.\* Second: That the basis of such negotiation is the re-establishment of the balance of Power in Europe. Third: The Court of Vienna has declared itself to be incapable† (a declaration the truth of which is admitted) of commencing hostilities at the same moment that Russia was forced into a war, but on the other hand pledges itself to join in the contest after a certain time.

I was extremely desirous of being informed what the stated time is, but Count Rasoumoffsky did not appear disposed to satisfy this inquiry. It appears to me indeed most probable that that essential point is not sufficiently settled between them for him to hazard a direct opinion, much less to speak with certainty upon it.

Your Lordship is of opinion that until some steps had been taken by Russia in consequence of the overtures made by England for a co-operation of Austria, it would

\* Austria and Russia made a secret Treaty, November 6, 1804.

† Champagne had demanded the evacuation of Bavaria by the Austrians in August 1804; also the forces gathered in Bohemia and the Tyrol were to be recalled.

be useless for me to attempt to make any overtures to Count Cobentzl. I not only subscribe entirely to that opinion, but under the change of circumstances still retain it, and Count Rasoumoffsky is decidedly of the same.

This leads me to mention a circumstance related to me by Count Rasoumoffsky, the truth of which is well worth Your Lordship's attention.

By a Messenger who was sent off the night before last to Petersburg, there is one particular Dispatch addressed to Count Stadion, in which Count Cobentzl complains of the little attention which is paid by His Majesty's present Ministers to the overtures which Count Stahremberg has been directed to make to them, and he instructs Count Stadion to declare to the Court of Petersburg that without subsidies from England, to proposals for which that country does not by any means appear disposed to listen, it will be impossible for Austria to enter into a war.

I should be rather inclined to think that the overtures of which Count Cobentzl speaks are imaginary, for it is, I know, the constant practice of this Government to attribute their own misconduct to what they conceive to be the fault of others.

Count Rasoumoffsky is in daily expectation of the arrival of a Courier from Petersburg, and as from the present negociation with which he is charged there appears to be serious disposition on the part of His Court to renew the war, reasonable hope may be entertained that the late digified and generous offer made by His Majesty to the Emperor of Russia, will be followed by a spirited attempt to decide at once this Court to a direct co-operation.\*

*August 31, 1804.*

[A secret and confidential despatch from Lord Harrowby to Sir Arthur Paget states that the Swedish Minister in England "thought proper to put himself into the hands of Baron Jacobi, and to adopt the politics of Prussia instead of those of his master": his aim was to draw the King under Prussian influence, and to prevent his entering into alliance with England and

\* In August 1804 the Russian Government decided to send Novossiltzow as Envoy Extraordinary to London to negotiate the new alliance against France.



Russia for a war against France. The despatch continues :—]

“You will take occasion to explain to Baron Armfeld the reasons, founded upon the public opinion of this country, which must prevent the King from making the Restoration of the House of Bourbon the declared object of the war; and you will endeavour through him to persuade His Swedish Majesty \* that the best method of accomplishing the Restoration of the House of the Bourbons is to diminish the influence and tarnish the reputation of Bonaparte; that this can only be effected by a successful contest against his military superiority; that no impression can be made upon it but by the coalition of several of the Great States of the Continent; and that an union for the express purpose of dethroning Bonaparte cannot be expected to take place amongst those whom fear has just compelled to acknowledge him as Emperor. . . .

“The conclusion from this reasoning would be that his only chance of ultimately obtaining his own object would be a cordial concurrence in the pursuit of ours—viz., the diminution of the exorbitant power of France.”

*From Sir JOHN B. WARREN to Sir A. PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURG, *Sept. 10th, 1804.*

As to the new title taken by the Court of Vienna it has been an unpleasant business here, more especially from the name of Czar being placed so near with that of Buonaparte. At the same time the manner of recognizance has been considered as a case of necessity on the side of Austria.

*From Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

DOWNING STREET, *Sept. 11, 1804.*

SIR,—I have learned with pleasure from your dispatch No. 21 that your intercourse with Count Rasoumoffsky is restored to its former confidential footing. The means

\* Gustavus IV., the old King of Sweden, and the most unselfish of the opponents of democratic France, remonstrated against the secularisation of Church estates in the settlement of the indemnities and the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien. In 1804 he made a tour of the German States to arouse feeling against France, and was at this moment in Munich, where he was very nearly captured and carried off by French agents.

which you adopted for that purpose were in this particular instance perfectly well judged. The communication which he made in return, although by no means full or explicit, is of considerable importance, and I do not doubt that you will feel in the progress of the negotiation all the advantages of having inspired him with confidence.

Although there was every reason to expect, that the Court of Vienna would be driven from her project of gaining time whenever M. Champagny\* was directed to hold the language of menace, yet the manner in which the sacrifice has been made, appears as destitute of prudence as of dignity.

The implied parallel between Buonaparte and Peter the Great, and the equal authority given to the French and Russian precedents, are a very unnecessary aggravation of the offence which must be given to the Court of St. Petersburg by this proceeding. I cannot but entertain serious apprehensions that it may be considered by the Emperor Alexander both as insulting to him, and as degrading to Austria; that both these considerations may incline him to give up all hope of forming even a defensive concert with that power, and that his feelings of indignation may be expressed in such a manner as to create a great distance and coolness between the two Courts.

If Count Rasoumoffsky should receive any instructions to this effect and should communicate them to you before he executes them, it would be extremely desirable that you should use all your influence to prevail upon him to soften, as much as possible, the tone of his remonstrances. Nothing can be gained by making those who have already degraded themselves in the eyes of others, feel still more degraded in their own. Such reproaches serve only to excite a false courage which revenges itself upon a friend for the insults to which it has submitted from an enemy, and rejoices to find, in the harsh language of the adviser, a pretext for refusing to listen to the advice. There is an additional reason for avoiding, in the present instance, all unnecessary irritation. From the nature of the transaction the Emperor himself, and both the Archdukes,

\* See p. 144. In September Napoleon ordered Cobentzl to meet him at Aix-la-Chapelle, with letters from the Emperor consenting to recognise his new Imperial title. This was done. The selection of Aix-la-Chapelle was a special humiliation to the head of the Holy Roman Empire.

appear personally committed, and as whatever faint hope may remain of bringing Austria into action rests rather upon them than upon their present ministers, it would be highly imprudent to alienate their minds by vehement and disgraceful censure.

The whole conduct of Austria has been dictated by fear, and little impression is to be made by any reasoning which does not enter in some degree into the feelings of those who act under such an impression.

There is one case, indeed, where this observation does not apply—it is, if means can be employed for overcoming that fear by a stronger. If Russia is inclined to adopt this conduct, to advance an Army of 100,000 men to the frontiers of Austria, or beyond them, and to reduce the Emperor to the necessity of engaging in immediate war, either with her or against her, she would, I believe, take the most effectual means of saving Europe. But unless she is prepared to act in this spirit, it is much to be wished that the chance of ultimate, though, I fear, distant co-operation should not be diminished by the use of intemperate language, or the assumption of a dictatorial tone.—I am, &c. (Signed) HARROWBY.

*From Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

[Separate. Most secret and confidential.]

DOWNING STREET, Sept. 11, 1804.

SIR,—You will perceive by the enclosed Separate most secret & confidential dispatch, that the suggestions you allude to as having been made in some of your former communications though not expressly noticed, had not escaped the consideration of Government. That dispatch has long been written, but the last measure of Count Cobentzl's administration has decided me to send it, and some expressions of Prince Czartoryski to Sir John Warren, lead me to hope that, when Lord Granville Leveson Gower\* arrives at S. Petersburg he may find that Government not disinclined to co-operate in producing a change.† The Prince's views at present seem

\* He replaced Sir J. Warren, who had not proved successful.

† On this same day the Czar had given secret instructions to Novossiltzow for his mission to England. It dealt with the government of Sardinia,

rather directed to Baron Thugut, but according to Mr. Stewart's report, his age and infirmities appear to put him out of the question. Even if his health would permit his taking the reins of government, I much doubt whether such a change would be desirable. Unless a cordial reconciliation could take place between him and the Archduke Charles, his restoration to power would only lead to a repetition of those dangerous and disgraceful schisms in the army, which occasioned the calamitous conclusion of the last war. Although such a reconciliation would remove that leading objection to his return, yet his political opinions respecting Naples and Piedmont,\* two of the points in which the Emperor Alexander takes the deepest interest, make it extremely improbable that any serious effort in his favour should be made by that monarch, and an administration formed under the auspices of the Archduke would probably be thought an object not only more easily accomplished, but more eagerly to be desired.—I am, &c. (Signed) HARROWBY.

*Enclosure from Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

[Separate. Most secret and confidential.] DOWNING STREET, July, 1804.

SIR,—In my former dispatch you will have seen the intentions of His Majesty respecting the overtures to be made eventually to the Court of Vienna. Little as I am inclined to be sanguine as to their success with any Austrian Ministry, till the invasion of Great Britain has been attempted, and repelled, the chance of that success seems materially diminished by the personal character of the leaders of that Cabinet. No effectual step can probably be taken to produce a change without the decided interference of Russia in concurrence with Great Britain. Instructions will therefore be given to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg to bring forward that question, and to discuss the best means of accomplishing so desirable an object; he will be directed to communicate to you the result of that discussion, and his opinion

Switzerland, Holland, and France; a league for the pacification of Europe; the new organisation of the European Powers; the Turkish Empire; and the maritime code. Novossiltzow arrived in London November 16.

\* His policy was the extension of Austrian dominion in Italy.

thereupon : and unless you should in the meantime have seen reasons to change the sentiments you entertain upon the subject, you will consider yourself authorised to adopt in concert with the Russian Minister any measures for the purpose of obtaining a change in the Cabinet which may be so suggested from Petersburg, and which do not amount to such an interference in the Councils of an independent power as would be inconsistent with the respect which is due from one Sovereign to another.

The manner in which you appear to have been treated by the Archduke Charles and his adherents may perhaps afford an opening for accomplishing this object in the least offensive manner.

However anxious for the dignity of the Austrian name and for the security of the Imperial dominions, he is said to be averse to war. The idea of any active concert which might commit Austria to immediate hostile measures against France, cannot therefore prudently be proposed, at least not in the first instance : but he may be strongly urged both by yourself and Count Rasoumoffsky to press the adoption of all such measures as are evidently indispensable for security on the strictest system of self-defence. In many of those which he has already pressed, he has been opposed and has given way, but with evident reluctance and discontent. Advantage might be taken of any familiar intercourse with him or his advisers, to represent that it may be considered both as injurious to his reputation, and inconsistent with his duty, to remain responsible in a great degree for the safety of the country, while he is denied the means of making effectual provision for its defence—that a forcible statement of all the measures necessary to be taken for that purpose in which he has been already thwarted, as well as of such further measures as he may have to propose and which would certainly meet with the same reception from the present Cabinet, should be laid before the Emperor, with the decided opinion of both the Archdukes, and of all such officers of high rank and reputation as would be brought to concur in it—and that the Emperor should be peremptorily but respectfully informed, that if plans to that effect are not immediately adopted his brothers cannot submit to remain in the situations in which they would

become the passive instruments of the ruin of their country; and that they must therefore retire from the service. If it were possible to persuade the Archdukes to take a line as decided as this, it seems highly probable that the present administration would be wholly driven out of power, or at least that those who might remain would be obliged to act in complete subordination to their opinions: and whether the result of such a change were war or peace, it would enable the Austrian Monarchy to engage in the one, or preserve the other, with vigour, or with dignity, and afford it in either case the only chance, which yet remains, of safety.—I am, Sir, &c.

(Signed) HARROWBY.

*From Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

DOWNING STREET, Sept. 11th, 1804.

I am not surprised to learn that no fresh instructions have yet been received by Count Rasoumoffsky, as no answer has yet been returned from St. Petersburg to the communication from hence.

The delay has probably arisen from a determination to wait till an answer could be received from Paris to M. Oubril's last note; & the absence of both Buonaparte & Talleyrand from Paris \* will have afforded a real ground for some delay, & a plausible pretext for extending it.

In the meantime the language of the Court of St. Petersburg to that of Vienna seems perfectly satisfactory; & the declaration made to the German Emperor that Buonaparte never would be acknowledged until the conditions stipulated in M. Oubril's note are fulfilled, ought to be felt as a strong tie in point of honour to adhere to that determination.

\* Oubril received the order to demand satisfaction for Talleyrand's note when Napoleon and Talleyrand were in Boulogne in July. Their journey closed with visits to Aix-la-Chapelle and Mayence in September. In that month at last Talleyrand replied—

- (1.) That Russia retained Corfu, and increased her troops there.
- (2.) That Russian agents everywhere opposed France.
- (3.) That Malta was still held by England.
- (4.) That threats must not be employed. The last campaign (Suvarrow's) did not entitle Russia to use them, and it must be well understood that the Emperor of the French is not the Emperor of the Turks or Persians.

Oubril thereupon quitted Paris.

*From Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

[Separate and secret.]

DOWNING STREET, September 11, 1804.

SIR,—I inclose you an Extract from a most Secret Dispatch of Sir John B. Warren, dated 30th July.

I am not at all disposed to give any credit to the information it contains, but as the project is stated to have been communicated through Vienna I think it right that you should be acquainted with it. It is by no means impossible that proposals of this nature may have been made in a contrary direction, and I should wish your attention should be turned to ascertain the point.—I am, &c.,

(Signed) HARROWBY.

*Extract of a dispatch from His Excellency Sir JOHN WARREN, dated St Petersburg, 30th July 1804.*

“A secret channel informs me that in a late communication from this Government to that of Paris, a project was given for a new arrangement in the German Empire and the North of Europe ; \* that one of the stipulations was that Russia should occupy Hanover and a proportion of the revenue be paid to France. This court has also communicated the project to that of Vienna, where it was approved ; but the French government, which had also received it from Vienna, rejected it.

“In the late communications between this Government and France it is proposed, I understand, to form a new kingdom for the King of Sardinia, consisting of some of the Ecclesiastical States, and some province belonging to the King of Naples ; and in order to settle any new claims in Germany, Russia is to have a prevailing interest in the North, and Bavaria to receive a considerable addition of territory. Prussia will in this case join the territory of Hanover on the side of . . . † to her own frontier. If the propositions are accepted in France, an alliance is then to be formed with this country. It is also believed that the seven islands ‡ will be annexed to Russia in full Sovereignty.”

\* Czartoryski proposed to make Alexander king of a restored Poland, with compensations to Austria and Prussia.

† Place omitted.

‡ The Ionian Islands were occupied by Russia at this time.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord HARROWBY.*

[No. 31. Cipher.]

VIENNA, 12th September, 1804.

MY LORD,—I have still to notice the non-arrival of any new instructions to the Russian Ambassador.

Count Rasoumoffsky has in fact been absent from Vienna during the last week.

The distinguished manner in which the Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia \* has been received here is, I think, worthy of remark. The Archduke Anthony was ordered by the Emperor to receive him, and to pay him all honours and attentions during his stay here, and the Prince Ferdinand of Wurtemberg was sent from Brunn in order to shew him the troops in garrison at Vienna.

His Royal Highness dined with me the day before yesterday, on which occasion I learnt from him that, although he was not charged with any commission from his Court (as had been surmised) he had nevertheless had a great deal of conversation both with the Emperor and the Archduke Charles at Brunn on the present state of Public Affairs, and that he had (and as he flattered himself not altogether unsuccessfully) used his utmost endeavours to convince them first of the expediency of a close connection with Prussia, and next of the facility which would be found on the part of the Court of Berlin to enter into such a system.

The Vice Chancellor informed me yesterday that his letters from Italy mention that the French had demanded the occupation of the ports in the Papal Territory which had hitherto been declined, and that the Pope had made fresh remonstrances against assisting at the Coronation of Bonaparte.

I learn also from other quarters that the French are reinforcing their army in Italy.—I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

\* Nephew of Frederick the Great. As leader of the party hostile to France he was opposed to the King and Haugwitz.



*From Mr. F. J. JACKSON to Sir A. PAGET.*

BERLIN, 26 Sept, 1804.

DEAR SIR,— . . . This Court has declared in the most positive Terms both to me & to M. D'Alopeus\* that it will not see with Indifference any farther Progress of the French in Germany, and has specified the Possibility of an Attack upon Swedish Pomerania as a Case that w<sup>d</sup> occasion its Interference.

The King of Sweden wishing, as I understand, to obtain a direct Declaration to this Effect, has sent here Baron Armfelt for that purpose; but it is not very probable that he should succeed. His Swedish M<sup>r</sup> has also applied to our Government † for an Advance of 100, or 120,000, to put Pomerania in a State of Defence. M. d'Armfelt tells me that the Works round Stralsund will soon be in good Repair & capable of resisting an Attack, which he seems to think may soon follow the arrival at Paris of the Note delivered to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm. He informs me likewise that he is to be recalled from the Vienna Mission at the Request of that Court.—  
I am, &c. (Signed) F. J. JACKSON.

*From Prince COLLEREDO-MANSFELD ‡ to Sir A. PAGET.*

VIENNE, le 21 Novembre 1804.

[The Prince acknowledges a note sent him by Sir A. Paget on the seizure by the French of Sir G. Rumbold, English Minister at Hamburg, which he had laid before the Emperor; and continues:—]

En attendant Sa Majesté avoit déjà appris par une lettre circulaire du Senat de Hambourg adressée aux Ministres étrangers résidans dans cette ville, que le dit Senat ne negligeroit aucun moyen propre à obtenir la mise en liberté de Mr. Rumbold; et Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse en sa qualité de Directeur du Cercle de Basse-Saxe avoit fait demander cette même mise en liberté au Gouvernement François. Sa Majesté l'Empereur, applau-

\* Russian Minister in Berlin.

† A convention of subsidy was signed between Great Britain and Sweden on December 3.

‡ Vice-Chancellor of the Empire.

dissant à cet demarche a fait charger sans delai, par un Courier parti le 11 de ce mois, son Ambassadeur à Paris d'en faire de pareilles au nom de Sa Majesté comme Chef de l'Empire Germanique.

VIENNE, 9 Decembre 1804.

[A note from Count Cobentzl to Sir A. Paget states that, as the affair of Rumbold only affects the Emperor as head of the *Corps Germanique*, he must refer Sir A. Paget to the answer he has already received from the Vice-Chancellor of the Empire.]

*From HENRY WILLIAM COLE to Sir A. PAGET.*

MONSIEUR,—J'ai appris par mes dernières lettres de l'Allemagne que le chien que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous céder a été battu par un chien Allemand. Comme c'est une chose regardé impossible en Angleterre qu'un veritable *Bull dog* Anglois peut etre vaincu par aucun autre que de son Espèce, j'ai lieu de craindre qu'il y a eu quelque négligence du coté de vos gens & qu'il n'a pas en beau jeu, de façon ou d'autre. Un boucher à Leipzig nommé *Breumer* dans le Gerber Gasse où il a été en pension pourra vous donner des preuves de son ouvrage.

Enfin comme je ne suis pas dans l'habitude de tromper qui que ce soit & etant très mortifié & piqué de cet malheureux accident à mon retour à Leipzig pour la foire St. Michel, je suis pret à vous dedommager de telle façon que vous jugerés à propos. Me trouvant actuellement en Angleterre, si vous avez de l'inclination à risquer une seconde épreuve, je m'engage à vous envoyer un chien qui donnera le défi à tout autre en Allemagne sans exception & si vous voulès faire un pari sur lui, je suis content à y être intéressé.

Comme je partirai de l'Angleterre le milieu du mois prochain. En attendant l'honneur de votre reponse j'ai celui d'être, &c. &c.

(Signé) HENRY WILLIAM COLE.

[Note.—I have no clue to the exact date of this letter, nor as to the personality of the writer. Nor am I able to explain why, if he was an Englishman, as his name and

the contents of his letter would appear to indicate, he addressed my father in French instead of English.

I was not previously aware, and regret to learn it now, that my father encouraged dog-fighting (but allowances must be made for the tastes and habits of the day), though I knew that he was a patron of the prize-ring, as were most of the "set" with whom he lived in England. I place this letter with the Vienna correspondence because I know that my father had a large, fierce sort of bull-dog, whose portrait I possess, while he was at Vienna, and I remember to have heard that one of the gentlemen of the Legation, who lived in my father's house, happening to come home rather late one night, was stopped on the staircase by this dog, and not allowed to go either up or down stairs until he was released the next morning by a servant.—A. P.]

*From the Emperor NAPOLEON to the QUEEN OF THE  
TWO SICILIES.\**

PARIS, *ce Nivose-An XIII., Janvier 1805.*

MADAME,—La lettre de Votre Majesté m'a été remise par M. le M. del G.† il m'est difficile de concilier les sentimens qu'elle contient avec les projets hostiles qu'on paroît nourrir à Naples. J'ai dans ma main plusieurs lettres de Votre Majesté qui ne laissent aucun doute sur ses veritables intentions secrètes. Quelque soit la haine que Votre Majesté paroît porter à la France, comment après l'experience qu'Elle a faite, l'amour de Son Epoux, de ses Enfans, de Sa Famille, de Ses Sujets ne lui conseille-t-il pas un peu plus de retenue, et une direction politique plus conforme à ses intérêts? Votre Majesté, qui a un esprit si distingué entre les femmes, n'a-t-elle donc pas pu se détacher des préventions de son sexe, et peut-elle traiter les affaires d'Etat comme les affaires de Cœur? Elle a déjà perdu une fois Son Royaume. ‡ Elle a été deux fois la cause d'une guerre qui a failli ruiner de fond en comble sa Maison Paternelle; veut-Elle donc être la cause d'une troisième? Déjà à la sollicitation de Son

\* This letter is printed in the Memoir of the Right Hon. Hugh Elliot, p. 360.

† Le Marquis del Gallo, Neapolitan Minister in Vienna.

‡ The flight of 1798.

Ambassadeur à St. Petersburg, 10 mille Russes ont été envoyés à Corfou.\* Quoi? Sa haine est-elle tellement jeune, et son amour pour l'Angleterre tellement exalté, qu'elle veuille, quoiqu'assurée d'en être la Victime première, embraser le Continent, et opérer cette heureuse diversion pour l'Angleterre? J'avoue que des passions si fortes auroient quelque part à mon estime, si les plus simples idées de raison n'en faisoient sentir la frivolité et l'impuissance. Son Neveu l'Empereur d'Autriche ne partage point ses sentimens, et ne veut point recommencer la Guerre qui n'auroit pour Son Empire que des résultats peu satisfaisants. La Russie même, que les sollicitations du Ministre de Votre Majesté ont porté à envoyer 10 mille hommes A Corfou, sent très bien que ce n'est point par là qu'elle peut faire la guerre à la France, et les dispositions d'Alexandre 1<sup>er</sup>. ne sont point guerrières. Mais en supposant que la Catastrophe de Votre Famille, et le renversement de Votre Trône armassent la Russie et l'Autriche, comment Votre Majesté peut-elle penser, Elle qui a si bonne opinion de moi, que je sois resté assez inactif pour être tombé dans la dépendance de mes voisins? Que Votre Majesté écoute cette prophétie, qu'elle l'écoute sans impatience. *A la première guerre dont elle seroit cause, Elle et sa Postérité auroient cessé de regner, Ses Enfans errans mendieroient dans les différentes contrées de l'Europe des secours de Leurs Parens.* Par une conduite inexplicable Votre Majesté auroit causé la ruine de sa Famille, tandis que la Providence et ma modération Lui avoient tout conservé. Renonce-t-on ainsi à un des plus beaux Royaumes de l'Univers? Je serais fâché cependant que votre Majesté prit cette franchise de ma part pour des menaces. Non; s'il était entré dans mes projets de faire la guerre au Roi de Naples, je l'aurois fait à l'entrée du premier Russe à Corfou, ainsi que l'auroit voulu une politique circonspecte. Mais je veux la Paix avec Naples, avec l'Europe entière, avec l'Angleterre même, et je ne crains la guerre avec personne. Je suis en état de la faire avec quiconque voudra me provoquer, et de punir la Cour de Naples sans craindre de ressentimens de qui que ce soit. Que Votre

\* Taken by the Russian fleet, by orders of Suvarrow, March 1799. Russia had undertaken the protectorate of Naples, 1798.

Majesté recoive ce conseil d'un bon frère, Qu'elle rappelle les Chefs des Milices,\* Qu'Elle ne provoque aucune espèce d'armement, Qu'Elle renvoye les François qui l'excitent contre leur Patrie, Qu'elle rappelle de St. Petersbourg un Ministre† dont toutes les démarches ont pour but de gêner les affaires de Naples et de la mettre dans des dangers imminens, Qu'Elle renvoye Mr. Elliott‡ qui ne traine que des complots d'assassinâts et excite tous les mouvemens de Naples. Qu'Elle donne sa Confiance au Chef de Sa Maison, et j'ose le dire à moi, et Qu'Elle ne soit pas assez l'ennemie d'Elle-meme pour perdre un Royaume qu'Elle a gardé au milieu d'un si grand bouleversement où tant d'Etats ont peri. Je ne fais pas ma Cour à Votre Majesté par cette lettre. Elle sera désagréable pour Elle. Cependant qu'Elle y voye une preuve de mon Estime. Ce n'est qu'à une Personne d'un Caractère fort, et au-dessus du commun, que je me donnerais la Peine d'écrire avec cette verité. Sur ce je prie Dieu, Madame Ma Sœur et Cousine, qu'Il ait Votre Majesté en Sa Sainte Garde.

(Signé) NAPOLEON.

*From the Emperor NAPOLEON to the KING OF THE  
TWO SICILIES.*

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE,—Je reponds à la lettre de Votre Majesté. Les Troupes Françaises sont dans le Royaume de Naples, en conséquence du Traité de Florence. § Elles y seront tant que les Affaires du Levant ne seront point finies, et je ne pourrai les considérer comme telles que lorsque Malte sera évacué par l'Angleterre et Corfou par la Russie. Sans l'arrivée à Corfou de Troupes que l'Empereur de Russie y a envoyées, à la sollicitation spéciale du Ministre de Votre Majesté, j'aurais diminué le nombre des Troupes Françaises, et n'aurais laissé à Tarente que

\* With the help of a subsidy of £150,000 a year, vigorous preparations had been made in 1804 for the defence of the Calabrian coast.

† For the Duke Serracapriola see Mr. Paget's letter of December 23, 1800. Orders had been given that the Russian troops in the south were to be employed in defence of Naples, if attacked by France.

‡ From Lord Harrowby's despatches of July 1804 it is evident that Mr. Elliot had been singularly successful in stimulating the Sicilian Court to resistance, and had won the warmest approbation of the King of Naples and of the Courts of London and Russia.

§ See Mr. Paget's letter of April 18, 1801, and note.

les 4 ou 5 mille hommes nécessaires à l'occupation de ce Poste. L'Arrivée des Russes m'a obligé au contraire à en augmenter le nombre. Que Votre Majesté me permette de le lui dire—Elle est mal conseillée ; Elle suit un système passionné et contraire aux intérêts de Sa Maison. Paris, Madrid, Vienne, voilà les vrais appuis de Votre Majesté. Votre Majesté est intéressée à la Paix plus qu'aucun autre Prince. Qu'elle repousse ces conseils perfides dont l'entoure l'Angleterre. Elle a conservé Son Royaume sans aucune Perte, au milieu du bouleversement de l'ordre social. Qu'elle ne risque point de le perdre lorsque l'ordre social s'est rassis. Un moment de plus peut-être, et le monde pacifié et tranquille reprendra sa politique et son allure de tous les tems. J'ai pourvu à la solde des Troupes Françaises, tandis que par le Traité de Florence Votre Majesté s'y était engagée. J'ai voulu en cela lui donner une preuve de mon désir de répondre, autant qu'il est conciliable avec la politique générale, aux sentimens qu'Elle veut bien me témoigner. Sur ce je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait, Monsieur mon Frère, en Sa Sainte et Digne Garde.\* (Signé) NAPOLEON.

PARIS, ce Nivose-an XIII., Janvier 1805.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE. †*

[No. 10.]

VIENNA, February 16th, 1805.

MY LORD,—There has unquestionably of late been a considerable degree of Misunderstanding between this Court and the French Government.

Your Lordship will have seen by my former Dispatches that Bonaparte had spoken to the Austrian Ambassador in the most unbecoming and disrespectful terms respecting the Augmentation which has of late been made to the Imperial Forces in Italy.‡ M. de la Rochefoucauld § has

\* By the Treaty of Presburg (December 1805) "the King of Naples ceased to reign." Napoleon charged him with having broken his promises of neutrality, made in September 1805, by admitting Russian and English troops.

† Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Austria armed secretly in the winter of 1804 as a consequence of her secret Treaty with Russia, November 6, 1804. She also entered into alliance with Russia in December to resist further encroachments of Napoleon in Italy.

§ French Minister in Vienna.

made the same remonstrances, tho' in a milder language, to the Emperor's Ministers.

At Paris the most menacing and insulting language has, I have reason to believe, been made use of to Count Philip Cobentzl, such as "that if the Armaments of Austria were not immediately discontinued, and the additional Troops which had been sent into Italy withdrawn, the French Armies would be ordered to the Frontiers, and that Bonaparte was never last in taking the Field."

To this the Imperial Ministers both here and at Paris have declared "that the sole object of reinforcing the Austrian Army on the Italian Frontier was a measure of Precaution against the Introduction of the contagious Fever which had manifested itself in different parts of Italy, a measure which had been equally adopted by other States; that the small number of Troops which had been sent could never warrant the suspicion of their being destined for any hostile purpose; but that if after this Explanation the French Government thought proper to put its threats into execution, the Emperor, however reluctantly, would feel Himself compelled to adopt similar measures for the defence of His Dominions."

Such was I apprehend the state of things, until the arrival of a French Courier at Vienna three days ago.

He was the Bearer of a letter written by Bonaparte to the Emperor, which letter is couched in terms of infinite moderation, particularly as bearing a comparison with the language used by the same Man a short time prior to the transmission of it.\*

It is, I am informed, expressive of the Writer's Uneasiness at the preparations which had been made by Austria, which had necessitated the remonstrances he had been obliged to make, and of his sincere desire to continue in the Relations of Friendship which subsist between the two Countries.

M. de la Rochefoucauld in making a communication of the same tendency to His Imperial Majesty's Ministers has gone rather farther by acquainting them that Bonaparte, trusting to the assurances which he had received

\* In February Novossiltzow completed his mission and returned to Russia. A Treaty of Alliance between England and Russia had been sent by Pitt to St. Petersburg, to be concluded by Czartoryski and Novossiltzow on one side, and the English Ambassador on the other.

upon the Subject, had revoked the Orders which had been given for reinforcing the French Army in Italy.

In reply to which, he has been informed that the Emperor would on his side agree not to follow up the measures which a perseverance on the part of the French Government in its original pretensions would have rendered indispensable.

The above is pretty accurately the state of this question, such as it has been represented to me by the Vice-Chancellor, and as it has been reported to me from other Quarters.

In adding therefore a good deal to the Arrogance of France, and in deducting somewhat from the firmness said to have been displayed on this Occasion by Austria, the above statement of this business may, I should conceive, be a tolerably correct one. . . .

The Negotiations, if any exist between the two Imperial Courts, are I am pretty confident carried on almost exclusively at Petersburg.

With regard to that which relates to a future co-operation between the Courts of London, Vienna, and Petersburg, this Government continues silent. The last time I brought the Subject forward I learnt from the Vice-Chancellor that the Negotiations had been removed from Petersburg to London, and that Count Woronzow had been charged with it; generally speaking however he not only professed, but appeared to be as ignorant as possible of the State of it.—I have, &c.

(Signed)      ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Captain the Hon. CHARLES PAGET to  
Sir A. PAGET.*

"ENDYMION," OFF PORTLAND,  
*Friday Night, Feb 22nd.\**

MY DEAREST ARTHUR,—I wrote to you about six weeks ago before I had taken any Spaniards. As a real & attached & affectionate Brother which you have ever proved yourself to me, you will be glad to hear that I have captured seven Spanish Ships.† Three of them I

\* Year not stated. Probably 1805.—A. P.

† In consequence of Spain granting a subsidy to France and fitting out a fleet, Moore seized some Spanish treasure-ships on October 5. Spain declared war December 12.



sent away for England immediately after taking them—the four others I have now under my convoy. I am now lying to with them off Portland lights meaning to run for Spithead at daylight. The last I took was one of the famous *Lima* Register Ships which besides merchandize had on board Specie, Plate, & Jewels to the amount of about a million & a half Dollars, all of which for safety I removed on board the *Endymion*; in short, my dear fellow, my *whack* of Prize Money at a moderate calculation will be about fifty thousand Pounds, which for a younger brother is not a bad fortune to have made. Having been out twenty three weeks I am little able to give you an account of anything but myself. You may conclude, (as I am irrevocably of the same mind as well as herself), I am anxious to get to London to see Elizabeth \* which with or without leave I purpose doing about eight hours after the anchor is gone at Spithead.

Before I go to sea again you shall hear from me. . . . God Bless you, my very dearest good Arthur, & always believe with the sincerest Love & attachment,—Your most devoted & affectionate Brother, CHARLES PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 13.]

VIENNA, 23<sup>rd</sup> February, 1805.

MY LORD,—It is not to be expected that any public disavowal will be made by this Government, of the Assertion which has appeared in the last French Official Papers, by which Austria is termed the Ally of France, but I perceive at the same time that this Compliment would have been very readily dispensed with here.

This expression, and indeed the Language which has been of late held by the French Government with regard to this Country, are considered here as one of the means which Bonaparte has adopted, in order to diffuse mistrust and jealousy towards each other amongst the Great Powers.†

I have indeed been particularly requested by the Vice

\* His wife, third daughter of Henry Monk, Esq.—A. P.

† To the King of Prussia Napoleon signed himself, "Good brother, friend, and ally." The King confined himself to the usual form, "Good brother and friend."

Chancellor, to represent to your Lordship such to be the opinion upon this subject of His Imperial Majesty's Ministers, and further to say, that the Word Ally, as applied by France to Austria, is wholly destitute of Truth. . . . —I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 18.]

VIENNA, 13th March, 1805.

MY LORD,—I have announced to your Lordship that great changes may very soon be expected to take place in the War department of this Country.

The whole of the projected Arrangements are evidently levelled against the Arch Dukes Charles and Joseph, the latter of whom may be considered as already put aside.

It is in contemplation to establish something like the old Council of War (which, as your Lordship may well know, required all the efforts and influence of the Arch-Duke to abolish) under the presidency of five General Officers.

The persons spoken of, though not finally determined on, are The Prince Leopold of Auersberg, one of the worthiest but most ignorant and stupid of men, General Kolowrat who now commands in Bohemia, and of whom I know of no one quality to recommend him, the Generals Latour and Alvinzi, who are remarkable for having always been beaten by the Enemy, and the Prince Charles Schwartzenberg who, from his fitness for the Situation, will, I have some reasons for apprehending, not receive the appointment.

What will appear incredible, because it is so *preposterous*, is, that it is clearly in contemplation to *reduce the Army*.

Count Cobentzl is a chief Actor in the whole of this conspiracy, for I can call it by no other name. . . . —I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

VIENNA, 19th March, 1805.

MY LORD,— . . . It has for some time past been in the contemplation of the Emperor's first and favourite Minister to effect a complete change of system in the War Depart-

ment of this Country, a project in which he has been zealously and ably supported by others of an inferior order, who from a variety of motives had become the avowed Enemies of that branch of the Government such as it exists at present.

The principal objects which the Promoters of this Revolution have had in view are—1st. To destroy the Edifice which the Archduke Charles, assisted by Monsieur de Fasbender, had been constructing for these last four years: to revive the ancient System with all its disorders and abuses, by re-establishing the celebrated Aulic Council of War (*Hofkriegs Rath*), the Abolition of which may be considered as one of the Principal Merits of the above-named Persons.

2ndly. To overthrow the Influence and Authority of the Archduke Charles.

3rdly. To remove all or any of the Archdukes who might have shewn a disposition to take a share in the direction of Affairs, and more particularly the Archduke John who, as Chief of the Engineer Corps and having (*ad interim*) the joint management of the Military Department with the Archduke Charles, had gained a pretty secure footing, and who by his distinguished and estimable Qualities had begun to create some uneasiness in the Minds of the People about the Emperor, and a degree of Jealousy in the Emperor Himself.

The Pretence which has all along been made use of, and upon which the Necessity of completing the projected Arrangements is founded, is the weak and uncertain State of Health of the Archduke Charles, which at times obliged His Royal Highness to absent Himself altogether from affairs, and generally speaking rendered him unfit to move under the load of business to be transacted in His Department.

These and similar Insinuations gave rise to the Idea of appointing a President of the War Department, who was to have an equal share in the Administration of it with the Archduke, and who in case of either Absence or Illness should replace Him.

This Project, which was in the first Instance directed against the Archduke John, and had been frequently brought forward and discussed, began towards the begin-

ning of February to bear such an Appearance of probability as left little doubt as to the execution of it.

Accordingly the Archduke Charles and Mr. Fasbender, finding that it would be impossible for them altogether to ward off the blow, conceived the idea of giving it a different direction, and to this effect His Royal Highness obtained the Emperor's permission to present to His Imperial Majesty a plan for the new Organisation of the Military Department.

This Plan, which was most admirably and skilfully drawn up by M. de Fasbender, determined the functions of the New President, and with infinite address combined the power with which he was to be invested with the Authority (of course superior) of the Archduke; it finished by the Proposal of appointing the Archduke John to this new Situation.

It was presented to the Emperor about the middle of February.

This measure however completely failed of success. The Emperor informed the Archduke Charles that the Plan which he had presented to Him, was in no way conformable with His Intentions, that He could therefore make no use of it, *and that he would Himself see what was to be done in the business.*

This answer was accompanied by several comments which were made in the Cabinet, and which threw a sufficient degree of light upon the real Intentions of the Emperor.

The Count Colleredo and his creatures declared aloud, that the Power of the Archduke was already too great, and that it had been necessary to limit it; that as to the other Archdukes, their services were not required; that M. de Fasbender was a turbulent Man, a Projector, an Innovator, &c. &c.

From this moment the Archdukes Charles and John considered themselves as completely disgraced and overthrown, for the Emperor, having declared so explicitly that He should himself new model that part of the Administration, it was evident that those who had hitherto been at the head of it were destined to remain quiet Spectators of their own Defeat.

Such I take to be nearly the exact state of the affair at the moment I am writing.

There exist however certain data which lead me to anticipate the changes which are likely to take place, which changes may now be looked for from one day to another.

It is more than probable that the Military Department will undergo a complete Revolution, and in order not to spare the feelings of the Archduke Charles, not only his whole work will be completely pulled down, but the scattered Materials of the old Buildings will be collected and piled up in the same uncouth shape, and the Mansion tenanted by the same order of Beings.

Instead however of one president as heretofore, there will be seven, of whom one will receive the Title of First President, and what may be considered as most remarkable is that, with the exception of one Individual, these Presidencies will be bestowed upon a set of Men the weakest, the most inapt, and the least distinguished and respected that could have been pitched upon among the list of Generals.

The first of these situations it appears is destined for an old Man of the name of Kosboth, General of Cavalry, a perfect invalid, and either generally unknown or forgotten. His associates will be the Generals Kolowrat, Alvinzi, and Latour as mentioned in my dispatch No. 18, with the addition as I am assured of General Beaulieu, whom His Imperial Majesty has in the first instance to thank for having very much contributed towards the loss of the Low Countries and of Italy.

To this illustrious Society it is in contemplation to join the Prince Charles Schwartzenberg, whose Military Talents, whose Zeal, and whose Uprightness would have rendered him ineligible, had not a degree of weakness of character and a natural propensity to yield to rather than resist the pressure of the times, qualified him for the situation.

Of the character and talents of General Mack it is not necessary that I should remind your Lordship, but it is with pain I have to relate that that officer is deeply concerned in this plot against the Archduke, but it is not expected that he will reap much benefit from this New Order of things: On the contrary, the work once completed, it is more than probable that he will be again disgraced and dismissed.

Why the Archduke Charles did not as he certainly at one time might have done, secure General Mack to his Party, is one of those Phenomena, which it requires local knowledge to form any conception of.

It is not hitherto known what part His Royal Highness will take in this New Piece of Work. It is not improbable that in order to carry the Persecution as far as possible, and with a view of getting rid of him once for all, he will be bereft of the Title of Minister of War. At all Events His Power and Influence are irrevocably gone.

The mere retreat of that Prince, as well as of every Individual attached to Him, with the single exception of M. de Fasbender, for whom I entertain the highest opinion, would have been to me a Matter of real exultation, could I have placed the slightest confidence in the choice of the Persons appointed to succeed him, for I know of no Event more sincerely to be wished in a political point of view, than the exclusion of the Archduke from any share in the Councils of this country.

Your Lordship well knows that I consider Count Cobentzl as the maximum of political Evil, but after him I have no hesitation in saying that there is not in this country a more decided enemy to every measure by which the Court of Vienna might find itself eventually forced to take up Arms than the Archduke Charles.

But with respect to His Royal Highness's Administration of the Military Department, it is but common justice to say that it has been brought to a degree of Perfection hitherto unknown in this country.

It is not therefore the loss of the Archduke (supposing such an Event to take place, of which let the business terminate in whatever way it may I very much doubt) that is to be regretted, but the Acquisition of greater Imbecility and Supineness, accompanied with more positive evil, that we have to apprehend.

Most happy shall I be if the View I have taken of this Subject shall in the sequel be found to be an erroneous one, but persuaded as I am that the system of this Country is more than ever decidedly fixed, and that that System is the Maintenance of Peace upon any Terms and by any Sacrifices, I cannot bring myself to consider the

Changes in question, whether they be general or partial, otherwise than as a measure ultimately tending to the consolidation of that System.—I am, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 20.]

VIENNA, 20th March, 1805.

MY LORD,—The Emperor's Journey is considered as uncertain—if the Journey is put off, it is certainly in order to avoid it.

These Ministers deny that any proposition has been made to them upon the subject. It is suspected that Bonaparte is waiting to be informed of the Emperor's Motions in order to regulate his own, as he is determined that His Imperial Majesty shall not escape him.

I have seen a Person arrived within two Days from Milan, who represents the preparations making there for the reception of Mr. Bonaparte and Mr. Joseph Bonaparte and the rest of that illustrious Family to be magnificent beyond all example. The people at Milan have a confused idea that there will be a Coronation, but nobody knows who is to be crowned.\* The Doge and the other leading Members of that Republic had been ordered from Genoa to be present at the Ceremony.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord PAGET to Sir A. PAGET.*

IPSWICH, March 24th, 1805.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I take the earliest opportunity of acknowledging your letter of this 27th of Feb<sup>r</sup> which I received yesterday. In answer to Count Meerfeldt's enquiries respecting Portugal, I believe I may mention to you without further enquiry that there is no prospect of service in that country. We certainly do not send any troops there & the Portuguese are by no means capable or indeed inclined to attempt to defend themselves against France & Spain.† A much more probable event is, their

\* Napoleon accepted the crown of Lombardy, March 31. He placed on his head the iron crown of Charlemagne at Milan on May 26.

† They had made a Treaty with France, December 1803.

shutting their ports against us. Had any military operations been going on in that country, a person of Count Meerfeldt's calibre would have been most necessary to that State, as their troops are said to be most wretchedly officered. As Report sent a large body of British troops there some months back, the Cavalry of which I was said to be destined to command, I enquired respecting the accounts that might have been written of that Country & I found that the only one at all military & in the least to be depended on is that written by Dumourier. I send it to you for the Count's perusal. When I see the Duke of York I will sound him upon the subject of your letter with discretion & let you know the result. Sir James Craig is about to sail with some thousand Infantry, I believe for Malta, with a view probably to watch Egypt. The Line is about to recruit from the Militia, & as it is said that the Cavalry is to be allowed to enlist Men from them I conclude some Continental Service is hoped for. They are all augmenting to 1000 Men. Mine will be a wonderful Regiment next year. We are scarcely old enough now. Believe me that wherever the British appear, they will carry all before them. The Army never was in so thriving a state. . . . —Ever Affec<sup>d</sup> Yours,  
 PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 27.]

VIENNA, 10th April, 1805.

MY LORD,—Lest your Lordship should not have heard it through any other Channel, I have to mention that I know, *from certain Authority*, that Bonaparte has proposed to the King and Queen of Naples to be present at his Coronation at Milan.

The determination of His Sicilian Majesty was not known when the person who brought this Account left Naples.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord G. L. GOWER to Sir A. PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURGH, April 21st, 1805.

DEAR ARTHUR,—I have the Pleasure of informing you that on Thursday 11th Ins<sup>t</sup> I signed a Treaty of Alliance



between the Courts of London & St Petersburg \*—the object of this alliance is the Reduction of the Power & Influence of the French Government. England engages to pay £1,250,000 per annum for every 100,000 men employed by the Continental Powers in the accomplishment of this Object, provided that not less than 400,000 Men are brought into the Field against France; of this number Russia binds herself to furnish 115,000; the Remainder it is proposed should be obtained by inducing the Courts of Vienna & Berlin to accede to this Treaty. Count Stadion holds out expectations that he may receive Instructions & Full Powers to sign the accession of his Court.

This is the outline of the Treaty, of which I will not trouble you with all the Details, but it is I think right that you should know that it is agreed that a Plenipotentiary should be sent by the Emperor of Russia to Paris authorized to state the conditions on which alone Continental war can be avoided & general Peace reestablished; the demand of a Passport for Mr. Novossiltzoff whom the Emperor has chosen for this Mission was sent to Berlin about ten days ago.† . . .

As the Russian Ministry are desirous that the conclusion of the Treaty should not as yet become public, I must enjoin Secrecy upon the contents of this Letter.

*Copie d'une Lettre Autographe du ROI DE SUÈDE au  
ROI DE PRUSSE, en date du 22 Avril 1805.*

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE ET COUSIN !—C'est avec regret que je me vois forcé de déposer entre les mains de votre Majesté Son ordre de l'Aigle Noir, qui m'a été conféré par feu le Roi Votre Père comme un gage précieux de ses sentimens pour moi. Connoissant trop bien le prix et la valeur de ces marques solennelles qui tiennent leur origine des tems les plus anciens, et qui sont fondées sur les principes et les devoirs sacrés de la Religion et de la Chevalerie, ce n'est que malgré moi que je cède aux tristes circonstances des tems où nous vivons, pour

\* The work of Czartoryski and Novossiltzow. The Emperor, however, refused to ratify the Treaty till changes had been made with regard to Malta and the maritime code, and negotiations on these points began.

† By common agreement of Russia and England.

faire une démarche, qui seroit contraire à ma manière de penser et d'agir, si des évènements trop récents ne m'imposaient ce sacrifice comme un triste devoir à remplir.\* Une explication ultérieure me seroit pénible; mais je me crois obligé de déclarer comme Chevalier, que je ne puis reconnoître ce titre respectable dans la personne de Napoleon Bonaparte et de Ses Semblables.

Je prie Votre Majesté d'être persuadée de la sincérité de mes sentimens pour Sa personne, étant, Monsieur Mon Frère et Cousin, &c., &c., &c.,

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 32.]

VIENNA, 24th April, 1805.

MY LORD,—A circumstance which was kept a profound Secret, and which reached me only in a vague manner at the time, is, that Bonaparte had actually given an Order to attack the Austrians on I believe the 8th of February, under a supposition that the number of Troops sent from hence into Italy was more considerable than he supposed it to be.

I have reason to believe that this intelligence was transmitted to this Court by the Arch Duke Charles, and that neither Count Philip Cobentzl nor the French Mission were informed of it. The subject of my last dispatch, the dismissal of General Duca,† I really consider as one of the most desirable events that could have occurred, and it is not, as I understand, intended to appoint a Successor to the situation he held. It is probable that General Mack will be appointed Aide de Camp General next to The Emperor, or to some Confidential situation near the Sovereign; in which case he will have a principal share in, if not the entire direction of the Military Department—his intentions were good. It has reached me from the best authority that his plan,

\* On April 3 an exchange of decorations was arranged between the King of Prussia and Napoleon. Seven Golden Eagles of the new Legion d'Honneur were sent to the King and members of his Court, and seven Black Eagles to Napoleon's Court. The ceremony of investment at the Prussian Court took place on the 7th. On the 9th the King wrote to Napoleon a complimentary letter hoping that the making of the Italian kingdom into a republic might lead to the peace of Europe.

† A well-known officer in the literature of the time, a little behind the front rank of men.

if he should be allowed the full execution of it, is to make a gradual but total change in the distribution of the Troops, and by this operation, to place an Hundred Thousand Men between Vienna and the Frontiers of Italy.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 33.]

VIENNA, 27th April, 1805.

MY LORD,—Within these very few Days there is evidently a very considerable change in the Vice-Chancellor's Language. I was particularly struck with it in a Conversation with him yesterday.

He repeated to me that The Emperor in his Answer to Bonaparte had not acknowledged his Title as King of Italy. That He, on the contrary, rather treated that Subject as one in which the other European Powers had so deep an interest that He could not alone take upon Himself to decide upon it.

He said more than once that I might be assured that Bonaparte was as dissatisfied as possible with the Court of Vienna: that the State of Affairs became every day more critical &c.; and on leaving him he said with much earnestness and Emotion, "the time is probably not far distant when we shall have much more to say to each other."

I had once before occasion to remark a similar Change in the Vice-Chancellor's language, and I should probably not have noticed it on the present Occasion had it not been conformable to the language of others whose opinion I have no right absolutely to disregard.

Amongst these I know from General Meerveldt, who is very much in Count Cobentzl's confidence, that this Minister has within a very short time expressed himself upon Publick Affairs in terms totally different from any he had been accustomed to hear from him on any former occasion.

It is my duty to mention these Circumstances, but until I see a little further into them I cannot wish that too much attention should be paid to them.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 35.]

VIENNA, 1st May, 1805.

MY LORD,—Since I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship an account has been received by this Government that a very formidable French Army is collecting in Italy. It is said two Camps are forming, one at Marengo which will consist of Forty thousand Men,\* & another of two Thousand at Castiglione. Orders have been issued from hence for four Regiments (forty Squadrons) of Cavalry to march into Stiria.

I had yesterday a long conversation with Monsieur Fasbinder, who confirmed to me the plan attributed to General Mack, as stated in my Dispatch No. 32.

He also remarked to me the change which he has lately discovered in the language, and as he pretends, the sentiments of these Ministers. His opinion is that a rupture is inevitable—he thinks that the ascendancy of the present Council of War cannot long hold—indeed without his assistance, they would not I am persuaded go on three weeks. He owned to me that his plan was to bring back the Archduke Charles, but to place a totally different set of people about him. With this condition, *most strictly fulfilled*, I should not be sorry to see His Royal Highness reinstated. The Archduke Charles is fully persuaded that the Russian Ambassador and myself (but myself principally) were instrumental to his removal. I thought it proper therefore to desire Monsieur Fasbinder to set His Royal Highness right on this point.

I know that this Government is in expectation that Bonaparte will demand the cession of the Venetian State. A refusal to accede to this demand, and a refusal to acknowledge his new title, are, *if persisted in*, two points which will lead to hostilities.

The Russian Ambassador has hitherto received no instructions relative to Bonaparte's last usurpation.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

\* For the mimic battle of Marengo before the Emperor on May 5.

*From the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE to Sir A. PAGET.*

LONDON, May 3d, 1805.

MY DEAREST ARTHUR,— . . . I have had nothing but anxiety and disappointm<sup>t</sup> on my mind and the dread of a breach between your Father and Paget on the Subject of politicks. The former could not desert the King at such a moment and the latter had pledged himself to Vote with M<sup>r</sup> Pitt, but his duty & affection to his Father got the better and he did not come up, but he resigns his Seat in Parliament : the Conduct of both does them the greatest Credit, & the Correspondence on the Occasion is strictly honorable. Could your Father feeling as he does towards the King *do otherwise*? The only thing to lament is Paget's having made the engagement without the knowledge of his Father. . . . M<sup>r</sup> P—— knows perfectly your Father's Sentiments towards him, and that it was out of Consideration alone to the King, that he persuaded Paget not to Vote against him : in justice to P—— I must make use of his own words, that nobody could feel more sincerely attached to H. M. than he did, but that he Did not consider Opposition to the Minister Opposition to the King.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 38.]

VIENNA, 11th May, 1805.

MY LORD,—I received a letter yesterday from Lord Granville Leveson by which I am informed of the Treaty signed by His Lordship on the 10th ult<sup>o</sup>.

There can be no doubt of the Courier who arrived here seven or eight days ago from Count Stadion having brought the Intelligence of it to this Government. My reason for noticing this Circumstance is, that when I last saw the Russian Ambassador two Days ago, he told me in so many words that he had never had a worse opinion of the Disposition and Intentions of this Court than at the present moment, and he evidently grounded this Opinion upon what had passed between the Vice Chancellor and himself since the arrival of the above mentioned Courier.\*

\* On April 15 the Czar had declared that unless Malta were ceded the Treaty must fall to the ground. This concession Lord Leveson-Gower refused point-blank.

Count Rasomouffsky is not insensible to the alteration which has lately been observed in the language of these Ministers, but he certainly does not appear to be more or so much disposed as myself to deduce any real good from it.

After General Mack had received his Appointment, and before he set out for Bohemia where he has been for a few days, he presented to the Emperor a Plan by which in case of Emergency, an Army might be assembled in Italy with the least possible delay. The Emperor delivered this plan (which I am told was an admirable one) to the Archduke Charles desiring to have his Opinion upon it. His Royal Highness lost no time in submitting it to his Friend General Duca, who immediately drew up a Memorial to prove that in no possible event whatever could this Country oppose an open Resistance to France. I will say no more of this performance at present, than that the Archduke did actually adopt it *in toto*, and presented it as his Opinion to the Emperor.

On the other hand, Count Cobentzl speaks in a vague and mysterious way of augmenting the Austrian Army in Italy to Sixty Thousand Men.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 39.]

VIENNA, 11th May, 1805.

MY LORD,— . . . Since my Dispatch of the 8th Inst I have been informed by the Russian Ambassador that he has been instructed to invite this Court to accede to the Treaty signed on the 10th April at Petersburg.

[He goes on to say that he had mentioned the subject to the Vice Chancellor, and continues:]

Count Cobentzl did not evince the smallest disposition to enter into any detail of the question; he confined himself entirely to general assurances of the Emperor's invariable Friendship and Attachment to His Majesty, and to the cause in which He is engaged.

He then however proceeded to inform me, desiring that the Communication might be considered as a mark of his Confidence, that orders had been given for encreasing the Austrian Army in Italy to Sixty Thousand Men.

Upon a question of this important Nature, I am as averse as possible to the Idea of giving your Lordship any false impressions relative to this Court. I am as unwilling to depreciate such part of its Conduct as is entitled to Attention, as I am averse to holding out a prospect of Success, from Circumstances which at first view are calculated to raise much expectation.

The assembling for instance these Sixty Thousand Men might certainly (considered exclusively) pass for a wise and vigorous Measure. But it is impossible for me to pass that sentence upon it,—that is to say I cannot admit, in consideration of this single measure, that the System of this Court which has hitherto been impolitic and weak is at once become firm and judicious, particularly when I reflect that at the very conference in which I am informed that this Army is collecting, I find the question of a close alliance with two Powers whose cooperation and whose Cooperation alone can ultimately avert the total Ruin of this Monarchy, treated if not with Indifference, at least with less Interest than the extreme Magnitude of the affair is entitled to.

On the other hand, I must allow that there are other circumstances from which favorable deductions may be drawn.

The refusal to acknowledge Bonaparte as King of Italy—the order sent to Count Cobentzl to absent himself for a certain time from Paris, which the French Ambassador here has received order to enquire the reason, and complain of—the Order sent to the Imperial Agent at Milan (M. Moll) to quit that Residence during Bonaparte's stay there—the sort of dry language which has of late been held to M. de la Rochefoucauld, are incidents which tend at least to prove that there exists a considerable degree of coolness between the Austrian and French Governments.

In a late conversation I had with the Vice Chancellor, in speaking of the changes which had taken place in the Military Department, Many People, he said (and I expect that the Allusion was meant for myself) had been very profuse in censuring the Emperor's Ministers, without taking into consideration the difficulties of all Sorts they had had to encounter, observing that the State of the Military Department under the Administration of the

Archduke Charles (to whom he paid many Compliments as a Military Character) had not been the least of them. The inference he seemed to draw was that the changes in question would afford to this Government means which they had not hitherto possessed, and that it was their Intention to turn them to advantage.

I have said upon a former Occasion, that a perseverance on the part of the Court of Vienna in its refusal to acknowledge Bonaparte King of Italy, and a determination not to accede to any demand which may be made for a cession of the Venetian States, may involve this Country in a War.

The second of these objects may at present be considered as speculative matter, no positive indication having hitherto appeared of Bonaparte's Intention either to demand or enforce the accomplishment of it.

Nearly the same Observation is applicable to the former, as in fact the Acknowledgement has only been asked for by Implication.

The Armaments and other Demonstrations of this Court to which I have alluded are, as it strikes me, directed exclusively with a view to both of these possible Events—a line of conduct in which what has lately been transacted at Petersburg will unquestionably induce these Ministers to adhere to. If therefore Bonaparte should *for the present* feel it to be his Interest to desist from these Pretensions, I very much fear that this temporary Appearance of Moderation will be construed into a complete and perhaps sufficient Triumph, which will give no facility to the formation of a solid System of Alliance by which the general Interest and welfare of Europe may be restored and protected.

Notwithstanding the assurances made by the King of Prussia both to the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna that He would not be the first to acknowledge the newly usurped Sovereignty of Bonaparte, it appears by Accounts received by this Government that not less than three Prussian Ministers, Messrs. Lucchesini,\*

\* Prussian Ambassador to France in 1800. He followed Napoleon to Italy with the Prussian Orders, which Napoleon wore at his entry into Milan. In 1806 Napoleon insisted on his recall, Lucchesini having discovered his intentions against Westphalia and Prussia.



Humboldt\* (from Rome) and Lombard† are at this moment at Milan.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the* MARQUIS OF WELLESLEY *to His Excellency the*  
Right Hon. Sir ARTHUR PAGET, K.B.

[Private.]

Fort William, May 21<sup>st</sup>, 1805.

MY DEAR SIR,—I return you my sincere thanks for your obliging and interesting letter of the 28th September 1804, received on the 25th of February 1805, as well as for the honorable terms in which you have signified to me your approbation of the transactions related in the printed notes, which I had the honor to forward for your information. By the overland Dispatch of the 22nd of February 1805, I had the honor to forward to you a continuation of Official Documents connected with the printed notes which I hear have reached you in safety. . . .

I have obtained permission from England to lay down this arduous charge, and the State of Affairs being such as to admit of my departure without danger to the public interests, it is my intention to embark for England, as soon as the season will permit me to sail from Bengal. I expect to be able to embark from Calcutta towards the close of the month of August, but the exact period of my departure must depend upon the state of the season, as well as the condition of public affairs in this Country. I entertain no doubt however, of being able to take my departure about the period of time which I have stated in this letter; and the state of my health renders me particularly anxious to quit this unfavorable climate, in which I have passed so many years under circumstances of great difficulty and solicitude.

I am extremely obliged to you for the interesting details which you have communicated to me respecting the state of affairs on the Continent of Europe, and for the obliging intention which you have expressed of continuing to favor me with your correspondence. . . . I shall take the liberty of addressing you on every occasion when I may

\* William von Humboldt, for three years Prussian Minister at Rome.

† Cabinet secretary to the King of Prussia. He was a Frenchman, entirely devoted to the French interest, and had great influence over the King. At this time he was staying, for his health, at Leghorn.

be enabled to communicate any circumstance which may appear to me to be deserving your notice.

With the most cordial sentiments of respect and esteem  
I have, &c. (Signed) WELLESLEY.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 40.]

VIENNA, 15th May 1805.

MY LORD,—I omitted informing your Lordship in my last Dispatch that all Soldiers on furlough had been ordered to join their Corps, that is, the order has been signed by the Emperor and is about to be issued.

There was a sort of Military Council held the day before yesterday at the Archduke Charles's, (who I must observe declared himself upon this occasion more strongly than ever against War) who was for throwing twelve thousand Men into Venice, and for ordering General Bellegarde to retreat with the rest of the Army. On the other hand General Mack is for leaving only six thousand in Venice, and for concentrating the rest (which may amount to between twenty-five or thirty thousand) with a view to resist the first attack.

This proposal met with the most violent opposition from the Archduke and his friends, who immediately insisted (this fact is almost incredible) upon the plan being submitted to the consideration and decision of *two Colonels* in the Army, too obscure for me to name here.

I have not yet heard their reply, but it is to be hoped that General Mack at a moment like the present, will not allow himself to be thus dictated to.

If his plans are carried into execution, General Bellegarde will in the course of three or four weeks have between fifty and sixty thousand men under his command, but it will I fear require at the lowest calculation at least two months to place that Army upon a footing to make an effectual resistance if they are attacked in force—in such a case it is probable that the Archduke would take the command.

They have now placed about His Royal Highness a General Grun, whose pacific disposition and admiration of Bonaparte have probably procured him that distinction.

I am happy to say General Duca has at length quitted.  
—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 43.]

VIENNA, 25th May 1805.

MY LORD,—The Declarations lately made in the French Papers of Bonaparte's having assumed the Title of King of Italy with the Consent of the great Powers, amongst which the Court of Vienna is named, have not escaped the attention of this Government, and Count Cobentzl has given me reason to suppose that a Contradiction will be given to the Assertion.

It is not probable that the Military Preparations which have been lately carrying on in this Country can have passed unnoticed by the French Government. I have however to observe that hitherto The French Ambassador, if he has not been quite silent upon the Subject, has at least not made any Official remonstrance, an Event which these Ministers appear to be daily expecting.

This Government having no Agent in that Country is very indirectly and vaguely informed of what is going on there, but from the Information they have received it would seem that instead of rejoicings and thanksgivings, the presence of Bonaparte at Milan has inspired a general Gloom and Despondency.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

LONDON, May 30th, 1805.

MY DEAREST ARTHUR,—We are all most grateful for your writing to so many of us, hurried as you must have been when you sent off Morand. I know what this is just now, for the King has announced his intention of going to Beaudesert as soon as possible after the birth day. If that dear old place had had fair play it would have been the joy of my life to have received him there; as it is, my sensations are very different, and I believe your Father is more than ever annoyed that he has done so much in Wales. It makes us all very jealous. It is impossible for them to sleep there. All we can do will be to give them a breakfast or a dinner. This subject ought not to have made me postpone my acknowledgements for the most perfect chain I ever possessed, but my dearest Arthur I must again and

again repeat and entreat that you will not be so kind to me, believe me it hurts my feelings; if I could in any way make you a return I could bear it better, but alas! I have nothing but unbounded affection for you. . . . I believe the person whose silence you complain of is right now, whatever he might have been, for you will see in the Papers that he has resigned his seat in Parliament, as he was brought in by Lord S——d who is hostile to Mr. Pitt: I feel uncomfortable at the arrangement about yours, as it looks as if we were never to see you here, tho' of course if you can come you can resume your situation either in Wales or some where else. Your Vote would have been of use several times this session. . . .

I have charged the Dean of Windsor to send you all the News, & he has more than anybody, he can announce several Marriages but none that will interest you. My memory is very bad upon these occasions, and in the midst of the World I live out of it, having been only at one ball, or anything else except the Royal ones this year, and we were to have gone to Plasnewydd immediately but for the King's intention. I send you a little Broth Basin of Derby China. You must not measure my love for you by the gift. I wish I could fill it with bank notes, but we are as poor as Poverty, as Mrs. Peacocke calls it. Dear Charles sent Edward a thousand pounds on his Marriage, but this is not to be spoken of. I'm afraid his Prizes will fall short of our expectation. This is an anxious moment, and we are waiting with great impatience for news from our Fleets. . . .

*4th of June.*

I kept this open, to add anything I might hear at the birth day, but all we had to do was to secure our lives if possible, & I doubt if every body succeeded. The King's reply to the Arch Bishop of Canterbury's Address, was deliver'd in the most impressive manner, and drew Tears from every body. He never looked better, thank God.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 48.]

VIENNA, 8th June 1805.

MY LORD,—I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that down to this Day he has not succeeded in obtaining

the Accession of this Court to the Treaty lately signed at St. Petersburg.\* I am sorry that it is not in my Power to present to Your Lordship any more detailed or satisfactory Information on this important Subject, but as long as the Court of Vienna is allowed to pursue its favourite Plan of negotiating exclusively with the Court of St. Petersburg and at Petersburg, it is not to be expected that the Emperor's present Ministers should voluntarily engage themselves in a Transaction of that Nature.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 50.]

VIENNA, 15th June 1805.

Notwithstanding the certainty of your Lordship's being apprized by Count Woronzow of the Nature of Gen<sup>l</sup> Wintzingerode's Mission,† I will succinctly state that the object of it is to induce the Court of Vienna to accede to the Treaty of the 10th of April, and consequently to enter into co-operation with England and Russia against France in the event of the failure of M. Novossiltzoff's Mission,‡ I have hitherto had but one short conversation with Count W., with whom I have every reason of expressing myself particularly satisfied.

He has not seen The Emperor, who only returned yesterday, but from the discussions he has had with the Ministers I find him upon the whole extremely confident. The Comparison he draws between these & the Prussian Ministers is highly favorable to the former.

He informed me He was particularly well received by the Arch Duke Charles, but seems at the same time to be perfectly aware that the most serious opposition may be expected from that quarter.

\* The Anglo-Russian Alliance had been in serious peril ever since the signature. It seemed finally doomed now, when on June 5 Pitt formally refused to cede Malta, and on June 7 refused to accede to Russia's demands as to the maritime code.

† Aide-de-camp to the Emperor of Russia. He arrived in Vienna, June 6.

‡ Novossiltzow left St. Petersburg for Paris in June. Alexander, deeply angered by the action of England, was prepared, if she did not yield about Malta, to denounce her policy in the face of Europe.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 51.]

VIENNA, 19th June 1805.

MY LORD,—On Sunday the 16th General Wintzingerode had an Audience of the Emperor at His Country Palace, and delivered to His Imperial Majesty The Emperor of Russia's Letter. I understand that he remained with the Emperor about half an hour.

I do not as yet know precisely what passed at the Interview, but I believe that I may venture to state that the result of it is such as upon the whole to afford satisfaction at the Court of Petersburg.

Previous to this Interview, I know that Monsieur Wintzingerode's Opinion was that if the Court of Vienna could be brought to a thorough Conviction that in no possible Case whatever it would be abandoned by Its Allies, the Difficulties which presented themselves in the way of securing the co-operation of this Country would at least be considerably diminished, if not wholly done away with.

There exists however a Party, and a very strong Party, at the Head of which is The Arch Duke Charles, for remaining at Peace, let the Sacrifices for it be what they may; and so steady and effectual have been their Proceedings in support of this System, that at the above-mentioned Audience The Emperor Himself, without absolutely naming his Brother, did actually intimate to Monsieur Wintzingerode that it was in that Quarter that He met with the greatest Obstacles towards forming such a Military System as the Sense of His Situation would have led Him to adopt. In sending General Wintzingerode upon this Commission, a better choice I have reason to believe could not have been made. There is no officer in the Service better acquainted with the Austrian Army, and He has already availed himself of this choice by bringing under the Emperor's Observation several Circumstances which had appeared to him to require the Intervention of such Authority. . . .

During His Imperial Majesty's Absence at Prague, the French Ambassador made a Proposition to this Government from Bonaparte for exchanging the Imperial and

French Orders. I am glad to say that the Proposition has been rejected. M. Rochefoucauld was yesterday informed by the Vice-Chancellor in the Emperor's name, that the Exchange he had proposed would not be agreed to by His Imperial Majesty.

Such is the Account the Vice Chancellor has given me of this Business. I hope that the Refusal may not be qualified by some Allusions to the Statutes of the Orders of this Country.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the Hon. H. ELLIOT \* to Sir A. PAGET.*

NAPLES, June 1805.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR,— . . . The recognition of Bonaparte's new title is to be formally made by the Marquis de Gallo at Bologne, upon the 20th of this month; it is expected here, that this new mark of condescension will allay the ill humor, which Bonaparte has of late manifested against this Government. The result will be known here about the 25th Inst. . . .

Hitherto the Court of Vienna has manifested little *public interest* in the fate of this Country, & I have conformed to what appeared to be the wish of the Austrian Minister here, in rather avoiding than seeking for any real or apparent political intercourse with Him.

Perhaps the recent events in the North of Italy may prove to the Austrian Government, that we are less dangerous friends than Bonaparte, but as long as the System of paying Court to France remains, I am persuaded that all our communications will only be betrayed to France. . . . —Believe me, &c. (Signed) H. ELLIOT.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 52.] ,

VIENNA, 22d June 1805.

MY LORD,—It is, I believe, felt here that the annexation of Genoa† and Placentia are Acts which nothing but an Appeal to Arms can afford a proper Satisfaction for;

\* British Minister at Naples.

† The Ligurian Republic was incorporated in the French Empire June 9, and Napoleon entered Genoa in triumph June 30. On his return to Paris the decree annexing Parma and Placentia was issued.

accordingly I do not find that The Emperor has broken Silence upon those Subjects.

It has been lately a Subject of deliberation in the Military Councils here whether, in the Event of being attacked, Venice should be abandoned, and this Question has been decided in the Negative.

General Devaux, an Engineer Officer of great Merit in this Service, sets out within this day or Two in order to put the following Places into the best possible State of Defence, viz<sup>t</sup>., Venice, Treviso, Trent and Brixen.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 54.]

VIENNA, 3<sup>rd</sup> July, 1805.

I am sorry to say that the impression left on my mind since my last Conversation with General Wintzingerode is that he is not so sanguine in his expectation of succeeding here as he appeared to be on the outset of his Mission.\* Had that officer opened his Career here instead of at Berlin, he would, I dare say, have gone away vexed and dissatisfied, for amidst all his reasoning and calculations, I very plainly perceive that his hopes of ultimate Success are not so much grounded on the progress he has hitherto made in his Negotiation, as upon the reflection that he is treating with Men who have the merit of being honester and more loyal than those who compose the Prussian Government.

[On July 6 Sir A. Paget informed Lord Mulgrave that M. de la Rochefoucauld had stated to Count Cobentzl that the encampments in Italy had been formed for the sole purpose of exercising the troops, and having been inspected by Napoleon, had broken up, and that Napoleon trusted the Emperor would show his friendship by ceasing his military preparations in Italy. Count Cobentzl answered that the military preparations were solely in consequence of the increase of the French army in Italy, and that the Emperor's preparations were within his own dominions, whereas Napoleon had collected his troops in a country that did not belong to him.]

\* He succeeded (July 7) in drawing Austria into the Alliance on the fall of Genoa. The plan of campaign was settled July 16.



*From M. NOVOSSILTZOFF to Baron HARDENBERG.\**

BERLIN, le <sup>28 Juin</sup>  
10 Juillet 1805.

Lorsque S.M. l'Empereur de Russie consentit, à la demande de S.M. Britannique d'envoyer le Soussigné auprès de Bonaparte pour répondre à une démonstration pacifique que celui-ci venoit de faire à la Cour de Londres, Elle fut guidée par deux motifs également pressants, également conformes à Ses principes et à ses sentimens connus ; l'un de seconder un gouvernement pret à faire des efforts et des sacrifices pour le repos général, et l'autre de tirer avantage pour tous les états de l'Europe d'un désir de paix qu'on auroit du croire sincère à la solemnité avec laquelle on l'avoit annoncé.

Les rapports existans entre la Russie et la France eussent pu opposer des obstacles insurmontables à une négociation de paix par l'organe d'un Ministre Russe. Mais S.M. Impériale ne balança point à passer sur tous les sujets qu'Elle avoit de mécontentement personnel, sur toutes les formalités usitées. Elle profita de l'intervention de S.M. Prussienne et en faisant demander des passeports pour son plénipotentiaire, Elle se borna à déclarer qu'Elle ne les accepteroit que sous les deux conditions bien précises ; que Son Plénipotentiaire traiteroit immédiatement avec le Chef du Gouvernement François, sans reconnoître le nouveau titre qu'il s'étoit donné ; *et*, que Bonaparte assureroit positivement qu'Il étoit encore animé du même désir de paix générale qu'Il avoit paru vouloir manifester dans sa lettre à S.M. Britannique.

Cette affaire préalable devenoit d'autant plus importante, que Bonaparte immédiatement après la réponse donnée par S.M. Britannique à sa lettre du 1 Janvier s'étoit revêtu du titre de Roi d'Italie, titre qui pouvoit mettre par lui seul de nouvelles entraves à la pacification désirée.

S.M. Prussienne ayant transmis la réponse formelle du Cabinet des Tuileries, qu'il persistoit dans l'intention d'y prêter les mains sincèrement, S.M. Impériale accepta les passeports avec d'autant plus d'empressement que le

\* Baron de Hardenberg had succeeded Count Haugwitz, in 1804, as Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Gouvernement François avoit affecté d'en mettre à les envoyer.

Une nouvelle infraction aux traités les plus solennels vient d'opérer la réunion de la République Ligurienne à la France. Cet événement en lui-même, les circonstances qui l'ont accompagné, les forces qu'on a employées pour en précipiter l'exécution, le moment même qu'on a choisi pour l'accomplir, ont formé malheureusement un ensemble qui devoit marquer les dernières bornes aux sacrifices que S.M. Impériale venoit de faire aux instances de la Grande Bretagne et à l'espoir de ramener par les voies des négociations la tranquillité nécessaire à l'Europe.

S. M. Impériale n'eut sans doute pas arrêté, dans ces bornes, sa complaisance et ses sacrifices, si le Gouvernement François avoit permis d'espérer qu'il respecteroit les premiers liens qui unissent la société et qui soutiennent la confiance des engagements parmi les peuples civilisés. Mais assurément il seroit impossible de croire que Bonaparte en expédiant les passeports accompagnés des protestations les plus pacifiques, songeroit sérieusement à les suivre, puisque dans l'intervalle qui devoit s'écouler entre l'expédition des mêmes passeports et l'arrivée du Soussigné à Paris, il hâtoit des mesures qui, bien loin d'apporter des facilités au rétablissement de la paix, sont de nature à en détruire jusqu'aux élémens. Le Soussigné en rappelant à Son Excellence Msr. le Baron de Hardenberg &c. &c. des faits bien particulièrement connus du Cabinet de S.M. Prussienne doit lui faire part qu'il vient de recevoir de S.M. Impériale l'ordre exprès \* du  $\frac{9}{21}$  Juin dernier de remettre sans délai les passeports ci-joints, et de prier Son Excellence de vouloir bien les renvoyer au Gouvernement François, en lui annonçant que, dans l'état actuel des choses, ils ne sauroient être d'aucun usage.

Le Soussigné saisit, cette occasion pour réitérer à S.E. l'expression de sa haute considération.

(Signé) NOVOSILTZOFF.

\* Alexander sent the order of recall instantly on hearing of the annexation of Genoa. The action of Napoleon in preventing the arrival of Novossiltzow alone made possible the renewal of alliance between Russia and England, and averted the repudiation of the Treaty.

*Extract of a despatch from Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE, dated Vienna, 20th July 1805.*

[No. 59.]

My opinion remains unshaken, and I thought it my duty to deliver it most unreservedly to General Wintzingerode. It is that nothing will be concluded here by Negotiation. If it is the Emperor of Russia's object to secure the Co-operation of the Court of Vienna, he must march 200,000 Men into the Austrian States. This opinion cannot be too strongly enforced at St. Petersburg.\*

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*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE.†*

VIENNA, 18th August 1805.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I received your kind letter of the 16th July three or four days ago. It was brought to me by a Doctor Neale, a Physician who is going to the Arbuthnots at Const<sup>ple</sup>.

From what you say upon the subject, I may I believe congratulate you very sincerely upon Charlotte's‡ marriage. This appears to be the first of Nine, that has received your unqualified approbation, for altho' one is happy, and t'other is happy, and they are all happy, more or less, still it happens that there is not one of the other eight, that has not presented objections of one sort or other. From whence I conclude that Charlotte must be just the happiest of beings, to marry a man whom she loves, and to whom you, my Father and all of us wish to see her united. Once more accept my sincere congratulations upon the occasion. The satisfaction I feel upon it does, however, I own experience some drawback from the idea that you are now left quite alone and, without disparagement to the rest of my sisters, Charlotte is perhaps the one, whose loss you will feel the most. I wish I could supply her place, tho' it is certain that

\* See Lord Mulgrave's despatch, September 10.

† See Introduction, p. 89.

‡ Married John, Earl of Enniskillen, and died 1817.—A. P.

they will be too happy to be one or other constantly with you.

I see, my dear Mother, that you will not yet give up the idea of my marrying;—it is however impossible for me to encourage it in the smallest degree,—the shock I received last winter has probably decided me for ever. I did not at the time tell you half I had to go thro', such a detail would have wounded your feelings, without bettering my situation—but what is still more afflicting, was the state of mind of the poor dear Princess L—. It is only lately that I have learnt the extent of her sufferings upon that unfortunate occasion; they must, from what has reached me, have been most poignant. I have in her lost the most beautiful and the best of creatures,—such a mind, such a heart! as are rarely to be met with,—and God knows into what hands they are to fall. It is not to be believed, all that has been practised to make her forget me. It is little to say that I have been constantly, from that day to the present, represented in the most odious colours to her,—it is little to say that the utmost pains have been taken to make her believe that my only object was to gain her Person, because it is beautiful, and that at the end of a year or two I should abandon her for the first woman whose external appearance pleased me. Such poison might very well have worked upon a very young mind;—upon her's however, it has had no other effect than that of setting her against the persons who have administered it. She has constantly cried out "Calumny," & that she will not believe a word of it. One or two other Parties have since been proposed to her, which she has rejected without hesitation, saying as I have heard, that as she will never marry against the consent of her Parents, so she hopes not to be forced to unite herself to a man whom she does not love & esteem. But I am pretty nearly at the end of the story, without ever having informed you of the beginning of it, which being upon the subject, I will now endeavour to do as briefly as possible.

You already know what passed two or three years ago. Of that therefore I will say nothing, except that having felt for Leopoldine what I then did, it was not unnatural that my feelings towards her should be revived. This

happened in the commencement of the last winter and a few weeks proved to me that they were mutual—I at that time frequented Prince Esterhazy's House, pretty nearly as I do Uxbridge House, that is to say, I was there whenever I pleased. To give you an idea of the footing I was upon in that family I will mention a single anecdote. In the month of January last, I met Prince E. at a Ball at the Russian Ambassador's. I said to him "What do you do to-morrow, there shall be dinner at my house if you like it," he answered that he was engaged, & asked me what I meant to do. Upon saying that I had as yet no engagement, He replied, "then go and dine with my son Paul,—the Princess & myself dine out, but he will take care of you." To this proposal, I observed that this plan would be very agreeable to me, but I feared that it would derange the Princess Leopoldine, who would perhaps like to dine alone with her brother—"Oh no," he said, "you will all dine together." Well, I went, and the Mother being unwell staid at home & dined with us, & I remember well that she, her daughter, & myself got to the fire after dinner & sat talking together for above two hours. I have mentioned this circumstance to prove to you the terms I lived upon with that family. I had during the whole of that winter dinners at my house every Sunday;—Esterhazy was of course one of those who had received a general Invitation, which he never missed, besides which, he occasionally sent to me in the morning to announce himself for dinner:—he has indeed come without any previous notice. I accompanied him during that winter twice or three times to the Chasse, to his Country House & so forth, when there were but ourselves; in short without going into further detail of this sort, it appeared to me that I had completely gained his affections, nay I can with my hand upon my heart most solemnly say that I thought I had discovered in him something more than common friendship. To be brief, I really thought that I perceived in his breast a secret desire that I should belong to him. Affairs continued in this state (the affection of L—— and myself daily increasing and strengthening towards each other) till, as well as I recollect, the end of the month of Febry, at which epoch some few people *began to talk*. It is unnecessary to say that their language was hostile to

my interests; it however produced an Invitation from the Mother to desire to see me, the day and hour was fixed. Not doubting of the object of this proposed interview, I determined, having obtained L.'s consent to that effect, previously to break the subject to the Father. Upon this occasion I made use of the language of Honor & Delicacy. I informed him that I came to learn his Sentiments upon a Subject which I well knew was nearest and dearest to his heart. I then proceeded to acquaint him with the impression his daughter had made upon me &c., &c. I begged him not to return me any answer whatever at the present moment, but to take all the time he required well to weigh the subject, & I concluded by assuring him that if the proposal I had to make was found to be incompatible with the views he had formed for the welfare and happiness of his daughter, that he would never find in me the destroyer of the Peace of a Family, & that whatever it might cost me, I would in that case abandon the pursuit. In the course of the conversation I ingenuously said, that if he would consult his daughter I trusted that he would not find her averse to the proposal which had been submitted to him. Would you believe it? this fair, this candid, this warranted declaration broke my neck. I on the following day or the day after received such a letter from the Princess as I can never forget. She begins by expressing her surprize at the proposal I had made to her husband, which she, in the name of the Prince, in her own, & *in that of her daughter* now rejected, and accuses me of want of faith and principle, in having gained the affections and consent of the Princess L., without having previously obtained that of her Parents. This letter did not remain *unanswered* as you may imagine, and my reply produced a correspondence between the Prince & myself of a very unpleasant nature. I ought to have said that at the interview I had with him he expressed himself in the most gentlemanlike, liberal and flattering terms,—in a way, in short, which gave me just grounds to suppose that the battle was gained. You may therefore judge of my feelings upon the receipt of the Princess's letter. The Result of my correspondence with the Father was, that a meeting took place between us at the Russian Ambassador's House (he being present)

at which a *soi disant* reconciliation took place. Thus have I briefly, tho' I fear rather confusedly, (for I am writing in great haste) given you an account of this melancholy transaction, whereby two people loving each other, & I sincerely hope & believe worthy of each other, were rendered miserable beyond the power of words to express.

I am writing to you by a Messenger from Gosh (?) whom he has begged me not to detain, you will I know shew this letter to my Father, & he will I hope consider it as equally addressed to him & not be angry at my not writing. You will guess that the *circumstances of the day*, will not have allowed me to leave Vienna this summer as I had intended;—I have indeed passed the whole of it in town, for I do not like the country when quite alone, indeed Summer, there has hitherto been none, constant rain & cold weather. Your account of poor Charles is really distressing. You will easily believe how truly unhappy I felt at learning the misfortune which had befallen the King;—what you say of him affords me some relief. Your having given Anglesea to Berkeley looks as if you did not mean to see any more of me,—in fact there does not at present appear much prospect of such happiness; you may depend upon it that during Bonaparte's life, no family in England at least will be able to boast of the enjoyment of true domestic happiness. I must now take my leave & in good truth it is time. I am unpardonable for having inflicted such a punishment upon your poor eyes. Good-bye, pray give my kindest love and duty to my Father & believe me ever my dear Mother,—Your most dutiful and affect. Son,

A. P.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Princess ESTERHAZY.*

[*Copia.*]

MADAME LA PRINCESSE,—Je ne sais pas si la surprise que vous a causé ma conversation avec le Prince Esterhazy a pû égaler celle que je viens d'éprouver en lisant la lettre dont vous avez bien voulu m'honorer. Après la marche et le caractère de cette conversation, après la manière parfaitement satisfaisante dont le Prince avait

reçu ce que je lui disais ; enfin, après tant d'autres circonstances qui m'autorisaient à compter sur des procédés d'amitié et de bienveillance de votre part, je ne pouvais guère m'attendre à une lettre, laquelle, en repoussant un projet mis en avant par moi avec toute la réserve, et toute la délicatesse que je pouvais y mettre, aggrave le désagrément inséparable d'une explication pareille par des reproches peu mérités, par des accusations injustes, et par des réflexions affligeantes.

Je n'ai pas mis en œuvre pour m'assurer du consentement de la Princesse Léopoldine aucun moyen qui pût être désavoué par les principes de la loyauté la plus stricte et la plus pure. Ce n'étoit pas, je crois, un crime, d'avoir deviné ce qui paroisoit se passer dans le cœur d'une jeune personne intéressante, à travers le voile dont la sagesse et la décence admirable de sa conduite cachotent ses sentimens ; — ce n'étoit pas, je pense, une action déloyale que de lui présenter purement et simplement la question, si elle consentoit à ce que je cherchasse à connoître les dispositions de ses parens par rapport à sa destinée future. Cette marche me paroît au contraire aussi conforme à la délicatesse, qu'au bon sens. Un homme raisonnable ne s'engagera jamais dans un projet très sérieux, sans avoir établi une base quelconque sur laquelle il puisse s'appuyer. D'un autre côté, et j'en appelle aux rigoristes les plus scrupuleux, la simple question, si elle ne s'opposeroit pas à une démarche à faire auprès de ses Parens, ne peut jamais compromettre une jeune personne. Si cette question avoit été précédée, je ne dis pas d'un ensemble, et d'un système de conduite répréhensible, mais seulement de la plus petite indiscretion, de la plus légère inconséquence, du moindre oubli passager, je pourrois encore plier sous le poids d'une accusation, dont l'idée d'avoir pu la mériter, empoisonneroit ma vie entière. Mais ayant été constamment sous vos yeux, Madame, je vous fais juge vous-même de toute la teneur de ma conduite passée, et s'il y a eu la plus légère nuance qui ait pu justifier votre reproche, je vous invite à me la faire connoître. Jusque là je resterai convaincu de la rectitude irréprochable de mes procédés comme je le suis heureusement de celle de mes intentions.

J'ai été également étonné de trouver dans votre lettre des



observations sur "les nouveaux engagements de mariage" que j'avois contractés dans mon pays. Je ne m'arrêterai pas à les examiner, parceque je les regarde comme étrangères au sujet qui nous occupe. J'en conclus seulement que vous êtes très mal instruite sur cet événement. Mais je ne me serais pas attendu à vous voir prendre fait et cause pour une autre liaison qui, d'après votre opinion, auroit été un des plus puissans obstacles à l'exécution de mes projets. Ce n'est pas ici que j'entrerai dans des explications sur cette dernière liaison, mais je vous avoue franchement, Princesse, que par mille et mille raisons, je n'aurais jamais cru que, dans une occasion aussi solennelle, vous vous en déclareriez la Protectrice. Ce phénomène singulier, cette accumulation de reproches gratuits, et d'accusations incompatibles me prouvent finalement que vous n'avez voulu négliger aucun moyen pour me faire de la peine, et pour me punir *de la confiance* et de la franchise avec laquelle j'ai agi dans toute cette affaire.

Je n'examinerai pas non plus les différentes objections que vous avez spécifiées dans votre lettre ;—je le ferai d'autant moins que le Prince qui doit pourtant en connaître la force comme vous, Madame la Princesse, ne m'a pas paru y attacher beaucoup d'importance. Mais je vous dirai en peu de mots ce que je pense de la chose.

Je ne désavouerai jamais le désir extrême que j'ai eu de posséder la main de votre fille,—je pourrais même, si c'étoit ici le moment, vous exposer de la manière la plus satisfaisante, comment presque tous les événemens des dernières années de ma vie, comment ceux même qui ont eu l'air de m'occuper de légèreté et d'inconséquence, ont été le résultat constant d'un attachement profond et insurmontable sans cesse contrarié par quelques obstacles réels, et par une infinité de difficultés imaginaires, de faux scrupules, et d'injustes préjugés. Si j'avois trouvé en vous les dispositions sur lesquelles je croyais pouvoir compter, et que j'ai effectivement trouvées dans Monsr. le Prince Esterhazy, je n'aurais pas tardé à vous présenter quelque proposition formelle. Votre lettre me l'interdit. Je sens tout ce que j'y perds, mais j'ai cependant assez de fierté pour ne pas vous cacher que ce qui constitue la partie la plus sensible de mes regrets, c'est la nécessité de renoncer à l'espoir de faire le bonheur d'une des personnes les plus

dignes d'être heureuse que j'aie jamais rencontrées dans le monde, espoir, dont j'avois acquis le droit de croire qu'il auroit été réalisé dans toute sa plénitude.

Mon honneur m'ordonnait de me défendre contre ce qu'il y avait de trop pénible, et de trop injuste dans votre lettre. Mais, après tout, Madame, je vous dois des remerciemens de la tournure que vous avez cru devoir donner à vos déclarations. Les sentimens amers que vous m'avez fait éprouver, sont un contrepoids bienfaisant aux sentimens douloureux que m'auroit fait naître dans tous les cas l'idée de me voir mal entendu, mal jugé et mal apprécié dans une tentative, qui ne m'étoit inspirée que par les intentions les plus pures et les plus irréprochables en elles-mêmes, et je puis ajouter les plus conformes à l'amitié et à l'attachement que je nourrirai éternellement pour vous, et pour tout ce qui vous appartient.

Ayant trop de raisons pour craindre qu'on aura représenté à la Princesse Léopoldine sous les couleurs les plus hostiles mes sentimens, mes projets et ma conduite, je crois, madame la Princesse, que la justice exige que vous lui communiquerez la présente, et je vous demande solennellement cette communication. Je n'ai aucun moyen pour m'assurer du succès de cette démarche, mais je la recommande à votre loyauté.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec les sentimens les plus distingués, &c.

(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

VIENNE, le 30 Janvier, 1805.

## VIENNA

### (3.) THE CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ: 1805-1806

ÆTAT. 34

THE third Coalition against France was completed by the accession of Austria to the alliance between England and Russia in July 1805. But what was the conduct of Prussia in regard to this Treaty? It is fully explained in the letter from the King of Prussia to the Emperor of Austria of the 4th of September, in reply to an appeal of the Emperor Francis to join him in endeavouring to effect, by their good offices, the renewal of the negotiations for peace; and what the King says amounts practically to this—and he seems very proud of it—viz., that after conferences with Marshal Duroc, who had been sent by Napoleon from Boulogne to confer with him and his Ministers upon the general position of affairs, he had reason to hope that he could obtain from France four points which he enumerates, and which, had they been accepted, would simply have confirmed the French in the possession of their actual usurpations in Italy and Germany, with some illusory promises respecting the integrity of those countries for the future, according to the Treaty of Luneville.

This letter is very well answered in a letter from Count Cobentzl to Count Metternich of the 11th of September, but the length of this document renders its publication in this correspondence impossible.

In the meantime the King of Prussia issued his declaration of the 9th of September, in which he announces his intention of maintaining a strict neutrality, not only for himself, but for the States situated in the North of Germany, for which purpose he had taken the resolution to arm and assemble a body of troops which, in the first instance, would amount to 80,000 men.

How faithful His Majesty was to the above programme, and how well he defended the neutrality of his dominions, will appear in the sequel. Napoleon knew his man, and the Power he had to deal with. It is not an exaggeration to say that to the King of Prussia, for not having joined this Coalition, and to his vacillating policy, are due all the misfortunes, desolation, and bloodshed which subsequently afflicted Europe. Had he joined his forces to those of England, Russia, Austria, and Sweden, it would have been quite impossible for France to have stood against such an array of strength as would then have been brought into the field; and no one was better aware of this than Napoleon himself. He would consequently have consented to disgorge a part of his ill-gotten gains, and have made peace upon the terms proposed by the Allies, which would still have left him with the enormous additions of territory up to the Rhine, and the incorporation of Piedmont, as acquisitions to the French Empire. But he counted on the King of Prussia, and he paid no heed to his neutrality.

The plans of Napoleon for the invasion of England were considerably deranged by the dispersion on the 22nd of July, by Sir Robert Calder, of the combined fleets of France and Spain (the latter Power having joined France at the end of 1804), under the command of Admiral Villeneuve, which had been reckoned upon for the convoy of the flotilla destined to transport the French army across the British Channel; and on the 17th of August, after several ineffectual attempts on the part of his admirals (Villeneuve and Gantheaume) to bring this squadron to Brest, and feeling that, even should they eventually succeed in getting there, the time for the invasion would be past, Napoleon took the resolution to abandon his enterprise against England, and to direct all his forces to the centre of Germany. The Austrians had already assembled a considerable force on the banks of the Danube, and were waiting for the arrival of their Russian allies; by the middle of September they had crossed the Inn and invaded Bavaria, the Elector, after much hesitation and contrary to the feelings of his people, having determined to throw in his lot with France.

Napoleon made great efforts through his plenipotentiaries in Berlin, Marshal Duroc and M. Laforest, to obtain the alliance of Prussia; but the King, distrusting his promises to allow him to annex Hanover permanently to his dominions, although he was to be allowed to take it in deposit, declined the proposals, and continued to follow his temporising policy. It being the object of Napoleon, however, to surround the Austrian army in the centre of Germany before the arrival of the Russians, he gave orders to Marshal Bernadotte to disregard the neutrality of Prussia, and to march the corps which he commanded through the territory of Anspach. The note in which Count Cobentzl brought this violation of Prussian neutrality to the knowledge of Count Rasoumoffsky, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, was evidently written under the impression, and with the hope, that this act of Napoleon might finally decide the King of Prussia to join the alliance against France. Its only effect, however, was to produce diplomatic representations addressed to the French envoys at Berlin, who duly replied, of course, though apparently in a not very satisfactory manner, as will be seen by a note addressed to them by Baron Hardenberg dated the 14th of October.

Meanwhile the Austrian Government was becoming very anxious for the payment of part of the subsidies promised by Great Britain, which was duly attended to; and on the 8th of October, Count Cobentzl announces to Sir A. Paget that he and Count Rasoumoffsky are to accompany the Emperor to the army, "*et à faire la guerre avec nous.*" Sir A. Paget accordingly followed the Emperor to Olmütz, and to other places whither His Imperial Majesty transferred his headquarters.

On the 19th of October, General Mack signed the capitulation of the fortress of Ulm. Thirty thousand Austrian troops defiled before Napoleon and laid down their arms. A similar fate had attended another portion of the army at Memmingen. Nothing, in short, could have been more disastrous than was the beginning of this campaign for the Austrians, and unfortunately the end was not destined to be more favourable for them than the commencement.

Amongst the papers connected with the surrender of Ulm

will be found one containing the report of a conversation between General Mack and Napoleon after the signature of the capitulation.

The first information of what had happened at Ulm and its neighbourhood reached the British Government through the official publications in the *Moniteur*. Lord Harrowby was at once despatched to Berlin with a view of securing the co-operation of Prussia, of which sanguine expectations appeared to be entertained. The British Government, moreover, determined to send a special military embassy to Vienna in order to concert more promptly on the spot the necessary measures for the defence of the Empire, and appointed Lord Cathcart for that purpose.

While the calamitous events just referred to (with more to follow) were happening in Austria (and no one who reads Sir Arthur Paget's despatches, reviewing the general condition of the Austrian Empire, its civil and military organisation and administration, &c., will be surprised at them), England was brought to the highest pinnacle of glory by the victory gained by the immortal Nelson over the French and Spanish fleets off Trafalgar on the 20th of October, an event acknowledged by Count Cobentzl as "la meilleure des consolations qui aurait pu nous arriver dans nos malheurs, qui ne dureront pas toujours j'espère."

In December, Lord Harrowby, owing "to the extreme liberality of the offers" made by England, had great hopes of "securing the co-operation of Prussia." His Lordship, however, had not yet fathomed the duplicity and perfidy of that Power; and no wonder, for, in order to show it in its true light, it is necessary to refer to a circumstance which is not mentioned in the correspondence, viz., the visit of the Emperor Alexander to Berlin and the conclusion of a Convention between him and the King of Prussia, by which the latter bound himself (unless its stipulations, based on the Treaty of Luneville, with the retrocession of all the conquests since made by France, and the independence of Holland and Switzerland, were agreed to) to commence hostilities on the 15th of December; and yet the compact was ignominiously set aside by the King of Prussia immediately after the battle of Austerlitz.

It will be observed that, although this Convention was

signed early in November, Lord Harrowby on the 3rd of December, as stated above, had only "great hopes of securing the co-operation of Prussia." The Emperor Alexander had hardly left Berlin before the old habit of temporising returned, from which the King had only been detached by the urgent solicitations of the beautiful Queen Louisa—who, to her honour be it said, had consistently advocated a more active and honourable policy—and by the public indignation caused by the affair of Anspach, above referred to, and the general feeling of antagonism aroused by the acts of Napoleon.

Count Haugwitz, who was charged to present the ultimatum, and should have proceeded at once upon his mission, did not set out till the 14th of November;—"the Prussian armies made no forward movement towards the Danube, and Napoleon was permitted to continue without interruption towards Vienna." When he eventually arrived at the French headquarters on the 28th of November, and was received by Napoleon, he was careful *not* to deliver the ultimatum, deciding, on the contrary, to await the turn of events after knowing the result of the impending battle of Austerlitz.

After the battle, when an armistice had been agreed to between the Emperor Francis and Napoleon, and the outlines of the Treaty, subsequently negotiated at Pressbourg, settled between them, Count Haugwitz presented himself before the French Emperor, and not only did not present the ultimatum, for which possibly some excuse may be made under the then circumstances, but proposed a Treaty on the basis of the old project of annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions.

Napoleon, with vehement declamation against the perfidy of the Prussian Cabinet, declared that Prussia must enter heart and hand into the French alliance, and in exchange for Hanover cede to France and Bavaria certain of its detached southern possessions. These terms were agreed to by Count Haugwitz, and were subsequently ratified by the King of Prussia.

Sir A. Paget's diplomatic career in Vienna was drawing towards its close. On the death of Mr. Pitt, on the 23rd of January 1806, and the failure of Lord Hawkesbury to form an Administration, a Coalition Ministry was com-

posed, of which Lord Grenville was the head, but Mr. Fox, who took the Foreign Department, the ruling spirit.

Not long after assuming office, viz., on the 14th of March, Mr. Fox wrote a private letter to Sir A. Paget to announce that he had recommended his recall to the King, to which His Majesty had been graciously pleased to consent. The chief reason for this measure, fully explained in the correspondence that follows, was the laying before Parliament by the late Ministry of some of Sir A. Paget's correspondence, a publication which, in Mr. Fox's estimation, was as little necessary for the defence of the preceding Administration as it was unfair and unjust towards Sir A. Paget himself.

Sir A. Paget seems to have answered Mr. Fox in the same courteous spirit in which the latter had addressed him, but there is no record of his letters, and the above is only to be gathered, therefore, from Mr. Fox's replies of the 31st of March and 16th of May. It may indeed be almost inferred from the letter of the 31st of March that, had it not been for the unfortunate publication of Sir A. Paget's despatches by Lord Mulgrave, Mr. Fox would have been glad to leave him still at Vienna, but it may be gathered that Sir A. Paget was himself not desirous of remaining there.

On leaving office Lord Mulgrave wrote (January 30) to Sir A. Paget, taking leave on their official separation, and it is not difficult to read between the lines of this letter that their views upon Austrian politics were the reverse of harmonious. As to whether this had anything to do with the publication of the despatches I will not allow myself to express any opinion.

In a letter from St. Petersburg of the 20th of March, Lord G. Leveson Gower comments in terms of just severity upon the unpardonable indiscretion of Lord Mulgrave in publishing Sir A. Paget's confidential correspondence, and remarks with great truth that such publication "will naturally have the effect of making foreign courts extremely cautious in their relations with that of London." Fortunately a wiser and more correct system prevails in our Foreign Office of the present day, and has done so for many years past.

There is nothing to show the precise date at which Sir



A. Paget actually left Vienna, but it may be assumed from Mr. Fox's letter of the 16th of May, above alluded to, that it was about the 1st of June, and that he then proceeded to the baths of Tœplitz for the benefit of his health, which, as will have been seen, was very much impaired in the autumn of 1805, and had been far from satisfactory at various times during his service abroad.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### *From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 62.]

VIENNA, 27th July 1805.

MY LORD,—Accounts which have been received here from Switzerland as well by Individuals as by Government, leave no doubt of the Projects of Bonaparte for uniting that Country to France. It is perfectly well known that there are French Emissaries dispersed throughout Switzerland for the purpose of preparing the same revolting changes which have lately annihilated the Republic of Genoa.

I am very sorry to say I do not hitherto discover on the part of these Ministers any greater Resolution to oppose this vast and dangerous project, than was manifested in the Affair of Genoa.

The Vice-Chancellor treats the Subject (having done the same Thing upon Twenty Thousand Occasions) as an open violation of the Treaty of Luneville, but here he stops—and here I am persuaded he will stop, unless forced on.

The Preparations for War still continue\*—the Artillery which has been sent into Italy is immense, though I conclude that a considerable part of it is destined for the Places which are fortifying, as mentioned in my Dispatch No. . . . —I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

\* According to the plan of campaign of July 16.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 63.]

VIENNA, 1st August 1805.

MY LORD,—At a moment when one would give one's blood to bring about a close and intimate Connection between Austria and Prussia, a circumstance has arisen which will, I fear, create some unpleasant explanations between the two Courts.

One of the first measures adopted by this Government after the late riots \* was to order a recruitment to take place in this City, with a view, no doubt, of getting rid of vagrants and idlers of all sorts. On the other hand those who have been seized are between fifty and sixty individuals, Subjects of the King of Prussia—and it has happened to several who have presented themselves with proper documents to verify the same, that their Passports or Certificates have been taken from them and destroyed in their presence.

These violences have produced a Remonstrance on the part of the Prussian Minister, which was conveyed in a note presented by the Secretary of Legation to the Vice Chancellor.

The pretence set up for enlisting these People is, that they were concerned in the late disturbances: The Count Keller has replied, both in his note and through the Secretary Finkenstein, that, if the facts be so, let them be tried, and executed if found guilty; but that the Emperor has, in no case, the right of enrolling Prussian Subjects. At the above interview the Vice-Chancellor expressed himself in terms so rude, so disagreeable, and so unfriendly towards the Court of Berlin, that Count F. thought it prudent to conceal it as much as possible from the Minister; a Circumstance worthy remark is, that several persons, in the same predicament, and under the protection of the French Ambassador, have been enlarged.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

\* The bread riots of July.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 65.]

VIENNA, 7th August 1805.

MY LORD,—Since the Arrival here of a French Courier three or Four Days ago, Mr. de la Rochefoucauld has renewed his Remonstrances against the military Preparations of this country.\* The same Answer has been returned as to his former Representations,—and it has further been signified to him, that the Emperor, as Guarantee of the Swiss Constitution, would not view with Indifference the Changes with which, according to Rumour, that Country was menaced.

This may be well for Swisserland, but it is a sort of tacit acknowledgement, that the Emperor will not go to War for all that has been lately done in Italy.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 67.]

VIENNA, 10th August 1805.

MY LORD,—When Count Cobentzl wrote to me this Morning, desiring to see me, I hardly expected that the sole Object of the Interview would be to communicate to me this extraordinary Declaration.

I think that your Lordship will agree that We now see the whole System of the Court of Vienna in its true Light—not a hundred folio pages could have given a juster Insight into the real Views of the Men who govern this Country. We have now before us an official Declaration, wherein, after more than the half of Italy has been swallowed up by Buonaparte, the Emperor makes a solemn tender of His good offices to bring about a Negotiation to prevent a War between Russia and France,† which was not commenced in consequence of such Acts of Usurpation and Violence on the part of the latter Power as would at any other Period of History, and without any alternative, have drawn forth the immediate vengeance of the Court of Vienna.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

\* There are also two long despatches from Talleyrand in this month which reiterate these complaints.

† In accordance with the method of profound dissimulation agreed on at the Alliance of July.

*From the MARQUIS OF WELLESLEY to Sir A. PAGET.*[*Private.*]

FORT WILLIAM, 12th August 1805.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have the honor to inform you that I resigned this Government on the 30th July to the Marquess Cornwallis, and that it is my intention to embark on Thursday next the 15th Instant on His Majesty's Ship the *Howe*, which has for some time past been prepared for my reception and accommodation on the voyage to Europe. I expect to leave the Hoogly River on the 22d of this Month, and to reach England by the close of the Month of December 1805, or the beginning of January 1806. I am happy to inform you that the Company's possessions are in a state of perfect tranquillity, and have not been disturbed since the expulsion of Holkar from Hindostan in the Month of May 1805.—With great respect and regard, &c. (Signed) WELLESLEY.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 72.]

VIENNA, 29th August 1805.

MY LORD,—I have at length been put in possession by the Vice Chancellor of the whole of the Negotiation which has been carrying on between the Two Imperial Courts since November 1804.

[Sir A. Paget proceeds to speak of the subsidies to be paid to Austria, and continues :—]

From the present appearance of things it is evident that a War with France will now no longer depend upon the payment of one or two Hundred Thousand Pounds more or less, but I must nevertheless observe that Count Cobentzl has insinuated to me that the language which the Emperor will soon be called upon to hold to the French Government would naturally be heightened or lowered in proportion as He may be provided with the Means of making good His Pretensions. His Majesty's Government may certainly expect that the Subsidiary Demands of the Court of Vienna beyond the Sum which has absolutely been offered by His Majesty's Ambassador at Petersburg\*

\* Russia, by the Treaty of July, was to procure English subsidies for Austria.

and accepted by Count Stadion, will be strongly pressed upon them.

According to the best information I have been able to obtain upon the Subject the Austrian Armaments have already occasioned an Expenditure of about Thirty six Millions of Florins; what the result of them may be is another question, but I must admit that they could not have been carried on upon a more extensive and a more formidable Scale, and with greater Activity had that sum been previously placed in their Bank.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 73.]

VIENNA, 29th August 1805.

MY LORD,—I have the Honor to enclose a *Réglement* which was published yesterday and by which the Austrian Army is declared to be upon the *War Establishment*.

In order to avoid your Lordship an immediate Contest with the probably bad German in which this *Réglement* is written, I have caused a translation to be made of the essential Points contained in it, which I herewith enclose. The opening of it is in fact the most important of the whole.

I happened to be in Count Cobentzl's Cabinet yesterday morning, reading some Papers, when the French Ambassador arrived in the adjoining Audience Room with this *Réglement* in his hand.

The Interview, though very short, was I fancy rather a boisterous one.

M. de la Rochefoucauld—alluding to the *Réglement*—began by saying, as Count Cobentzl informed me immediately afterwards, “Vous voulez donc la Guerre, eh bien vous l'aurez.” The conversation did not in other respects appear to be very novel.

*From Lord MULGRAVE to Sir A. PAGET.*

DOWNING STREET, August 30, 1805.

SIR,—The negotiations which have hitherto taken place having passed entirely through the Medium of St. Petersburg, without any direct Communication between this Court and that of Vienna, it has not been possible to

make to you any detailed Communications which might be applied to any effectual purpose at Vienna. The State of Affairs is however at this period come to such a crisis, that it is important not to lose a moment by circuitous Correspondence. I have to desire therefore that you will state to Count Cobentzl, that you have been instructed to inform him (as a Most Secret and Confidential Communication) that His Majesty's Government has received from Russia the last Proposal made from thence to Austria, together with the Additional Article,—that we concur in the Plan proposed,—that the Additional Article will be immediately ratified here,—and that measures are taken to furnish without delay to Austria the Pecuniary Succours stipulated, whenever she shall be in a State of War, and shall have acceded to the Concert already concluded between Great Britain and Russia.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 77.]

VIENNA, 30th August 1805.

MY LORD,—It was not until this Afternoon that I got a sight of the Answer made by the French Government to the *declaration* of the Court of Vienna. . . .

In the first place the Note in answer to the *declaration* contains a refusal to accept the Mediation of the Court of Vienna.

Bonaparte rejects all idea of any further Negotiation with Russia; he at the same time tells the Court of Vienna that it depends upon the Emperor to bring about a Peace between England and France; that he has nothing to do but to disarm and to declare to England that He will take no part in Her quarrels with France, and that thus Peace between those Powers will be signed before the Month of January.

The letter of M. de Talleyrand is written in the same sense, and goes into a great deal of detail to prove that Austria is running headlong into Perdition by allying itself with Russia,—that its true Ally is France,—that the Emperor has no right to complain of the annexation of Genoa to France, because Bonaparte tacitly consented to the cession of Lindau in Swabia (this is so ludicrous that had I not seen it I should not have ventured to

have reported it) to the Court of Vienna, (I will just observe that this Lindau belonged to the Prince Breitenheim, a natural Son of the late Elector of Bavaria, for which Possession he has in exchange received an Estate in Hungary),—that the whole conduct of the Court of Vienna is favorable to England and of course inimical to France,—that these Armaments will oblige Bonaparte to withdraw his Troops from the Coast, and that he must thus abandon the Conquest of England, towards which his whole views had been of late directed.

The second Note contains a formal demand that the Austrian Troops in Italy and the Tyrol should be reduced to the numbers that were in those Countries *six months ago*, and that the *fortifications de Campagne* should be discontinued, in which class those of Venice are placed.

To these demands a speedy and Categorical Answer is insisted upon, in default of which Bonaparte will withdraw his Troops from the Coast in order to repel force by force.

No answer has been, or I suppose will be made to all this.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

[A declaration of the Court of Vienna of September 2, 1805, was sent in answer to the French demands. It recounts the infractions of the Peace of Luneville, the menaces and the pretensions of France, the usurpations in Italy, the action of Napoleon with regard to England and the mission of Monsieur Novossiltzoff, and the Italian progress in 1805. The arming of Austria has not been a measure of war, nor undertaken to make a diversion in view of the French descent on England. In union with Russia, Austria now declares that the two Powers together are ready to negotiate on moderate terms; that in no case will they interfere with the internal affairs of France, nor with its territorial or political relations with Germany; that they will in no way injure the rights of the Ottoman Porte; that Great Britain is in agreement with these views; and that the Emperor hopes that his frank explanation may dissipate the doubts of the Emperor Napoleon.]



FREDERICK WILLIAM III,  
KING OF PRUSSIA.





*From the KING OF PRUSSIA to the EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.*

BERLIN, le 4 Septembre 1805.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur m'a invité par sa dernière déclaration \* à me réunir à Elle, pour tâcher d'effectuer par nos bons offices communs le renouement de la négociation pour la paix. Je n'ai rien au monde de plus au cœur que de répondre à la confiance qu'Elle m'a témoignée, et d'obtenir le but salulaire qu'elle a en vue, le grand objet depuis deux ans, de mes vœux et de mes efforts.

Au moment où la réponse de l'Empereur Napoleon à ces mêmes offres de la cour de Vienne, et d'un autre coté les Armemens formidables qui se forment de toute part, faisaient craindre un éclat très prochain, ce souverain vient de m'envoyer du Camp de Boulogne le Général Duroc pour s'expliquer avec moi et mon Ministère sur la position générale des affaires, et sur la possibilité de prévenir encore l'extension de la Guerre.

Suivant les premières conférences qui ont eu lieu avec cet officier Général, arrivé ici le premier au soir, J'ai sujet d'espérer que J'obtiendrais de la France.

1°. La Garantie de l'intégrité de toutes les parties de l'Italie non comprises dans le royaume de ce nom et les territoires actuellement possédés par la France au delà des Alpes, y compris la Ligurie, Parme et Plaisance, Lucques et Piombino.

2°. L'Independance de la République Helvetique.

3°. Celle de la République Batave.

4°. La Sureté et l'intégrité du territoire Germanique, tel qu'il est fixé par la paix de Luneville, et le récès d'Empire qui en est resulté.

Je crois pouvoir supposer que ces quatre sujets, dont dépend la sureté future de l'Europe, forment le seul, ou du moins surement le principal but des mesures guerrières dont la cour de Vienne s'occupe, et je puis me flatter qu'il y aura moyen de négocier encore avec la France sur les accessoires. Mon Ministre d'Etat, le Comte de Haugwitz, qui est sur le point de se rendre de ma part à Vienne, sera chargé de fournir sur ce sujet à Sa Majesté Impériale tous

\* The first proposal of mediation.

les developemens et toutes les communications de detail qu'Elle peut désirer : mais en attendant et comme il n'y a pas un moment à perdre, il m'importe de savoir préalablement si Elle seroit disposée à se contenter de ces points principaux et si, vû l'espérance de les obtenir, Elle ne voudroit pas dès à present suspendre et arrêter tous preparatifs ultérieurs, et laisser au moins les choses *in statu quò* afin de prevenir quelque explosion après laquelle le rapprochement n'en deviendroit que plus difficile ? Tout se réduit à la simple question, si dans l'application des mesures guerrières qu'Elle prend, Elle auroit pour objet d'opérer un changement dans l'état des choses en Italie tel qu'il resulte de la proclamation du Royaume de ce nom et de l'incorporation de quelque moindres parties ? ou si, consultant toujours les dispositions pacifiques qu'Elle a manifestées jusqu'à présent pour le bonheur de l'humanité, et reconnaissant l'incertitude des chances de la guerre, elle ne prendroit les armes que pour sa défense, pour assurer l'état actuel de ses Possessions et prevenir de nouveaux empiétemens ? Dans ce dernier cas, son but principal seroit obtenu par la garantie des quatre articles que Je me flatte d'emporter.

Une lutte violente et dangereuse seroit prévenue, et on pourroit se flatter même d'acheminer une négociation heureuse pour le rétablissement de la tranquillité générale. La position des affaires est telle qu'Elle exige entre nous la plus grande franchise. Je demande donc à S.M. Impériale de vouloir bien me faire connoître préalablement et avec le plus de célérité, par le retour du Courier, quels sont ses Sentimens à cet égard, et si Elle consentiroit en effet à se contenter des points sus indiqués, à retirer ses armemens à ces conditions, et à les suspendre du moins pour le présent, moyennant quoi Elle prepareroit la réussite entière de la médiation commune à laquelle Elle m'a invitée, et que Je desirerois si vivement de voir parvenir à une bonne fin. En attendant, J'employe mes soins les plus assidus pour empêcher que la France, comme les apparences le feroient craindre, ne fasse entrer ses troupes en Allemagne, et ne se porte en général à des démarches décisives.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 82.]

VIENNA, 5th September 1805.

MY LORD,—I have already had the Honor to announce to Your Lordship that the Emperor will take the command of all His Armies in Germany, the Tyrol, and Italy.\*

It appears at present to be His Imperial Majesty's Intention to direct in Person the movements of the Austrians in Germany.

He proposes to inspect the Army assembled at Wels before it passes the Frontier. It is therefore probable that His Imperial Majesty will set out for that purpose to-night or to-morrow. He would in fact otherwise scarcely arrive in time, as I believe that that Army will commence its march in the course of two or three days.

Having reviewed those Troops the Emperor will return to Vienna, and remain until circumstances require Him to resume the Command.

The Archduke Charles has not as yet left Vienna, but His Royal Highness is expected from one day to another to set out for Italy.

The same with the Archduke John, who will in the first instance go into the Tyrol.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 84.]

VIENNA, 5th September 1805.

MY LORD,—Count Meerfeldt will set out in a day or two, charged with a special Commission for the Court of Berlin, the object of which, it is hardly necessary to observe, is to engage the King of Prussia to declare Himself for the Allies.

But the first and most immediate object of his Mission is to announce to the King of Prussia the March of the Austrian Army into Bavaria, and to explain to that Monarch the causes which have decided the Emperor's Conduct upon this Occasion.†

About the same time I apprehend that the Russian

\* On September 1 the army of Boulogne was ordered to the Rhine.

† See despatch of September 14, note.

Minister at the Court of Berlin will receive orders to notify the entry of a Russian Army into the Prussian Dominions.

Thus seconded, reasonable hopes may be entertained of the success of General Meerfeldt's Mission. If the King of Prussia should come forward we shall probably obtain by Negotiation what we shall have to fight and perhaps to fight hard to accomplish.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*September 9, 1805.*

[A declaration of the King of Prussia of this date announces his resolution to maintain his neutrality, and that of Northern Germany, by calling out an army of 80,000 men, which could be considerably increased later. This measure had no offensive or hostile significance, but was adopted solely to defend the system of neutrality which he had adopted.]

*From Lord MULGRAVE to Sir A. PAGET.*

[Separate.]

DOWNING STREET, *September 10th, 1805.*

SIR,—In your No. 69 you express considerable regret at the channel through which the Negotiation with Austria has been conducted. Lest that regret should arise from any impression which you may have received from hence, with reference to your official situation, I lose no time in assuring you that the course which that Negotiation has taken did not arise in the smallest degree from any want of the fullest confidence in your Zeal and Exertions in His Majesty's Service, and I trust you will easily perceive that the expediency of a particular place or mode of Negotiation may be perfectly unconnected with any personal considerations. In the present instance, the state of actual alliance between the two Imperial Courts;—the Necessity of affording to Austria the Encouragement of certain support from Russia; and the more direct and intimate Union of Views and sentiments which existed between the latter Power and Great Britain, pointed out St. Petersburg not only as the preferable Seat of Negotiation, but, in a manner, as the only convenient Point at which the general object and Interests of the common

cause might be discussed. The anxious desire of Austria to prevent suspicion on the part of the French Government previous to the full preparation of Her Means of Defence, rendered it desirable that there should not be an appearance of frequent and confidential conferences between the British Minister and the Austrian Cabinet, and the consequently frequent dispatch of couriers between London and Vienna. There cannot be a stronger proof of the Efficacy of the Measure of negotiating at St. Petersburg for the purpose of secrecy, than the little suspicion entertained by the French Ambassador at Vienna, and the circumstance of your having yourself (with all the exertion of your constant and vigilant attention to the conduct of the Austrian Government) doubted the course which might ultimately be adopted by them.

It will, in the present State of Affairs, become important to establish a cordial and confidential Intercourse with the Austrian Ministry; I trust, therefore, that you will not find Count Cobentzl indisposed to communicate with you upon that footing; and that you will see no ground in future for the sentiments conveyed in your expression, that the Negotiation and Negociator would have been equally importunate to that Minister, if the discussion had been committed to your Management. The Reserve which Separate Negotiation created might naturally assume the Appearances of a personal Indisposition towards you, which I trust will disappear upon the Establishment of more open and unreserved communication.—I am, &c., (Signed) MULGRAVE.

[On September 11, 1805, a despatch was sent by Count Cobentzl to Count Metternich,\* in answer to the proposal of Prussia of September 4. He recalls the manner in which the Emperor had rejected the proposals of Russia, and his menaces of aggression, points out the necessity of backing future negotiations by a demonstration of force, and declares the determination of Russia and Austria to claim the independence of Italy, as well as of Switzerland and Holland. In the strongest terms he states that the time of illusions is over, and that experience has shown the servile dependence and ruinous contributions which

\* Austrian Minister at Berlin.

Napoleon demands of countries which seek his alliance, and declares that Austria, acting in concert with Russia, will resist his insidious policy to separate the interests of the northern and southern Powers, and by isolating them to carry out his schemes of invasion.]

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 86.]

VIENNA, 11th Sept. 1805.

MY LORD,—The Mission of Mr. Duroc to Berlin \* has been followed by an official communication made the day before yesterday by the Prussian Minister to this Government.

I have not as yet seen the note presented by Count Keller. . . . I can only now say, that it evidently appears to have been dictated by, or at least submitted in the first instance to the French Government—its principal object being, as I am informed, to deter the Court of Vienna from the prosecution of the Enterprise in which it is at present engaged. I am happy to inform your Lordship, that The Emperor's Ratification of the Act of Accession delivered on the 9th ultimo by Count Stadion to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, was sent off by a Messenger the day before yesterday. The Arch Duke Charles will leave Vienna on Monday next, he will take up his first head quarters at Padua, at which place he will arrive on the fifth day. . . . —I am, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE.*

VIENNA, 12th Sept. 1805.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I do not like to talk of my own sufferings, but indeed you would have pitied me had you known what I have been going through for these last four or five weeks. The last five days and nights before the operations took place, I did not close my eyes, and was at intervals in delirium from the pain. I cannot speak too much in praise of the medical people who attend me, both for their skill and attention. Not a

\* With the offer of Hanover as the price of an alliance between Prussia and France.

day that they have not been three, four, five times, and the Surgeon has slept here as often as there has been the smallest necessity for it. At no period of my illness was there any danger; it is on the contrary remarkable how very little so violent a local Disorder affected the general System, for the fever I had, violent as indeed it was, proceeded from the pain & irritation, & used generally to subside towards the morning. You will I am very sure be delighted to hear, that I want nothing now but a little strength to be as well as I ever was in my life. Under these circumstances pray excuse the shortness of this letter. I must go to work again in a day or two, & shall in a very few more send a Messenger by whom you shall of course hear from me.—Ever, my dear Mother, Your most dut. & aff. Son,

A. P.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 87.]

VIENNA, 14th Sept. 1805.

I will now inform your Lordship, that the Elector of Bavaria, after having, in the most solemn manner, bound himself to join His Troops to those of Austria, precipitately left Munich,\* having given Orders for the whole of his Army to follow him into Franconia. The French Minister had also set out for Wurtzberg.† I cannot as yet inform your Lordship of the measures which this Conduct of the Elector may lead the Court of Vienna to adopt towards Bavaria; I believe that the last accounts at present say the Austrians have now orders to advance as far as the Lech.

I will just mention that the King of Prussia's Letter (a production which does little credit to that Sovereign) contains an invitation to the Emperor to discontinue his Military Preparations and Movements. . . . —I have, &c.  
(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

\* Montgelas (see vol. i. p. 155, note) aimed at making Bavaria one of the great central Powers of Europe. Through his *illuminati* views he was led to sympathise with France, and accordingly in September 1805 he and Otto (French Minister at Munich) negotiated an alliance which secured Bavaria for France, and disconcerted the Austrian plans, especially Mack's. This Treaty was signed August 24th, but Montgelas got the date changed to September 23rd, by which he defended his conduct on the ground of necessity.

† Where the Treaty of September 23 was signed.



*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 88.]

VIENNA, 15th Sept'r. 1805.

MY LORD,—I have now to inform your Lordship that the French Ambassador yesterday demanded his Passports, which he was instructed to do as soon as he received information of the Austrians having entered Bavaria.

Instructions have been sent to the Austrian Minister at Munich, to follow the Elector of Bavaria to Wurtzberg and to employ Promises, Threats, and every means of bringing Him back to His Engagements.

This had already been done by Prince Schwartzenberg. Mr. Buol *will offer more*. We shall see whether Mr. Monjelas will be more tractable with him.

The Bavarian Forces do not, as Count Cobentzl mentioned to me last Night, amount to more than Ten or Twelve Thousand Men. The Elector of Bavaria in his first Interview with the Prince promised every thing that was demanded—he confirmed his promise in a few lines he wrote him. He sent General Nogarola here with a letter to The Emperor, which commences by nearly these Words: "*I have ordered my Minister to sign a Treaty with Prince Schwartzenberg by which I join my Troops to those of your Majesty.*" When the above officer arrived with this letter, The Emperor had already heard of The Elector of Bavaria's [departure].

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 91.]

VIENNA, 18th September 1805.

MY LORD,—The Emperor sets out for the Army to-morrow. . . .

My Last Letters will have informed Your Lordship that the Austrians were advancing *to the Lech*. I have now to announce a still more forward movement *to the Iller*, or in other words to the Position of Ulm.

According to the last Accounts which have been received here, it is supposed that the Army under Bonaparte which is assembling at Strasbourg and Mayence, but particularly the latter, will amount to a hundred and

fifteen thousand Men. Independent of this, there is the Army under Bernadotte, which is understood to be marching in the direction of Franconia, with the view probably of threatening Bohemia.

It will therefore probably become necessary to strengthen the Austrian Army in Germany, which can only be done by drawing Troops from the Tyrol.

This consideration, together with the determination which had been taken of not commencing operations in Switzerland, have induced the Emperor to accede to the demand of Neutrality made by the Swiss Government. Accordingly His Imperial Majesty, in His Answer to the Landamman, has signified to that Government his consent to admit the Neutrality of Switzerland.

But His Imperial Majesty has, at the same time, declared that His observance of this Engagement will depend entirely upon a strict adherence to such a System on the part of the Swiss, and that from the moment they permit the passage of French Troops or grant supplies of any sort—in general, that they deviate in the slightest degree from the Neutrality they have proposed, He shall without further explanation look upon the agreement as dissolved.

. . . In proportion as the prospect of succour from Prussia decreases, the Necessity of employing fresh efforts appears to be felt here. I am informed by Count Cobentzl that not only all the Reserves, but what is called the *Double Reserve* has been called out.

The Archduke Ferdinand left Vienna yesterday to join the Army in Suabia.—I have, &c.

(Signed)      ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Mr. F. J. JACKSON to Sir A. PAGET.*

BERLIN, 20th September 1805.

SIR,— . . . Orders were issued last night for putting the whole of the Prussian Army upon the War Establishment. Count Haugwitz sets out to-morrow upon a special Mission to the Court of Vienna, and will probably explain the motives of this extraordinary Measure, which is represented to me by M. de Hardenberg as having no hostile Intentions in view towards any Power, but as merely intended to protect the Neutrality of this Country, and

to enable it to co-operate with the two Imperial Courts in re-establishing the Independence and Tranquillity of Europe. His Prussian Majesty has also determined to hold Himself an Interview with The Emperor of Russia, and will set out in two or three days for Warsaw, in the neighbourhood of which City His Imperial Majesty is supposed to be.

I have, in obedience to His Majesty's Commands, made an Offer to this Court of a considerable subsidy, in case of its co-operating with the allied Powers in their intended Measures against France. This Proposal was taken *ad referendum*, and the Acceptance of it made subject to the Issue of the Negotiation now about to be commenced with the two Imperial Courts.—I am, &c.

(Signed) F. J. JACKSON.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 96.]

VIENNA, 28 September 1805.

MY LORD,— . . . Notwithstanding the Promise I made to Count Cobentzl of supporting as much as possible his demand for an increase of Subsidy, I have uniformly pointed out to him the impossibility of its being acceded to, and have endeavoured, and I trust not unsuccessfully, to persuade him to abandon altogether the Pursuit. . . .

The Circumstances under which the King of Prussia formed the Resolution of having an Interview with the Emperor Alexander are by no means considered as favorable here. The Enemies of Russia appear to have fully succeeded in representing the Conduct of that Prince in the most hostile point of view towards Prussia.

Your Lordship will have heard from His Majesty's Minister at Berlin of the unpropitious Issue of General Meerfeldt's Negotiation; at the last Interview that officer had with The King, His Prussian Majesty in speaking of Russia gave loose to a degree of violence in His Manner and intemperance of Language wholly unusual in Him. . . . —I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord PAGET to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

IPSWICH, Sept. 30, 1805.

. . . Now for my own concerns. The proposal\* in your last letter is very tempting, but I fear that the objection of my not knowing German is insurmountable to my filling the situation in question. There is another very potent one too. Report whispers that a very large body of British Cavalry is to be employed in the spring, and it is in every body's mouth that I am to command it. I certainly do not aspire to so very high a trust, but I feel confident that I shall be employed somehow, & think it likely that The Light Cavalry may fall to my share. As however I never ask or propose anything, & as there is much intriguing at Weymouth &c., &c., I may possibly be mistaken. If our Commanders are well chosen (& there are some *very* good ones) I think that the British Army is in a state that will astonish Friend & Foe. There is no part of the Allied Army that I should so well like to act with as the Austrians, but their numbers are too great to require help, & I rather expect to act to the Northward. Thank God Austria & Russia have now gone too great lengths to recede; my only dread is that France may shrink & negotiate. That will be fatal to us all. *She must* be beaten, dreadfully beaten, before there can be any peace or happiness in Europe. Whether under Bonaparte or Bourbon, her wings must be clipped *close*. Pray stick to that for ever. We, too, ought I think to disgorge some of our Eastern Plunder.

What a glorious fellow is Pitt. I am so much his admirer that I cannot help attributing a great deal of what we may now look forward to to him. But one event can now endanger the vast plans which I force myself to believe are now carrying on, & I do not think *that* is to be feared. I mean the King's death. That would ruin all. A new administration, a dissolution of the Coalition on the Continent, & a bad peace would inevitably follow. I am therefore in the greatest hurry to precipitate Austria into action, for out of it she can now never come until France is fairly subdued, until she has it not in her power

\* That he should join Austrian headquarters.—A. P.

to do mischief. Do tell me if they are completely in earnest. . . . God Bless you.—Affec<sup>d</sup> Yours, PAGET.

I expect the Duke here in ten days. I shall certainly offer myself to him as a *Military Envoy*.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 97.]

VIENNA, 2d October 1805.

MY LORD,—Count Haugwitz arrived here two days ago, and will have his first Audience of the Emperor this Day. I cannot as yet inform your Lordship of the Object of his Mission. . . .

The Elector having been required by the Court of Vienna to disembody and to disarm his Troops, and his Highness having thought proper not to accede to this demand, a Body of Austrians have been ordered into Franconia for the purpose of executing this measure.

It has been several times reported here that the French had crossed the Rhine;—the account which arrived here yesterday of that event appears to be credited by this Government. Should it be true, or whenever it may happen, General Mack, as Count Cobentzl assured me last night, has orders to advance and give them Battle. It has been found necessary to reinforce the Army in Germany by drawing thirty Battalions from Italy, a circumstance which appears to have created some Displeasure in the Archduke Charles.

[At this time (October 3) Sir A. Paget became so unwell he was incapable of attending to his diplomatic duties, and he therefore deputed Mr. Cecil Jenkinson, the Secretary of Legation, to see the Vice-Chancellor, Count Cobentzl, on his behalf and to carry on the correspondence with the Foreign Office.

On the 9th of October Mr. Jenkinson reports that accounts had been received at Vienna of the French army, under Marshal Bernadotte, having violated the Prussian neutrality by entering the Margraviate of Anspach, that the troops of the Elector of Bavaria had united themselves with the above-mentioned French army, and that the direction of the whole force appeared to be towards the Upper Palatinate. The junction

of the Bavarian army with that of Marshal Bernadotte was accompanied by a declaration of war. Count Haugwitz' language during his mission to Vienna had been in strict conformity to that of his Court, viz., that the most inviolable neutrality would be preserved, and some curiosity was now felt as to the effect which might be produced by this violation of Prussian neutrality. It was thought that the meeting between the two Imperial Majesties and the King of Prussia would take place at Cracow. The Austrian Government was most anxious for the payment of part of the subsidy promised by Great Britain.

On the 12th of October Mr. Jenkinson further reports that orders had been sent to Count Philip Cobentzl (the Austrian Ambassador) to quit Paris, and that arrangements had been made for the exchange of the two Embassies at the advanced posts. Count Cobentzl informed Mr. Jenkinson that, according to his advices from Berlin, the French violation of Prussian neutrality had produced the greatest indignation on the part of the King of Prussia, who had even had it in contemplation to send away Marshal Duroc and M. Laforest from Berlin, but that the measures to be taken had been submitted to a council of war, and that the result of their deliberations was to advise His Prussian Majesty to unite himself to the Allies, but that His Majesty's determination was not yet known.]

*From Count COBENTZL to Sir A. PAGET.*

*Oct. 5, 1805.*

Vous etes malade, je le suis aussi un peu, mais ce qui est encore plus malade que nous deux, ce sont nos finances. Ainsi pour l'amour de Dieu, dépêchez vous de nous donner vos deux cent mille livres sterlings. Zichy me presse beaucoup, et il a raison, car nos besoins sont énormes. —Je vous embrasse de tout mon cœur.

(Signé) COBENTZL.

[On October 7 Count Cobentzl writes again to ask for immediate payment of the subsidy of £200,000 promised to be paid whenever the outbreak of war should seem inevitable.\*]

\* The Minister of Finance writes on October 16 to acknowledge the payment of this subsidy.

*From Count COBENTZL to Sir A. PAGET.*

*Oct. 8, 1805.*

Mille pardons de ce que je n'ai point été chez vous hier ; beaucoup d'affaires et le besoin de me ménager pour chasser un très léger ressentiment de goutte que j'éprouve, m'a empêché de sortir. J'ai à présent un intérêt de plus d'être sur un bon pied puisque je dois vous dire en confiance que vous êtes destiné à accompagner Sa Majesté à l'armée ainsi que M<sup>r</sup> le Comte de Rasoumofsky et à faire la guerre avec nous. C'est cela que je voulois vous dire hier, persuadé d'après ce que vous m'avez fait connoître à cet égard de tout le plaisir que vous en ressentiriez.—  
Agréé, &c. (Signé) COBENTZL.

[On October 14, 1805, Baron Hardenberg wrote a despatch to Marshal Duroc and M. Laforest, in which he remonstrated on the passage of French troops over Prussian territory. The King of Prussia in consequence holds himself free from his engagements, and, without obligations as well as without guarantees, he sees himself obliged to place his armies where they are needed for the protection of the State.]

*From Count COBENTZL to Sir A. PAGET.*

*VIENNE, le 15 Oct. 1805.*

L'Electeur Bavaro Palatine non content de manquer à la parole qu'il avoit donnée verbalement, et par écrit, de joindre ses troupes à celles des deux Cours Impériales, vient au contraire de passer du côté de leur ennemi commun, en publiant une déclaration de guerre contre les dites Cours, accompagnée d'un exposé des motifs de Son Altesse Serenissime Electorale, dans lequel les faits sont entièrement defigurés.

*Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[Private.]

*VIENNA, 17th Oct. 1805.*

MY DEAR LORD,—Having but a moment's notice of the departure of this Courier, it is only in my power to trouble

y<sup>r</sup> Lordship with a few lines in this unofficial form, for which I ask your Lordship's Indulgence.

The French Army under Bernadotte have entered Munich, by which means, the communication between the Army under the Archduke Ferdinand and the Russian Troops is cut off, which was evidently the object of Bernadotte. General Meerfeldt, who has now the command of the Corps lately under Kienmayer, is at Ampfing about two marches in front of Braunau, where the Russians are assembling. In five or six days these two Corps, viz. the Russians under General Kutusow, and the Austrians under C<sup>t</sup> Meerfeldt, will be united, and will advance to the attack of Bernadotte. The above two Corps may be estimated at nearly 70,000 men. Should the attack be a successful one, Bernadotte's situation will be a bad one; should it be otherwise, we may be prepared for disasters, for the Austrians under the Archduke Ferdinand would be exposed to an attack in front by the Main French Army, and to be taken in the rear by Bernadotte. The last accounts from His Royal Highness are, of his being upon the Iller, with his flanks defended by the Fortresses of Ulm & Memmingen, and of his determination to maintain as long as possible that position, which is an admirable one. The French under Generals Ney and Soult had reconnoitred that position, apparently with the Intention of attacking the Austrians, but had found it too strong to hazard the Enterprize. Since the arrival of the Army under General Bernadotte at Munich no accounts have been received from the Austrian Head Quarters. . . .

I am still so weak, & the time is so short that I have been obliged to desire Mr. Jenkinson to acquaint your Lordship by this opportunity of the conclusion of the money Concerns which I have lately had to transact. . . .  
—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

[On the resumption of his official duties, after recovering to a certain extent from his illness, Sir Arthur Paget addressed a very important despatch (No. 100 of the 24th of October) to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs relative to the manner in which the Austrians had hitherto conducted their campaign.



It was the laying of this despatch (amongst others from Sir A. Paget) before Parliament by Lord Mulgrave which appeared to Mr. Fox (as will be seen in the correspondence of 1806) to be incompatible with Sir Arthur's longer residence in Vienna, and was one of the reasons assigned by Mr. Fox for having recommended the King to recall him.]

Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.

[No. 100.]

VIENNA, 24th October 1805.

MY LORD,—If the first Operations of the Campaign have been attended with loss and disadvantage, which from the present Aspect of Affairs it is, I am grieved to say, not too much to presume, we may among other Causes attribute our ill success to the following:—

The first and principal fault which has been committed was to have taken the field with too small a force. Since the very first Appearance of a Rupture with France, it has been proved almost to demonstration that the Theatre of the War would be in Germany. Bonaparte himself publicly announced it in the first note presented by his Chargé d'Affaires at Ratisbon, and it was otherwise not difficult to calculate that the whole Army of Boulogne would rather be directed towards Strasbourg than Vienna.

Massena cannot have more than seventy thousand Men under his Command. The Armies under the immediate command of Bonaparte cannot be estimated at less than an hundred and forty thousand.

Notwithstanding which, the Campaign has been opened in Germany by about eighty thousand Austrians, whereas to attack or to oppose Massena, neither of which he has hitherto done, the Archduke Charles has not less than from an hundred to an hundred and twenty thousand men.

I cannot explain this strange distribution and Misapplication of the forces but in the two following ways:—

1. It is probable that General Mack, aware of the jealousy or perhaps the decided Hatred borne him by the Archduke, was unwilling to inflame that Animosity by a proposal to withdraw from Italy any very considerable Number of the Troops which, in the Commencement of the Preparations, it was judged expedient to place under

the Command of His Royal Highness in that Country. To this false and misplaced delicacy therefore are in great measure owing the present Misfortunes.

And I do not see anything improbable in this surmise, for it was not until the last extremity that thirty Bataillons of Infantry were in fact ordered from Italy to reinforce the Archduke Ferdinand's Army, and we know that this very measure gave a great degree of Umbrage to the Archduke.

2nd. In settling the plan of the Campaign, it must have been calculated that previous to the opening of it the Russians would have joined. This in truth, however false and extraordinary, was the Calculation which was made; upon what it was founded I cannot exactly say.

Considering the immense Preparations which were carrying on here, the return of M. Novossilzoff announced in the middle of July, the Notions which by that time Bonaparte must more or less have acquired of the Negotiations carried on between His Majesty and the two Imperial Courts, it was hardly to be expected that the deception could be carried on beyond the Month of August, and this was in fact the Epoch at which it ceased. On the other hand it might have been and was ascertained that the French Troops would quit the Coast in the first Days of September; it might also have been calculated that according to the prodigious rapidity of their movements, and the immense activity of their Chiefs, they would reach their destination at the end of the same Month. Equally well might it have been known that the first Russian Army could not have arrived *upon the Inn before the Middle of October*. From whence it became evident that in opening the Campaign in the vicinity of the Rhine, the Austrians voluntarily and with their eyes open chose to commence hostilities single-handed against the French.

This statement, if it be a true one, and I think it cannot be refuted, places it should seem General Mack in the following dilemma :—

Either the Austrians were in sufficient force to contend alone against the French, or they were not.

In the first hypothesis, why should the position of the Iller have been chosen, *never to be abandoned?* in the latter, why risk so forward a Movement?

If however General Mack in taking up his position upon the Iller under the above circumstances, could have felt himself confident of being able to maintain it until the Arrival of the Russians, it is natural that with a view of opposing a Barrier to the progress of the Enemy into the Empire, he should have chosen it in preference to a more backward Position. One cannot suppose that he could have been directed by any other Motive—but we have had the Mortification to discover the fallacy of it.

There was unquestionably something fascinating in the idea of opening the Campaign in Suabia or Wirtemberg, rather than in Bavaria, but it is to be presumed that had the latter Electorate been fixed upon as the first scene for action various Advantages would have resulted from it.

In the first place, had the Austrians advanced no further than the Inn or the Iser or even the Lech, the French would have required eight or ten days more, to have come in contact with them, and the Russians might have joined them in as many days less. Thus the Archduke Ferdinand's Army of eighty thousand Men, the Russians with a Corps of Austrian Cavalry making together sixty thousand Men, the whole amounting to an hundred and forty thousand would have been concentrated and ready to act together at the signal given.

2ndly. By this plan (supposing the Austrians to have taken their first position *on the Inn*) it is possible that the scandalous Defection of the Elector of Bavaria might have been avoided. Placed between two powerful Armies, he would perhaps have maintained his Neutrality until the moment of the explosion. Had Victory attended the Austrians, he would have become an easy prey to their Arms; at all events the immense mischief which both his Army and his Subjects in general have done in Germany since the commencement of Hostilities would have been averted.

3rdly. It is true that the Countries of Baden, Wirtemberg, and part of Bavaria, would have equally been devoted to the ravages of the French Armies. This evil was not to be prevented but by the Occupation of the whole of the South of Germany by the Austrians, and the conduct of these Princes creates little regret for the Oppression which they have undergone.

The Position of the Iller was however determined upon, and the Campaign was opened towards the end of September.

The Operations were commenced by Generals Bernadotte and Marmont who directed their March towards Wurtzburg, thence into the Margraviate of Anspach, and having in their route collected all the Bavarians that could be found, they crossed the Danube at Ingoldstadt and Neubourg, driving before them the small Corps under General Kienmayer, and entered Bavaria with between sixty and seventy thousand Men.

And here commenced the Misfortunes of the Campaign : \* whether General Mack undervalued the force of that Army, or whether he was uninformed or misinformed as to its destination, which he might have conceived to be a momentary irruption into Bohemia, remains to be explained,—certain it is that, instead of changing his own Position in consequence of it, he contented himself with detaching an inconsiderable force under the command of General Kienmayer for the purpose of watching its Operations.

During the above period the French Army under Bonaparte, amounting according to the nearest calculation to eighty thousand Men, crossed the Rhine. The Electorate of Wirtemberg, the Plains of Nordlingen, &c., were passed with a degree of rapidity almost unexampled. On the 6th or 7th of October the greatest part of the French Army had crossed the Danube near Donauwerth, had taken up a position between that River and Augsburg, had by this Movement formed a Junction with the Army under Bernadotte, and had thus posted themselves in the Rear of the Imperialists.

From this moment commenced that species of Warfare by which the French rendered themselves so remarkable and so formidable in former campaigns.

\* Mack took up a position at Ulm which was protected against all possible French attacks expected from the Black Forest. Napoleon, instead of moving directly, "coasted" the Swabian Alps (the highest hills of the Black Forest), crossed the Danube at Donauwerth, and came in the very rear of Mack. In all previous campaigns of French commanders the route taken had been either the defiles of the Black Forest near Strashourg, or the Rhine valley to Lake Constance, and thence to the sources of the Danube. In an extended line of twenty-six leagues Napoleon led converging forces numbering 180,000 men, unencumbered (except with bread and biscuit for four days), and this whole mass closed round Mack and hemmed him in before he could change his position.

Of the Affairs of the 8th, 9th, and 11th I have already had the honor of transmitting to your Lordship the Official Accounts. To those who were the most sanguine the Issue of the Battle of the 11th had given some hopes of future success, but they were illusory; General Ney had quietly made his retreat upon the main of the French Army still between the Danube and Augsbourg, and the Communication between the Austrians and Russians was now completely cut off.

What has been the result of the reiterated Attacks which have taken place since the 11th I can by no means take it upon myself to inform your Lordship with any degree of accuracy, but what I can unravel out of the confused and incoherent Mass of Intelligence which has been received here may be reduced I believe to the following Points.

The Austrians have been obliged to abandon the Position of Ulm and to cross the Danube. At the departure of the last Courier they were, I fancy, in the Neighbourhood of Heydenheim.

In consequence of this Movement (whether by choice or by Necessity I know not) General Mack divided his Army, and General Jellachick was detached with I believe fifteen or sixteen Bataillons towards the Tyrol. Orders were sent at this time to the Garrison of Memmingen, which consisted of eleven Bataillons, to evacuate that place and join the above Corps under General Jellachick. Whether the Order arrived too late, or whether it was ill delivered I am also unable to decide, but the Garrison capitulated to the French under General Davoust after the Town had been nearly reduced to Ashes. It is to be observed that the Artillery destined for the Fortifications of that place was still without the Town.

Upon this Occasion a great Number of Bavarian Peasants who had joined the French, and who were taking possession of the above Artillery, were cut to pieces by the Austrian Hussars who carried the whole or the greatest part of it off.

It is difficult to say what has been the Loss of the Austrians, but after that sustained on the 8th, 9th, and 11th, which by their own Accounts are estimated at four thousand Men, but which may be fairly laid at least at

six or seven, after the Loss of the whole Garrison at Memmingen which consisted of eleven Bataillons, after the separation of Jellachick who may be supposed to have taken with him twelve thousand Men, I can hardly suppose that General Mack had, at the moment of his crossing the Danube, much more than forty-five thousand Men with him. What has happened since I shudder to reflect upon, for it is reported, and in fact there is little room to doubt it, that up to the 16th or 17th of this Month, there have been various and bloody Actions between the two Armies.

With the above force therefore it is evident that General Mack could not attack the French, who are perhaps triple his Numbers.

Had it been in his power to have reached the Tyrol with the whole of his Army, great advantages might still have resulted from such a movement. He might have operated his junction through the Electorate of Saltzbourg with the Russian Army at Braunau, and have thus protected the Austrian Frontier, but it is more than probable that when he passed the Danube he was no longer master of his Actions.

In this state of things it appears that he has the Choice but of two Movements,\* either to traverse Franconia in order to regain the Frontiers of Bohemia, or to recross the Danube in order to effect his junction with the Russians.

It is hoped that he may be able to execute this latter movement (the best in fact should it be practicable) and that he will effect the Passage at Ratisbon. I own that I have no such hopes.

I devoutly wish that the Affairs I have been discussing may still take a favorable turn; this may result from some well directed and decided blow—if for instance the Archduke should be fortunate enough to force a passage through some weak point in the French Army; it may also happen through some fault committed by the Enemy, but situated as things are at the moment I am writing,

\* In Mack's defence before the Council of War it was urged against him that Prince Ferdinand escaped to Bohemia and Jellachick to the Tyrol; why, then, did he not escape too? His answer is complete. Both were detachments largely composed of cavalry, with no stores to protect, and their withdrawal, by reducing his army from 70,000 to 30,000, took away all hope of resistance on his part.

no reasonable hopes can be entertained of so favorable an Issue.

I have thus endeavored to give your Lordship the best Information I am capable of respecting the Situation of the Austrian and French Armies.

Those under Generals Kutusow and Meerfeldt, which, as I have on a former Occasion had the Honor of informing Your Lordship, amount to between sixty and seventy thousand Men, were to advance yesterday or the Day before from Braunau and Ampfing, but it cannot as yet be known here the direction they will take. Whether they will immediately march to attack the French, or whether they have had the means of concerting their Movements with General Mack, in order previously to effect the Junction,—whether, on the other hand, Bonaparte, after perhaps having nearly annihilated the Austrians, will commence an Attack upon the united force under the above named Generals, are Events upon which it would be rash and inconsiderate in me to pretend to decide, but I own I rather lean to the latter Opinion, nor do I feel altogether sanguine as to the result of it.

I am sorry to say that a general Consternation and Dismay is beginning to prevail here, at least in the public. The presence of the Emperor of Russia, who is expected here on the 5th of next month, may perhaps tend to dispel the Gloom, particularly should Affairs take rather a more favorable turn in the Interval. If in truth they bear an inauspicious aspect they are not by any means desperate. There is an Army of Reserve of fifty thousand Men; there are as many more Russians on their March; some Reinforcements may be drawn from Italy; fifty or sixty thousand Men may, it is to be hoped, be saved from the Austrian and Russian Armies now in Germany; so that in the course of three or four Weeks, unless these Armies should be absolutely and literally annihilated, we shall have considerably above an hundred thousand Men ready to take the Field.

But what is more extraordinary than all the rest is the torpor which seems to prevail at the Head Quarters of the Archduke Charles. Until I see reasons for altering my Opinion, I must think that this inactivity proceeds

from Ill Will in His Royal Highness. Had Hostilities commenced at the proper period in Italy, we should in all probability have been in possession of the Milanese. But there is nobody about that Prince capable of stimulating Him; there are Generals Bellegarde and Lach, both of whom are experienced and good officers, but neither of whom have either the Energy or Enterprize to conduct such a War as the present, and as to the persons composing the Staff of His Royal Highness I have too often had Occasion to speak of them.

On the 16th Inst., the day on which it was calculated that the Archduke would cross the Adige, a Cannonade was opened from the French side of Verona upon the Works constructing by the Austrians on their side, and which was answered by them. This is the only Act of Hostility which down to this date has taken place in Italy.

According to the reports which I have seen from Count Metternich it would appear that the determination taken by the Emperor of Russia to go Himself to Berlin was most wise, necessary, and well timed.

But much as I desire the co-operation of that Court, I cannot but feel averse to the idea of its being called in *to save Austria*, for as I am now informed, the King of Prussia has been formally invited to march his Troops into Bohemia for that purpose, a measure which, in my opinion, ought in no possible case to have been resorted to. In the first place I am persuaded that it is not a necessary one, and in the next, I cannot but consider it as one full of Objections and liable to Evils which may not be felt at the present Day, but which will most certainly be only consigned to temporary oblivion.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 102.]

VIENNA, 24<sup>th</sup> October 1805. Thursday Night.

MY LORD,—It is with the deepest concern I have to announce to your Lordship that the apprehensions expressed in my Despatch of yesterday relative to the Situation of the Austrian Army were but too well grounded.

In my Way to the Vice Chancellor's this morning I received a Note from him desiring to see me immediately.



He had just left the Emperor.

The scene was a most distressing one. The following is the Intelligence he communicated to me.

A Courier arrived here this morning from General Meerfeldt with accounts fully confirming those which had already been given by the French of their victories over the Austrians. They were sent to General Meerfeldt's outposts by the Bavarian General Wrede, and have been further confirmed by letters from Baron de Hügel at Ratisbon, who dispatched an Estafette which arrived about the same time as the above Courier.

By these different Reports we learn that General Mack with eighteen thousand Men had taken Refuge either in the fortress of Ulm or in some of the fastnesses about that Town, and had there offered terms of Capitulation for Himself and His Army. The French had refused to treat with him (on account of his escape from France), and the Terms had been signed by Prince Maurice Lichtenstein; they were however accepted by the French, with the proviso, that should there be the smallest appearance of the Arrival of any succour to the Austrians between that time and the 25th of this Month, the Capitulation would be considered as null and void. From the Situation of things no succours could have arrived,—that part of the Army therefore will to-morrow surrender themselves Prisoners of War.

As to what remains of it, we learn that the Archduke Ferdinand had forced a Passage at the Head of twelve thousand Men, supposed to be chiefly or entirely Cavalry, with which he was making the best retreat he could towards the Frontiers of Bohemia. Of the eighty thousand Austrians therefore with which the Campaign opened, at the end of less than a fortnight there remains besides the small Corps under Generals Jellachick and Kienmayer, mentioned in my Dispatch No. 100, twelve thousand Men, of whom we have yet to learn how many will escape.

I have not as yet seen the list of the Officers killed and taken Prisoners, but among those who have escaped are, I have reason to hope, Prince Charles Schwartzenberg and General Ozjuly.

With the above Intelligence the Vice Chancellor begged

that I would lose no time in dispatching a Messenger to England, and that I would assure His Majesty's Government of the Emperor's decided Resolution to call forth the very last Resources of His Dominions in defence of them. A Military Council was to be held this afternoon for the purpose of issuing such Orders as the Pressure of the moment demands.

Nothing is known of Bonaparte's movements, but it is hardly to be doubted that his next and immediate Operations will be decided against the combined Corps under Generals Kutusow and Kienmayer. Here I should correct an Error. I have lately been describing the Corps of Austrians now attached to the Russian Army as commanded by General Meerfeldt. This officer generously declined the flattering offer of His Sovereign, and requested His Imperial Majesty not to displace General Kienmayer. This General therefore retains his Command, and Count Meerfeldt is at the head of the few regiments originally destined to act with the Russians. I conclude that they will now act on the Defensive, until either the movements of the Prussians, or the arrival of the other expected succours will place them in a situation to move forward.

Such, My Lord, is the deplorable State of Affairs at the moment I am writing. I have been besought in the most impressive Terms by Count Cobentzl to entreat His Majesty's Government to represent to His Majesty the Emperor's earnest and anxious hope that His Majesty will come to the Succour of His Allies, by sending a Part of His Forces into Holland and thereby creating a powerful diversion, which Country I have been desired to state to be wholly evacuated by the French Troops.

I have been further most anxiously requested to lay before His Majesty's Government the total absence of pecuniary Resources in this Country, and to propose that I may be forthwith authorised to furnish to this Court such part of the Subsidy as according to the Treaty may be due, and considering the heavy Misfortunes under which this Country is now struggling, earnestly to recommend to His Majesty's most gracious consideration the proposals which have lately been made by the Emperor for additional pecuniary Assistance.

Two or three different times during this Interview Count Cobentzl, with tears in his eyes, assured me that in proportion as the danger increased, the Emperor's Resolution to oppose it with His utmost efforts became inalterable.

As I mentioned in my Dispatch No. 100, the King of Prussia has been solicited to march a Body of Troops to the support of the allied Armies, and I have been requested by the Vice Chancellor to call upon His Majesty's Minister at Berlin to second Count Metternich in the execution of his Instructions.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord MULGRAVE to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

[No. 8.]

DOWNING STREET, *October 25, 1805.*

[Lord Mulgrave announces the arrival of despatches expressing the favourable disposition of the Court of Berlin, which has been confirmed by the verbal declaration of Baron Jacobi, the Prussian envoy in London. Nothing was yet exactly ascertained with respect to the extent of the engagements into which Prussia would enter, yet a direct opening had been made upon the provisions of a subsidiary Treaty with a view to hostile operations against France. Lord Harrowby was to be sent on a special mission to Berlin, invested with the most ample powers; his object was to engage the Prussian armies in operations menacing the rear of the French, so as to produce diversion in favour of the Austrian forces, or even decide the campaign, either by obliging the French precipitately to retreat within their own frontier, or to incur the risk of being entirely cut off from all communication across the Rhine. A considerable body of Hanoverian troops was embarked to co-operate with the Russians and Swedes for the deliverance of Hanover, and to advance upon the frontier of the united provinces in conjunction with the Prussian troops destined to march into the Electorate. A second expedition was embarking to occupy the island of Walcheren. Other considerable Bodies of His Majesty's troops will be kept in constant readiness to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. He continues:—]

I trust that these Prospects will animate the Austrian Cabinet to exert the utmost vigour and Perseverance under any temporary difficulties with which they may have to contend from any Success which may have attended the French Arms in the first Operations of the Campaign. It is evident that if the Hopes now entertained of the co-operation of Prussia are verified, no Progress which the French might for a time make in Germany, even (if it were possible to suppose such a case) to the Walls of Vienna itself, could terminate otherwise than in the certain Disgrace and probable Destruction of the French Army.

Even independent of the co-operation of Prussia, the same effect could hardly fail to be produced by the full exertion of the immense means and Resources which Austria itself could employ in the Heart of its Empire, aided by the Powerful Reinforcements which it has to receive from Russia, and directed against an Army which must be weakened, impaired, and unsupported, in Proportion to the distance to which it advances.

His Majesty trusts and believes that the Reports which have reached this Country of the Successes said to be obtained by the French on the Danube, are at least greatly exaggerated, and that there is no reason to apprehend any Crisis of the Nature here referred to; but in any extremity He cannot doubt that, if it were necessary for a time even to relinquish the defence of Vienna Itself, the great Power of the Austrian Monarchy would remain unbroken, and would still furnish the means of finally turning so desperate an enterprise to the certain confusion of the Enemy. . . . —I am, &c.

(Signed) MULGRAVE.

*Interview of General Mack and Napoleon.*

*October.*

Voici la substance de la conversation du Général Mack avec Bonaparte, telle que le Général l'a rendue lui-même Lundi 28 de ce mois :—

Bonaparte avoit son quartier-général dans un village près d'Ulm. Après que l'Armée prisonnier eût défilé devant lui, il a fait venir les Généraux à son quartier.

Lorsque Mack est entré il l'a très poliment reçu. Celui-ci a commencé par lui dire que ce qui l'intéresse avant tout, étoit une affaire qui compromettait son honneur personnel, et dont on continuoît sans cesse à lui faire des reproches ; il s'agissoit de sa fuite de Paris en 1799.\* Bonaparte l'a interrompu pour le prier de ne pas en parler, en lui assurant qu'il n'y pensoit même plus. Mais Mack ne s'est pas déconcerté ; il a allégué tous ses moyens justificatifs, et Bonaparte a fini par lui dire qu'il en étoit pleinement satisfait, qu'il avoit toujours été assez mal-instruit sur cette affaire, et qu'il le priaît très-fort de l'oublier.

Après cela Bonaparte est entré en matière. Il a déclamé pendant une demi-heure contre la folie de l'Empereur de lui faire la guerre, *tandis qu'il travailloit pour le continent afin de le soustraire à la tyrannie Angloise*. Il a voulu apprendre par Mack quel avoit proprement été la cause du changement subit dans la système politique de la Cour de Vienne ; sur quoi Mack lui a dit qu'autant qu'il connoissoit la politique, cette cause se trouvoit surtout dans les progrès continuels des François en Italie. Et lorsque Bonaparte a voulu lui prouver que ces progrès n'interessoit nullement la maison d'Autriche, Mack lui a dit que cet objet avoit été envisagé *sous un tout autre point de vue* par la Cour Impériale, comme par toutes les autres puissances de cette partie de l'Europe.

Voyant que Mack évitoit autant que possible d'entrer dans les détails politiques, il s'est tourné vers la partie militaire. Il lui a demandé pourquoi on avoit fait d'aussi mauvais arrangements ; pourquoi avec la certitude que le théâtre de la guerre s'établirait en Allemagne, on avoit envoyé en Italie la partie la plus considérable de l'armée ; il a ajouté qu'il se moquoit de cette armée d'Italie, que la sienne n'étoit pas à la vérité forte de 70,000 hommes, mais que l'Italie étant hérissée de places, et les Italiens capable de les garder seuls, il n'avoit jamais eu la moindre crainte ; que, si on avoit eu 150,000 hommes sur le Danube, il n'auroit jamais osé faire ce qu'il avoit fait.

De là il a passé aux opérations particuliers. Cette partie de la conversation n'a pas été rendue à l'interlocuteur. Mais il est vraisemblable que Mack y a un peu

\* Mack had been a prisoner in 1799, and not being exchanged, he broke his parole and escaped.

attaqué les autres généraux Autrichiens en rejettant sur eux le tort de tous ses désastres.

Ensuite Bonaparte lui a demandé pourquoi il n'avoit pas aussi tâché de gagner le territoire Prussien. Mack lui a répondu "puisque nous le savions neutre." Bonaparte : "Et qu'en seroit-il résulté?" Mack : "Que les Prussiens se seraient déclarés contre nous." Bonaparte, après avoir réfléchi pendant quelques moments : "Ah ! les Prussiens ne se déclarent pas si vite." Outre ce seul propos, il s'est exprimé sur le compte de la Prusse avec la plus grande circonspection, et toutes les fois que Mack a parlé dans la supposition que la Prusse pouvoit agir contre lui, il a fait semblant de ne pas l'entendre.

Il s'est engagé après cela une longue discussion sur les projets ultérieurs de Bonaparte ; il a dit à Mack que son plan étoit d'entrer dans le Tyrol, et de tourner de cette manière toutes les provinces héréditaires à la fois. Mack s'est donné beaucoup de peine pour lui prouver que dans tous les cas le projet de s'avancer jusqu'à Vienne étoit excessivement dangereux ; et Bonaparte à la fin a paru le sentir. Cependant il a coupé la conversation en lui disant : "Eh bien, si j'attaque une mauvaise position, je saurai m'en tirer." (Ou quelque chose de Pareil ; car ce point-ci n'est pas tout-à-fait éclairci.)

Enfin, il lui a dit que ses troupes entrent en Suisse, Mack lui en a témoigné son étonnement en lui faisant observer "que l'Empereur son maître avoit accordé la neutralité à la Suisse." Bonaparte lui a répliqué : "Oui, mais sous condition que je la leur accorderois de ma part. Eh bien, je l'ai refusée."

Voilà ce qui m'a été communiqué de positif et de détaillé sut cette conversation. Mais je sais en outre, à ne pas pouvoir en douter un instant, qu'il y a été beaucoup question de paix ; que Bonaparte a répété sans cesse "qu'il étoit prêt à faire la paix," en ajoutant cependant à plusieurs reprises "qu'il lui falloit *quelques garanties* pour la stabilité de cette paix."

Le Général Mack a fait de toute cette conversation un rapport détaillé à l'Empereur.

*Précis of Sir A. PAGET's despatch No. 104.*

VIENNA, Nov. 1st, 1805.

The A. Duke Anthony has been sent to Berlin to solicit the speedy and effectual co-operation of Prussia.

The A. Duke Charles is invited to join the Army in Germany, and to reinforce it with troops from Italy.

Sir A. Paget thinks that his presence here would soon be followed by pacific proposals.

Two Officers have been sent to take down Depositions of Gen<sup>l</sup> Mack's Recital of his Military Operations : & he is since gone to the neighbourhood of Brünn in Moravia.

The Emperor is gone to join the combined Army, for the object of stimulating Kutusow to action. Nothing is known here of the movements of the French.

Sir A. Paget deeply laments the capricious conduct of Ct. Cobentzl towards him, varying with the day from the fullest confidence to the strictest Reserve.

The A. Duke Charles has met with a check on the 24th, & Sir A. Paget is convinced he is now retreating to join the Army in Germany, & that to prevent this will be Buona-parté's next object. Preparations are making for leaving Vienna. Recruits are collected with the greatest activity ; the Depredations of the Russians are much complained of. The Austrian Ministers are more imbecile than ever.

Ct. Cobentzl assures Sir A. Paget that Gen. Mack will be tried by a Court Martial. He has lost 50,000 Prisoners, & stores etc. to the value of 30 millions of florins. None of His officers ever approved of His conduct, & He had a *carte blanche* from the Emperor which placed him above The Commander in Chief, Prince Ferdinand. Gen. Mack persisted to the last in asserting that a counter-revolution had broken out in France, the English Army landed on the Coast, & the French Army retiring. He on the contrary says that the officers never would obey his orders, & were unanimous in saying that resistance was impossible. Gen. Mack will probably escape punishment by the circumstance of the position of The Iller having been determined on by the Emperor himself.

To Sir A. Paget Count Cobentzl denies that The Emperor has taken any notice of the vague proposals of peace

brought by Gen. Mack : but Sir A. Paget is assured that the Emp<sup>r</sup> has answered them *in a letter* to Buonaparte, in dignified and firm terms, refusing to listen to any other conditions than those offered before the War & persisting to treat in concert with Russia.

Ct. Cobentzl has shown this letter to the Prussian Minister.

On the arrival of the Archduke Ferdinand the Emperor reproved him for not putting Mack under arrest. The A. Duke accuses Mack of the deepest treachery, cowardice, &c. &c. &c.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE.*

VIENNA, 3rd November 1805.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I write by a Messenger I am dispatching to England, not I am afraid with any good news, but on the contrary to represent the wretched state of affairs here. You can have no idea of the consternation which prevails here at this moment. I don't know which is the most feared, the arrival of the Russians or their retreat, or that of the French. Every body who possesses or can hire a Horse is moving off, and all the Horses are put in requisition by the Government, as well as the Boats on the Danube. There never was such work. Sailors and Soldiers are no doubt exposed to more danger, but you may believe me when I tell you that we are not always upon Roses. I am fortunately sufficiently recovered to support the movement of a Carriage. In case of a retreat the Emperor will go to Olmütz. Of course I shall have to accompany him. Not to mention the Inconvenience of all this, the expense of it is enormous; what with the preparations for the Campaign and those for my Departure, I shall not get off for much less than £3000, for which I must necessarily open a Battery upon Government.

In this state of things you will not expect to hear much from me upon a *certain subject*;—in fact, I really do not know whether I have any right to mention it at all. This Charivari will certainly not make me more popular among them all, for of course they attribute their misfortune to the English exclusively, and I do not pass for the most peaceful of the Nation.



*Précis of Lord MULGRAVE's despatch to Sir A. PAGET.*

[No. 10.]

DOWNING STREET, November 5th, 1805.

No official account of the fall of Ulm and capitulation of Mack has been received. It is most probable that the news of disaster are exaggerated. It is believed that favourable prospects remain of an early change of circumstances.

His Majesty looks with Confidence to the great Exertions which the powerful Resources of the hardy and warlike Population of the Austrian Dominions may immediately afford, in conjunction with the 140,000 Russian troops destined for active Operations in Germany. Possibly the favourable Disposition of the Court of Berlin may enable the Emperor of Russia to move forward another Body of 40,000 Men, which it had been originally intended to leave as an Army of Observation on the Frontiers of Lithuania. His Majesty, seeing the Fortitude with which the Court of Vienna has encountered the first impetuous Exertions of the Enemy, will leave no means untried which the period of the Season and the nature of Maritime Operations will permit to create a Diversion favourable to the Allies.

Contrary Winds have alone retarded the sailing of 12,000 British and Hanoverian Troops for the purpose of landing in the Elbe. A large additional British Force is also prepared, to be used to the best advantage according to the Intelligence received from Prussia.

Lord Harrowby has gone to Berlin. Should he be successful, and should the King of Prussia be prevailed upon to act, Saxony and Hesse (and perhaps Denmark) will also probably accede to the Confederacy. Great as have already been the Pecuniary Efforts which His Majesty has made for the Common Cause, He is ready still to extend them to such a further Amount as may enable those Powers to bring forward an active force of from 200,000 to 250,000 Men; His Own Active Force, to be employed either in Co-Operation on the Continent or in Offensive Maritime Operations against France, will be augmented, by the next Season, to 60,000 men.

The cordial Union and United Exertions of the great

Powers of Europe cannot fail of ultimate success. His Majesty is persuaded that the Antient Spirit of Austria would still remain unshaken and undismayed, though the Common Enemy of Europe should for a moment effect his declared purpose, and establish his Standard on the Walls of Vienna. Should he, contrary to Expectation, possess himself of the Capital of the Austrian Empire, he would then have to encounter the concentrated Energy of a great and loyal Nation, and the United efforts of powerful Allies, all deeply interested in the Destruction of his Power, which he will also be less capable of maintaining in proportion as success shall have carried him to a distance from the Source whence that Power must derive its Augmentation and Support.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 105. Secret and confidential.]

VIENNA, 8th Novr. 1805.

MY LORD,— . . . The French are in full march, and the Combined Armies in full retreat. Bernadotte and Marmont are at Saltzbourg; it is understood that Bonaparte and Murat are advancing on the left Bank of the Danube: it is Davoust who is marching *directly* to Vienna. He may be here to-morrow. The Austro-Russian Head Quarters according to the last Accounts were at St. Polten forty miles from hence, but that Army has probably at this moment crossed the Danube on its Retreat into Moravia. I still observe that the ignorance here and, as I am informed, at Head Quarters, respecting the movements of the Enemy is beyond all credibility. They have not such a thing as a Spy belonging to them.

The Emperor set off at five o'clock yesterday Morning for Presbourg, from whence he was to continue his route for Brünn and Olmütz.

Count Cobentzl set off last night. I shall follow to-night or to-morrow morning, in consequence of the enclosed Invitation. The Russian Ambassador is already gone.

In conformity to the Notice given in my Despatch No. 104 I yesterday morning presented an official note to the Vice Chancellor of which the enclosed is a Copy.

I hardly expected that an immediate Answer would

be returned. What however has since passed upon this subject is as follows.

When I called upon Count Cobentzl last night his first words were "Vous m'avez envoyé une note ce matin dans laquelle vous ne nous rendez pas justice, il ne faut pas ajouter foi à tous les bruits de la ville." More than this (had I entertained any doubt relative to the Information I had received) was not wanting to convince me of the ground upon which I stood. He proceeded to say that I might be strongly persuaded of the Rectitude and Firmness of the Emperor, that I had an unanswerable proof of it in the determination he had come to of sacrificing His Capital, and that He had no hesitation in assuring me that this Resolution and Firmness were not to be shaken. He said that he had not hitherto had it in his power to lay my note before His Imperial Majesty;—he therefore particularly begged that I would consent to his not entering further upon the matter of it, until we met at Brünn or Olmütz.

I saw and felt that this was not the moment for a discussion, particularly as the Vice Chancellor was just getting into his Carriage; I therefore thought it advisable not to press the Question further.

What fell from him during the short time we remained together amounts nearly to a Confession of that of which he is accused. I shall take the earliest opportunity of making your Lordship acquainted with what is still to pass between us.

The latest Accounts received here from Berlin state that the Emperor of Russia was still there; the Reports from the Archduke Anthony and Count Metternich appear to afford satisfaction.

Hence the Interview between the two Emperors will now probably take place at Olmütz.

There are levies of all sorts going on here and in the other Provinces of the Monarchy. The States of Hungary alone have voted fifty thousand Men, who are to be equipped and ready in about a Month.

There is a considerable degree of discontent here, which has not been diminished by the departure of the Emperor having taken place without any notice of it having been given to the Public.—I have the honor,  
&c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

[Enclosure.]

Le Soussigné Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande comptant sur les assurances positives et réitérées qui lui avoient été données par Son Excellence M. le Vice Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat n'a pu jusqu'à ce moment ajouter foi à un bruit qui s'est repandu depuis plusieurs jours ; mais tout extraordinaire qu'il est, il prend une telle consistance que malgré son désir d'éviter tout embarras dans des circonstances aussi critiques, il est cependant de son devoir de demander à ce sujet une explication.

On dit qu'à la suite des Ouvertures faites au Général Mack par Bonaparte, Sa Majesté Imperiale a écrit à ce Chef du Gouvernement François, qu'Elle ne seroit disposée à entrer en Negociation *que de concert avec Son Allié Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Russies.*

Le Soussigné ne pretend pas examiner l'Utilité d'une pareille démarche mais, d'après les rélations intimes qui existent entre les Cabinets de Londres et de Vienne, il doit croire que si Elle eut été faite, il en auroit eu Communication.

Il doit donc penser que ce bruit n'a aucun fondement, cependant l'Objet est d'une telle importance qu'il se voit obligé pour sa décharge de demander à M. le Vice Chancelier ce qu'il doit écrire à cet égard à Son Gouvernement.—Il s'empresse de renouveler, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

VIENNE, le 7 Nov<sup>r</sup> 1805.

*From the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE to Sir A. PAGET.*

PLASNEWYDD, Nov. 10, 1805.

MY VERY DEAREST ARTHUR,—With heart felt sorrow we have received your letters of the 9th & 12th of October ; to express our sensations is impossible, but you can judge of them, who know our unbounded affection for you. Who but your dear self would have written under such cruel sufferings. God bless and reward you for this additional mark of kindness and attention. Tho' you assure me you are so much recover'd I cannot have

a moment's peace of mind till I have a further confirmation of it; never shall I forget yesterday as long as Memory remains. Oh! my beloved Son, think what a day it was to us; the account of your illness, of the fall of that great Man Lord Nelson, and his brilliant Victory, and the total defeat of the Austrians (if we may credit the French Account the total annihilation of them) all came together; it was too much and we were sunk to the lowest ebb. Victory purchased at such a price is dearly bought, but we have the consolation of reflecting that he died as he always express'd a wish to do. What a contrast is the account of this Exploit, and that given in the French papers of Bonaparte. How strongly do they mark the character of the two nations.

*From the EARL OF UXBRIDGE to Sir A. PAGET.*

PLASNEWYDD, 21<sup>st</sup> Nov. 1805.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,— . . . Poor dear Edward is off, I presume for Hanover. He commands an Elegant Brigade; I have some Notion his own Reg<sup>t</sup> the 28th will soon join him. The dear King said to me one day, "When is that old fellow to die?" "Who, sir," I said.—"Prescot,—remember when he does, that I will give the 28th away myself. I will not be asked for it, no, no, Edward shall have it." I instantly stoop'd & kiss'd his dear hand, & when he has seen him ever Since, his Notice of him has been always most Mark'd. I have already told you Mr. E. P. is at Blithfield. I wrote you a very Unguarded letter the last, & I can hardly refrain from expressing my Anger in this; however I must say that the Austrians shou'd have a better look out, & if they allow themselves to be bullied by the Usurper, they will soon cease to be a Nation. What think you of our late Naval Victory, it cou'd not have been better timed; but the death of Poor Nelson is a most grievous national loss,—but thank God we have a good list of fine fellows left. Six very (fine) Line of Battle Ships are already Sail'd to replace those that were damaged in the Action. Our Board of Admiralty are quite alive, & had actually prepared these ships expecting the Battle that has been fought. The Battle of the Nile raised the drooping spirits of

Europe when subdued by the Battle of Marengo. Why then may not the destruction of twenty of the Enemies' combined fleet rouse our Spirits again, & enable us to make an example of that most Wicked, Vilainous, & very worst of Wretches Buonaparte.

*From Lord MULGRAVE to Sir A. PAGET.*

[No. 11.]

DOWNING STREET, November 15th, 1805.

[He directs Sir A. Paget to convince the Austrian Government that His Majesty will afford more effectual assistance to that Power by directing his further pecuniary exertions to bringing the armies of the Northern Powers to act against the common enemy than he can by adding to the payments made to Austria, and thereby circumscribing the efforts of the rest of Europe for its relief, and for the ultimate and complete success of the great and arduous contest for general security in which they were engaged.]

*Précis of Sir A. PAGET's despatch No. 107.*

OLMÜTZ, November 16th, 1805.

Further reflections on the silence of the Austrian Ministers to Sir A. Paget on the Subject of The Emperor's letter to Buonaparte, and on the policy of the Austrian Cabinet in studiously avoiding any allusion to Their alliance with England in their public proclamations, or communications with the French Gov<sup>t</sup>. The Emperor is well satisfied with the Project mentioned in L<sup>d</sup> Mulgrave's No. 8 to Sir A. Paget.

Count Colleredo has quitted the Austrian Councils, Sir Arthur supposes from The Emperor being at last convinced he was not fit for his Situation.

The Army under Kutusow & Kienmayer crossed the Danube at Krems on the 9th, & on the 11th they defeated a large part of The French Army, in a general battle in which 3000 French were killed & General Mortier killed or drowned.

The French entered Vienna on the 13th, & Prince Auersberg has been arrested for not having destroyed the bridges. The Enemy crossed the Danube in great force

& spread a general terror throughout Moravia, but, by forced marches, The Combined Army have gained a strong position on the Thaya.

Gen. Meerfeldt has been defeated S. of the Danube.

The Tyrol, it is hoped, may still be saved. Pr. Charles writes in high spirits & full of zeal.

The Austrian Army on the frontiers of Austria & Moravia, will it is hoped, in ten days, amount to at least 100,000 men under Prince John Lichtenstein.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[Private.]

OLMÜTZ, *Tuesday Night, 19th Novr. 1805.*

MY DEAR LORD,—Lord G. L. Gower's Dispatches to your Lordship by this Messenger will I fancy fully justify all I have at different times said of the persons who compose the Government of this Country. I always suspected that the E. of Russia and his Ministers had no real knowledge of them. They are, it appears, now judged, and I sincerely wish that my next may announce that sentence has been passed upon them. If ever Y<sup>r</sup> Lordship thought me biassed or harsh in my opinion of these men, I trust that I now stand acquitted. I have certainly frequently passed censure upon them, but I have not said half that I think,—half what I know of them.

We are now perhaps upon the eve of a decisive battle. Gen<sup>l</sup> Baschövden has been sent for from the Army, and upon his report will the question be decided.

I do not feel sanguine. If the battle takes place between this place & Prosnitz the country is open & flat, & we have little or no Cavalry, whereas the French have not less than from 16 to 20 thousand. It is said that both the Emperors are to take the field, that they are determined upon it in spite of the Councils & Remonstrances of all around them. For the Emperor of Germany, he will have with him Princes John Lichtenstein, Charles Schwartzberg, and General Weyrothen, all good and experienced officers. But for the other, when I reflect that he is to be guided by Kutusow & Baschövden & Mancertius, & God knows who, I own I tremble. Nobody knows exactly where the French are, or in what force. If, as report says, they are already in the neighbourhood

of Wischau (two posts &  $\frac{1}{2}$  from hence on the Brünn Road) they will probably again attack the Russians before they have the time necessary to make their dispositions for the Battle which is talked of, and, to say the truth, I think this latter the most probable case. It is meant to defend this place, but to this moment no notice of any such intention has been given to the Inhabitants of it. It is really beyond all credibility what one sees & hears. The French are at Presbourg & had pushed their advanced Posts as far as Stampfen. I have no doubt that at this moment they are  $\frac{1}{2}$  way on their Road to Olmütz. They have taken 30,000 Sabres intended for the *Hungarian Insurrection*.\* It is pretty evident that this latter measure, which by the bye had not common sense, is by this time pretty well paralysed. I am informed that the loss sustained by Gen<sup>l</sup> Meerfeldt is much greater than what I mentioned in my last.

We have no accounts whatever from Vienna. In general the state of ignorance in which this Gov<sup>t</sup> is of what regards their very existence is perfectly astonishing.—I have the Honor, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Count COBENTZL to Sir A. PAGET.*

Nov. 23, 1805.

Mille graces de l'excellente nouvelle † que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer. Je me suis empressé d'en informer l'Empereur ; malheureusement S.M. etoit déjà sortie pour aller voir les troupes. Vous pouvez être sur en attendant qu'Elle l'apprendra avec une satisfaction égale à son importance. Très certainement c'est la meilleur des consolations qui auroit pû nous arriver dans nos malheurs qui ne dureront pas toujours j'espère. Il est bien à regretter que le brave et immortel Nelson nous ait été enlevé à cette occasion, mais quelle mort digne d'envie et d'admiration !

Dès que S. M<sup>e</sup> retournera de Sa Course je ne tarderai pas un instant de me rendre chez Elle pour la mettre au fait de toutes ces bonnes nouvelles, elles Lui procureront

\* The levy in Hungary. See despatch of November 8.

† The victory of Trafalgar.



des momens bien agréables, et Elle vous en saura beaucoup beaucoup de gré.

En attendant que je sois chargé par mon Auguste Maître de vous exprimer la satisfaction qu'il ressent des succès des braves flottes de son intime Allié; je vous prie d'agréer mes sincères complimens et remerciemens de même que l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé) COBENTZL.

*From Lord MULGRAVE to Sir A. PAGET.*

*November 23, 1805.*

The improvement of Lord Granville Leveson's health enabling his Excellency to continue at the Court of S<sup>t</sup> Petersburg till next Spring, His Majesty has in consequence directed that Lord Cathcart \* (who is appointed to succeed Lord G. Leveson as Ambassador) should be charged with the extraordinary Mission to Vienna. His Lordship's high military Rank, his great professional Reputation, his long habits in political business, as well as his Judgement, Temper, and Talents, are calculated to excite the most sanguine expectations that assisted, as His Majesty does not doubt that his Lordship will be, by your zeal and talents, the most beneficial effects may be produced at Vienna by this Special Embassy.

*Précis of Sir A. PAGET's despatch No. 110.*

*OLMÜTZ, 25th November 1805.*

Sir A. Paget has, according to Lord Harrowby's directions, avoided stating to C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl the full number of Troops belonging to Prussia & to her Allies which His Majesty had offered to subsidise.

Sir Arthur has again found it necessary to remonstrate with C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl on the unjustifiable Reserve with which he still treats him on the subject of the Emperor's Correspondence with Bonaparte.

C<sup>t</sup> Stadion set out yesterday for the French head quarters at Brünn, it is said to watch the conduct of Haugwitz who will be there in two or three Days. The Emperor is

\* Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, 1803-1805. Recalled by Castlereagh's advice.

still determined not to accept peace, but on the conditions of the treaty of Potsdam; but Sir Arthur has no doubt should the Allies be defeated in the approaching general Engagement, C<sup>t</sup> Stadion will sign an ignominious peace.

On the subject of L<sup>d</sup> Mulgrave's No. 10 C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl has spoken with gratitude and firmness.

As he complained of the unfortunate delay of the British Expeditions to the Continent, Sir Arthur replied That as They were intended only to co-operate with The Northern Powers, they could not have been advantageously brought forward at an Earlier period; and That Austria had precipitated the campaign contrary to the original plans.

Count Cobentzl assured Sir Arthur that The Emperor will never consent to a peace that shall compromise the British Armies in the North of Germany.

Sir Arthur laments the inauspicious delays occasioned to the operations of the combined Armies by too many counsellors.

The Austrian Cavalry is very good.

The Arch-Duke Ferdinand has marched with 9000 Men to join Gen. Michelson who was on the 24th inst. at Glatz.

The A. Duke Charles is supposed to be still at Laybach.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. III.]

Olmütz, 2nd December 1805.

MY LORD,—On the 27th ult<sup>o</sup> the combined Armies under the immediate command of the Emperors of Germany and Russia quitted the position of Olmütz and advanced.

Their Imperial Majesties fixed their Head Quarters on that day at Prosnitz and on the next at Wischau.

At the latter place there was a slight Affair between the advanced Guard of the Russians and the French, in which the former took an hundred and fifty prisoners.

By the last Accounts the Allied Armies had advanced beyond Austerlitz, having met with little or no opposition.

The French Army having called in all their Detachments are said to occupy the Camp of Turas between Austerlitz and Brünn.

And it is in this Position that it is expected that the

French, if they do not fall back upon Vienna, will make their stand.

In my last Dispatch I had the Honor to inform your Lordship that Count Stadion, accompanied by General Giulay, had set out for the French Head Quarters. On their arrival there they were invited by Bonaparte to proceed to Vienna where they would find M. de Talleyrand, and to which place he promised to follow them. By the latest Accounts however Bonaparte was still at the Army.

The Vice Chancellor, who returned here the night before last from Head Quarters, has informed me that Bonaparte had proposed an Armistice, which Proposal had been rejected. It seems that it was made purely and simply, by which it was of course understood that the different Armies should occupy their present Positions. It was very properly deemed inadmissible. The Count de Stadion has in consequence been instructed to declare that the Emperors can consent to no Proposals for an Armistice, unless the French cede to the House of Savoy a considerable Portion of Territory (these were Count Cobentzl's words, and he did not explain himself further), and that even should Bonaparte agree to this he, Count Stadion, was to take his consent *ad referendum*.

A Correspondence (and in my opinion not a very creditable one) has now commenced between The Emperor of Russia and Bonaparte. An Interview even has been proposed by the latter, but this has been declined.—I have the Honor, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord MULGRAVE to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

DOWNING STREET, Dec. 3d, 1805.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR,—Four Mails having arrived last night & this morning do not leave me more time than is just necessary to inform you that Lord Cathcart being destined to the temporary Command of the British Forces in the North of Germany, The Earl of Harrington will proceed to the Special Military Embassy in his stead.

A False Report was circulated, by intelligence sent by a Dutch Admiral, of a Peace having been concluded at Vienna by the Emperor of Germany. This created a

great sensation in the public Mind, but the impudent imposition was detected in a few hours, and the object of influencing the Funds has wholly failed. Lord Harrington will set off in two or three days.—Believe me, &c. (Signed) MULGRAVE.

*From Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

BERLIN, 3 Decr. 1805.

DEAR SIR,—I have written the accompanying dispatch in order to put you in possession of the present state of things here. It may not probably be prudent to inform C<sup>t</sup> Cobentzl of the period for which there is great hope of securing the co-operation of Prussia, but it may be important to repel the idea which may have arisen from my remaining here so long without any thing being settled, that there were insuperable difficulties in the way of *any* Treaty.

You will therefore make use of this information to give such general assurances as may be necessary to keep up the spirits of Austria, & prevent further concessions being produced by the fear of being abandoned.—I am, &c. (Signed) H.

*From Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

BERLIN, 3d Decr. 1805.

SIR,—The knowledge you have had of the articles of the treaty of Potsdam\* must have made you well aware of all the difficulties which stood in the way of any arrangement for the permanent co-operation of Prussia in the war.† It has been my endeavour to set these difficulties aside; & to bring the Court of Berlin to treat for a provisional & temporary convention.

Baron Hardenberg announced to me some days ago that he had the K. of Prussia's orders to treat with me upon that footing. We have had several conferences & I have great hopes that the extreme liberality of the

\* The alliance sworn by the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia at the tomb of Frederick the Great, November 4, two days after hearing of the surrender of Ulm.

† It was agreed at Potsdam that Russia should aid in the annexation of Hanover to Prussia. The Russian Ambassador was directed to explain to the King of England the necessity of making this sacrifice.

offers which I am enabled to make will secure the most active co-operation of a Prussian Army of 180,000 men during the ensuing year. The pressing dangers of the moment will by this means be averted & sufficient time allowed to consult between the allied powers some admissible plan for procuring to the King of Prussia such territorial acquisitions as may be an ample recompence for his exertions & may unite him permanently with the Allies in the common cause.

In the meanwhile no time appears to be lost in bringing forward the Prussian Army to the several points from whence it is destined to act; & if the Court of Austria has sufficient firmness to bear up for a short time longer there seems every prospect of a change of fortune.—I have,  
(Signed) HARROWBY.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE*

[No. 113.]

OLMÜTZ, 3rd December 1805.

MY LORD,—Having closed my Dispatches of yesterday, I set off to join the Army.

Before my arrival at Wischau, the second Post from hence, from the number of Soldiers and Waggon I met upon the road, I concluded that there had been a Battle, and that the issue of it had not been favorable. I am truly grieved to inform your Lordship that my conjectures were too well founded.

Soon after my Arrival at Wischau, I fell in with General Winzengerode, and the Information I received from that Officer enables me to lay the few following and afflicting details before Your Lordship.

Agreeably to the decision of a Council of War and to a plan of attack suggested on the preceding Evening by General Weyrotter, the combined Armies marched in five Columns at Day break yesterday morning, having the villages of Telnitz and Kobelnitz in their Front. The Plan was to attack the Enemy who were supposed to be at Schlapanitz in their Flanks. The Columns were marching by Sections.

On their Arrival at the above Villages they found them occupied by the Enemy who had remained totally concealed and who at the very instant presented themselves

in order of Battle. This unexpected Reception led to the most fatal consequences. The Battle commenced at eight o'clock in the morning, under all the advantages for the French and all the Disadvantages for the Allies which I have described. By twelve the centre of the combined Army after an obstinate resistance was completely put to the rout.

Fortunately the French had no Cavalry whatever in this part of the field of Battle: it is otherwise probable that few would have escaped. The right wing of the Allies under the Command of Prince John Lichtenstein, and the advanced Guard commanded by Prince Bagration, which was still upon his right, was principally composed of and opposed by Cavalry, until the defeat of the Centre which when thus disengaged attacked the right wing, as well as the reserve composed of the Russian Guards headed by the Grand Duke Constantine.

My Information does not allow me to give any details relative to this part of the Army, but it is probable that they have suffered considerably. Nor am I able to give more satisfactory Intelligence respecting the left Wing.

They seemed in the commencement of the Battle to have gained some Advantage which, it is too much to be feared, the defeat of the Centre will not have allowed them to have followed up. The Army is retreating upon the Morava, in the direction of Rhadisch, and I fear that for the present nothing more is to be hoped than that they may have made a safe and effectual Retreat.

The Emperor Alexander was at the Centre when the attack took place, nor would He consent to retire until forced as it were away by the entreaties of those who surrounded Him. Of the Emperor of Germany General Winzengerode knew nothing.

This officer, who was sent by the Emperor of Russia to the centre, did not leave the Field of Battle until there were not two Men together for him to give his Orders to. With this disastrous news I left Wischau last night at twelve o'clock and arrived at the Vice Chancellor's at five this morning, since which Olmütz has been declared to be in a state of Siege, and we are now upon the point of our departure for Teschen, for which place the Empress has already set out.—I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord PAGET to Sir A. PAGET.*

WROTHAM, Dec. 6th, 1805.

We have been in a dreadful stew here about you all, not indeed at Vienna's having been abandoned, but at the report that Austria had made a separate peace. God avert so direful a measure. Be firm & all must go well.

I believe I did not tell you in any of my former letters that I had offered to join the Austrian Army as you proposed it to me. The Duke however said that I should certainly be wanted before I could ever go & return. Ld. Harrington I find is now going on a Special Mission. This I conclude does not interfere with you. I do long to be at the Rascals. We are all under orders to be perfectly prepared for Embarkation, but the order don't come. You may depend upon it that We will play Hoko with them. God bless you. I was very sorry to hear of your illness—but a good campaign will cure all. I am really all impatience.—Ever affec<sup>d</sup> Yours,  
PAGET.

*From Lord HARROWBY to Sir A. PAGET.*

BERLIN, Decr. 9, 1805.

The subsidiary treaty is in forwardness. Baron Hardenberg's *contre project*, as he told me yesterday evening, is to be sent to me to-night, & I hope & believe his expectations will come within compass. If so, we may sign in a very short time.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 114.]

TESCHEN, 9th December 1805.

MY LORD,—On the day after the Battle of the 2nd Inst. Prince John Lichtenstein went to the French Head Quarters and demanded an Armistice of two days, which was granted.

On the 3rd December the Emperor, in consequence of a proposal to that effect of which Prince John was the Bearer, had an Interview with Bonaparte, which lasted two hours.

At this Interview an Armistice for an indefinite time was

concluded of which the first and Principal condition was, that the Russian Troops should quit the Emperor's States.

In consequence of this Arrangement, the Russians are retreating homewards through Hungary.

The Emperor Alexander arrived here at three o'clock this morning from the Army, and immediately continued his Route for Gallicia. . . . —I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE to Sir A. PAGET.*

PLASNEWYDD, Decr. 10th, 1805.

The following toast was given at a recent public dinner, viz.:—

“The Roast Beef of Old England—  
May Englishmen eat both the fat and the lean,  
And leave Frenchmen to pick the *Bony-part* clean.”\*

MY DEAREST ARTHUR,—The relief it was to our Minds to receive your letter from Brünn was in proportion to the Misery we endured from the apprehension that you was not sufficiently recover'd from your Severe illness to accompany the Emperor to Olmitz. You will allow the idea was not a pleasant one, but here I must restrain my feelings from prudence, not *now* being sure of my letters ever reaching you. If an Emperor & an Ambassador are waylaid † a Messenger may, so I must content myself with venting my indignation at home against the Usurper, but thank God since we heard from you the accounts from the Continent have been more satisfactory; the Victory over the French and the Emperor's having announced Prussia as his Ally, give us hopes that we may ere long hear something very interesting. It would amuse you more, my dear Arthur, if I could write upon other topics than the preceding, but the truth is no other ever enter our heads. Even the Children are Politicians, and fly to the Papers for News with as much avidity as we do, particularly if there is a paragraph from Vienna.

\* Newspaper cutting enclosed in letter.

† A short time before this the Emperor Alexander, travelling from Dresden to Prague, was warned of a French force sent to interrupt communication between Prague and Vienna, and in consequence changed his route. In the spring of the same year a rumour had been spread that Kotchebui (who vainly still signed himself in the *Hamburg Gazette* Chancellor of the Emperor of Russia) was arrested by the French on his way from Rome to Naples.



*From Lord G. LEVESON GOWER to Sir A. PAGET.*

TESCHEN, Dec. 14th, 1805.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I had not been at Troppau above a few hours when I received notice of Czartoryski being upon his Road from Olmütz to this Place. I in consequence immediately returned here. I have heard from him nothing very cheering or consolatory, unless it be his assurances of the determination of the Emperor to continue his system of perfect Union & Cooperation with England. All Continental operations necessarily depend upon the King of Prussia to whom, if he continues firm to the engagements contracted by the Treaty of Potsdam, His Imperial Majesty promises the most powerful Succours. The army of Bennigsen, now in Silesia, is left at the Disposal of His Prussian Majesty. Czartoryski counsels strongly my return to St. Petersburg, & thinks that Lord Cathcart abandoning entirely his Vienna Mission would look as if all idea of resistance on the part of Austria to the will of Buonaparte was to be given up.

*From M. DE GENTZ to Sir A. PAGET.*

BRESLAU, le 17 Decembre 1805.


Je vous ai écrit deux fois, une fois de Troppau par Mr. Jenkinson, une seconde de Neuswide par Mr. Clinton. Quand Kraus est arrivé ici sans m'apporter une ligne de votre part, j'en ai été d'abord un peu capot ; mais bientôt je me suis pénétré de l'horreur de votre situation, et je vous ai parfaitement excuser. Le portrait qu'on me fait du séjour de Teschen, est tellement effrayant que l'idée de vous y savoir, me navre le cœur ; et quand je pense de plus à tout ce que vous devez avoir senti et souffert au milieu de tant d'infamies et d'atrocités—je frémis de la disposition dans laquelle je présume que vous vous trouvez.

Je crois que tout est fini de côté-là. Je n'attends plus que les conditions auxquelles la paix sera signée ; et comme ces conditions memes sont assez faciles à deviner, je n'attends plus rien.

Mais que fera-t-on de ce côté-ci ? Voilà une question à



**FREDERICK GENTZ**



laquelle il est impossible de répondre avec les données que j'ai pu recueillir ici, et tant que je ne saurois pas avec certitude ce qui s'est passé à Vienne. Voici en attendant mon avis. Si la question de paix ou guerre est exclusivement abandonnée à la décision de la Russie et de la Prusse, si Bonaparte ne leur demande que la paix, je crois qu'elle se fera. Je suis plus que jamais convaincu de la sincérité et de la loyauté des intentions du Roi de Prusse ;\* et sans les affreux dérangemens qui ont eu lieu là-bas, je n'ai plus l'ombre d'une doute qu'il n'y soit allé tout de bon. Mais si, après les catastrophes que nous avons vues, après la séquestration absolue de l'Autriche, après la perte totale de l'objet primitif de la guerre, on lui ouvre une porte par laquelle il peut honorablement sortir, il ne manquera pas d'en profiter. Or je crois que la Russie lui ouvrira cette porte, et qu'au lieu de le pousser à la guerre, elle tâchera secrètement de l'en dégouter. Les symptômes, qui m'engagent à le croire, sont dans tout ce qui se passe autour de moi depuis que je suis ici. Le Prince Dolgorouky,† envoyé à Berlin avec une mission de la plus haute importance, et (de l'aveu de tout le monde) avec le but d'aiguillonner le Roi, ce Prince Dolg. a employé 7, je dis *sept* jours, pour aller de Neustadt à la porte par laquelle il est parti de Breslau. Il s'est arrêté ici pendant quatre jours, disant qu'il n'avoit pas d'habits pour se montrer à Berlin, et tenant d'ailleurs des propos d'autant plus étranges qu'il est certainement un des plus spirituels et même des plus instruits parmi les siens. Le Grand Duc Constantin (cet être monstrueux que j'ai vu ici pour la première fois) a eu l'ordre exprès de ne pas paraître à Berlin avant le Pr. Dolgorouky ; ce qui m'a valu le bonheur de faire deux diners avec lui, dont je me souviendrai longtems, et qui, au milieu de mes douleurs et de mon désespoir, m'ont appris qu'il me restoit encore quelque chose qui ressemble à des entrailles pour les malheureux Autrichiens. Le Général Bennigsen (*nomen divi ominis !*) en arrivant ici, a déclaré "que son corps venoit d'être mis à la disposition absolue du Roi de Prusse, et qu'il se regardoit dès-lors comme étant sous ses ordres." Il a été reçu et traité

\* This is a very patriotic sentiment on the part of a Prussian subject, and, if sincere, shows a very robust faith.—A. P.

† Sent by Alexander to offer to put the Russian forces at the command of the Prussian Ministry if they would press on the war.

en conséquence. Ce matin le Ct. Hoym reçoit une lettre de Berlin, où le Roi dit qu'il approuvoit très-fort tout ce qu'il avoit fait pour le corps de Bennigsen, mais que quant à l'arrangement en question il n'en avoit pas entendu parler. Tout cela me paroît mystérieux et suspect. En attendant les Prussiens marchent, marchent, marchent, et personne ne sait ce qui en résultera.

Bonaparte ne l'ignore pas. Car c'est lui, et lui tout seul, qui prononcera en définitif. S'il se contente de ses victoires, s'il s'en retourne chez lui pour les célébrer et pour en jouir, laissant à un autre moment la punition qui est certainement jurée à la Prusse, il n'y aura pas un coup de canon tiré dans tout le nord de l'Allemagne, et chacun s'en ira comme il est venu,—sauf ce qui arrivera le printems prochain. Si, au contraire, Bonaparte veut se venger de la Prusse sur-le-champ, et compléter ses triomphes en détruisant une puissance de plus, il trouvera d'amples prétextes pour entamer tous ces pays. Je crois qu'à l'heure qu'il est l'issue de la mission de Haugwitz (qu'on ne connoissoit pas encore le 13 de ce mois) doit être connue à Berlin ;\* c'est sur cela que tout se réglera, et je m'imagine que d'ici à quatre ou cinq jours les grandes affaires de l'Europe, c'est-à-dire ce qui en reste encore, seront pleinement développées.

Quel avenir affreux que celui qui s'ouvre devant nous ! Qui sait si je reverrai jamais la ville de Vienne ? Et si nous la revoyons, quel tourment que celui de voir les derniers des hommes insulter à notre juste douleur. J'ai appris aujourd'hui dans un diner Autrichien, que j'ai fait chez l'Archévêque de Salzbourg, (avec Naso, Mr. de Wurmbrand) que la cour étoit presque résolue à ne pas retourner à Vienne, mais à fixer sa résidence à Prague pour plusieurs mois. Pendant toute cette discussion je n'avois qu'une seule Pensée. Comment peut-on s'occuper de sangfroid de ce qui se fera *après la paix* de Nicolsbourg. De Nicolsbourg !†

\* Haugwitz was sent to notify the Potsdam Convention to Napoleon, and if not accepted, to announce the opening of war on December 15. He arrived at the French headquarters November 28. After Austerlitz he agreed to form an alliance with France, Prussia receiving Hanover. The Treaty was signed December 15.

† In a peace at Nicolsbourg, January 7, 1622, the semi-barbarian, Bethlem Gabor, renounced the kingship of Hungary to the Emperor. In December

Je m'occupe sans cesse de la recherche et de l'arrangement des causes premières qui ont produit ces épouvantables malheurs. Je suis bien fâché de vous dire que tout me ramène sans cesse à votre gouvernement; et je persiste à soutenir, que lorsqu'on vous a écrit qu'on vouloit apprendre les nouvelles de Vienne par le canal de Petersbourg, dans ce moment on a décrété la perte de l'Europe. Des enfans et des novices comme Lord Gower et Stuart l'ont accéléré; de perfides égoïstes comme R.\* l'ont consommée.—“Vous êtes le sel de la terre”—disoit Jesus à ses disciples, et dis-je aux Anglois “vous êtes le sel de la terre; mais si le sel devient stupide, de quoi doit-on assaisonner?” Hélas! comme tout me paroît à présent expliqué! Quelle clarté effrayante entoure cette scène de désolation!

J'ai presque honte de dire à un habitant de Teschen, combien sous les rapports physiques, et même sous certains rapports moraux (le Ct. Hoym et plusieurs autres de ce pays me comblent de bontés—j'ai Mad. Landkoronski—Mad. Dolgorouky—Armfeldt, plus intéressant, plus adorable que jamais, mais parti ce matin) je me porte bien à Breslau. Mais comme dans les circonstances présentes tout est permis, je me permets du moins de vous envoyer par cette même occasion deux petites provisions de cornichons et de Mangos; et si votre malheureux séjour à Teschen se prolonge, et que vous imaginiez quelque chose que Breslau peut vous fournir, ordonnez, je vous en supplie, je serai trop heureux de vous servir. Dans tous les cas je vous adresserai du *Caviar* dans un ou deux jours.

N'oubliez pas de regarder le soir entre 6 et 8 heures *Venus* dans sa plus brillante beauté. . . .

Nous avons eu hier ici deux nouvelles assez importantes; si l'une et l'autre, ou seulement l'une ou l'autre se confirme il pourroit bien fournir une toute nouvelle scène. Les Russes doivent avoir escaladé Hameln; et les troupes de Corfou et de Malte doivent avoir débarqué dans le royaume de Naples. Le Ct. Hoym, première source et

1805 an armistice was agreed upon between Napoleon and Francis II. at the bivouac of Saroschütz, and negotiations for peace were to be opened at Nicolsbourg; these led to the agreement at Schonbrunn and the Peace of Presbourg.

\* Probably Rasoumoffsky, Russian Ambassador at Vienna.—A. P.

autorité de la ville de Breslau, m'assure que la dernière de ces nouvelles est indubitable. . . . —Votre très dévoué serviteur, (Signé) G——.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 117.]

TESCHEN, 25th December 1805.

The Place of Negotiation has been since changed. From Nickolsburg the Plenipotentiaries were to have assembled at Brünn, the Negotiations are now transferred to Presbourg.\* It is said that the Apprehension of a Contagious Disorder manifesting itself (there being no less than three and twenty hospitals at Brünn) is the reason for this last Change.

But from what I can learn it does not appear that the Negotiations have hitherto been opened. It may perhaps happen that the Conditions of Peace may be discussing all this time in secret, and that the Plenipotentiaries will only meet for the purpose of signing and ratifying it; for it would be otherwise difficult to account for the interval since the 6th Inst. having elapsed without to all appearance any progress having been made in the Negotiation. I am further strengthened in this Opinion from a passage in a letter written on the 16th Inst. by the Emperor to one of His Ministers here which passage has been quoted to me by the Minister himself: His Imperial Majesty says—"Now that the Negotiations are in a state of forwardness &c."; as well from one or two letters which I have accidentally seen from Prince John Lichtenstein, who I take it has been very much employed in this business, and who throws out expectations that it may shortly be brought to a Conclusion. . . .

On the other hand it may so turn out (but I cannot I own lean much to this Opinion) that the Emperor has had the address to put off the opening of the Negotiations, in the hopes of succour arriving from Prussia, upon the appearance of which He might break the Armistice. This might, and to be sure ought to be,—for the Army under the Archduke Charles, which is ninety thousand Men strong and in every respect in the highest Order, is at Edembourg only four Posts from Vienna, while Massena,

\* Treaty of Presbourg, signed December 26.

who has detached St. Cyr with thirty five thousand Men against the combined British and Russian Forces in the Kingdom of Naples, has remained at Goritz.

If the Archduke Charles marched to Vienna, and the King of Prussia into Bohemia, Bonaparte's situation would be a desperate One. He could no longer recross the Danube at Vienna, and the passage of it at Krems or Lintz would be equally hazardous, because by this means the Archduke could gain those points before him. If under these circumstances Peace is concluded, it will be made at a Moment when there never existed a more favorable chance for crushing the Enemy.

In addition to this, the French Army is said to be in a very reduced state and full of sickness. There are as I have observed no less than twenty three hospitals at Brünn and the Number of those at Vienna is proportionably great.

By the last Accounts from Hölitch, the Archduke Charles was momentarily expected there.

Orders have been issued for provisioning all the Fortresses in Bohemia and Moravia.

The Archduke Ferdinand is on his March towards the Emperor's Head Quarters.

The Contributions which have already as I understand been levied in Moravia and Lower Austria, are fourteen Millions of Livres on the former, and thirty two on the latter Province.

Various are the reports here respecting the conditions of the Peace.

Some make them more favorable to the Emperor than the turn which Affairs have taken would have led one to expect.

That He will cede the whole of the Venetian States and all His Possessions in Suabia, there can I should imagine be no doubt, but it is said that He is to receive Salzbουργ and that His Brother the Elector is to be put in Possession of the Tyrol.

Disgraceful as such Conditions would be, it is not probable that these or any such would be granted, but for the purchase of a general Peace, or at least a Peace with Austria and Prussia.

Whether therefore the Negotiations between those two



Powers since the conclusion of the Armistice have been carried on upon that Principle, whether Austria has been charged with the Work, and has been declaring to Prussia that her future Existence depends upon the dissolution of the Confederacy, or whether the Emperor has had the Courage and the Address to elude all this time the Propositions of France and has been negotiating with His Ally the King of Prussia a plan of future Operations, is what your Lordship will hear from Berlin and what I am most anxious to be informed of. . . . —I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Lord MULGRAVE.*

[No. 118.]

TESCHEN, 30th December 1805.

MY LORD,—I avail myself of an Austrian Courier who I am informed is just setting out for Berlin to forward to Your Lordship the enclosed copies of notes \* which reached me yesterday. By them your Lordship will find that Count Cobentzl has resigned his Situation of Vice Chancellor and that Count Stadion is appointed *ad interim* to direct the Department for Foreign Affairs.

I can confidently assure Your Lordship that this Change has taken place in consequence of Bonaparte having had the audacity to declare that he would not treat with the Austrian Government as long as Count Cobentzl retained his Situation.

We are still in the same state of ignorance in this wretched spot with regard to Public Affairs, as when I had last the honor of writing.

The different Departments which have remained here received fresh Orders yesterday to hold themselves in readiness to quit Teschen at a moment's notice.—I have, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From M. DE GENTZ to Sir A. PAGET.*

BRESLAU, le 22 Decembre 1805.

Je prends la liberté de vous envoyer ci-joint du *Caviar*; un morceau d'un excellent fromage Anglois; de la

\* Communications from Count Cobentzl and Count Stadion, December 25 and 26.

moutarde ; et quelques pommes-de-terre sur lesquelles je voudrois savoir votre pensée toute entière, puisque (selon mon goût) Ce sont les meilleures que j'ai jamais rencontrées. Je répète en même tems, que, si vous désirez quelque autre objet du même genre, ou de quelque genre que ce soit, comme il est assez facile d'avoir ici les marchandises chargées, je me trouverais trop heureux de pouvoir vous le procurer.

On est ici passablement mal placé pour les nouvelles. Le Cte. Hoym est au fond la seule source ; et cette source ne coule que médiocrement, puisqu'on ne l'instruit que par boutades, et ordinairement tard, de ce qui se passe à Berlin. J'attends avec la plus vive impatience des lettres de Mr. de Metternich, de Mr. Jackson, de Armfeldt ; mais jusqu'ici je n'en ai pas reçu. Je vois par une lettre très récente de Teschen, que les François ne remplissent pas même l'armistice, quelqu'avantageux qu'il soit pour eux, que les négociations de Vienne sont dissoutes, que celles de Nicolsburg ne sont pas même entamées, que l'armée de l'archiduc Charles est à Oedenburg, l'insurrection Hongroise complete, et qu'on parle de la reprise des hostilités. Je n'en crois rien ; mais ce que je crois c'est que le dénouement final de toutes ces horribles crises est encore bien éloigné. Je ne puis pas vous dire avec quels sentimens de douleur et de rage je lis ici la *Gazette de Vienne* rédigée sous les auspices de ces scélérats, et combien en général je désespère du salut public. Je crois, mon cher Seigneur, que le tems où il ne nous restera que de nous enfermer dans quelque cabane pour feuilleter les anciens livres pendant le jour, et contempler les astres pendant la nuit s'approche à grands pas.

Je m'étonne que depuis notre séparation vous n'ayiez jamais eu un moment le besoin de vous entretenir avec moi ; je ne m'en plains pas, puisque les circonstances sont telles, qu'on ne peut exiger de personne d'être autrement que le cœur le lui dit, et que je vous conçois parfaitement dans une humeur très opposée à celle qui dicte des lettres. Adieu donc ! Je ne quitterai pas Breslau avant que tout ne soit fini ; et Dieu sait ce que je deviendrai alors.

(Signé) G.

*From the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE to Sir A. PAGET.*

PLASNEWYDD, Janry. 4th, 1806.

We are waiting with the greatest solicitude for a Messenger from you. Five Mails are due. It is a momentous period for all Europe. It put me into a raging Fever last night when Caroline read to me the homage paid to Madame Bonaparte by Our Princess Royal; it was a French account and probably exaggerated, but I who know the greatness of her mind cannot conceive anything so humiliating. These are strange times, and we may moralise for ever without being able to develop them. French bribing perhaps could. It will not surprise me to hear you are coming home. I don't see what you can have to do at Vienna if the Emperor has made a Separate Peace. This is a bad requital to that great Hero, Alexander, for his extraordinary Exertions. I never mean to write upon these subjects, which I know but little of, but when one's whole thoughts are directed to one point, it's difficult to draw it off. Charles is just appointed to the *Egyptienne*, the finest Frigate in our Service. He is going to Plymouth to take possession of her. She is to be attached to Admiral Cornwallis's Fleet. I could have wished on account of his health, that he had remained on shore till the bad weather is over, and I think Mr. Pitt would wish it for another, as I understand the Opposition are straining every nerve to be as formidable as possible at the Meeting of Parliament. At such a time the loss of three Members must be felt & I'm afraid neither yourself, Edward, or Charles will be in England. It will in my opinion be madness if our Troops are not recall'd. I wish it may not be too late. Don't think, my dear Arthur, because I don't say much upon the affair nearest your heart that it the less interests mine, but it is upon that sort of footing that I am at a loss how to express myself. However this I can declare with truth that there is nothing in this world that can make me so happy as your being so. All the family are well. Your Father is gone to Windsor. Heaven bless you.—I am ever your most truly affect<sup>o</sup> Mother,

J. UXBRIDGE

*From Mr. HAMMOND to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Private.*]

BERLIN, *Jan'y. 6, 1806.*

[After announcing that Lord Harrowby, in consequence of illness, was obliged to abstain from public business, and was to return to London on the following day, he continues:—]

It is impossible to communicate to you any information upon the actual state of the negotiations between this country and France, as the most profound silence and reserve upon this subject have been observed by Baron Hardenberg, not only towards Lord Harrowby but also towards the Russian Mission. There is however little doubt that the arrangement, of whatever nature it may be, is approaching rapidly to a conclusion, and will be *amicably* terminated. . . . —Be assured that I am, &c. (Signed) GEO. HAMMOND.

*From Lord GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER to Sir A. PAGET.*

BERLIN, *Jan'y. 6th, 1806.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—Your expectation of receiving a Budget of News from Berlin must have been a little disappointed by the letter I wrote to you of which Stuart was the bearer. It is in fact an unprofitable waste of thought to pay the least attention to what this Court is doing. I believe that if Austria had given any assurances that she would act only in concert with Prussia, Hardenberg might have been able to have persuaded the King not to have bowed his head to Bonaparte,\* but the perfect silence observed by the Court of Vienna destroyed all hope, and when I tell you that the Duke of Brunswick & Count Haugwitz are now the real Directors of His Prussian Majesty's Councils I need not add that all idea of resistance to the will of France is completely vanished. The measures now passing† are in opposition to the advice of Hardenberg, & he has offered his Resignation, which the

\* By consenting to the alliance of Prussia and France, signed at Schönbrunn, December 15, Hardenberg opposed the action of Haugwitz.

† Hardenberg, Haugwitz, and Schulemberg met the military authorities, the Duke of Brunswick and M. Möllendorf, to discuss Napoleon's offer of Hanover to Prussia and the terms of alliance.

King however for the present refuses to accept. A complete mystery is observed with respect to their negotiations with Bonaparte, & notwithstanding that the Emperor of Russia has given to the entire disposal of the K. of Prussia no less than between 60 and 70,000 men, the same Reserve is extended to Dolgorouki \* and Alopeus; the former is indignant, & is writing to the Emperor to beg him to withdraw immediately all the Russian Troops.—Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) G. L. G.

*From M. DE GENTZ to Sir A. PAGET.*

*DRESDEN, le 8 Janvier 1806.*

Après les événemens inouis qui se sont passés chacun doit se consulter soi-même, s'orienter avec ses amis, et examiner radicalement la situation où il se trouve, et les projets qui lui restent pour l'avenir; vous étiez jusqu'ici un des hommes, sur lesquels je comptois le plus, et qui entroient le plus directement dans toutes les considérations auxquelles je pouvois me livrer sur un objet pareil. Je vous demande en grace, et bien sérieusement, de m'ouvrir votre pensée toute entière sur ce que vous croyez faire après ces catastrophes qui ont renversé de fond-en-comble toutes les anciennes bases de l'existence publique et individuelle. Je vous demande ensuite votre avis sur moi, et le sort qui m'attend. Etes-vous résolu de reprendre et de garder votre place à Vienne? Si non, de quel côté comptez-vous tourner vos pas? Croyez-vous que je pourrai jamais retourner à Vienne? Croyez-vous que je pourrai y vivre? Voilà des questions d'une haute importance pour moi. Entrez un moment, je vous en conjure, dans l'examen de ces questions. Tâchez de savoir par le Comte Stadion, comment on envisageroit de ce côté-là mon existence future! Je lui écrirai directement; mais c'est par vous que je pourrois apprendre d'une manière en même tems plus prompte et plus sure ce qui m'attend à-peu-près. Ne perdez-pas un moment pour m'écrire sur tous ces objets. Que reste-t-il encore à dire sur les affaires publiques? Le decret qui proclame l'Elec-

\* See letter of Gentz, December 17.

teur de Bavière,\* Roi de Bavière, sans le consentement de qui que ce soit au monde, ne nous explique-t-il pas assez clairement notre horrible situation ? Le souvenir de ce que l'on a fait contre ces épouvantables malheurs, voilà la seule ressource d'un homme-de-bien. Vous en jouissez, vous avez le droit d'en jouir. Dans la presse du moment, dans la chaleur de l'action, je vous ai quelquefois grondé de n'avoir pas fait *tout* ce que j'avois imaginé que vous auriez pu faire. Mais en réfléchissant sur l'ensemble de votre conduite, sur toute la teneur de votre vie publique, sur l'invariable bonté de vos principes, sur la noblesse et la grandeur de votre *démarche* politique, sur tant de choses précieuses qui sont sorties de votre plume, sur le triomphe—déplorable mais complet—que votre manière de voir et de juger remporte à présent sur celle de tant de vos foibles contemporains, je n'hésite pas un instant de déclarer, que

Si Pergama dextra

Defendi proterint, etiam *hac* defensa fuissent !

Vous seriez pour moi l'être le plus indifférent, et un simple observateur de ce que j'ai vu de vous pendant trois ans, je ne vous refuserais pas l'hommage de mon admiration ; jugez donc de mes sentimens pour vous, lorsque tant d'autres liens, le souvenir de toutes vos bontés pour moi, le souvenir de tant d'heures charmantes que j'ai passées avec vous, la douce habitude de vous voir et de vous entendre, et au-delà de tout cet attachement presque mystérieux, que des rigueurs passagères de votre part ou des nuages qui s'étoient élevés par ma faute, n'ont jamais pu affaiblir pour un moment, lorsque tout cela me rend votre amitié un des premiers besoins de mon existence morale. Relevez-moi, rafraichissez-moi bientôt par une bonne lettre, et croyez en attendant que cent fois par jour je me livre aux sentimens dont je ne vous ai donné ici qu'une bien foible esquisse, et qui m'ont constitué pour jamais Le plus dévoué et le plus fidèle de vos serviteurs,

(Signé) G.

\* A few days after the Treaty of Presbourg the Elector of Bavaria, while out shooting, received from a messenger sent by Bonaparte a letter directed to "Sa Majesté le Roi de Bavière et de Suabe, notre très chér frère, ami, et allié."

*From Major-General the Hon. EDWARD PAGET to  
Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

BREMEN, 23d January 1806.

MY DEAREST ARTHUR,— . . . The fatal News we have received from your part of the world has sadly damp'd our Spirits, and we now talk of nothing but going home instead of marching to Holland.\* Here we are and here we have been for a considerable Time, and what is to become of us Nobody yet knows, tho' from the Embarkation of heavy baggage, Stores & heavy artillery there is much reason to suppose that we shall not be here much longer. Nothing but my Change in Life would prevent my paying you a visit, in the event of our being order'd home. But that, for *cogent Reasons*, is now out of the Question. You will be sorry to hear that Pitt is so ill that he was five days on his Journey from Bath to Town.† This will be a very favorable Circumstance for the Opposition. I most sincerely wish that I had anything worth relating to you; but as I have not I will at present say no more.

BREMEN, 24th January 1806.

MY DEAREST ARTHUR,— . . . I cannot figure to myself, the Probability of our remaining here much longer, without indeed we take the bold Resolution of defending the Electorate against all Invaders. For one I cannot help thinking, "*que le Jeu ne vaut pas la Chandelle*," and that it would be much better for us both to be for ever separated.‡ We are for ever bringing each other into Scrapes without the power of rendering mutual and effectual Support. I dread the Consequences, I confess, as far as regards The [King], of such a Surrender of Sovereignty, & perhaps this is the Greatest Evil that could occur, but I am persuaded it is the only One.

\* Cathcart made no attempt to attack the flank of the French; he established his headquarters at Bremen, and peacefully waited for news, while Russia complained bitterly that the English forces had attempted no diversion of the enemy. After the death of Pitt the Ministry recalled his army from Germany.

† He died on this day, January 23.

‡ He evidently means separation of Hanover from England.—A. P.



GENERAL THE HON. SIR EDWARD PAGET



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However, let our Projects be what they may, I most sincerely hope & pray that they may be unconnected with any Plan, Promise, or Engagement, however Solemnly Entered into, of the Court of Berlin. Heavens! what has this Power to answer for! For nothing less in my mind than every calamity which has befallen Europe for more than ten years. But I am a bold man, thus to harangue His Majesty's Minister at the Court of Vienna. The next Thing I expect to hear of is a War between Austria & Russia, as certain Turkish Provinces would be very convenient to the former as an Indemnification for Her Losses. In the mean time, My great hope is that we shall maintain our Navy at its highest Establishment and contrive some means of creating a real Army of 200,000 Men at home, and never make Peace as long as Europe remains in so complete a state of subjection. These are my Politicks, and, as every man is blockhead enough to be fond of his own Fancies, I am quite sure we shall never be able to make a Secure, durable, and Advantageous Peace untill we can confidently smile at the Threats of Invasion, and this can only be done by the Maintenance of a great & permanent force. I hope My dearest Arthur, that my Politicks may have been the means of relaxing the muscles of your Countenance in this afflicting Period of long Faces, and I shall be well pleased, as I have nothing to send you from this place worth hearing. I told you yesterday that we know nothing of our Return to England, but that the Heavy Artillery and Baggage of the Army is Embarking, which is certainly a Suspicious Circumstance. This however may be only a Measure of Precaution, and what every wise Man would have done even without waiting for Orders in the present Critical state of things. If we are to remain I am confident that we must look to our own strength alone, and not depend one Moment upon what Prussia may promise you. In this case you must send much greater Reinforcements than Great Britain can well spare. If she does not send them, our present force is much too small for any considerable object, and much too great to run any Risks with.

(Signed) E. P.

*From Lord CATHCART to Sir A. PAGET.*

BREMEN, 24 Jany. 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,—Having heard that your Chasseur is here I cannot suffer him to go from hence without availing myself of the opportunity of recalling to your recollection our old acquaintance. Your brother Colonel Paget is here at the head of a magnificent Brigade in which is the 1st Battalion of the 28th. He is in perfect health. The turn which affairs have taken renders our Expedition rather unprofitable, and we sit here considering the immense tract of mud and water before us with not much more satisfaction than we did eleven years ago when you left us not very far from hence. If any thing should occur in this Part of the world in which I could be of any sort of use to you I should be most happy to receive your Commands.—I have the honor, &c.

(Signed) CATHCART.

*From Lord PAGET to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

WROTHAM, Jany. 26th, 1806.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,— . . . I have taken no measures whatever respecting your present situation. I did not quite approve the Mission of L<sup>d</sup> Harrington,\* altho' it was wholly of a military nature; still however I am most fully persuaded that Pitt, who entertained a high opinion of you, would not have permitted the measure could he have thought that it would annoy your feelings. Alas! Alas! he is dead. A greater loss this Country could not have sustained. I do most sincerely regret him. I have lost my political Sun, & I shall be in no hurry to adopt any one to replace him as my Leader. I am most thoroughly persuaded that so much integrity, so much Talent, so much Energy, and such an undaunted spirit—so truly necessary in these times—is not to be found combined in any one Man. What changes may now take place in the Cabinet I am at a loss to speculate upon. But the Lord deliver us from Mr. Addington.

\* See Lord Mulgrave's letter, December 3, 1805. Lord Harrington was destined for an *extraordinary* embassy to Vienna, but stopped at Berlin in December 1805 in consequence of the peace negotiations in Vienna.

Altho' I detest their recent conduct, yet I cannot help thinking that L<sup>d</sup> Grenville & Mr Wyndham are the most likely men to uphold the honor & spirit of this Country, & the least likely of all our politicians to yield one inch to Bonaparte. If then I am right in my conjecture respecting them I would have them employed, for the more I see & the more I reflect upon all that has happened within these 8 years, the more I am persuaded that no humiliation, no concession can secure any country against his diabolical designs, & that he must be openly combated & set at defiance, or he will undermine & then overwhelm the State that has the pusillanimity to act otherwise.

You talk of coming over here, & why should you not? Of what use can you be where you now are? I should conceive that your situation at the Court of the Emperor of Austria must now be humiliating to you. All further hope of any struggle from that *power* (that is now a bad word, I should say that State) is at an end. You must not however act upon what I say, but, at all events, I conceive there cannot be the slightest objection to your obtaining leave of Absence.

All are well here & send their love. Let me hear from you soon and do let me hear something.—Ever affect<sup>d</sup>  
Yours, PAGET.

*From Lord MULGRAVE to Sir A. PAGET.*

LONDON, *Jany. 30th*, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR ARTHUR,—The great Loss which this Country and Europe has sustained by the termination of Mr. Pitt's most valuable Life, has led to a change of Administration, which puts an end to official correspondence between us. I only write therefore to express to you my sense of the very candid Manner in which you have written in your private letter \* on the subject of the Austrian Ministry. I should have much to say to you on that subject if it could now lead to any conclusion which might be advantageous to the King's

\* I can find no trace of this private letter, but it appears to me that the official despatches on this subject, already given, are sufficiently plain spoken and *candid*.—A. P.

Service. I cannot however close my correspondence with you, without assuring you of the very sincere personal Regard, with which I am, &c.

(Signed) MULGRAVE.

*From the Right Hon. C. J. Fox to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Private.*]

DOWNING STREET, 14 March 1806.

SIR,—You will easily believe that with the most perfect good will to yourself and professing, as I do sincerely, the greatest regard for Lord Paget, it must nevertheless be my wish to place in the very important Situation you now occupy some Person in my particular confidence, and whose views in regard to foreign Politicks are in general similar to my own.

I should not however have given way to this consideration at so early a period of my Administration, but rather have waited till I found an opportunity agreeable to you, if the papers laid before the House of Commons by the late Ministry, and since printed, had not appeared to me to be of a nature to render your continuance at Vienna disagreeable to yourself and by no means conducive to the Publick Service. The Publication of your letters, especially of that of the 24th of October, seems to me to have been as little necessary to the defence of our Predecessors as it is certainly unfair and unjust towards you; but having been so published no alternative was left to me, and I accordingly recommended to His Majesty your Recall, to which He was graciously pleased to consent.

At the same time, His Majesty expressed himself most graciously respecting your general Conduct and Abilities, and much lamented a publication which He imagined could only have appeared from Lord Mulgrave's inadvertence.

I shall defer sending a formal notification of His Majesty's Pleasure till the next Mail, but thought you might like to be informed of it in a private way as soon as possible.—I am, with great truth & regard, &c.

(Signed) C. J. Fox.

*From the Right Hon. C. J. Fox to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Private.*]

*March 18, 1806.*

SIR,—I have this day seen Lord Paget, from whom I learn with great pleasure that it was your wish, and his for you, to relinquish your Mission at Vienna, and consequently that what I thought myself obliged to do will not eventually turn out in any way unpleasant to you. He mentioned at the same time your wish even if you were to return again, for an immediate leave of Absence, but he gave me to understand that as you were to come away altogether in a short time, He thought you would have no objection to stay a few weeks longer if such a stay was convenient to me. It certainly would be very convenient, not only as it would make the interval between your departure and the arrival of your Successor less, but as it would enable (me) to send some person in confidence time enough to receive the business for you. My anxiety however to do what may be most agreeable to you is such, that if you find it necessary or convenient for your private affairs you may set out when you please, but I own your staying a little longer would be a great favour to me.—I am, &c. (Signed) C. J. Fox.

*From the Right Hon. C. J. Fox to Sir A. PAGET.*

[No. 1.]

DOWNING STREET, *March 18, 1806.*

SIR,—In conveying to you His Majesty's Gracious Permission to return to England on your Private Affairs, it is very gratifying to me to have it at the same time in Command to acquaint you that the zeal and Talents which you have uniformly displayed in His Service, have met with His Majesty's entire approbation.

You will leave the official Correspondence of the Mission in charge of His Majesty's Secretary of Legation—but you will consult your own private wishes and Convenience as to the time of your Departure from Vienna.—I am, &c.

(Signed) C. J. Fox.

*From Lord PAGET to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

LONDON, *March 18th, 1806.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—In consequence of your last letters, it was thought advisable that you should have the power of withdrawing from Vienna immediately if circumstances rendered that step desirable for you, and as there were contradictory reports respecting the intentions of the present Ministers towards you, I determined upon seeing Mr. Fox upon the subject. I am this moment come from him where I also saw the Comte de Stahrenberg, who informed me that he would dispatch a Messenger to Vienna this night, & it is by him that this will reach you.

On seeing Mr. Fox I told him that it was important I should know what were his intentions respecting you, as if it was his wish that you should retain your present post it was of the utmost consequence to you to receive without delay a short leave of absence. He told me that it was his intention to recall you, but that as it was a very great object with him to do it in the most polite & satisfactory way to you, he had judged it best for this purpose to write a private letter to you in the first instance with the information that he had done this, but that he had not intended to recall you until a Successor could be sent out. I told him I could not take upon me to say that in the Event of a Successor being very soon sent out you would require to come away immediately, but that I thought it possible you might in that case dispense with the leave of absence; still, however, I asked that he would leave it to your discretion to act. I am now then authorised by him to say that if it is material to you, you may leave Vienna upon the receipt of this letter; that, however, considering the youth & inexperience of Mr. Jenkinson (I think that is the name) he would prefer you remaining until *he* (Mr. Jenkinson) is relieved, which shall be done immediately, as it might possibly be 2 or 3 months before L<sup>d</sup> Darnley or L<sup>d</sup> Douglas or the person who they might appoint to relieve you would be ready.

In fact you are from this moment at liberty to come off immediately, or to remain upon the spot until your

regular Successor arrives, or only until a new Secretary is appointed.

He was uncommonly attentive & seemed vastly anxious that you should be satisfied with his manner of making known to you your recall. Remember that this Recall was absolutely decided upon before I saw him. He took occasion to reprobate sternly the publication of your later dispatches & in that Every one that I have ever heard upon the subject agrees. It is really infamous.

*From Lord G. LEVESON GOWER to Sir A. PAGET.*

ST. PETERSBURGH, *March 21st, 1806.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—Different circumstances combine to render your stay at Vienna no longer agreeable, & I think it very Doubtful whether the Austrian Courier by whom I send this letter will arrive there before your departure. I feel however a satisfaction in venting my indignation to you upon the wanton exposure of an official correspondence & the papers & Memoirs confidentially communicated to the English Gov<sup>t</sup> by the Imperial Courts. This last act of Lord Mulgrave's Ministry will naturally have the effect of making foreign Courts extremely cautious in their relations with that of London,\* & had Lord M. remained in office would have caused foreign Ministers to use a very guarded language in their dispatches. I find the Austrian Court are extremely dissatisfied upon the subject, but the impropriety of the proceeding is so generally felt in England that I trust they will not be apprehensive of the repetition of it upon any future occasion. . . .

I have as yet received no official Dispatch since the change of Gov<sup>t</sup> in England. I regret this delay the more, because there exists at this moment the strongest disposition here to cherish the connection with the Court of London & to adopt energetic measures against France, but their proceedings are suspended by the doubt in which they are left with regard to the System of Lord Grenville's & Mr. Fox's administration; they are disposed also (particularly Czartoryski) to renew a confidential

\* On March 3 the Czar wrote to Worontzow that no communication must be made to Parliament of alliances, secret articles, or of the protocol of the Vienna Conference; since, if the English Government became indiscreet, they could no longer negotiate with it with the desired freedom.



intercourse & Union with the Court of Vienna. Nothing could be more unpopular than the Austrians were here for some time after the return of the Emperor to Petersburg, but since the arrival of General Meerfelt that acrimony seems very much to have subsided, & the infamous Conduct of the Court of Berlin, notwithstanding the partiality of the Emperor to His Prussian Majesty, is viewed in its true colours. The Duke of Bavaria completely failed in the object of his Mission; he could not obtain the Sanction of this Court to any of the arrangements concerted by M. Haugwitz, nor was his proposition of Marriage between Prince Henry of Prussia & the Grand Duchess Catherine listened to with a very favourable Ear. Adieu, my dear Arthur.—Yours most sincerely, G. L. G.

*From the Right Hon. C. J. Fox to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Private.*]

March 31, 1806.

DEAR SIR,—I have received your very obliging private letter of the 3d Instant, and I can truly assure you that, were it not for the circumstances to which you allude, it would have been very agreeable to me to act in confidence with you in the situation which you now fill, but as I have written to you before on this subject I will add no more than to thank you for the paragraph with which you close your letter.

Your Separate Dispatch expressing your wish to go to the Baths of Toeplitz I conceive to have been already answered according to your wishes by the general leave which, by the command of His Majesty, I had the honour of transmitting to you, but if you have any doubt I beg it may not weigh with your mind a minute against any consideration respecting your health or convenience.—I am, . . . &c. (Signed) C. J. Fox.

*From M. DE GENTZ to Sir A. PAGET.*

DRESDEN, le 6 Avril, 1806.

Il m'est impossible de voir partir le Cte. Metternich pour Vienne sans lui donner quelques lignes pour Vous. Ce n'est pas d'aujourd'hui ou d'hier que je réponds à vos rigueurs par la soumission, par la constance, par le dé-

vouement le plus inaltérable. Vous savez depuis longtemps, que je ne puis pas exister, quoiqu'il arrive, sans tenter l'impossible pour vous faire croire à la profondeur de mon attachement, quand même vous me refuseriez le votre. Je reviens toujours à mon ancienne comparaison. Je suis un amant malheureux qui a besoin de se plaindre de sa maitresse, si le ciel lui a refusé le bonheur de pouvoir s'en louer.

Je vous parlerai peu de politique. Vous savez certainement tout ce qui je pourrois vous en dire ; et je vous en crois si dégouté que ce seroit ne pas vous rendre service. Il ne s'agit d'ailleurs plus que d'assister aux funérailles de l'Europe ; car le courage le plus exalté, le génie le plus fécond en moyens, n'en conçoit plus aucun pour la sauver. C'est l'enthousiasme du désespoir qui m'anime encore à travailler comme un fou, lorsque tout ce que je crois toucher est déjà cadavre ou néant. Mais je sens que ma carrière tire vers sa fin ; et que *Sirius* et *Orion* sont déjà là pour m'attendre, et après eux le tombeau. J'ai voulu signaler mes derniers momens par quelques efforts qui puissent m'accompagner dans la solitude ; et mourir comme j'avois vécu.

Ce qui m'intéresse le plus aujourd'hui, toutes les fois que je pense à vous, (et Dieu sait si cela arrive rarement) c'est de savoir comment vous vivez, de quoi votre cœur s'occupe, si, au milieu des horreurs de cette époque infernale, vous avez trouvé quelque consolation, quelque soulagement particulier de vos peines. La nouvelle du mariage de Leopoldine m'a vivement affecté, m'a absolument attéré pour vous. Je l'ai eue par une lettre que la Princesse mère a écrite à Mad. de Mier, et dans laquelle au milieu de la joie, qu'elle manifestoit sur une union si parfaitement assortie, J'ai vu de la manière la plus distraite, la plus indubitable, que sa fille étoit d'un avis bien différent. " Elle ne l'aime pas encore ; mais elle l'aimera ; et nous pouvons nous flatter que le malheureux attachement qu'elle avoit pris, comme vous n'ignorez pas, *s'effacera* complètement dans quelque tems " — voilà ce que j'ai lu, relu, et appris par cœur ; tant fut grand l'intérêt que j'y attachai. Daignez me dire, pour peu que vous fassiez encore cas de mon amitié, daignez me dire, quel effet cet événement a produit sur vous. . . .

Il y a encore un autre objet sur lequel je désirerois bien ardemment d'avoir quelques renseignemens positifs. Vous savez qu'on m'a menacé de votre rappel de Vienne. Ma première inquiétude est calmée depuis que je sais que Lord Holland que l'on nommoit comme Votre Successeur, est destiné à aller à Berlin. Mais puis-je être parfaitement tranquille ? Cette question, je vous l'avoue, est une de celles qui pèsent dans la balance de mes argumens pour et contre mon retour à Vienne. C'est un bienfait du premier ordre que Vous me conférez, en m'instruisant sur ce point. Soyez bon et clément ! Rouvrez notre correspondance ; écrivez-moi une seule fois, non pas une lettre (Je sais que vous ne les aimez pas beaucoup) mais un petit billet bien amical, bien rassurant, bien rafraîchissant. Je ne l'oublierai pas tant que je vivrai.

Vous serez extrêmement content du Cte. Metternich. Il n'en existe pas beaucoup, comme lui, à Vienne ; il s'est tellement développé à Berlin, que c'est à présent seulement qu'il faut le juger. Regardez-vous encore les étoiles ? Vous promenez-vous encore sur les remparts, et sur le glacis ? Allez-vous encore chez les *Lakierer* et *Vergolder* ? Montez-vous souvent vos beaux chevaux ? Dites-moi quelque chose qui me transporte dans le passé ; c'est le seul moyen de me faire soutenir le présent, et de me donner la force pour voir arriver l'avenir.

Croyez aux sentimens de la fidélité à-toute-épreuve, avec laquelle je suis Votre très dévoué serviteur,

GENTZ.

*Copie d'une lettre de l'Amiral VILLENEUVE à BONAPARTE \*  
écrite la matinée de son suicide.*

RENNES, ce 6 Avril, 1806.

MONSIEUR!—Vous devez vous rappeler quand La Touche mourut à Toulon, et lorsque je commandois à Rochefort, et que je refusois d'être son successeur, j'étois persuadé

\* This letter, purporting to have been written by Admiral Villeneuve, was found among my father's papers, where it had lain untouched since he had put it away. How it came into his possession I am not aware. It will be seen that there are expressions in it which could hardly have been penned by a Frenchman, but I nevertheless give it, notwithstanding its literary defects, as a curious document, respecting the authenticity of which readers may form their own judgment.—A. P.

alors, que chacun qui dirriggeroit l'avanturière et mauvaise expédition de la flotte unie Française et Espagnole, seroit battu honteusement, si même il auroit la fortune de sauver sa vie d'une bataille, qui contre un ennemi lequel couvre toutes les Mers de ses bâtimens étoit inévitable.

Ce sont, mot par mot, les paroles que j'ai dit au Ministre de la Marine; après quoi, malgré moi j'ai navigué à Barcelonne et Cadix, et où après m'avoir persuadé comment la flotte Espagnole étoit équipée, et comment elle faisoit ses manœuvres, j'ai envoyé avec ma première Dépêche ma première résignation; je continuois cela à Martinique, à Ferrol, et Cadix, lorsque je reçus l'ordre du 25 Sept<sup>bre</sup> de retourner avec la flotte combinée à Toulon; sur quoi j'ai répondu; même s'il falloit rétrancher toute la flotte Anglaise j'obéirai, mais je ressouvins au Ministre mes anciennes appréhensions sur l'incertitude d'une bataille de Mer, et sur ma forte résolution de renoncer à un Poste périlleux ou vainqueur ou vaincu, auquel je serois incapable d'être utile, tant à cause de mes maximes, et principalement à cause de votre caractère vif et barbare.

L'infortune de Trafalgar ne doit pas être attribuée à quelque faute ou manque de courage, et je l'ai assez prouvé dans ma Note officielle sur la bataille de Mer: pourquoi a-t-on refusé la place à cette Note dans le Moniteur? En attendant les injures et accusations de mes ennemis et de mes envieux y ont été reçues.

Vous-même, lorsque vous reçûtes ma Note Officielle pendant votre heureuse et ambitieuse expédition en Allemagne, disiez avec votre pétulance barbare: "je vois qu'il faut absolument un exemple d'un brigand Français, pour faire d'une victoire de ma puissance sur Mer une journalière." Mille voix repetoient cette expression, et la sentence de mort insensible qu'un usurpateur étranger prononça contre un Amiral Français patriote; et en attendant on ne prit aucune connoissance de ma Dépêche, on n'entendoit rien d'elle; elle n'a pas même été lue. Cette Dépêche contenoit vraiment quelques vérités amères, qui n'auroient pas contribué à mettre vos capacités nautiques dans un lustre brillant, mais, au contraire, demontroient que celui dont l'incapacité et orgueil a causé la perte d'une flotte

Française à Aboukir, étoit aussi la cause de la destruction d'une autre à Trafalgar.

Dans notre dernière entrevue vous-même m'avez avoué, que si même la France domineroit toute la terre ferme sans résistance, pourtant sa force extérieure resteroit incertaine, ses manufactures devroient se détruire, son état intérieur ne pourroit obtenir aucune force, son commerce s'arrêteroit, ses habitants resteroient dans la pauvreté et manque, jusqu'à ce qu'elle ne seroit en état de forcer la Grande Bretagne de se soumettre à ses lois et ordonnances.

Pendant la Tyrannie que vous avez pratiquée dans ces années, ma patrie et ses Alliés ont perdu déjà plusieurs vaisseaux de guerre que la Marine Royale possédoit pendant la plus grande partie du Regne de Louis XIII. et XV., et si ma patrie devoit survivre encore quelque tems l'anathème d'être sous votre Sceptre de fer, sa puissance Militaire de la Marine sera bientôt reduite à devenir aussi mauvaise que celle du Commerce de la Marine l'est déjà, et l'on ne verra dans ses Ports que des Corsaires impudiques, et des Négociants réduits à la mendicité.

Quel avantage et quel honneur ma patrie a-t-elle eu de vos campagnes heureuses?—ou bien est elle plus libre votre pouvoir absolu qu'auparavant? Accablée des Taxes, et cruellement opprimée à cause d'un despotisme Militaire aussi inefficace qu'insensible, mes patriotes esclaves s'affligent à l'approche d'un malheur inévitable, et ils ne peuvent pas oser d'en soupirer. Vous seulement, vos parents, et vos créatures, avez de l'avantage de vos victoires, qui sont acquéries par le sang le plus pur, et par les trésors les plus nobles de la France.

Mais si l'on regarde la chose politiquement, quel avantage ou honneur ont les Français?—quelles assurances ont les autres peuples de vos usurpations, de vos destructions, indemnisations, changements, et de vos Traités de Paix? À quoi est ce que ça leur est bon de voir un aventurier acharné Empereur, sa vicieuse . . . Impératrice, ses misérables frères et beau-frères Rois et Princes, ses rejettés megères Reines et Princesses, les complices de sa méchanceté Ducs, Maréchaux, et Chevaliers? Ils ont enchainé les personnes des Français, mais ils n'ont pas su tromper leurs esprits. Par conséquence est ce que ceux-ci

pourront voir 20 mille Autrichiens ou Russes prisonniers en France, sans se rappeler au nombre plus grand de leurs patriotes prisonniers en Angleterre, qui ont été la victime de leur bravade, et folle ambition ? S'ils verroient retourner ces prisonniers dans leur patrie, ne doivent ils pas plaindre l'absence de ceux qui par droit leur sont chers, et qu'ils ne doivent pas espérer de les embrasser jamais, lorsqu'ils ne sont pas encore sauvés de leur tyrannie ? Ils savent très bien que la Grande Bretagne est beaucoup plus sage et trop puissante pour faire encore une fois la paix avec un homme qui, en se montrant ami, travaille pour son indépendance, et qui est un aussi dangereux ami qu'un ennemi déclaré, dont les oliviers n'ont été que les torches allumées de cet assassin en égard politique et social.

Du langage que je parle avec vous dans cette lettre vous pourrez bien comprendre que l'auteur ne peut pas être attrapé de votre vengeance, et qu'il ne craint plus vos tortures, prisons, vos empoisonneurs et bourreaux. L'ordre de vos Ministres de ne pas m'approcher à la Capitale avant que de recevoir leur permission, a prolongé encore l'espace de votre punition et délivration du genre humain de son fléau ; sans cet ordre je vous aurois sans doute effacé du nombre des vivans, car étant résolu de ne pas survivre la destruction de la flotte Française, je l'aurois pu faire avant de me punir moi-même de ce qu'avec la perte de mon honneur, et avec l'offense de mon devoir, de ma naissance et caractère, j'ai permis que vous vous êtes servi de moi, et que vous vivez encore, c'est une marque qu'un destin aveugle et injuste permet pour des raisons inépuisables la continuation de votre tyrannie barbare. Mais confiez vous à celà, et l'inexprimable grande quantité de vos crimes différens doit vous prouver que de la manière que vous avez vecu comme le plus scélérat, votre fin sera également unique et terrible. Un assassin ou bourreau finira le cours de vos cruautés, qui a trop duré pour la honte de l'humanité.

Pour qu'une postérité vertueuse, qui peut-être critiquera une partie de ma vie publique, sache mes intentions de repentir et de patriotisme que je sentoais près de ma mort, ont été envoyées des Copies de cette lettre dans tous les Ports de Mer aux Officiers. Vos adulateurs de vils senti-

ments ont beau dire ce qu'ils veulent, si je vous aurois tué des siècles suivants m'auroient bénit, et m'auroient loué comme leur sauveur.

Tremble, Tyran, tu vis abhorré, tu mourra sous le poid du blasphème de tout le monde qui te poursuivra encore au delà de ton tombeau.

(Signé) DE VILLENEUVE.

## THE DARDANELLES: 1807

ÆTAT 36

IN order to explain the objects of Sir Arthur Paget's embassy to the Dardanelles in May 1807, it will be necessary to go back a little in the order of time, and to mention, as briefly as possible, the events which led to it.

After the battle of Austerlitz the Emperor Alexander displayed the greatest activity in repairing the losses of his army, and the war between France and Russia was renewed on the banks of the Vistula in the autumn of 1806.

In the meantime Napoleon had sent General Sebastiani to Constantinople with instructions to do all in his power to bring about a rupture between Russia and Turkey, in order to create a diversion for a part of the Russian forces on the banks of the Danube. This he succeeded in doing on the question of the appointment of the Hospodars (or Governors) of Moldavia and Wallachia, which, contrary to Treaty engagements, the Porte had made without the concurrence of Russia.

The demands of Russia were strongly supported by the British Ambassador at Constantinople, even to the extent of threatening the bombardment of the capital by a British fleet unless they were complied with; and he further urged that the Porte should renounce its alliance with France and contract one with England and Russia.

For the moment the Porte yielded on the first point, but it was only to gain time. In the interval war had been declared by Russia against Turkey, and eventually Admiral Sir John Duckworth, who, with Admiral Louis, was cruising with some line-of-battle ships and a few frigates in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, was desired to force the passage of the Straits, and to dictate



at Constantinople an ultimatum, under a threat of bombardment if it were not complied with within twenty-four hours (February 1807).

The Turks were again about to yield, when Sebastiani intervened, and Sir John Duckworth, unfortunately, allowed himself to be drawn into negotiations which lasted a week; at the end of which time, by the most extraordinary exertions, the Turkish forts, arsenal, and fleet had been fully armed, so as to render an attack upon them hopeless; and, the object of the expedition having failed, nothing remained for Sir John Duckworth but to provide for the safety of the fleet, which he did by beating a hasty retreat on the 1st of March, and after running the gauntlet of the heavy fire from the forts which lined the Straits, the fleet again cast anchor off the island of Tenedos.

Early in March 1807 a change of Government took place in England in consequence of the presentation by the Ministry of a measure for a partial repeal of the Test Act, to which the King most strongly objected, and a new Cabinet was formed by the Duke of Portland, with Mr. Canning at the Foreign Office, Lord Hawkesbury at the Home Office; Lord Castlereagh, Colonial and War Office; Mr. Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty, &c., &c.

It may be well to bear in mind that reasons precisely the reverse of those which prompted Napoleon to bring about the war between Russia and Turkey induced the British Government to use their best endeavours to prevent it, and, after it had broken out, to restore peace between the two Empires, so that the whole strength of Russia might be concentrated in resisting the common enemy on the Russian frontier, and that no part of her military resources should be diverted by hostilities in the Danubian principalities. It was for these reasons that Admiral Sir J. Duckworth was ordered to force the passage of the Dardanelles and dictate an ultimatum at Constantinople. It was for the same reasons that Sir A. Paget was subsequently sent on an embassy in order to negotiate peace between the contending Powers. Great Britain, in short, was at war with Turkey simply in support of Russia, and not on account of any direct British

interests which had become involved, as distinctly stated in Mr. Canning's despatches.

Mr. Canning's private letters show how fully he was impressed with the difficulties and delicacy of the negotiations with which Sir A. Paget was charged. He had, in fact, a double negotiation to carry on : first, to endeavour to bring about peace not only between Great Britain and Turkey, but between Turkey and Russia ; and, secondly, to negotiate with his Russian colleague, M. Pozzo di Borgo, in order to keep his demands upon the Porte within limits which might be consistent with the policy of the British Government. For Mr. Canning did not lose sight of the probability of Russia having an eye to the acquisition of some part of the Ottoman territory which was already in the occupation of the Russian troops, while the policy of England was to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Sir A. Paget's previous intimacy with M. Pozzo di Borgo placed him in a favourable position for speaking frankly to this plenipotentiary upon all these matters, but the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit soon relieved him of the necessity for entering upon them, although, as will be seen, there was an active correspondence between them.

Pozzo di Borgo, born in 1764, was a native of Corsica, and between his family and that of Napoleon there was a political and family feud. He entered the Russian service, and was employed in several important missions, amongst others to Louis XVIII. in 1814. He was subsequently appointed Russian Ambassador in Paris, and in 1835 in the same capacity in London. He was the most determined adversary of Napoleon, and it may therefore be imagined with what feelings he heard of the arrangements at Tilsit. Some traces of these are perceptible in his correspondence. He died in 1842.

Sir A. Paget joined Lord Collingwood's fleet on the 18th of June off Cadiz. Being anxious to arrive at his destination with the least possible delay, he started on the 20th in the *Queen* line-of-battle ship, and arrived on the 4th of July off Palermo. It had not been his intention to land there, but it happened that a dead calm made it impossible to proceed, and the *Queen* sent off Marquis Circello to insist upon Sir A. Paget landing, and coming to see her. He found Her

Majesty full of complaints against Generals Fox and Sir John Moore, who were in command of the British troops sent to defend Sicily, as well as against Mr. Drummond, the British Minister, — who, at the same time, were all three squabbling amongst themselves as well as with the Queen. What Sir John Moore's opinion of Mr. Drummond was appears in his letter to Sir A. Paget of the 3rd of September, in which he also gives an account of an interview he had with the Queen, which it is curious to compare with a memorandum drawn up in Her Majesty's own handwriting containing her version of the same meeting.

While he was thus detained at Palermo, Sir A. Paget learned that General Fox had received instructions from Lord Castlereagh to withdraw at once the British garrison from Alexandria, which, however, he (Sir A. Paget) took upon himself to suspend in order that he might be able to reap the full advantage which the occupation of that place by British troops might give him in his negotiations with the Turkish Government, and this exercise of his discretion was fully approved by the Government at home. He, however, was subsequently induced to modify this decision owing to the pressing solicitations of Sir John Moore, who represented his urgent need of the troops for the defence of Sicily.

It was evident from the beginning that the presence of a Russian plenipotentiary and the distrust of Russia were a great obstacle in the way of Sir A. Paget's negotiations; but even after the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit was known; — that the joint negotiations had been broken off, and that the Porte had been informed of the existence of secret articles to that Treaty which would be destructive of the Turkish Empire in Europe, such was the dread then entertained of France in Constantinople, and such the influence still exercised by General Sebastiani over the mind of the Sultan and his Ministers, that the Turkish Government could not make up its mind even to name a plenipotentiary to treat for peace with Great Britain.

At the last moment, indeed, Ismail Pasha did inform Sir A. Paget (whose account of this interview in his despatch No. 10, of the 24th September, gives a very curious

illustration of Turkish character) that he had received full powers to treat. To the humiliating and absurd conditions which he proposed Sir A. Paget returned a dignified refusal, but he did not lose his temper, and made a further, but ineffectual, effort to bring the Porte to reason. The story is fully told in the following despatches, until the final breaking off of negotiations by the Sultan on October 14.

Thus ended Sir Arthur Paget's last diplomatic mission abroad, and though the result was not satisfactory, I venture to think that its failure was in no way attributable to any shortcomings of his; and that was certainly also the opinion of Mr. Canning, from whom he received the highest approbation.

The difficulty he had to contend against was indeed an insuperable one, and it is stated in the message delivered to him by the Capitan Pasha in his last communication; but, until the end, he never allowed himself to despair, and never abandoned his efforts to overcome it. His correspondence is there to show the energy and determination, as well as the temper, forbearance, and moderation (the latter, as he himself acknowledges in his despatch of the 22nd of October, carried to a greater degree than was perhaps justifiable), with which he conducted the negotiations. But he was aware of the immense importance attached by the Government to his success, and he was determined to leave nothing undone to secure it.

During all the time (three months) of this negotiation he was living under conditions to which few, if any, diplomatic agents employed upon a mission abroad have ever been accustomed, viz., on board a ship-of-war (and the ships-of-war in those days were not what they are now), with no outlet except upon a miserable island (Tenedos), rendered pestiferous from the odours of the dead bodies still unburied there, with no other recreation but to await the good pleasure of the Ottoman Sultan and Government. Such circumstances might well have disheartened and furnished an excuse to any one of less determination for bringing his labours to a close, but he remained, nothing daunted, until the negotiations were put an end to by the Turks themselves.

He duly returned to England, and never, as far as I am aware, crossed the British Channel again (except, I believe, once when we were living at Dover and he took us all over to Boulogne and came back the next day)—certainly not as a diplomatist; although there is evidence of another appointment having been offered him that same year, in a short note from Mr. Canning dated the 30th of December, begging him “to decide (and decide right) as quickly as you can, for I am beset with applications;” and a further letter was written by Mr. Canning on the 15th of May 1808, stating that the Turks were prepared to make peace, and offering him the appointment.

I do not think it necessary to enter with greater detail into the correspondence, both in private letters and official despatches between Mr. Canning and Sir Arthur, or into the exchange of letters between him and the Turkish Pashas, with Admiral Lord Collingwood, Sir John Moore, and others, while he was off the Dardanelles. With Lord Collingwood, with whom he was in almost daily communication, he acted in the most cordial agreement, except on one occasion when His Lordship attempted what Lord Palmerston used to call “*making a score off his own bat*”—by sending off a sort of *Ultimatum* to the Capitan Pasha, without consultation with, and certainly unknown to Sir A. Paget. (See His Lordship’s letter, and its enclosure, to Sir A. Paget of September 4, with the latter’s answer, and his letter to Mr. Canning on the subject of September 5.) The letters, with all the persons above referred to, are there to speak for themselves, and I believe they will repay the trouble of perusal.

I cannot help thinking that those who read the reports of these negotiations will be forcibly struck, as I have been myself, by the remarkable ability and readiness displayed by Sir Arthur Paget in dealing with the various subterfuges employed by the Turkish Pashas for meeting his demands, and by the similarity between their tortuous modes of procedure and those consistently practised by the Sultan and Turkish Government of the present day.

## CORRESPONDENCE

*From Major-General the Hon. EDWARD PAGET  
to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

MELAZZO, 29th April 1807.

MY DEAREST ARTHUR,—It has so happened that our Avocations in life have been the means of separating us more than any other two members of the family, and as I am too well persuaded that long absences are very fatal to the Ties of Friendship and Affection, especially when no sort of communication is kept up, I therefore, looking at the Chances of our Meeting again as very distant, cannot help sending you a few lines as a Remembrance, & you will forgive me if I occasionally repeat them. It would be too ridiculous in our old Age\* to meet completely like strangers. If ever you have any spare time, I wish you would send me your Thoughts upon the unhappy subject on which we had so much conversation when at Plymouth. I never hear a word of it from any one, and it is much too interesting & important to the future Prospects of all of our house not to occasion the greatest Anxiety. I see by the Papers that you have had your turn in a Committee,† & I hope it did not prove a very tedious one, for it's quite as bad as a General Court Martial.

Our Communication with the Continent is as completely cut off as Yours, or rather more so as you have still the roundabout Channel of the Baltic. The consequence is we are kept completely in the Dark with respect to the state of the War, and instead of real Intelligence are only now & then answered with the most wonderful fabrications from Palermo. It makes one's Heart sick to see such a country as this might be so lost & sunk by oppression and bad Government. It is necessary to see it to believe it, but you have already witnessed it, and will therefore agree with me that if Satan himself had appeared as a Deliverer, instead of Bonaparte, there would have been no wonder at his being received with open Arms.

\* The writer was then thirty-two, and his brother Sir Arthur thirty-six!!—A. P.

† In the House of Commons. Sir Arthur did not proceed to the Dardanelles till May of this year.—A. P.

A Priest came to me this morning, deputed by the Senate of Melazzo, to inform me that "as a favor" Il Ré had exempted me (because I am best able to pay them) from the Payment of Certain Duties upon Goods landed at this Port, such as Sugar, Tea, &c. My answer was that instead of a Favor I considered it as a gross Insult. This to be sure was not very polished, but I hope you will agree with me that it was merited. Good bye, my dearest Arthur, & believe me, your sincerely affectionate Brother,  
E. P.

*From the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING \* to Sir A. PAGET.*

[No. 1.]

DOWNING STREET, May 16th, 1807.

SIR,—His Majesty having been pleased to nominate you for a special Mission, the object of which is to endeavour to accommodate the differences which have broken out between the Ottoman Porte and the Russian Government, and to bring back the Porte to a just Sense of the expediency of renewing and maintaining its former Engagements as well with Russia as with this Country, and of throwing off that predominant Influence which is now exercised over the Councils of the Divan by France, I am commanded by His Majesty to furnish you with Instructions for your conduct of the business of this arduous and delicate Mission. Much must, after all, be left to your own discretion in a case where Events have succeeded each other so rapidly, that it is possible that you may find on your arrival in the neighbourhood of Constantinople a State of Things very different from that in contemplation of which these Instructions must be framed. But I shall at least be enabled to explain to you with sufficient Precision the general Principles upon which His Majesty feels it incumbent upon him to act, and the general object which He has in view, in whatever relates to the Affairs of the Turkish Empire.


However strong the Probability may appear that the cumbrous and ill compacted Fabric of the Ottoman Power may not be able long to withstand the Course of Events by which its Destruction has been for some time prepared, it is by no means either the wish or the Interest of His

\* Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.



THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE CANNING





Majesty to be instrumental in precipitating its Fall. At this moment especially, when the one great Danger, with which Europe and the World are threatened from the overbearing greatness and insatiable ambition of France, requires the undivided efforts of all the Powers interested in resisting it, His Majesty would see with peculiar Regret the diversion of so considerable a share of the attention and of the military means of Russia to objects of aggrandisement on the side of Turkey. Such objects would perhaps contribute but little (if accomplished) to the solid Power of an Empire already extended over so large a proportion of the Globe, while the attempt to accomplish them at this time could not fail to weaken, and perhaps by degrees entirely to suspend, the exertions of the Emperor of Russia in that part of Europe where the security of Europe and of Russia Herself can alone be effectually maintained: nor can it be doubted that such a change of the Seat of the War, and of its apparent Motives, would work a corresponding change in the Views and Feelings of the other Powers now engaged in it; would probably drive Russia and perhaps Sweden to seek for Safety in separate Peace: and leaving the rest of Germany without a Chance of recovering its Independence, or even mitigating the Severity of the Yoke under which it at present groans, would too probably convert the wavering Neutrality of Austria into a decided Hostility to Russia, if not into a close Alliance with France.

In stating to you these as the Sentiments entertained by His Majesty on the present situation of the Turkish Empire, I have no Intention of insinuating that a different view is taken of this Subject by the Emperor of Russia. On the Contrary, the several Documents which I inclose for your Information, and particularly the Language held by the Baron de Budberg in his conversation with Mr. Stuart,\* and the account received from Mr. Adair† of the Instructions given to Mr. Pozzo di Borgo,‡ whom the Emperor of Russia has recently commissioned to treat for Peace with the Sublime Porte (and with whom you will have to act in perfect concert and Communication), concur in representing that the present demands of Russia are

\* Minister in St. Petersburg.

† Minister in Vienna.

‡ See Introduction, p. 285.

confined within the limits of what she is entitled by Treaty to require; that the military occupation of the Turkish Provinces is to be considered as provisional and temporary: and that the Emperor of Russia is ready to agree to a Peace of which the Basis shall be the preservation of the Integrity of the Turkish Empire.

In these Views His Majesty is desirous of seconding and supporting His Ally with all His Power and Influence. But as it is impossible not to be aware that projects of a much larger extent have undoubtedly been at different times entertained with respect to Turkey by Parties in the Russian Cabinet, and are probably only now laid aside to be reproduced when the opportunity for realizing them may appear to arise, it is fit that, without appearing to impute such Intentions to the present Ministry of Russia, you should yet be apprized of the Possibility of their existence. Without in any degree pledging an opinion as to what might be His Majesty's disposition at some future time, and under circumstances less unfavorable than the present, and with the strongest general Professions of a wish on the part of His Majesty to lend Himself to every just and practicable Plan for strengthening and augmenting the Power and Resources of His Ally, you will confine yourself in any discussion upon this Subject for which an opening may be afforded you by the Russian Plenipotentiary, to urging in the most confidential and amicable Tone those Arguments which are most likely to have weight with the Russian Government—namely, the Unfitness of the present time and circumstances for entering into a System of Measures which must lead to an entire Revolution on the Eastern Side of Europe, to the neglect of so much more vital Interests, and the hazard of so much more substantial Power, and to the loss of an opportunity for a vigorous and effectual Effort against France, such as it is scarcely possible to hope can ever be retrieved.

Having stated to you the general Principles by which you are to be governed in your Intercourse with the Russian Negotiator, and to which you are to conform your joint Negotiation with the Porte, I have now only generally to instruct you that in every point not inconsistent with these Principles you are to adopt as far as

possible the Views and Wishes of the Russian Government, and to co-operate for the Accomplishment of whatever objects M. Pozzo di Borgo may have been instructed particularly to press.

You will assure the Russian Minister that His Majesty has no distinct or separate Views or Interests in the Question, that the re-establishment of the Russian and British Alliance and good understanding with the Porte, and the Extinction of the French Influence there, are the sole objects in His Majesty's opinion worth contending for at the present moment; that the means by which these objects are to be attained, and the Degree in which they are now attainable, are matters for your joint and serious consideration; that provided these objects would be secured, or any reasonable advance made towards their accomplishment, His Majesty would be satisfied; and so far from looking to any selfish Advantage, or wishing to trench on the principle of that Integrity of the Turkish Empire, which (it is hoped and believed) M. Pozzo is instructed to make the Basis of His Negotiation, His Majesty would not even consider the Retention of His recent conquests in Egypt as to be put in competition with the advantages of a pacific arrangement which, by securing the Neutrality of the Porte, and restoring the unrestrained Intercourse and Navigation of the Allies, should set the Emperor of Russia free from the necessity of accumulating His Force on the Side of Turkey, and turning His Attention from other Quarters where the whole strength of His Empire may be most advantageously employed.—I have the Honour, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

*From the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING to Sir A. PAGET.*

[No. 3.]

DOWNING ST., May 17, 1807.

[After directions about the journey, he orders Sir A. Paget to intimate his arrival off the Dardanelles as a plenipotentiary, charged to negotiate the cessation of hostilities and the renewal of the ancient good understanding between His Majesty and His ally the Emperor of Russia and the Sublime Porte; and continues:—]

But in the Time of making this Communication you will be guided by a view of the State in which you may find Circumstances on your arrival off the Dardanelles. Should no Blockade have taken place, or what (it is trusted) is more improbable, should any Measures to defeat it have been taken by the Turks with Effect, or should the Russians not have co-operated on their part by the Blockade of the Black Sea; or generally should you find Reason to believe that no Impression either of Distress or Alarm has been created at Constantinople, either by the Menace or by the actual Operation of the Blockade, or by the successful Occupation of Egypt; or unless there shall in your Judgement and M. Pozzo's appear to be other Circumstances which afford a favorable opening for Negotiation, it will be adviseable that you should defer the communication of your pacific Mission, and should employ yourself in urging vigorously the Execution of the Instructions sent to the British Commander-in-Chief, and in impressing upon M. de Pozzo and the Russian Commander-in-Chief the necessity of enforcing an effectual Co-operation on the part of His Imperial Majesty's Forces.

Whenever you shall have Reason to believe that such an Impression has been produced at Constantinople as is at all likely to prepare the way for the favorable Reception of such an Overture, you will lose no time in announcing your arrival and the objects for which you are employed.

Whenever the Turkish Government shall profess on their Part a Disposition to treat with you, it will perhaps be expedient that you should propose as the Place of Negotiation (provided that Suggestion shall meet with the Concurrence of M. Pozzo di Borgo) one of the Islands in the Archipelago, with a view to the Security of your own Person, and to the exclusion of that Influence from popular Prejudice and Enthusiasm to which Mr. Arbuthnot apprehends the conduct of a Negotiator would unquestionably have been exposed if he had consented to carry it on at Constantinople.—I am, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

*From the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING to Sir A. PAGET.*

[No. 7.]

FOREIGN OFFICE, 18th May 1807.

SIR,—Although you are instructed to consider the retention of His Majesty's Conquest in Egypt as an object which He could not put in competition with the restoration of Peace with the Porte on terms satisfactory to His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, I have nevertheless to signify to your Excellency the King's Pleasure that in any Treaty of Peace which may be formed with the Ottoman Government, it be expressly stipulated that neither Alexandria, nor any other territory of the Porte which may be conquered by His Majesty's arms, shall be evacuated until all confiscated British Property shall be restored or an ample equivalent be paid for its amount.

It is farther His Majesty's Pleasure that in the Treaty it be also stipulated that the Turkish Prisoners of War shall not be released until all British subjects, who may have been either detained by the Ottoman Government, or who may have become prisoners by the fortune of War, shall be previously liberated.—I am, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

*From the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING to Sir A. PAGET.*

[Private.]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 26th, 1807.

DEAR PAGET,—I cannot put into your hands the Instructions with which you are about to depart for the Mediterranean without feeling sensible how many Cases there may be for which no provision is, or can be, made, & in which you will have to exercise (if they arise) a most difficult & delicate discretion.

I am afraid that any attempt to imagine & anticipate all such Cases would be perfectly useless, & might even lead to more perplexity, from the variation of circumstances not to be foreseen, than the leaving to your judgment to adapt the general spirit of your instructions as nearly as possible to whatever circumstances may occur.

The first Object is Peace; the second Peace with perfect satisfaction to Russia.

The Instructions given to M. Pozzo di Borgo, of which

you are furnished with a Copy, afford better hopes than I had originally conceived with respect to the practicality of the second Object; and if the assurances from Vienna are to be believed, the removal of the jealousy which subsisted at that Court respecting the views of Russia upon Turkey would afford an additional facility. It is to be hoped only that it will not revive or enhance the pretensions of Russia.

The question of the Command in any joint operations of the Russian & English Fleets, & that of the treatment of Greek Captives, & of the policy to be observed generally towards the Greeks in the Islands, the Morea, &c., are those upon which it is possible to foresee that you may have occasion for a good deal of management. The first can be settled only (as it appears to me) either by sending Lord Collingwood himself up the Mediterranean, or by a division of the stations & the duties of the two Admirals. The Command cannot be yielded by this Country. But this is a point which *you* will not have to decide, tho' you may be called upon to support the British Admiral in the discussion of it, if unfortunately that discussion should not be rendered unnecessary.

As to the Greeks, there is no doubt that Russia has all along been intriguing with them upon every favourable opportunity, with a view to the accomplishment of ulterior projects which, however they may be laid aside for the moment, she cannot be expected to abandon. It would not be adviseable to thwart her views in this or in any other part of her policy beyond the necessity of the occasion; & it may not be without use to cultivate a good disposition among the Greeks which may be available in the event of the Porte refusing to listen to terms of accommodation. But in all that is done or encouraged by us in this respect, it will be above all things necessary to avoid any Engagement, express or implied, which should make an accommodation with the Porte more difficult by mixing with it any stipulations respecting the internal policy of that Government.

There is yet another question, & a very difficult one, which regards the Pacha of Yanina, of whose present situation and dispositions there has been no sufficient information lately received here to enable me to give you

any certain knowledge of them, much less any precise instructions. He is represented as a Chieftain of great talents and enterprize, as well as of considerable power; alternately a Rebel to the Porte & the chosen delegate of Its authority; well inclined to the English but the sworn Enemy of the Russians; & not otherwise partial to the French (with whom he is now understood to be in connexion) than as their enmity to the Russians points them out as more effective allies than the English.

It does not appear that, with the very important commission which you have to execute, it would be right to divert any part of your attention to the *seeking* a communication with Ali Pacha, which when opened might probably involve you in difficulties with the Russian Minister. But it is not impossible that Ali Pacha may seek to communicate with you. In that Case it is fit that you should continue to hold the language of friendship & goodwill which has hitherto been held in all our intercourse with him, & should offer your good offices to adjust any Differences between him & Russia which may subsist at the time of your communicating with him; or, (in the event of an accommodation with the Porte) your interference at Constantinople in his favour if he shall be at that time in want of a Mediator. But your intercourse with Ali Pacha will of course be restricted by the considerations which I have already mentioned to you, & which are to pervade & regulate your whole conduct—cautious not to give unnecessary umbrage to Russia, & not to commit yourself to any unconditional Engagements against the Porte. . . .

I rely confidently on your sagacity & firmness, & on the peculiar facility which you will derive from your acquaintance with M. Pozzo di Borgo, for getting you happily through all your Difficulties. But I have thought it fair to let you see that I am aware of the many difficulties which you have to get through, and with the same confidence with which I refer the solution of them to your discretion, you may rely upon the most favourable construction of every exercise of that discretion on your part, and on all the support that you can require & I can afford you here.

You will have the goodness to let me hear from you by



every opportunity, & should anything occur to you upon which you wish for further explanation & upon which it can be given you beforehand, I shall be very happy to relieve you as much as possible from the weight of that responsibility, which after all, however, it is not in the nature of things entirely to remove. And so I heartily wish you success.—Believe me, Dear Paget, &c.

(Signed) GEO. CANNING.

[A despatch of May 8th from Lord Castlereagh (then at the Colonial and War Office) to General Fox \* states that the defences of the Dardanelles and Constantinople have been so strengthened by the activity of the Turks, working under French engineers, and by the forces they have assembled, that the Government can no longer flatter themselves with the hope that any military operations can be successfully undertaken against the Turkish capital. They therefore rely on a vigilant and systematic blockade of the chief ports, and a total interruption of their commerce, as the best means of bringing the Turks to reason. The Russian and English fleets were to co-operate in the blockade.]

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

[Private.]

H.M.S. "MONTAGUE," OFF CADIZ, 19 June 1807.

MY DEAR CANNING,—I don't know that I have anything to communicate to you from Hence which requires being put into official form. I believe on the contrary that the very little I have to say is not of a nature to appear in that Shape.

Having arrived on this Station yesterday after rather a tedious passage of 15 days, I went on board the *Ocean* to pay my respects to Lord Collingwood, and returned there a few Hours later to dine with Him.

I own that I never met with any person less desirous

\* Henry Edward Fox, the younger brother of Charles James Fox, fought in the American War. On July 25, 1801, he was appointed a local general in the Mediterranean, with his headquarters at Minorca, where he remained till the Treaty of Amiens. In 1804 he was made Lieutenant-Governor of Gibraltar. After his brother's accession to office in 1806, he was put in command of the army in Sicily, and was also appointed Ambassador to the Court of Naples, then residing at Palermo. Sir J. Moore was his second in command, and as Fox was ill, really took the command.

of communicating with another than He appeared to be with me at our first Interview. You will for instance hardly credit that it was with Difficulty that I could get Him to give me any information respecting the late most unfortunate operations in Egypt. I was however determined not to be disheartened, and by dint of perseverance and at the same time management on my part, we ended the day by being I believe the best of Friends possible. . . .

The late reverse in Egypt cannot I fear but tend to increase the great and numerous difficulties I was at all events prepared to encounter in the execution of the commission you have entrusted to me. Lord Collingwood calls it rightly enough "*an experiment*" that we are going to try. And neither of us augur well of the result of it.

[The remainder of the letter gives a detailed account of the conduct of affairs in Egypt derived from private letters.]

*From Lord G. LEVESON GOWER to Sir A. PAGET.*

[Private.]

MEMEL, July 4th, 1807.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I little expected when I last saw you that my first letter to you would be to announce to you the cessation of the alliance between England & Russia. I have received a letter from Gen. Budberg,\* who by various devices has baffled my attempts to see him, in which a change of the political system of Russia is distinctly avowed; you will probably hear from other quarters that the Emperor of Russia lives at Tilsitt in habits of intimacy & Familiarity with Bonaparte, and it would seem from Gen. Budberg's Letter to me that from that intimacy His Imperial Majesty hopes to derive security and *Glory* to His Empire. Pozzo di Borgo's mission will, I suppose, be superseded by the employment of Sebastiani to make an arrangement with the Porte—the Deposition of Selim † will afford facilities for carving Turkey.

\* Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

† Sultan Selim was deposed by the Janissaries in the preceding May.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Admiral Lord COLLINGWOOD.*

MESSINA, 10th July 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,—By the *Wizard* Brig which arrived this morning at Messina, General Fox has received Dispatches containing instructions to withdraw the troops under M. General Frazer's command from Egypt.

For reasons which I shall have an opportunity of explaining to your Lordship hereafter, I have been induced to recommend to General Fox to suspend the execution of the above order, which recommendation, from a view of the circumstances which gave rise to it, the General has thought fit to accede to.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

[No. 1.]

H.M.S. "QUEEN," OFF SICILY, 12th July 1807.

As this order varies as to the exact time with that transmitted by Lord Castlereagh of evacuating Egypt, it behoves me to state the reasons which induced us to depart in so much from his Lordship's Instructions.

It appeared to us that those Instructions were drawn up under two Impressions.

1st. That Alexandria could not be securely held by the Force at present under the command of General Frazer.

2nd. That with a view to offensive operations against the Enemy in Italy, which subject is treated more at length in Lord Castlereagh's Dispatch of May 21st, the recall of the Forces from Egypt would be indispensable.

With respect to the first of the above considerations, the latest advice which had reached Generals Fox and Moore led me to believe that the troops in Egypt, as well with a view to the Difficulties which it had been expected would present themselves on the part of the Enemy, as with regard to stores and supplies of all sorts now in Alexandria, were in a state of perfect security, and as a proof of this opinion, on the first of these points at least, it will be found in the enclosed Dispatch that General Frazer is ordered to detach some of his Force for the

occupation of one of the Greek islands, if invited so to do by Lord Collingwood.

With regard to the second, I am sorry to say that the State of Affairs in Sicily \* do not afford any Hopes that operations can be commenced against the Kingdom of Naples within the time in which the troops could possibly arrive from Egypt, even supposing their departure to be protracted beyond the period at which in no case that I can foresee I should be disposed to detain them.

Had this not been the true state of the question, it is I am persuaded unnecessary to say that another circumstance I am about to mention, considering the peremptoriness of Lord Castlereagh's Instructions, would have had no weight on our minds. I allude to the very manifest disadvantage under which I should have commenced my negotiation deprived as I should have been by the previous evacuation of Egypt of the only weapon I have to threaten with, because I must here observe (and it is with much concern I do so) that the Blockade except of the Port of Alexandria by British Shipping is still to be begun.

Further with a view to my being able to obtain some partial advantages (should I fail in my negotiation for peace) such as the delivery of English prisoners, and the restitution of British property at Constantinople, we considered that it would be highly desirable if these objects could be attained by the restoration of Alexandria, rather than by the abrupt evacuation of it to forego the chance of reaping such benefits.

For these reasons, I in common with Generals Fox and Moore presume to hope that His Majesty's Government will not disapprove our conduct in giving a temporary suspension to the order for the immediate evacuation of Egypt by the British Troops.—I have the honour to be,  
&c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

\* When Fox assumed the command in 1806 Stuart had just won the victory of Maida, and the Queen of Naples pressed Fox to undertake a similar expedition on a larger scale, and thus drive the French from Naples. Fox felt the danger of leaving the island of Sicily for the mainland, where Murat could soon outnumber his troops, and was the more determined to refuse while his force was weakened by the absence of 5000 men in Egypt.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

H.M.S. THE "QUEEN," OFF SICILY, 13 July 1807.

MY DEAR CANNING,—I got to Palermo after a very quick passage of seven days from Gibraltar on Saturday morning the 4th inst.

Not intending to stop there the ship did not come to anchor; I therefore sent the packet from Prince Castelluciala to Marquis Circello, accompanied by a Letter in which I explained to him how impossible it was for me to remain long enough at Palermo to pay my compliments to the King and Queen,\* and begged him to present my Duty to their Majesties. I then went to see Mr. Drummond, and on my return to the ship found Circello there. He told me that he had been sent by the Queen, who insisted upon seeing me, and that his orders were "to bring me ashore, even if I were in my *Robe de Chambre*." I however resisted, and having satisfied him that every moment was most precious to me, he proceeded to lay before me a string of complaints against our Generals in Sicily, and implored my interference, either in persuading them to adopt a different line of conduct towards his Court, or to represent it to my Government.

After a very long conversation, he took his leave.

It was then, as it had been the whole morning, a complete calm. Finding that we could make no way, and knowing that the ship was seen from the Palace, and possibly therefore that my refusal to obey the Queen's summons might under such circumstances be attributed to *mauvaise volonté* on my part, I decided to go ashore. I got to the Palace about half-past ten at night, and remained with Her Majesty nearly two hours, in the course of which she went over the same ground that Her Minister had in the morning, only in more forcible and pointed terms.

Her complaints were principally directed against Sir J. Moore, as she considered General Fox to be completely under his control. Such, she said, was their conduct

\* They had fled a second time, January 1806, after Napoleon's decree of deposition.

towards the King and herself, such their general treatment of Her Subjects, that she should consider Sicily as a conquered country were she not persuaded of a contrary disposition existing on the part of the English Government.

Those Generals accuse the Sicilian Government of not recruiting the Army. "How," she said, "can we recruit our Army when they suborn our Subjects? They pay them better than we can afford to do. But with respect to our Army we have five or six thousand men ready for any service, and to be embarked to-morrow. The transports are in the harbour, the Artillery and Stores the same, the Cavalry can be embarked in two Days, and when we inform the Generals of this and present to them a plan, as we have done, for an expedition against Naples, instead of concerting with us our proposals are rejected with contempt. They insinuate as their justification that we are betrayed; nay more, they have said that to spill British blood to set such a Tyrant upon the throne of Naples, and such a Family, was paying too high a price. They who accuse us of betraying them are themselves the tools of a *Tas de mécontents et de Factieux* who surround them at Messina." All this and a great deal more of the like was not very pleasant or edifying to listen to. The Queen, as did Circello in the morning, finished by assuring me that I could be of the greatest use to Her, and by beseeching me to exert all my influence with the Generals to bring about another order of things.

You are, I believe, aware that the Queen of Naples was a long time at Vienna during my residence there, and that the days I did not see Her, which were not frequent, there used to be a regular correspondence between us. You will therefore not wonder at the anxiety to impart all Her present grievances to me.

I did everything in my power to set matters right, for after all, as it is not the intention to dispossess those Sovereigns of their remaining Kingdom, and as (if even it were an object) it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to get rid of the Queen in any other way, it is certainly most desirable that harmony and confidence should if possible take the place of strife and mistrust

between the Sicilian Government and our Generals in that island, and I flatter myself that my efforts to that effect were not altogether unsuccessful. I did not see the King as he was in the country, but received through Circello a very gracious message from Him.

Having said thus much I must, though with very great reluctance, proceed to inform you that these dissensions are not confined to the above persons. On the contrary, they exist to perhaps a greater degree between the Queen and Mr. Drummond, and also between Mr. Drummond and the Generals, so that in point of fact the three parties are at open War without any of the two being of the same side. Mr. Drummond inveighs with equal vehemence against both, and by what He says of the Generals one would imagine that the Queen and He *s'étaient donné le mot pour les dénigrer*. But then He is not less violent in His language against Her. He appears to have attached himself to the King, and is of opinion that His Majesty really applies Himself to Business and will in time take the Government into His own hands, and that then affairs will be conducted much better. Upon the whole, next to possessing the island Bonaparte Himself could hardly wish the situation of Affairs in it to be different. I was, as you will easily believe, pretty well prepared for what was awaiting me upon my arrival at Messina, which owing to calms and contrary winds did not take place till Friday the 10th inst.

I really do not think it necessary for me to enter into any detail of the Defence made, and the recriminations which burst forth at Head-Quarters against the Court of Palermo. I will briefly state that it appeared to be the decided opinion of both Generals Fox and Moore that no faith whatever is to be placed in the Sicilian Government, administered as it now is, and so long as the Queen directs its Councils, and that the Sicilian Army, if it is so to be called, is in so wretched a State, that no useful co-operation is under the present circumstances reasonably to be expected from it.

By the *Wizard* Brig, mentioned in my Dispatch No. 1, General Fox received his Recall, and to say the Truth, with every sentiment of respect and esteem for Him, He did not appear to me to be equal to the arduous and im-

portant situation He filled. To General Moore\* therefore, of whom I entertain a very high opinion, was all I had to say upon this delicate Subject addressed, and with Him it underwent an ample Discussion.

I resided long enough at Palermo to know all the weaknesses, all the vices of the Sicilian Government, not one of which I will take upon myself to say has been corrected since I quitted the country.

Sir John Moore has wisely decided to go there as soon as General Fox shall have resigned to him the command-in-chief. He will have immense Difficulties to contend with, violent prejudices to overcome, but I will not be quite without Hope that in the conduct He will now pursue in His relations with the Sicilian Court, the present Divisions which, if they were to continue, would effectually annihilate all attempts at co-operation, will (though gradually) be succeeded by mutual confidence and determination to promote the general Good.

As to bringing about a proper understanding between Sir John Moore and Mr. Drummond, that is what I thought fruitless to attempt; nor is it, when compared with the other, of more than very diminutive Interest, but it is at the same time lamentable that persons in their Situation should not possess each other's esteem and confidence.

[Sir A. Paget then refers to the question of the evacuation of Egypt, and adds:—]

Is it not possible that in the event of our success I may be able to engage Mr. Pozzo di Borgo to send the Russian Troops now at Tenedos, reinforced by a detachment from Corfu, to co-operate with Sir John Moore in an attack upon the Kingdom of Naples? And, in this point of view, might it not be worth while to delay the Departure of our Troops from Alexandria? for to do anything against that Country *qui vaille*, rely upon it we shall want at least 25,000 men. If I have anything in particular to add to this, I will do so at Malta. . . . —I have the Honour, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

\* Late in the year Sir John Moore was ordered to Sweden to resist the Russians, but was directed to wait at Lisbon; he afterwards assisted Gustavus in the campaign of 1808. The supreme military and civil command was ultimately given to Lord William Bentinck.



*From Sir A. PAGET to His Royal Highness the  
DUKE OF YORK.*

Malta, 16 July 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,—I enclose a copy of a private Letter written by this conveyance to Canning, by which Your Royal Highness will see that matters in Sicily are not at this moment quite as they ought to be, and to say the truth I have no great expectations for the Future. Though I place great confidence in Sir John Moore's zeal and abilities, he has a most difficult card to play, and between ourselves I am afraid He will not find much assistance from Mr. Drummond. It is really terrible how they all go on, but I think Sir John Moore is the Man to support. . . . (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to M. Pozzo di Borgo.*

À BORD LE VAISSEAU DE S.M. BRITANNIQUE "THE QUEEN,"  
DANS LA RADE DE TENEDOS,  
le 29 Juillet 1807.

MONSIEUR LE PLÉNIPOTENTIAIRE,—Je ne perds pas un instant à vous annoncer mon arrivée dans cette rade, et le plaisir que j'éprouve en vous y trouvant.

Vous serez sans doute déjà instruit de l'objet de ma Mission, mais je ne puis me refuser la satisfaction de vous informer, Monsieur, qu'une partie de mes instructions, qui m'est infiniment agréable, me prescrit de me concerter de la manière la plus confidentielle avec vous, et de réunir mes efforts aux vôtres pour l'accomplissement de nos vœux mutuels.\*

Comme Je desire infiniment être instruit de tout ce qui s'est passé entre vous et le Gouvernement Ottoman depuis votre séjour ici, j'ai à vous prier de bien vouloir me le faire connoître.—Veuillez agréer, &c.

(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

[To this letter M. Pozzo di Borgo returned a very long answer on the same day, July 29, dated "'*Le Tverdoy*,' près Tenedos." He recounted his arrival off Tenedos on

\* M. Pozzo di Borgo had been a close friend of Lord Minto from 1794, and was much with him in England, which he spoke of as his country.

the  $\frac{12^{\text{th}}}{24^{\text{th}}}$  of May, at about which time the revolution which deposed Sultan Selim took place. He wrote to the Reis Effendi pointing out the errors and corruption of the former reign, the intrigues of the French, the injustice of the war which the Porte had provoked against Russia and Great Britain,—stating that he was furnished with full powers to treat for peace, his readiness to proceed for that purpose to Constantinople, and suggesting, as an alternative, that a Turkish plenipotentiary should be appointed to treat with him at some other place. No answer was returned to this letter, but the Turkish fleet came out to attack Tenedos. An engagement between it and the Russian fleet took place, and the Turks were defeated with considerable loss. On hearing of Sir A. Paget's mission, M. Pozzo di Borgo informed the Porte of it. He then enters into some details respecting the revolution at Constantinople, says that Sebastiani's \* influence is no longer as great as it was, though France is still considered the ally of Turkey, and Russia and England her enemies. The French endeavour to persuade the Porte not to make a separate Peace with these latter Powers, promising that it will be secured through the victories of Bonaparte, who would himself take charge of the interests of the Porte. News of the battle of Friedland on June 14 came to the aid of French counsels, and was the greatest obstacle to be surmounted.

The habitual delays of the Porte were increased by the state of war and the spirit of revolt. "Le Vizir et les Ministres principaux sont au camp comme c'est d'usage; il existe à Constantinople ce qu'ils appellent le *Réxiab*, qui est un Ministère composé des substituts des absens. Des qu'ils ne sont pas absolument forcés par les événements, leur malice, car ils en ont beaucoup, les porte à se renvoyer les affaires de l'un à l'autre et à se procurer des excuses pour prolonger les décisions."

Formalities would be shortened by the aid of 10,000 troops, for the Porte lent itself to the insinuations of France so long as it saw no imminent danger.

The letter ends by expressing a desire to act cordially with Sir A. Paget.]

\* Sebastiani was sent in 1806 as French Minister to the Porte.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

[No. 3.]

H.M.S. "QUEEN," OFF TENEDOS, 30 July 1807.

I arrived in H.M.S. *Queen* off this island the day before yesterday. . . .

You will observe that I did not lose a moment in notifying my arrival, and the object of it, to the Turkish Government, because it is manifest from the extreme backwardness they have shewn to treat with Russia that, if Peace is to be restored between the three powers, and at this place, it can alone be effected by the British Plenipotentiary; and because I have no reason whatever to expect that any impression, either from Distress or Alarm which does not at this moment exist at Constantinople, can be created, (and that no such Impression does exist I am pretty well satisfied) and that therefore no advantage was in any shape likely to arise from deferring the communication I have thought it expedient to make.

And here it becomes me to say one word with respect to the Blockade of the Dardanelles, etc. (which it is but justice to the Russians to say has been rigorously executed) from which system it was expected that much facility would be given to the negociation by the Distress thereby occasioned to the Capital.

It appears by every Information that has hitherto been obtained on that Subject that the measure in question is become altogether useless and nugatory, inasmuch as it is now ascertained that Constantinople, so far from feeling any inconvenience from it, receives its supplies from the Provinces in precisely as great abundance and with as much regularity as heretofore, by means of caravans which have been established. On that point therefore the only question now is whether the capital can, during a long period of time, continue to be so supplied?

For the reasons explained in Mr. Pozzo di Borgo's Letter it is impossible for me to calculate when I may receive an answer from the Reis Effendi, but I have no expectation that it will arrive in less than a Fortnight.

The Russians are destroying the Fortifications of Tenedos, and mean to evacuate the island.

The reasons which decided the Russian Commander to adopt this resolution will, I have no doubt, be detailed in a report I am in momentary expectation of receiving from the Admiral Siniavin at Sea, but lest they should not I will just mention that previous to the last naval engagement between the Russians and Turks, the Latter (while the Russian Fleet was at the back of the island in search of them) succeeded in landing about 6000 Troops at Tenedos, against which Force the Garrison, consisting of about 800 Men, had to defend themselves. And it was in fact with a view to returning to their relief that Admiral Siniavin alleges that He felt Himself compelled to desist from a further pursuit of the Turkish Fleet. To obviate therefore the necessity of not following up his successes on any similar occasion, the Admiral will embark his land Forces.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

H.M.S. "QUEEN," OFF TENEDOS.\*

MY DEAR CANNING,— . . . Upon the whole, it is my bounden Duty, I think, to prepare you for the failure of my mission.

I am inclined to believe that it may not be unuseful to quit this Station, and approach nearer to the Entrance of the Dardanelles, and (if it should be practicable) to attack the Turkish Fleet which is now lying there, and which with the strong northerly winds now blowing cannot, I suspect, move higher up. This will be the subject of a conference which will be held as soon as the *Kent* returns, and which Ship will have taken that opportunity of reconnoitring more closely their position. If it were possible by any means to counteract the enormous mischief the late successes of Bonaparte in Poland have done to our Cause, but, in truth, I know of no other than a complete victory (which if we can get at them must ensue) over them at Sea.

Intimidation is no longer to be expected from menace; nothing but a complete drubbing, I suspect, will make them hear reason, and if it is true that Sebastiani is still in the enjoyment of a certain Degree of His influence, I

\* No date. Probably July 30, 1807.

can hardly figure to myself any other mode of depriving Him of it.

You can form to yourself no idea of the wretchedness of this place. Not even water is to be had here, the Turks having destroyed the Wells. The former Inhabitants have abandoned the Island, and have dispersed themselves amongst the others of the Archipelago. Nothing remains upon it but a few wounded Russian Soldiers, whose situation is so dreadful, the Turkish part of the Town reduced to ashes, dead Bodies floating about the shore. Upon the whole I never witnessed such a scene of Misery.

On the other Hand, I enclose an extract of a Letter received here this morning from Captain Hallowell, in which you will see a different picture of Affairs in Egypt. I am happy to tell you that hitherto everything goes on as smoothly as possible between the Admirals, and I have no doubt of Pozzo di Borgo and myself being able to keep all right. We are to dine to-day on board the Russian Flag Ship, and I know that the King's health is to be given with the Royal salute. We shall of course return the compliment here. These cannonades will show the Turks the sort of footing we are on, which may have a good effect, though I again say that nothing but hard blows will do all we want.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE.*

"QUEEN," OFF TENEDOS, 31st July 1807.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—I arrived at this Anchorage the day before yesterday, and my Pen is unable to describe the Horror of the Place. I went ashore for an Hour yesterday, & found the Town nearly reduced to ashes, the Island deserted by all its former Inhabitants, dead Bodies floating about the shore, & the air infected by those now lying unburied on the Island, not even water to be had, the wells having been destroyed, &c., &c. All this the effect of the Hostilities which have been carrying on between the Russians & Turks.

I cannot as yet guess when I shall remove from this Scene of Joy. I have little hopes of being able to bring

the wretches to any Terms. I heard indeed that the Country is in a state of Anarchy & Confusion. We had not, you know, formed a very brilliant Idea of the business I was sent about, but I can assure you that all you could have imagined falls very far short of the Truth. Well, it will be all the same an Hundred years hence, as they say; in the mean time I wish I may be able to do any good. I have not time for more than to assure you that I am Ever, my Dear Mother, Your most Dut. & aff. Son,

A. P.

*From Lord PAGET to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

*July 29th, 1807.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—Here I am again slaving away in Sun & Dust & preparing for a Review instead of a Battle, either of which Events produce about as many bad criticks as any other you could name. I don't know if my Hussars would fight well, but they certainly look well, which is all we are likely to want of them. 7th, 10th & 15th are all assembled, & it will be good luck if I have not soon the Colonels upon my back. Did you know or did you not know (perhaps knowing it you did not care) that there has been hell to pay between the Dukes of York & Cumberland. You know I am destined to be a Peace Maker Royal, & in effect have completely succeeded in reconciling these Brothers. This is likely to lead to an understanding between the Prince & the Duke of C., for the latter having expressed to me a strong wish to that effect & the Prince having given me an opening to touch upon the subject, I mentioned it to the Duke of York, who, with his accustomed good humour & kindness, seized the occasion of being useful to both with avidity. It is really important at this moment that This Family sh<sup>d</sup> draw well together, & if it was not that some of them are surrounded by Vagabonds, whose interest it is to keep all honourable Men from their Councils, & who themselves only live by misrepresentation, such scenes would never happen. . . .

I saw Charles off from Yarmouth Roads last Sunday. He belongs to the Expedition that is gone God knows where. He is much pleased with his ship, & a most com-

fortable one she is. I slept one night on board and sailed on shore with a fine breeze, in the Whale Boat. We longed for you & Berkeley. I cannot conjecture the object of the Armament. If it is to get possession of Copenhagen and the Danish Fleet I fear they will have a very tough job indeed, & it is too much to hope that we have been invited there by the Danes, who perhaps thro' fear, but certainly from some motive or another, have ever shewn a bias towards France. If we are going to assist the King of Sweden to keep his German' Territories, (The Emperor of Russia & the King of Prussia having made peace with France) 6 times the force we can send would not do it; besides no Cavalry goes, which decides that point. There are, I think, 5 Brigades of Infantry upon this Service, which is nearly all we had at home.

It seems odd enough that a Corps of British Cavalry is ordered for Service to bring about a Continental Peace. We have been twice, nay 3 times disappointed. I own I now begin for the first time to wish for Peace. Prussia is no more—Russia is beaten & dispirited—Austria is yet too sore from former blows—England is weak from the very success of her Arms, for our Army is dispersed over the whole face of the Globe, keeping possession of Countries & Colonies that we ought not to possess. I am for Peace, a Reassembly of our Forces, a close union with the natural Enemies of France—no *great* hurry in forming another coalition—I mean by that, no attempt at one in less than 3 years, and then the most united, the most formidable, the most energetick one that can be imagined.

What will you do with the Turk? I did hope that the late Revolution might have facilitated your negociation with him, but from the last accounts I almost despair of your success. At all events steer clear of the 7 Towers. I should very much prefer to run the Gauntlet thro' the Dardanelles. . . .

If you have seen Edward, pray tell me what you think of him, for he never mentions himself. I am glad he was not one of the Expedition to Egypt. I never liked that operation & shall rejoice when I hear it is evacuated.

Write to me when you have nothing else to do, And Believe me Ever affect' Yours,  
P.

*From Captain the Hon. CHARLES PAGET to Sir A. PAGET.*

"CAMBRIAN," OFF THE SCAW AT THE ENTRANCE  
OF THE CATTEGAT, *July 31st, 1807.*

MY DEAREST, DEAREST ARTHUR,—I think it was just three weeks ago that I last wrote to you, since which my mind has been with one thing or other so perplexed and bewildered that I have not been able in comfort to write to you since. Your long & interesting letter or rather Journal has at length reached me. I see by it, my best of fellows, that to use your own expression you were most infernally sick of the sea tho' not sea sick. I don't at all wonder at it, for it is a severe trial to those whose profession it is, at least so I find it, & heartily glad shall I be when this cursed war is over, that we may all meet in peace & quiet & spend some happy years together. . . .

My last letter will have told you that I *was* under the orders of Lord Gardner, who had directed me to go to Plymouth for further orders. I was in the act almost of Executing these orders when a telegraph message ordered the *Cambrian* to sail instantly for the Downs with flat boats. This was pleasant, & for which I of course in my heart thanked my Lord Mulgrave. In the Downs I found Commodore Hood with eight sail of the Line, & with him proceeded to Yarmouth Roads, where with the force we added, were collected Two & Twenty Sail of the Line, Eight frigates, & upwards of *forty* sail of Gun Brigs and Sloops of War. This fleet is entrusted to Admiral Gambier, who has for his first Captain Sir Horne Podham, to the particular mortification & disgust of Hood, Keats, & Stopford, who altho' Commodores & my senior officers, are degraded by this man being put over their heads. They in consequence made a very strong, firm, & spirited remonstrance which they expected would have occasioned their removal, but Lord Mulgrave, aware of the merit of these officers, & being conscious of the importance it is to this Expedition having such in the fleet, seems rather to have adopted temporising measures. However, their full determination is to strike their broad Pendants the moment the service is completed, & to publish to the world their having before the Expedition sailed entered




their protest against so glaring an insult to the Navy at large. In short my Lord Mulgrave is not likely to deserve more honor & credit to himself at the Head of the Naval Department than he did at the foreign one.

The day before we sailed from Yarmouth (four days ago) I was dining with Stopford on board the *Spencer*, & was most agreeably surprized by the arrival of Paget, who had rode over with Baron Teuil from Ipswich. This was one of his amiable acts. He slept on board the *Cambrian* & stayed with me the next day till we were actually getting under way. Nothing could be more thoroughly kind than he was, & it was bestowed on one who well knows how to appreciate such an act. . . .

What the devil are we going to be at, my dearest fellow, with this great fleet, & the reinforcements of Ships & troops that are following? The Danes have done nothing hostile towards us, & surely we cannot be so unprincipled as to attempt the island of Zealand without some fair pretext. We have positive intelligence that our fleets of transports with the Germans have passed the Sound unmolested & are I believe landed on the Island of Rugen, a pleasant spot. What then are we going to be at? Would it be justifiable without any previous hostile act on their part, to take their fleet from them, on the plea of preventing it being a means ultimately of Buonaparte to execute his Plan of Invasion. In short I am bewildered with different conjectures. If we are going against Copenhagen many of us will lose the number of our mess. If I should be destined to be one of the Number, I shall die in the consolation of knowing that the dear treasure I bequeath will receive all the comfort & support that you, amongst other dear relatives, can bestow. Take care of her, my excellent dear Arthur, & cherish her as you would a Legacy I left you. I have left everything I have in the world to her & the boy & the one that is about to be born. Thank God in pecuniary matters at least I have been able to give them a comfortable independence, & therefore all I have to ask is that you will all take care of her. This is supposing I am minus a Head, but in the supposition I am *not* minus in that necessary article, why then, my old Boy, I trust *we* shall still have some happy days together. . . .



ADMIRAL THE HON. SIR CHARLES PAGET



August 1st.

We are now, my good Arthur, running down the Catte-gat with a fair wind. But we have not yet been joined by the Six Sail of the Line which we left behind in Yarmouth Roads to bring a Battalion of the Guards & three Regiments of infantry. Paget told me that Finch was to command the Guards & Sir George Ludlow the whole.

I mean this letter should be ready to send by the first opportunity that offers. With so large a flotilla, we may hope for a constant communication with England. Do, my good, dear Arthur, continue to write to me. I long to hear what is likely to be the result of your Mission. I confess I am unable to form an Idea what is likely to happen now Russia & Prussia have made Peace.

It is however very curious that the moment that intelligence was received we instantly dispatched a large force to the Baltic.

As I am not much in a writing humour to-day I shall finish this letter another day, probably after we have passed the Sound.

"CAMBRIAN," ELSINORE ROADS, Aug. 4th, 1807.

We anchored here, my good Arthur, yesterday. So far from anything *as yet* having appeared hostile, that the Admiral saluted *Cronenburg Castle* in passing it, which was immediately answered; we are now all moored & are receiving Water & fresh Beef, &c., from the shore. But you may rely that this is all humbug, & that in a very few days a blow will be struck that the Danes at this moment are certainly unprepared for. Lord Cathcart, with all the Germans from Stralsund, are coming this way, & the force which is hourly expected from England will make, with the Seamen & Marines, I dare say, from 20 to 25 Thousand men. The Danish Troops, except 5 Thousand men which are distributed in the Island of Zealand, are all in Sleswig, & Commodore Keats with a strong detachment is now in the Belt (I have good reason to believe) for the purpose of preventing the Danish troops being transported hence.

The Danish fleet, I believe, are all in the arsenal at Copenhagen, neither manned or otherwise ready for sea.

I suspect the possession of them is the object, which accomplish'd, we shall all go back to England with them & leave the Crown Prince to sulk in his Island—pleasant treatment unless our Government is in possession of facts to bear them out in so apparently unjustifiable a measure.

What nonsense my writing you all this which you will probably be in the secret of, & have more correct information about. I am going on shore with Stopford to-morrow, He to taste & buy Hock. I go to visit again the Spot where our friend Hamlet says, "Whither wilt thou lead me? Speak, I'll go no further!" Hey!

I shall write to you, my good fellow, soon again. I close this now as I hear a vessel is going with despatches to England.

God Bless you, my dearest good Arthur.—Ever your most affect. Brother,

CHARLES PAGET.

*From Mr. SAUNDERSON\* to Sir A. PAGET.*

PLASNEWYDD, 1 Aug. 1807.

DEAR SIR,— . . . With respect to public affairs all our information in this Country is derived from the newspapers, and these, of course, you are in possession of. Ministers are stimulated to great exertions by the late events on the Continent, and probably by a desire to do something more than their predecessors. It is supposed to be owing to the supineness of the Cabinet Administration that we have now the prospect of standing single in a more extended War than has yet existed in Europe. Our regular Army is now to be increased by Enlistments from the Militia; but there is great unwillingness to save the Country unless it is done in a Constitutional way. We read the Riot Act whilst a mob is demolishing our buildings. In like manner our Country gentlemen, particularly those who are Colonels of Militia, must have things go on with regularity: they appear to make no distinction in the means of defence they would adopt between an insignificant Rebellion in Scotland and the mighty Invasion with which we are now threatened, or between the Battles of Preston Pans and Austerlitz or Marengo. In short, I

\* Lord Uxbridge's Agent.

believe we have nothing very great to expect till the Enemy is actually amongst us. He will then give us a practical lesson, which I hope may be turned to his own discomfiture, on the necessity of prompt decision and active movements. It is very pleasing to observe among your friends in this country a prevailing regret at a destination which has deprived them of their old Representative at the same time that Major Paget is in the highest degree of favor.

Colonel & Mrs. Peacock are frequent visitors at Plasnewydd. The Colonel's *peculiar talent* is in constant exercise, and Mrs. P. abates nothing of her usual vivacity. Mr. Harry Rowlands never ceases to wonder & admire, but he makes no progress in any human art of entertaining. Mr. Robert Hughes (the Commodore) has made a formal application to Lord Uxbridge to be included in the Commission of the Peace.—I remain, &c. J. SAUNDERSON.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

[No. 4.]

H.M.S. "QUEEN," OFF TENEDOS,  
6th August 1807.

SIR,— . . . On Sunday last the 2nd instant H.M.S. *Kent* returned from off the Dardanelles, when I received a letter of which Captain Rogers was the bearer, an exact copy of which I enclose.

I lost no time in sending back the above letter accompanied by one from me to the Capitan Pasha, of which the enclosed is a copy. . . .

It is difficult to comprehend what could have induced the Capitan Pasha to employ a person of that Description to write to me, and to write so improper a Letter. This circumstance is the more striking as at about the same time He himself wrote in his own language to Admiral Siniavin. He could not suppose that had He addressed Himself to me in Turkish, I had not the means of having His Letter translated as I had sent my Interpreter with Captain Rogers. . . .

With regard to the charge contained in the Letter of the Capitan Pasha to Admiral Siniavin, of the latter having thrown out a signal for the Battle to cease, &c., no human being here comprehends what is meant by it.

It is most likely to be an artifice by which the Pasha hopes to exonerate himself from the blame of having lost two or three Ships of His Squadron. . . .

Having stated to Admirals Siniavin and Martin my Opinion that it would be for the good of the service that the combined Squadrons should take a station nearer the Dardanelles, in which opinion the Russian plenipotentiary concurred, the same has been agreed upon, and we shall proceed to execute that movement, as soon as the fortifications of this place have been demolished, which will be in a day or two.—I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the REIS EFFENDI to Sir A. PAGET.*

[No. 15.]

RECUE 13 Aout 1807.

TRÈS DESIRÉ ET TRÈS HONORÉ NOTRE AMI,—La lettre que Votre Excellence vient d'envoyer est arrivée. Elle porte que vous êtes venu de la part du gouvernement d'Angleterre, Votre Souverain, avec des pleins pouvoirs pour arranger les conditions de la paix avec la Sublime Porte, et de concert avec le Plénipotentiaire Russe, qui reside à Tenedos, et il y est marqué qu'il soit fixé un lieu convenable pour la tenue des conférences.

Vous n'ignorez pas, vous, notre Ami, qu'il est de principe, que la mode de la Mission des Plénipotentiaires destinés à négocier la paix, c'est à dire que le degré de leurs pleins pouvoirs, et la base de la negociation doivent être préalablement connus pour agir en conséquence; or, dans votre lettre amicale, il n'existe aucune proposition relative à ces principes. En outre on a commencé à traiter de la paix au Camp Impérial entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie. Aussi l'état des choses exige que l'on communique au préalable avec vous, notre ami, et que la base de Votre Mission étant manifestée, on voie, en se concertant avec vous, ce qu'il y a à faire; en consequence la présente lettre amicale a été écrite et envoyée à Vous, Notre Ami, à fin qu'en déclarant et exposant les principes et la base de Votre Mission, ainsi qu'exige l'objet, on apporte une grande attention au renouvellement de la paix et de l'amitié.

S'il plait à Dieu, à la reception de cette lettre, comme

il est évident que le raffermissement et le maintien des liens de l'amitié reciproque sont sincèrement desirés de part et d'autre, Notre espérance amicale est que vous declarerez et exposerez les principes et la base de votre Mission ainsi qu'exige l'objet.—De la Part de l'Ami Mehomet Said Galet,

(Signé) REIS ULKULTAB,\* de l'étrier Imperial.

*P.S.*—Votre Excellence Notre très honoré Ami, Comme l'arrangement des objets dont vous etes chargé est sincerement desiré de part et d'autre, il est à espérer que la réponse amicale qu'exige Notre presente lettre sera envoyée un moment plutôt.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the REIS EFFENDI.*

À BORD LE VAISSEAU DE S.M.B. "THE QUEEN,"  
AVANT L'ISLE D'IMBROS,  
Ce 14 Aout 1807.

MONSIEUR,—Animé du plus vif desir de coopérer à retablir les anciens liens d'amitié, qui ont si long tems et si heureusement existé entre les deux nations, j'aurais sans doute éprouvé la plus vive satisfaction si Votre Excellence, au lieu de me présenter des objections sur la manière dont j'ai cru devoir faire mes premières ouvertures, et de causer par là un si facheux retard dans le progrès de cette affaire, eut accédé sur le champ à ma demande, en nommant un Plénipotentiaire pour traiter directement avec moi.

Frustré dans cette attente, je vais avoir l'honneur de répondre à la lettre de Votre Excellence, en date du 5 de la Lune Dgemuziulahir 1222, et d'observer, que les pleins pouvoirs dont je suis muni sont, pour négocier et conclure un traité de Paix définitif, que la base et les conditions de ce traité seront expliqués à la Sublime Porte dès qu'elle aura nommé un Plénipotentiaire, et que les communications seront établies dans les formes, comme c'est incontestablement l'usage parmi toutes les Puissances.

Que, ne voyant pas de raison pour nous écarter en cette occasion d'un principe si généralement reconnu, je ne puis penser que la Sublime Porte ne le respecte, comme elle a constamment fait jusqu'ici ; que dans le cas que la Russie ait effectivement conclu une paix séparée, qu'alors je suis

\* Chef des Commis.



autorisé et prêt à traiter aussi séparément pour l'Angleterre, mais qu'il est nécessaire que ce fait me soit préalablement constaté, ainsi qu'au Plénipotentiaire de la Russie qui se trouve réuni à moi en ce moment.

Maintenant donc je prie Votre Excellence si, comme je le désire sincèrement, Elle veut faire cesser les inconveniens qu'entraîne l'état de guerre actuelle, d'agir avec la même franchise et la même célérité que j'ai manifestées (témoignage que j'ai droit de me rendre) dans mes communications, et pour cet effet je demande encore une fois avec instance qu'il soit nommé un Plénipotentiaire de la part de la Sublime Porte, muni de Pleins Pouvoirs semblables à ceux qui m'ont été confiés.

Que cette résolution soit prise, que l'exécution la suive sans délai, et les Puissances intéressées auront toute espérance de jouir bientôt des avantages de la Paix.

Quant au lieu des conférences, mon desir est que ce Plénipotentiaire, arrivé aux Dardanelles, soit pleinement autorisé à s'entendre avec moi, pour le fixer d'une manière propre à accélérer notre ouvrage salutaire.—Veuillez agréer,  
&c. (Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING to Sir A. PAGET.*

[No. 8.]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 13, 1807.*

SIR,—Before you can receive this Dispatch you will, I presume, have been informed of the Signature of a Treaty of Peace between Russia and France,\* but as it is possible that you may not have obtained a precise Knowledge of its Stipulations, I inclose to you a Copy of it as printed at Paris, which, although the Treaty has not been com-

\* Public stipulations of the Peace of July 1807 :—

All provinces west of the Elbe to belong to France.

Acknowledgment by Russia and Prussia of the Napoleonic kingdoms of Holland and Westphalia.

King of Saxony to become Grand Duke of Warsaw.

Restoration to Prussia of old Prussia, part of Silesia, Pomerania, and Brandenburg. Title of King of Prussia to continue.

Private stipulations :—

Restitution to France of the mouth of the Cattaro, and the transfer of the Ionian Islands to France.

Napoleonic kingdom of Naples to be constituted.

Russia and France to make common cause against "disturbers."

Turkey to be reduced to Constantinople and Roumelia.

municated by the Russian Ministers to His Majesty's Government, there is every reason to believe to be authentic. This Paper was received here on the 8th of this Month.

In consequence of this Event, His Majesty can no longer have any motive for prosecuting the War against the Porte, which was undertaken solely at the Instigation and in Support of His Ally, and for Interests totally distinct from those of His Own Dominions.

You will therefore endeavour to open without delay a Communication with the Ottoman Government, and desire them to appoint some Person to treat with you for the Restoration of that Peace and good Understanding between Great Britain and Turkey, which, previously to the late unfortunate Rupture, had for a long period uninterruptedly subsisted between the Two Countries.

In the Event of any Minister being appointed to negotiate with you, you will, in your earliest Conferences with him, represent to him the Dangers with which the Ottoman Empire is at present menaced by the Concert established between Russia and France; and you will add your Conviction, that the Execution of the Projects, which have been long entertained by both those Powers, of acquiring Territory and Influence at the expence of the Porte, although hitherto suspended by the Operation of other Causes of Dissention between them, will be the first result of their actual Union, and will now be postponed for no longer an Interval than such as may be requisite for the Apportionment of the respective Acquisitions which they may concur in assigning to each other.

If any Corroboration be wanted of the Justice of the Apprehensions, it is sufficiently furnished by the Stipulations of the 22<sup>d</sup> Article of the Treaty, which, by the Exclusion of the Turkish Troops from Wallachia and Moldavia, virtually divests the Porte of the actual Sovereignty over these two Provinces, and leaves the future Title to them to be arranged at a subsequent and no distant period. You will further state to the Turkish Plenipotentiary that, in addition to this Evidence, His Majesty's Government have received the most positive Information of Secret Articles being annexed to the Treaty, from the Tenor of which it is manifest that the

Dismemberment of the Dominions of the Porte is not intended to be confined to the Loss of Wallachia and Moldavia alone, but that it is in the contemplation both of Russia and of France to expel it from all the Territories which it at present possesses in Europe.

To projects such as these, His Majesty's Government would never have been a Party, and their only motive for directing you to communicate the Existence of these designs to the Ottoman Ministers is, the Anxiety to apprize them of the Blow which is meditated against the Porte, in order that to avert it they may exert all the means which they may have at their Command.

Whatever may be the ultimate success of these Designs, His Majesty will always be disposed to acknowledge the Government of the Porte, in whatever part of its Dominions its Residence may be established, and to maintain with it the closest Friendship and Connection.

With respect to the precise Terms upon which it may be advisable that the Peace should be concluded, all that seems necessary at present is to replace the Political and Commercial Relations between the Two Countries on the footing on which they were antecedently to the War, and to refer the Arrangement of the Tariff and other objects of a similar nature, which have been long in a course of amicable Discussion between the Two Governments, to a period of more perfect Tranquillity.

Upon the subject of Egypt, you are authorized, if that Province is not already evacuated by His Majesty's Troops, to express the King's Willingness to restore it to the Porte, on the conditions that upon the British Troops being withdrawn, their place should be supplied by an adequate Turkish Garrison, and that the Porte should allow the Co-operation of a British Naval Force to assist in defending that valuable Dependency of the Ottoman Empire against those Designs of wresting it from its Legitimate Sovereign which, for so many years past, France has invariably entertained.—I am, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

[On August 14 Mr. Canning, in a *most secret* despatch, directed Sir A. Paget to ascertain whether, in the event of the Ottoman Government being expelled

from their European possessions, any of the Governors of the European dependencies of Turkey had the will or the means to maintain their independence against France and Russia—especially the Pachas of Smyrna or Janina.]

*From the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Private.*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, Aug. 15, 1807.

MY DEAR PAGET,—Things are changed since you left us; & changed not a little where you now are. I send you the best instructions that I can frame for the new situation in which you are placed. I would have sent them sooner, but that I thought it highly important to obtain previously some knowledge of the Russian treaty. The French Papers brought in a copy of it a few days ago, but there is nothing so bad upon the face of the instrument itself as the strong indication which it exhibits of Secret Articles still more unfavourable than itself. Sicily, Sardinia, Cattaro, & many other points are passed over in silence in the Treaty. It is impossible that they should not have been in some way or other brought into discussion, and if there are Secret Articles respecting *them*, there may, & must, be others.

We have indeed the almost certainty that the partition of Turkey is one stipulation. And we have too much reason to believe that the eventual shutting of the Russian ports against us, unless we consent to abrogate our maritime code, is another. The King's Speech will shew you that we are not likely to come into this last condition. I wish I could send you the news which we hourly expect from the Baltic, to shew you what steps we have taken to support our refusal of it.

I still think that the Emperor of Russia, even if he has consented to stipulations hostile to us, will do all in his power to avoid putting them in execution. A quarrel with England would not be popular in Russia. The peace with France is as little so as we could wish.

If he is otherwise disposed to forbear, the knowledge of our determination not to be bullied will probably come in aid of that disposition. If after all France is peremptory, & Bonaparte retains at Petersburg, in the person of M.

de Savary,\* all the influence which he acquired over the Emperor's mind at Tilsit, we must be prepared for the worst; & in that case before Admiral Siniavin & L<sup>d</sup> Collingwood part, they may possibly have to exchange something more than a salute. Of course I shall not lose a moment in forwarding to you the intelligence of any event which seems likely to lead to such an issue. As yet nothing has passed with Russia, except the offer of mediation, & the answer which I send you.

Make our peace with Turkey as soon as you can; with Constantinopolitan Turkey, if that is still in being—if not with Asiatic Turkey—and in either case make us friends with the Pachas of Smyrna & Janina, & any other Pacha who has power & goodwill, & whom nothing but aversion to Russia has hitherto kept at variance with us.

What will become of Austria in this general ruin? She was (as usual) just ten Days too late in her determination,† or the world might have been saved.

God bless you. I am fully aware of all the difficulties of your situation, of enough of them at least to make me feel it a duty to renew my promise to you of the most favourable construction for every exercise of your discretion, & all the support that I can give you.—Ever,  
dear Paget, Most Sincerely Yours, G. C.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

[No. 5.]

H.M.S. "MONTAGUE," OFF IMBRO,‡  
22nd Aug. 1807.

SIR,—I shall have the honour to lay before you an account of what has taken place relative to my mission since I enclosed my last Despatch No. 4 of the 6th Inst.

[After reporting upon certain preliminary circumstances, Sir A. Paget proceeds to give an account of an interview with the Capitan Pasha as follows :—]

I opened the conference by giving the Capitan Pasha

\* A general of Napoleon's staff, who was admitted to Alexander's intimate friendship. He was specially chosen by Napoleon instead of an ordinary diplomatist.

† After the battle of Friedland the Austrians had made no effort to hinder the understanding between Napoleon and Alexander.

‡ Sir A. Paget had left Tenedos on August 12, and taken a station nearer to the Dardanelles.

an exact account of the correspondence which had taken place between me and the Reis Effendi, and, having done so, I expressed my concern that so much time had already been lost by the unnecessary Delays arising from, as I conceived, the improper manner in which the Turkish Government had thought fit to receive and reply to my first overtures. In regretting these delays, I, in the most friendly and earnest manner, called upon the Capitan Pasha, as a Friend to Peace, to use his utmost influence to promote that end, by determining his Government to appoint, without loss of time, a Plenipotentiary, as, however painful it would be to me, I could not but consider a much longer delay in such an appointment as an Indication of the unwillingness of the Porte to treat.

The Grand Admiral, having thanked me for my friendly communication, lamented, he said, as much as I could, or even in a still greater Degree, the delay that had taken place. He begged to assure me that it did not proceed from any unwillingness on the part of the Sultan, His Master, to pay every attention to the pacific overtures I had been charged to make, much less was it the effect of any intentional Disrespect towards me, either in my private or public situation. That the pure and simple reason of it was, that the present Ministers were perfectly new in Office, and altogether unacquainted with the forms and usages practised on such occasions. That so much did He lament the delay of which I so justly complained, that He had, before any intercourse had been established between us, spontaneously written to His Government on the Subject, and represented to them how indecorous it was, that I should be allowed to remain such a length of time on board Ship,—that a House and every appropriate convenience should be provided for me,—and above all, the absolute necessity of their appointing a Plenipotentiary to treat with me. That as to the point I made of treating conjointly with the Russian Plenipotentiary, He had been positively assured by His Government that a separate Treaty had by this time been concluded between the Porte and Russia, but that until I had official information of it, I could not, he admitted, desist from such a demand,—that within three days, however, He took upon Himself to say that I should, as well as Mr. Pozzo di

Borgo, be completely satisfied on that head. That as to the Reis Effendi's request to be informed of the basis of the negotiation I had proposed, previous to his having appointed a Plenipotentiary to treat with me, it only served to prove His ignorance in affairs of this nature,—that unused as He also was to such matters, He could have told the Reis Effendi that Peace being concluded between Turkey and Russia, the Basis of a negotiation with England would be the renewal of former Treaties, nothing having happened to give rise to any material points of Discussion between the two countries. Finally, that I might rest assured that nothing should be neglected on His part to forward the business I had recommended to Him, and that I only did Him justice in believing that He had nothing more at Heart than the restoration of Peace.

Having expressed to the Capitan Pasha my entire satisfaction at the Friendly part He had already taken, and was still disposed to take in this business, I adverted to the very extraordinary and, as it appeared to me, the very unbecoming manner in which the pacific overtures made by the Russian Plenipotentiary had been treated, no answer whatever having to this moment been addressed to him, and stated my surprise and concern, that such usage had been practised towards a person with whom I had been directed to co-operate for so salutary a purpose.

In answer to this the Pasha answered that Mr. Pozzo di Borgo had arrived here long before me, and added, without much ceremony, that no faith was to be given to the word of a Russian Plenipotentiary,—that their conduct had been altogether highly reprehensible;—that He had been induced to write to His Government, in favour of the propositions for peace brought by this Gentleman, and that while this was going on, the Russian Admiral had actually caused a Descent to be made in the Island of Lemnos, where Depredations had been committed and even lives lost; that, in consequence of this outrage, the Inhabitants had presented a Petition to Him, which He could not from the nature of it avoid transmitting to Constantinople, and that in the Answer He had received to that communication, the Porte had reproached Him for

having recommended the business of the Russian Plenipotentiary to their consideration, observing that He ought to make Himself acquainted with People in whose favour He interested Himself.

In reply to my observation that the right of annoying one's enemy, until preliminaries of Peace were signed, could not be called in question, the Pasha said that He also did not mean to dispute the right, but that when these acts of Hostility were directed merely to the ruin of a wretched set of Individuals, as in the paltry achievement He alluded to, they only served to increase animosity between nations, without benefiting one or annoying the other,—that in consequence of this Kind of conduct no deference, it was true, had been paid to the Russian Plenipotentiary, and He certainly never had invited either Him or any of His party to His presence.

After stating to the Capitan Pasha the propriety of dismissing these considerations from our minds, and attending only to the main object which we were now discussing, and which could only be obtained by a joint negotiation, I again pressed Him to recommend to the Porte to authorize the Plenipotentiary (whom He gave me reason to believe might be hourly expected at the Dardanelles) to treat eventually with both Mr. Pozzo di Borgo and myself, observing that if what He had stated turned out to be true, namely that a separate peace had been concluded between Russia and Turkey, the measure I proposed would of course remain without effect, and in the contrary case, it would be out of my power to commence the negotiation; whereupon He asked me (again repeating that no faith could be given to the Russian word) whether I would consent to guarantee the execution of all that should be stipulated on the part of Russia, in the event of a joint negotiation being agreed to, and upon my answering that I should consider myself responsible for the fulfilment of any such engagements, the Capitan Pasha, after a good deal of discussion on this part of the subject, at length promised, after He should have communicated the whole of our conversation to Ismail Pasha, Commander-in-chief of the Forces at the Dardanelles, (a man supposed to have very considerable weight with the present Turkish Ministers) to write in conjunction with that Pasha, stating



to the Porte the fresh Demand I had made, that the Turkish Plenipotentiary should be instructed to treat with Mr. Pozzo di Borgo as well as with myself, and urging the necessity of acceding to that Demand. This letter He engaged Himself to dispatch the next day to Constantinople by a special Messenger.

The Grand Admiral next apologized to me on the part of Ismail Pasha for not meeting me on board, He having been prevented by the gale of wind it blew ; at the same time He invited me to pass any day I would fix at the Country House of Ismail Pasha.

I of course expressed my readiness to accept the invitation, but I proposed at the same time to the Capitan Pasha to send a similar one to Mr. Pozzo di Borgo, stating to Him that He would then have an opportunity of learning the real sentiments of that Gentleman, and thereby of forming a correcter judgment than He appeared to possess of the nature of His mission, an object most desirable in itself, and which never could be accomplished if He persisted in having no communication with Him. This proposal, however, met with a decided refusal ; at length, after much debating, it was agreed that the Capitan Pasha should send me a written invitation to the above effect, and should invite me to bring Mr. Pozzo di Borgo with me.

I next came to the subject of the British Prisoners in Egypt, and, having explained to the Capitan Pasha my wishes respecting them, He, without any hesitation, informed me that the Powers with which He was invested by His Sovereign enabled Him to promise me that an order should be sent off without any delay by an extraordinary Courier for their immediate release, on which I thought it right to give Him in return the fullest assurance that this act of Friendship would not fail to have due weight upon my mind, with a view to the arrangements I might have it in contemplation to make for the evacuation of Egypt.

I have now given in as short a space as I have been able, an account of my conference with the Capitan Pasha, and seeing that I obtained from Him three most important promises ; first, to use his best influence with the Porte that a Plenipotentiary should be appointed to treat

with Mr. Pozzo di Borgo and myself; secondly, that He would Himself confer with that Plenipotentiary; and thirdly, that our Countrymen Prisoners in Egypt should be released, I did not I trust express myself too strongly in saying that I had reason to be satisfied with the result of this interview, as far as it went.—I have the Honour to be, &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From M. Pozzo DI BORGO to Sir A. PAGET.*

DIMANCHE.

Il faisait si grand vent hier que je n'ai pas voulu risquer les conséquences du mal de mer. Dans le moment nous avons decouvert un Pavillion blanc à bord de notre vaisseau d'avant garde, et une chaloupe sortant des Dardanelles qui, après avoir communiqué avec le vaisseau, poursuit son chemin pour venir ici. Venez donc vous-même et vous serez présent lorsque les Turcs arriveront. Je suis très intrigué de ce qu'ils nous apporteront. Adieu, je vous attends—cérémonie est un mot qui n'est pas dans mon dictionnaire—vous me connaissez.—Tout à vous.

(Signé) Pozzo DI BORGO.

*From M. Pozzo DI BORGO to Sir A. PAGET.*

LUNDI.

Nous allons lever l'ancre à l'instant pour nous rendre à Tenedos,\* ainsi le diner de demain sera ajourné. Au nom du ciel que notre séparation soit la moins que possible. Faites moi savoir ce que vous croyez être communicable, et je ne manquerai pas d'en agir de même. Si toute fois nous parvenons à quelque arrangement avec les Turcs, en vertu de cette suspension d'armes, l'Amiral désirerait aussi pouvoir m'obtenir la permission d'aller à Constantinople;—dans tous les cas ma presence là-bas ne pourrait qu'être utile, ou du moins pas aussi nulle et aussi pénible qu'ici.—Tout à vous.

(Signé) Pozzo DI BORGO.

\* Immediately after hearing of the Peace of Tilsit. Meant as a demonstration that the interests of Russia and England were now separated.

*From Sir A. PAGET to M. Pozzo di Borgo.*

À BORD LE "MONTAGU," Ce 24 Aout 1807.

Je suis vraiment fâché que vous partiez avant l'arrivée de ce *Flag of Truce*. Pour ce qui est de communicable, vous avez dû voir, mon cher, que tout, absolument tout, vous a été communiqué. Ce tout est, à la vérité, très peu, mais que voulez vous que j'y fasse? Certainement votre présence à Stamboul serait plus utile qu'ici, aussi j'y travaillerai, comptez là dessus. Pour l'amour de Dieu ne réexpédiez pas votre Courier sans m'en avertir, et ne manquez pas, comme vous avez fait jusqu'ici de me faire savoir tout ce qui arrive qui peut nous intéresser. Je vous en promets autant. Adieu.—Tout à vous.

(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

*P.S.*—Tâchez d'aller plutôt derrière l'Isle des lapins; c'est bien plus près toujours que Tenedos, et par conséquent plus convenable.

[On August 27 Sir A. Paget writes to the Reis Effendi, from "devant le Château le Settîl Bahir," to express his satisfaction that Ismail Pacha, Seraskier of the White Sea, had been appointed to confer with him on the question of the negotiations, and had given him an interview.]

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

H.M.S. "MONTAGU," OFF IMBRO, 29th August 1807.

MY DEAR CANNING,—To my great surprise I have just heard, and by *accident*, that a vessel is under orders and is to be dispatched to-morrow for the Fleet off Cadiz. I am the more surprised at this as the Day before yesterday evening, on my return from the Dardanelles, it was agreed between Lord Collingwood and myself, that He would *not* dispatch anything to or toward England until after my next Interview with the Turks. Here I am therefore taken most completely by surprise. My Interpreter in one Ship, one Secretary in another, another in a third, pitch-dark, blowing a gale of wind, and of course without the power of communicating with them. Pray therefore take these circumstances into consideration, and be in-

dulgent towards me if I am prevented writing in any detail, if you are not towards Lord Collingwood, who in truth ought himself to have given me some notice of this intended expedition.

I shall probably to-morrow send an order, if not for the immediate evacuation of Egypt, at least for every preparation to be made for carrying that measure into effect at the earliest notice. And as I say in my Dispatch, unless I have been grossly and wilfully deceived by the Pasha I have been conferring with, I ought to have no doubt but that within a very few Days Peace will be signed. But still why have they delayed so long in appointing a Plenipotentiary? It will certainly not escape you that the tenor of the Language of the Reis Effendi's Notes to me looks very much as if Sebastiani had suggested, if not entirely dictated them. On the other Hand, I can entertain but little doubt of the Desire of the Turks to be again on Terms with us. Be assured that I have spared no pains in bringing this about, but believe me at the same time, if I succeed the task will not have been a very easy one. You will easily imagine what my anxiety is to learn Your sentiments respecting my determination to suspend the Order for the evacuation of Egypt. In the meantime, every day proves to me the propriety of my having taken that responsibility on myself. At all events that measure is on the eve of being adopted, as I will not delay the order one instant longer than is necessary.

Nothing can be compared to the hatred and contempt borne by the Turks towards the Russians, and with regard to the Latter there is I fear too much reason for it, as nothing could have been more dastardly than their conduct on the Days on which the Fleets were engaged. Not a Turkish ship *ought* to have escaped, and the single one that was taken is not an object to boast of in any way. You may rely on it that we were all sadly misled with respect to the effects of the Blockade to be established here. Undoubtedly the Turks wish this Squadron out of their sight, but with regard to any good arising from the *mere blockade* with a view to negotiation, it might just as well have been in the Red Sea. It is with this conviction that I have been holding out to them the most

fair and liberal Terms. In short, although there are some circumstances that present themselves under rather an awkward aspect, I will not give up the Hopes of having it in my power in a very short time, perhaps even a Few Days, to send you a satisfactory result of my proceedings here. In the meantime, I must again request your indulgence for writing in this hasty manner. I cannot however conclude my Letter without preparing you (in case I am fortunate enough satisfactorily to conclude the business) *again* to receive my request *not* to remain at Constantinople.—I beg my respects to Mrs. Canning, and remain, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

[In a despatch from Sir A. Paget to the Right Hon. George Canning on 30th August he states that on the 21st inst. a Russian officer arrived with an official account of peace having been concluded between France and Russia, and with orders to Admiral Siniavin to cease hostilities against the Turks: that he himself received, at the same time, a letter from Ismail Pasha, and an invitation to meet him at the Castle of Europe; that these and other circumstances left no doubt in the minds of either Mr. Pozzo di Borgo or himself that every idea of negotiating conjointly was to be abandoned, and he considered himself at perfect liberty to conclude, if he could, a separate peace with the Porte; that he therefore landed at the Castle, and passed a great part of the day with Ismail Pasha.

In consequence of a gale of wind he was obliged to confine himself to stating the result of that interview, which was a promise on the part of Ismail Pasha to write immediately to the Porte urging them to appoint forthwith a Plenipotentiary to conclude with him a Treaty of peace. There was reason to hope that a satisfactory answer would be received within six days. He concludes:—]

“From what passed on that Day, and if I have not been grossly deceived by Ismail Pasha, I ought to have no hesitation in expressing my anxious Hopes that my next Dispatch, which will, I trust, be sent off in a few days, will contain the intelligence of a Treaty of Peace having been concluded.—I have the Honour to be,” &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

H.M.S. "MONTAGU," OFF IMBRO,  
30 August 1807.

MY DEAR CANNING,—I have still some moments left, which I must employ in troubling you with a few more Lines. I have written by a Brig which sailed this morning for Alexandria to General Frazer, recommending Him to commence the embarkation of the Troops. Before this can come to the knowledge of the Turkish Government my business will, I trust, be concluded—that is to say if it is to be concluded, of which, if I feel sanguine at one moment, I am disposed to despond the next; for I cannot conceal from you my Fears of Sebastiani having a complete sway at Constantinople, and if so, it is too obviously His interest to exclude us for me to entertain any Doubt of His using his utmost exertions to do so. By allowing that ill-fated War to break out between Russia and Turkey, we have thrown the Latter more decidedly than ever She was into the arms of France, and how or when to extricate Her is a matter for serious consideration. The Blockade of their Forts, I again and again repeat, never will make such an impression on the Porte as to force them to listen to our Terms. Egypt must be evacuated. To pass the Dardanelles is impossible. What arms have we therefore to fight them with? None—and this they well know. It certainly looks very suspicious their having so long delayed the appointment of a Plenipotentiary to treat with me. Ismail Pasha, who is certainly the second or third Man in point of Rank (and perhaps the first in consideration) in that Empire, assured me that His Government meant to give Great Britain a proof of its particular Friendship and Deference by appointing Him to treat, or rather to *confer* with me, instead of naming a common Plenipotentiary, but He at the same time appeared thoroughly satisfied with the reasons I gave Him for insisting upon a Person being named who should be authorized to conclude and sign a Treaty, which He confessed He had not powers to do. He believed, or pretended to believe, that a single conversation between us

would put an end to all differences which had arisen between the Governments. "Evacuate Egypt," said he (as indeed the Reis Effendi says in His last Note), "raise the Blockade, and we are then as much Friends as ever we were. Consent to this, and there will be no longer any occasion for us to treat." Can there be any doubt as to who dictates this language? Is not every syllable out of Talleyrand's Office, as it were?

On the other Hand, nothing can be stronger than the expressions of Friendship used both by the Capitan and Ismail Pasha. The former, I am told, is perfectly indignant at the dilatory conduct of the Porte towards me, and with regard to the Latter he gave me a most solemn promise that a Plenipotentiary should be immediately named and sent to negociate and conclude a Treaty with me. He also, as well as the Capitan Pasha, begged of me to take into consideration the inexperience of the new Turkish Ministers in all public business. . . . If in answer to my last Letter to the Reis Effendi, He refuses to appoint a Plenipotentiary or even delays the appointment, I must after all that has passed, I fear, consider such conduct as a proof of their unwillingness, or at least of their having made up their minds not to renew their former intercourse with us, and I shall then, at least, have the consolation of thinking that the crime will be upon their own heads, as I trust I shall have it in my power to prove to you, that everything consistent with the dignity of the Government I represent will have been done by me to restore Peace. It appears to me that a very few days must decide the question, as by the separation of the Russians it is brought into a very narrow compass. Their Fleet is lying off Tenedos with instructions to wait there till further orders.—Believe me, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the COUNTESS OF UXBRIDGE.*

"MONTAGU," OFF IMBRO, 30th August 1807.

MY DEAR MOTHER,—Only two lines by this Brig, for I have, strange to say, had but a few hours' notice of her departure!

I hope as I have told my Father that all will be settled

in a few days, and if it should turn out otherwise it will not at least have been my fault. You cannot conceive anything more tiresome than my situation here, and independent of all other pleasures it blows a continual Gale of Wind, so that it is not often that one can get ashore for a little exercise. You will of course understand that there is not in any one of the Islands a House into which one could set one's foot,—there is therefore no choice about remaining on board ship. It is by the bye well that I took the stock of Linen I did, for washing is completely out of the question. It is I dare say generally thought that we are all living in Clover; be assured that the reverse is as much the case as possible. I have changed Ships again, & am come back to Cap<sup>m</sup> Otway, owing to a severe Illness Admiral Martin has had. I have one secretary in one ship, one in another, my Interpreter in a third, my Servants & effects in a fourth; in short it is all very comfortable! Whenever I think of my situation, which is not often, I wish those Gentlemen who amused themselves with writing those good natured paragraphs in my Place; they would at this moment perhaps be on their beam ends, as old Charles used to say, as even the Line of Battle ships are pitching. I never in short saw such a place for gales of wind. Good-bye, my dear Mother.—I am with kindest love to all, Ever your most Dut. & aff. Son, A. P.

*Précis of the despatch from Sir A. PAGET to Mr. CANNING.*

H.M.S. "MONTAGUE," OFF IMBRO,  
3rd September 1807.

A few hours after the arrival of the news of the peace concluded at Tilsit the Russian Admiral left Imbro and proceeded with the Squadron under His command to Tenedos, a pretty evident indication that the cause of England and Russia was no longer the same, and that their Interests were separated; no doubt therefore remained that Sir A. Paget was from that moment a Free Agent to make the best and most speedy arrangement possible with the Porte.

He therefore went to Ismail Pasha, and enquired whether He was vested with full Powers to conclude a Treaty. Ismail explained that he was only instructed to *confer*



on the subject of our present Disputes, and to receive *ad referendum* any communication;—that the Porte was anxious to renew its former Footing with England, *to whom she was not conscious of having given any cause of offence*, that there had been *no Declaration of War on either side*, and that there existed no ground of Dispute, *as soon as Alexandria should be evacuated and the British Fleet withdrawn from these Seas*, that would not at once cease; that those points accomplished, the two Countries would be placed with respect to each other in the situation they were before, and that Former Treaties between them would remain in their full Force. That under these circumstances the Porte thought it unnecessary to appoint a Plenipotentiary.

Sir A. Paget answered that if nations were not to make peace because there had been no formal Declaration of War, the wars in Europe could have no end; that Great Britain and Turkey had unfortunately been led to commit Hostilities against each other and were therefore at War; and that the true mode to end it would be for their respective Plenipotentiaries to conform to the practice among all civilized Nations who had been in a state of war; that with regard to the Evacuation of Egypt, and the raising of the Blockade of the Turkish Ports, he would find in Sir A. Paget every disposition to comply with the views of his Government. England would demand from the Porte nothing that could be called a sacrifice. In spite of professions of friendship, the only mode of settling differences had hitherto been eluded. In one letter, the Reis Effendi required to know the extent of his Powers, that he might appoint a person of equal rank to treat with him; in the second He infers that there is no necessity to appoint a Plenipotentiary, because, without any previous negotiation whatever, friendship would be restored when the blockade was raised and the conquests relinquished. This inconsistency showed the Porte to be under the baneful control of French Councils and French Influence. “I produced a Letter from Sebastiani to Admiral Siniavin, which begins thus—‘*Les Lettres qui vous ont été écrites dernièrement par L.L.E.E. le Capitan Pasha et Ismail Effendi, et la réponse que V.E. a faite à ces Lettres, m’ont été communiquées par la Sublime Porte,*’ etc., and I then asked the Pasha

whether with such proof before me, I could doubt that the transactions between the Porte and me were sent before the same Tribunal?" The Pasha answered that "He could not, He said, give me a stronger proof of his goodwill than by the very act of conferring, for said He, 'I am a Pasha of three tails. I command all the Forces in this part of the Turkish Dominions, and I was formerly Grand Vizier.'"

After some further discussion he admitted the necessity of a Turkish Plenipotentiary with full powers to treat, and "*promised in the most direct, positive, and unequivocal Terms to represent in the strongest manner to the Porte the necessity of acceding to this Demand.*" He inquired if there were any new stipulations to be proposed in the Treaty. "I at once told Him that as a proof of my confidence in Him, I had no objection (although what I was about to do was contrary to all practice) to communicate confidentially to Him the outline of the Treaty I had it in contemplation to propose to the Porte, whereupon I read to Him a few articles I had drawn up, and with which (after requesting me to accept His warmest acknowledgment for this additional proof I had given of my good opinion of Him) He expressed His fullest and most unqualified approbation, adding that the Porte could have no excuse for not subscribing to articles so fair and liberal.

"In fact it appeared to me of such consequence to be able to make out (in case of the failure of this Mission) that the Porte had positively objected *to treat*, and not to *the Treaty*, that I framed the articles in the way I thought the least liable to meet with opposition.

"This important point being now gained, it only remained for me to impress Ismail Pasha with the necessity of the Porte's coming to an early Determination in the execution of it, and to remind Him that I had already been allowed to pass a whole month in a State of Suspense and uncertainty which I could not with propriety expose myself much longer to.

"As to the Delay I complained of, Ismail, as well as the Capitan Pasha on a like occasion, alleged in exculpation of His Government that it had arisen from my having proposed, in the first instance, to treat conjointly with

Russia, and next from the inexperience of the new Turkish Ministers. He promised at the same time 'everything being now perfectly understood between us, that no further time should be lost.'"

*From Sir JOHN MOORE to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Private & Confidential.*]

MESSINA, 3d Sept. 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . I stayed three weeks at Palermo. I had frequent private audiences (very long ones) with the Queen. I spoke & explained to her with fully as much freedom as I did to you, and as far as I could judge by her manner, as well as by what she expressed, I have every reason to believe that she was satisfied, & that I succeeded in removing the prejudices she had imbibed. The Queen is clever enough; in private life she would be an agreeable & entertaining woman, but she has not ability for Publick affairs; she is governed by those about her, who are generally of the very worst description, for she is deficient in knowledge of character, and has a bad selection. We might have had some ascendancy at this Court had there been a man of sense & firmness, and who was a gentleman, in the character of British Minister, but it is impossible for you, unless you were on the spot to witness it, to conceive what a false, unprincipled mean fellow this Drummond is. These are strong expressions but not more so than truth requires—it was him who at first bred all the mischief with the Queen and who still, as far as he is able, will endeavour to foment it.

The French have sent 1500 men to Corfu,\* and have collected 6, or 7,000 more at Otranto & Tarentum to be passed over when boats can be collected. From this the Government of Palermo conclude that the Kingdom of Naples is left without defence, that we have only to land to gain the Country, and will, either by means of the Inhabitants be able to restore Ferdinand to his throne, or at least enable Great Britain to obtain better terms in negotiation. It is difficult to conceive much greater nonsense. However, both Admiral Thornborough & myself have positively refused to undertake any such operation, indeed our thoughts are much more employed in what

\* Handed over to France by Russia.

manner to defend Sicily, threatened as we consider we shall immediately be,\* than in planning attacks on the Kingdom of Naples, and we are looking earnestly for the troops from Alexandria as well as for the Fleet with you in the Archipelago. We conceive in the present preponderance of France, it is impossible that you can succeed in your negociation, unless Peace is concluded at home in consequence of the Treaty at Tilsit. This last, I think very improbable. I therefore expect we shall have to carry on the War single-handed—if so, this Sicily will be a first Point of attack. . . .

(Signed) JOHN MOORE.

*Memorandum by QUEEN OF NAPLES respecting Conversation with Sir JOHN MOORE.†*

*Précis de ma Conversation avec le Général Moore.*

Le 22 de Juilliet le ministre D'angleterre M<sup>e</sup> Drummond me présenta ce Général; la visite dura à peine cinque minutes. Le Général ne dessera pas les dents, et Garda un morne Silence.

Le 23 Juilliet le Général Acton m'écrivit, que le Général Moore ayant été lui faire visite, avoit témoigné le desir de me voire à Seule, me parler à L'insçus de M<sup>e</sup> Drummond Son ministre. Je repondis que mes heures les moins frequentés étoient celle de L'aprèsdiné 2 a 3 heures, et le Soir à neuf heure, et que j'écouterois toujours ce que le Général Comandant des Troupes Britaniques nos Alliées pouvoit avoir à me dire d'utile au Service du Roi mon Epoux et ma famille, il accepta d'abord à venir le 24 L'après midi et efectivement viut à trois heures, l'après diné, seul, chez moi.

Je fus d'un Embaras, d'un dèconcertement tel que je ne le pourrois jamais assez depeindre; je tâchois par des politesse reservé, mais honéte l'encourager, il ne put qu'avec peine Se remettre, la voix lui manquant, palissant, mais Come lui avoit demandé de me parler, j'attendis en Silence ce qu'il avoit à me dire. Il comença avec un Embaras

\* Napoleon was secretly preparing expeditions against Sardinia and Sicily. He had offered England the Balearic Isles or the Hanse Towns in exchange for Sicily.

† An exact copy of the original. See p. 338.

extrême, et ne Se remit que peu à peu. Qu'il étoit venus pour Se justifier, que Paget étant Son amy, ayant Son frère Sous Ses ordres, il lui avoit Communiqué les plaintes que nous fesions icy Contre Fox et lui, disant que nomant Fox, S'étoit Le nomer lui même, vûs L'entiere Confiance que Fox lui avoit toujours témoigné, quil Savoit que nous nous plaignions de n'avoir pas voulus agir, ni profiter des heureux momens pour la reconquête de Naples, que tels avoit été leurs Instructions, que actuellement étant differentes, ils agiront, quand ils le pourront avec probabilité, de S'unir, mais que le temps, momens doit leur entièrement abandonné, que Actuellement ils avoit peu de monde. L'Expédition en Egipte, dont ils ont reçus L'ordre précis, leur en ayant oté 6 homes qu'il Savoit, qu'on l'attaquoit sur Les Principes, qu'alors quoique aimant Son metier, il préféreroit qu'on lui otat Son Comandement, si il ne pouvoit inspirer de Confiance, je repondis que ces Sentimens Sufisoit pour changer les doutes, qu'on auroit pûs Concevoir ; il me demanda avec beaucoup d'Empressement Si nous ne pouvions avoir des Russe actuellement que L'affaire avec le Turque est terminé, il me donna des raisons véritables, pour agrandir L'armée, pour conquerir et Soutenir et étendre les Conquêtes, au della de Naples ; malgré la verité de ces motifs la demande m'etonua, mais je repondis franchement, que je les desirois, elle m'etonna puisque au momens où l'on repand et anonce Générale-ment une Armistice et Paix même Separé de la Russie, avec Buonaparte ; ce n'étoit pas le momens de cette question, elle m'etonne encore plus Car je *Sais de Sur, du Roi mon mary même*, que lors de Son Sejour a Messine Monsieur de Tatichief ministre de Russie offrit au Roi, et à Son ministère, de faire venir d'abord 3 mille Russe pour augmenter la défense de la Sicile, et M<sup>e</sup> Elliot ministre D'Angleterre, Exigèa Sur le Champ, avec humeur, qu'on les refusa, il en a été de même pour Escadre Russe et Troupes, Russe, qu'on a constamment refusé de la part des Anglois, en Sicile, et pour cella j'eus lieu d'être étonnée de cette demande du Général Moore, et Surtout dans ces temps actuels, continuant en général Ses Excuses, je lui demandois pourquoi il n'avoit point voulus me dire les mêmes chose en prèsence de M<sup>e</sup> Drumond, que nous estimons, et dans lequel nous avons Confiance, et d'autant

plus qu'il avoit repeté les mêmes discours et excuses chez notre ministre le Marquis de Circello, en présence de M<sup>o</sup> Drumond, que je n'aimois point les Cachotteries, dont mon Caractère franc et Loyal étoit Si éloigné, Cette question de ma parte le remit de nouveau dans Son embaras, il me dit, qu'il avoit craint, que M<sup>o</sup> Drumond ne lui laissât pas le temps de S'excuser, d'ailleurs, me dit il, avec un Sourire amer, j'ai lieux de croire que lui m'a accusée icy, ayant des affaires que lui Seul Savoit, il m'examina alors, et voyant, que je ne repondis point, il me dit L'affaire de Lechi son envoi, c'est Drumond qui L'a dit, et Certes le Lechi peut avoir de L'esprit, mais c'est une mauvaise tête, Je lui ai alors repondus d'un ton Solemnel, de la verité, que L'affaire mission et Comission de Lechi m'avoit été écrite par un Sujet du Roi, et cella est Si vrai que la lettre je L'ai envoyé au Prince de Castelcicala, Il S'excusera alors, que obligé par leur metier, repandus dans les différentes Garnisons à entendre les plaintes des Peuples, il les avoit anoncé, pour que le Gouvernement y remedia. Je lui repondis que tout Gouvernement a Ses defauts que les temps de Vertiges actuels il falloit Calmer, Soutenir les autorités, et ne point entreprendre des inovations trop dangereuses ; je lui parlois de notre petite troupe, petite, puisque de Calabre peu en étoit revenus, et que Seize mois de demeure en Sicile, il en étoit mort, inutilisé, deserté, et aucun home rëcruté, la Constitution du Pays empêchant toute levé forcé, et les Recrus étant Si bien payés par eux, il nous empêchoit de nous augmenter, Il m'offrit alors de cesser Sou Rëcrutement d'autant plus qu'il n'avoit eue aucun paysan mais mauvaise espèce de Gens, je lui repondis qu'en Italie le Peuple etant riche par le Soll, facile à Se nourrir, avoit horreur de se faire Soldat, que ce n'étoit que des levées par tant (?) à milliers qui donoit la bonne espèce d'hommes, que nous L'avions faite plusieurs fois à Naples, avec avantage, mais qu'icy la Constitution étoit Contraire. Je savois que le Général Moore avoit rëcruté 200 Calabrois des tant decriées masse, à 50 pezzi duri l'une, mais je ne le voulus point reprocher. Il parla de la nécessité d'une meilleure Police Générale, des Côtes et Ports, j'y repondis oui, en Conoissant la nécessité, mais Come c'est une Affaire qui rëgarde le Roi et le Gouvernement, je n'entrois dans aucun details, il me

parla de la nécessité d'unir toutes les forces du Roi avec L'armée Britanique pour ne faire qu'un seul Corps d'armée et de former les milices dans tout le Royaume; je lui repondis que le Roi Conoissoit en cas d'attaque la nécessité d'armer, unir les milices, mais que c'étoit une opération qui exigeoit Soins et attentions, et étoit Seulement en cas d'attaque, dont il n'y avoit pas la moindre apparence encore pour la Sicile, que de même le petit Corps des Troupes du Roi ne Sera réunis aux Troupes Britaniques, et mise Sous Son Comandement, que lorsque on agira Ofensivement, a reconquerir Naples, qu'entre temps il les verroit, et en auroit tous les detail. Je lui fis voire un portrait de L'imortele Nelson, que L'Eternelle Reconnaissance tient chez moi, dans mes Chambres, il me dit L'avoir connus, serois en quelques occasions avec lui; je lui fis les juste éloges de Sa Bravoure, honétété, Loyauté, Gloire, qui lui attirerent notre Entiere Confiance, et firent la gloire de Sa Nation. Come cella finit notre Entretien; et je me déclare, ni Conaitre, ni oser juger, ce Général, home très Reserve, et peu Communicatif.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

[No. 9. Confidential.]

H.M.S. "MONTAGUE," OFF IMBRO,  
5th September 1807.

SIR,—The Turkish Officer stated in the preceding Dispatch to have arrived on board this Ship the day before yesterday, was accompanied by my Interpreter, who came to me from the Capitan Pasha with the following important Intelligence.

That a large body of French Troops, under the command of General Menou, had been detached from the main Army in Poland, and was at this moment actually on its march towards the Persian Gulf, from thence to penetrate into India.

That the whole expense of this expedition was defrayed by Russia, who had also agreed to furnish every contingent want.

That all the French Engineers and Officers of Artillery had departed from the Dardanelles and Constantinople in order to join General Menou.

*From Lord COLLINGWOOD to Sir A. PAGET.*

"OCEAN," *Sept. 4th*, 1807.

DEAR SIR,—Our affairs in the Mediterranean are becoming so highly important—and the necessity of the fleet at Sicily being reinforced become so urgent that it is indispensable that the negociation here should be brought to a crisis, and the Turks compelled to declare themselves. All they have hitherto said is temporizing, and they are acting a part which, by keeping a fleet here, is highly detrimental to his Majesty's service. Under these circumstances, I have thought it necessary to write a letter to the Capitan Pacha, a copy of which I inclose to you, which Letter I hope will bring them to an immediate determination; they must reply to it, or their silence is an expression of their intention.

There will be a revolution in Sicily. Ferdinand \* is to be placed on the throne of Portugal. The King of Naples is now styled by Bonaparte of the two Sicilies, and a great army is said to be marching to the South of Italy. It will be necessary to concentrate our force.—I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) COLLINGWOOD.

*From Admiral Lord COLLINGWOOD to the Most Illustrious  
CAPITAN PASHA.*

[Enclosure.]

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PASHA,—It is now near a month since I arrived in these Seas with a Squadron of His Britannic Majesty's Ships.

Your Excellency knows it is the Duty of British Fleets to present themselves to the enemies of their Country, but I had entertained the hope that God would have inspired the Sultan of the Turks with the same Holy Desire which has ever animated the breast of my King, that Peace may be established among all Nations, and that in the Turkish Fleet I should have found, not enemies, but that Friendship renewed which it is to be lamented the

\* Prince of Asturias, afterwards Ferdinand VII. His Neapolitan wife (pp. 42, 60) had died in 1806, and in July 1807 negotiations were opened for his marriage with a Bonaparte princess.



convulsions that have shook the Governments in Europe have for a short time suspended.

His Majesty, with this Impression of Friendship for the Sublime Porte, had sent His Ambassador to them to propose a renewal of that Harmony and Friendly Intercourse He wished to maintain with a Nation whose interests and preservation from the Intrigues of Ambition have ever been a Subject of His Solitude, and which a few years since called forth the exercise of His Arms.

The Sublime Porte, professing a desire that this Friendship which we offered should be established, have yet proceeded not one step towards it; and this irresolution calls on me, most Illustrious Pasha, to propose to the Sublime Porte the following questions, which, as the Turkish Ministers are fully informed on the subject, I expect they will reply promptly, and with that ingenuousness and Truth with which they are proposed.

First: Will the Sublime Porte accept the Friendship offered by England, with the renewal of all the relations of Peace and Amity, the particular Terms of which will be settled by Plenipotentiaries?

Second: Or do they reject the proposal, and influenced by malign Councils determine on a state of War?

Third: If the Sublime Porte accept the proposals to establish Friendship, in what place shall His Majesty's Ambassador meet the Plenipotentiary whom the Sultan shall appoint to conclude the Treaty, which is necessary to declare the renewal of former engagements, and seal the Bond of Friendship between our Nations?

Fourth: If the Sublime Porte accept the proposals made of renewed Friendship, it is required that orders be immediately given that a British Frigate, which shall convey His Majesty's Ambassador to Constantinople, or the place appointed for the Plenipotentiaries to meet, shall pass free and unmolested, and be received by the Turks with Hospitality and kindness.

I have said before, Most Illustrious Pasha, that the subject is not new to the Ministers of the Porte. They have already doubtless determined in their minds the conduct to be pursued, and I expect in their reply that truth and ingenuousness with which God inspires the Hearts of Honest Men, and that they give it immediately.

If in a short period I have not an answer, I shall conclude they intend to take such a part or are under such influence as they cannot without regret reveal.

I cannot omit this opportunity of assuring Your Excellency of my high respect for Your Person, that I am, &c.

(Signed) COLLINGWOOD,  
Admiral of the British Fleet.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Lord COLLINGWOOD.*

[Enclosure No. 2.]

H.M.S. "MONTAGUE," 4 Sept. 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,—All I can say to Your Lordship's Letter is that I sincerely wish it may have the desired effect, but what if at the end of the week your proposal is not accepted? Why, the Fleet will be withdrawn, and Alexandria must be evacuated, which if I mistake not is all the Turks require of us.

Besides the intelligence Your Lordship has sent me, I am informed that Corfu is to be immediately taken possession of by the French Troops.—I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

H.M.S. "MONTAGUE," OFF IMBRO,  
5th September 1807.

MY DEAR CANNING,—You will, I am sure, be not a little surprised when I inform you that Lord Collingwood's Letter to the Capitan Pasha was written, and the Sloop of War actually under weigh with it, before He had given me the slightest Hint of His having any such intention.

The instant however He sent me a copy of it (which was accompanied by a private Letter from Him) I went on board the *Ocean*, and represented to Him candidly and without any reserve my surprise and concern that He should have come to the resolution of writing such a Letter without any prior consultation with me. These, I told him, were not moments to wrangle about points of formality, and that nothing was so far from my wishes or intentions, but that really, as I was in every way bound (without, I publicly declared, that His communication to the Capitan Pasha had neither my knowledge or assent)

to abide by the consequences of that Letter, it would have been but fair towards me to have previously consulted me as to the matter of it, and then fully explained to Him my reasons for not approving the measure generally, but very particularly that part of it which gives the Turkish Government a *week* to come to a Decision, for in the last paragraph of the Letter as it originally stood, instead of "a short period" he had said "a week," and after a long debate the Sloop of War was recalled by signal, in order that that alteration should be made. These reasons, as I stated them to Him, so will I now submit them to you.

When I left England, I was no doubt, as we all appear to be, under the impression that the presence of a considerable British Squadron here, would have the best effect. First, with a view to a Blockade, and next with that of lending our co-operation to Russia in any measures that might be found practicable for creating such a sensation at Constantinople as would assist our negotiation. I had not however been 24 hours at Tenedos—I had not, I mean to say, been longer there than was necessary to ascertain to demonstration the impracticability of attacking the Turkish Fleet, or performing any service to be done by great Ships, than from that instant I not only wished the whole squadron away, but represented such to be my wishes to Lord Collingwood. His Lordship is as well as myself, nay from His professional Skill more convinced (if that were possible) of the perfect inutility of keeping a Squadron of Line of Battleships in these Seas. This conviction added to the incalculable want of them in the Mediterranean, has in fact *at length* decided Him to leave this Station immediately and take with Him four or five out of the seven Sail of the Line, now here. What beneficial purpose, upon the Face of the Earth, could it answer for Lord Collingwood to require a categorical answer to be delivered *within a week* to His Demand. Whether the Porte will treat or will not treat, will receive me or will not receive me? Supposing the Turkish Government to answer No, we will not receive your Ambassador, we will not treat, what then? Why then Lord Collingwood weighs anchor, and leaves the Archipelago. I of necessity do the same. I must moreover order the evacuation of

Alexandria, because that is a measure that can be no longer delayed—why then I say by so doing, we are adopting precisely the line of conduct the Turks have been exacting from us before they would treat for Peace; so that in point of Fact, we should thereby submit to their own Terms, we should fulfil their own stipulations, and for what? not in order to obtain the advantages of Peace, but with a view to renew or rather continue the War, if this can be called War. Our Situation here is certainly a most embarrassing, and perhaps in some respects a humiliating one. The Turks, I believe, sincerely wish for Peace, we want it, and though I feel this Truth to its full extent, still it is not necessary to say that I would subscribe to nothing which could bear such an appearance. Lord Collingwood says, and says with some Truth, that by having delayed to come during above a month to a decision on my pacific proposals, the Turks are treating us with a degree of slight that the British Nation ought to resent. Well, but how resent it? What are the means? By going away? Why that is exactly what the French are probably driving at. The Discussions with the French Ambassador on that very point in all Human probability occasion the Delay we complain of. My object is to avoid anything like a threat, because I wish to avoid the enactment of a *second scene*,\* such as was displayed a few miles higher up than we are now in the months of February and March last. On board a Frigate, which I shall soon be, I can undoubtedly threaten to return home if my proposals are not listened to, and that for the best of all possible reasons, which is that it is completely out of my power to do more than threaten. The Turks know it, and if they do not, the French are there to inform them of it. But They must know more, they must know that these great Ships cannot even keep these Seas in Winter. Have we not been sending Ships to examine all the Ports and Creeks in the Archipelago to hide ourselves in by the time the Winter Gales commence? Undoubtedly the Turkish Government has treated me with some Degree of inattention by allowing me to remain here so long unsatisfied, unanswered almost on a single point, but they have hitherto enough to say in their justification. They

\* Sir J. Duckworth's expedition.—A. P.

will say, and say truly, that my first proposal was to treat conjointly with Russia, that they could not accede to this for the obvious reason that Russia had treated separately; also they will say that Ismail Pasha, one of the First Men in the Empire, was appointed to treat with me, that I objected to His appointment because He was not vested with sufficiently Full Powers, and that before they had time to send others, a Declaration came from the Commander of the Fleet containing a Threat that if in eight days I was not received in Constantinople, so and so. I know all this is to be answered, and I am prepared to answer it, but I will fairly state to you, that my object is to make them break off the negociation (if it is to be broken off), not to break it off myself, and I think a very few weeks more would have decided the business one way or other.

My plan, I will tell you fairly, was to have tired them out, and to have run them down as it were, not to have, as I have already observed, done anything which could to the most malignant Interpreter have looked like suing for peace, but by Degrees to have brought the question to such a shape that had the negociation failed, the entire blame, the crime of it, as I said on a Former occasion, should have been on their Heads.

And why had I formed this plan? Not, God knows, for the pleasure I derive in tossing about in continual Gales of Wind before the Dardanelles, but because it is admitted to be of great Importance that we should regain a Footing at Constantinople, and because the evidence of former most lamentable and Fatal facts prove to us that if temperate and candid negociation won't conduct us thither, beyond all doubt threats, let them be of whatever nature they may, will not. Did not Mr. Arbuthnot, being at Constantinople, threaten to quit it? Did not Sir J. Duckworth threaten to burn it, and what did all that produce? Shame and Disgrace. But what have Lord Collingwood and myself to threaten, more than to go quietly away and leave Sebastiani Master of that Country?

The state of the question then is this. I have been in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles (would to God I had been anywhere else) above five weeks, without much

progress having been made in the business I was sent on. By this Delay no discredit can attach to me or to the Government I represent. The Turks say, "we mistook your meaning," to which I answer, "now that I have explained it to you, let us see whether we can make peace," and unless we have the power of coercing them I for my part know of no other Language to hold, bearing in my mind at the same time that moderation must not be allowed to dwindle into pusillanimity.

Another consideration, and a most important one is this: It is, as already stated, in consequence of intelligence received from Sicily within forty Hours, decided to withdraw the greater part of the Squadron from hence, and to send an order to hasten the evacuation of Egypt. Why then should I not endeavour to make a virtue out of necessity, why should I not tell the Turks, Alexandria is now evacuated, the large Ships are gone, and the Blockade will be entirely raised—now then fulfil what you have promised?

And now let me beg your attention to a few words relative to Egypt. I am fully aware of the very great responsibility I took upon myself by suspending the order for the evacuation of that Country, and I am not less so that that responsibility is increased by the turn affairs are, in all probability, on the point of taking in the South of Italy; but on the other Hand, let me request of you to take into consideration, not the advantages I expected to derive in my negociation from the occupation of Alexandria, but the state of our Prisoners in that Country, the state of the Inhabitants of Alexandria, which will be seen by the *enclosed Letters* \* from Major General Frazer and the Russian Consul, both which Letters are faint in their description when compared with one received by Lord Collingwood from Captain Hallowell. If this be true, could there be a doubt of the propriety, nay of the sacred Duty, I will say, of endeavouring to obtain some terms for those wretched, and I fear deceived people, who for their attachment to our cause, must if unprotected fall victims to the cruel rage and vengeance of the Albanians. With regard to our Prisoners, I trust in God, even if my Interference since I have been here in their behalf shall not have been crowned with success, that General Frazer

\* Missing.—A. P.

will be able at so high a price as the evacuation of the Country to ensure their release. But I should certainly have felt more confident about them, had the order as one of the Articles of a Treaty made by me gone from the Porte. For these reasons, subject as the suspension of the measure I took upon myself to give must ever have been to any direct and positive order from Sir John Moore for the abandoning of Egypt, I look with confidence to your favourable Interpretation of my motives and conduct in this business. . . .—I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to General Sir JOHN MOORE.*

H.M.S. "MONTAGUE," OFF IMBRO, 5 Sept. 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,—General Frazer will no doubt acquaint you of the consternation which prevails among the Inhabitants of Alexandria from a report which had been most indiscreetly circulated of the British Garrison being about to leave that place. It was in consequence of a representation to that effect from General Frazer, as well as of one of even a stronger nature from Captain Hallowell to Lord Collingwood, that I was induced by the return of the same Frigate, a few hours after Her arrival here, to write to that General recommending Him (in the Hopes as well of procuring the Release of our Prisoners, as of obtaining some Terms for the Inhabitants of Alexandria) not to give up that place until he heard either from yourself or me, but at the same time to detach as large a portion of the Troops as in His Judgment could be spared to reinforce the Army in Sicily. The information, however, which has been received here within these forty hours, of the Hostile views of the French against Sicily, is of so important a Nature as no longer leaves me a choice how to act. To abandon Alexandria under such circumstances could not, in my opinion, be warranted but by a most extraordinary and unavoidable pressure of events. Such a pressure presents itself, and I feel that I must decide upon the least of two great evils. I shall accordingly by a Line of Battle Ship, which will sail immediately from Hence for Egypt, transmit to General Frazer my ultimate authority for the Evacuation. I trust that for so high a price he will be

enabled at least to obtain the release of our Prisoners. I shall not, however, relax in my endeavours in their behalf, and no exertion of mine shall be wanting in support of the Demand of the Inhabitants of Alexandria that a *Turkish* garrison should be sent to Alexandria. Little or no progress has been made in my affairs here since my last.—I remain, &c.,  
(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to M. Pozzo di Borgo.*

"MONTAGU," OFF IMBROS, *Ce 5 Sept. 1807.*

MON CHER POZZO,—Qu'est ce que vous faites pour l'amour de Dieu ? Si vous étiez resté aux Rabbit Islands,\* je n'aurais pas manqué de vous aller voir, mais je ne pourrais m'éloigner jusqu'à Tenedos puisqu'il prend deux ou trois jours pour s'en retourner.

Me voilà toujours dans le même état d'incertitude. Je n'en augure rien de bon. J'attends à chaque instant des nouvelles de Constantinople, qui devront, à ce qu'il me semble, décider de quelque chose. Nous poussons en attendant de tems en tems le Capitan Pacha—mais à quoi sert-il ? Je ne serais pas fort étonné si les Turcs en usoient envers moi, comme il a été jugé à propos de vous traiter, de m'annoncer, c'est à dire, que notre Paix sera faite par la médiation de la France et ailleurs qu'ici. Avez vous reçu des nouvelles quelconques soit sur les affaires publiques, soit sur votre personne ? Savez vous que mon opinion est que la médiation de la Russie, qui sera acceptée, produira des suites funestes. C'est à dire que la Russie prétendra que l'Angleterre cède sur tout ce que ces infâmes Fripons là voudraient stipuler *pour la liberté der Mers*,† et que sur notre refus la Russie se declarera pour la France, et nous fera la guerre. Voilà à quoi je m'attends comme à la rotation journalière de cet amas de boue. Est-il vrai que Ferdinand a reçu la couronne de Portugal ? On l'écrit. Dieu seul sait ce qui a été souscrit par ces deux Souverains à Tilsit, cela fait frémir. Adieu, je vous envoie 30 ducats pour mon ami Bulgakoff, qui ne valent pas, je crois, ceux qu'il m'a donnés, mais que voulez vous que je fasse. Si vous re-

\* See letter of August 24.

† How truly prophetic.—A. P.



cevez l'ordre de partir, ne vous en allez pas sans me voir, et moi je vous en promets autant. Je n'ai pas reçu de nouvelles de Pisani. Adieu. Bien des choses à tous mes amis, et écrivez moi toutes vos nouvelles.

(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From M. Pozzo di Borgo to Sir A. PAGET.*

*Le 5 Septembre à BORD DU "TVERDOY,"  
TENEDOS.*

Je réponds à votre dernier billet aussitôt que je peux le faire; quoique nous ne soyons pas bien éloignés l'un de l'autre, les communications sont rares. J'espère que vous trouverez à qui parler, en toute règle à la première entrevue avec les Turcs, et que vous pourrez conclure. Je le souhaite pour vous, et malgré que je m'intéresse bien sincèrement à tout ce qui peut contribuer à votre satisfaction personnelle je le souhaite encore plus pour les affaires. Il est nécessaire que l'Angleterre diminue les embarras de la situation actuelle autant que possible, et qu'elle concentre ses forces sur les points essentiels. Je ne pense qu'aux malheureuses transactions de Tilsit, et plus j'y pense, plus les conséquences m'en paraissent fatales et irremédiables. Je voudrais avoir à qui parler sur les faits que nous connaissons, et sur ceux que nous avons raison de craindre, mais cette consolation même m'est refusée dans la situation où je me trouve. Rien ne nous est encore parvenu de la Cour, depuis que nous nous sommes quittés. J'attends ce Courier non pas avec l'espoir de recevoir de meilleures nouvelles, mais avec le désir de connaître toute l'étendue du mal, puisqu'il existe, et de savoir quelle direction je dois prendre, quel sort m'est réservé. Le changement a été si total que toutes les données antérieures sont absolument devenues nulles. . . .

(Signé) Pozzo di Borgo.

*From Capt. the Hon. C. PAGET to Sir A. PAGET.*

*"NIGHTINGALE" IN THE CATTEGAT,  
Sept. 11th, 1807.*

You will be surprised, my dearest Arthur, to receive a letter from me dated as above, but the fact is I am going home with the dispatches of the surrender of

Copenhagen & the Danish fleet, which took place on the 7th, after a severe bombardment which commenced on the second. . . . Thus, my dearest fellow, have we struck a deadly blow to poor Denmark & inflicted a wound on Bonaparte that he will not speedily recover from.

I am only the bearer of the Duplicates, Captain Collier, a particular friend of Admiral Gambier's, having had more interest with him than I had in being charged with the first dispatches. The Duplicates however I thought better fun carrying home than staying off Copenhagen for three weeks to come doing nothing in the *Cambrian*. I therefore accepted Admiral Gambier's offer & here I am, my dear Arthur, in an infernal Brig, spinning down the Cattegat with a gale of wind at Southwest—we passed Elsinore at four o'clock this morning & hope to be abreast of the Scaw by Sunset. Then we have comparatively plain sailing. At present, however, *not* so, for I don't think in the Navigation of any sea there is one more precarious than the Cattegat, or one I have so thorough a dislike to—particularly in a Brig.

[On September 14 Sir A. Paget writes to the Reis Effendi to remonstrate on the silence of three weeks, during which his former letter had remained unanswered. He has so far received nothing but promises, though seven weeks had passed since his arrival. He urges again the moderation and disinterestedness of the proposals of England, repeats his demand for a Plenipotentiary to conclude and sign the Peace, and warns the Porte that he must consider further delay as a practical refusal to negotiate.]

*From Lord COLLINGWOOD to Sir A. PAGET.*

"OCEAN," *Tuesday Even. Sept. 15th, 1807.*

DEAR SIR,—The *Meteor Bomb* is arrived from Sicily, and I forward to your Excellency two packets which came by her. That from General Moore will doubtless inform you of the state of affairs at Sicily and the urgent necessity there is for the army being reinforced, which they can only be by the troops from Alexandria. It is also said the Russian ships which were here are ceded to the french.

I shall sail with four ships as soon as I have seen Your Excellency and without stopping at Malta proceed immediately to Messina, or as I may receive information, to Sicily.

The Court at Palermo are still urging a descent upon Naples, and what appears to me most marvellous is, that Mr. Drummond agrees with them in this measure; but it is not practicable.

Great Expeditions sailing from England to the Continent with formidable fleets which Adm<sup>l</sup> Gambier commands.

It is said the King of Sweden was shot by an Inhabitant of Stralsund.—I am, Dear Sir, &c.

(Signed) COLLINGWOOD.

*From Sir A. PAGET to Sir JOHN MOORE.*

H.M.S. "THETIS," OFF TENEDOS,  
16th September 1807.

I own that I have now no expectation of succeeding, and that therefore probably I shall very shortly have the pleasure of again paying my respects to you.

I don't know who possess *all the Talents*, but the State of things appears very much as if we should ere long stand in need of them, and perhaps much more. I am very sorry, though not surprised, at all you tell me of Mr. D——d. Your determination *not* to undertake anything against Naples is at this juncture most wise. To leave Sicily (unless it is to be abandoned) at such a moment defenceless would be madness; and those who advise it must be either in that State, or Knaves. God bless you, my dear Sir; I write in great haste, but am not less, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Lord COLLINGWOOD to Sir A. PAGET.*

H.M.S. "THETIS," 18th September 1807.

DEAR SIR,—The *Espoir* brings accounts only of the preparation for War near Sicily: 70,000 Men are said to be marching into Italy for that invasion. The French are in complete possession of Corfu and Catarro. I shall go straight to the neighbourhood of Corfu, take the chance of being joined there by something, and get intelligence

of what the Russian Squadron is to do in the *business*. Affairs have an aspect that requires all our activity and strength. I hope the Ships will not be necessary much longer in the Archipelago.—I have the Honour, &c.

(Signed) COLLINGWOOD.

*From Sir JOHN MOORE to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Secret.*]

MESSINA, 21 Sept. 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,—I had the honour to receive, yesterday, your letters of the 30th of Aug<sup>t</sup> and 5th inst. with their enclosures. I was kept in anxious suspense whilst reading them, untill relieved by the last part of the letter of the 5th which states that you had finally authorized the evacuation of Alexandria. I had no idea that it would have been delayed so long, for when we agreed to postpone the order to withdraw the Troops, it was merely with a view, as I conceived it, to give you some advantage in the commencement of your negotiation,—an advantage which, if the Negotiation drew to any length, would not be continued, as it was to be remembered that the same Government which sent you to negotiate with the Porte had also directed the evacuation of Egypt.

The events which have taken place since you left this would have induced me long ago to withdraw the Troops for the defence of this Island, but I daily expected their arrival. I was averse without your knowledge to take a step which might affect your negotiation, and I had no means of communicating with you untill that by the *Meteor* offered on the third of this month. . . .

What the opinions of H.M.'s Ministers are with respect to this Island, or from whom they have received their information, I know not. From me they have never received any thing but the truth. I have not failed upon this occasion to represent to them the danger to which this Island will be exposed from the effect which the withdrawing so large a portion of the force will have upon the minds of the Inhabitants, as well as from the real insufficiency of that which will remain for the purposes of defence. I have been occupied ever since we heard of the Peace of Tilsit, in arming the different Fortresses and putting them in a state of resistance.

With the Troops Gen<sup>l</sup> Sherbrooke will have, he can attempt nothing but their defence. If the fleet can prevent a landing, good and well, but if the Enemy once land the game is up. And in that case the best thing to do will be to save the Troops & Stores, by an early capitulation.

The contents of the late dispatches are known to the Admiral, Genl. Oakes, & me only—they have not been communicated by Government to Mr. Drummond, and both the Admiral and me, we agree that it is not prudent to trust him. That they should be kept secret is of much importance both to the tranquillity of Sicily and to perplex the French—and even when we sail, it is recommended in the dispatch, and it is our intention, that our destination \* should not be communicated. . . .

(Signed) JOHN MOORE.

[In a despatch from Sir A. Paget to the Right Hon. George Canning of 24th September 1807, he states that on the 6th of September the Russian squadron, under the command of Admiral Siniavin, sailed for Corfu. Also that on the 7th inst. a message reached him to the effect that "Ismail Pasha had been chosen to be the Plenipotentiary to treat for Peace with England, that His instructions and Credentials were making out, and would be forwarded to Him without delay. That Ismail Pasha expected it to be in His power to invite me to a conference at the Dardanelles in four days at most."

It was added that Ismail Pasha was most desirous that the most profound secrecy should be observed respecting this communication.

In an interview at the Castle of Europe on the 14th Sir A. Paget informed Ismail Pasha that if in ten days a Plenipotentiary had not been named by the Porte he should consider his mission as at an end.

A second conference at the same place was fixed for the 18th.]

"It was opened by the Pasha, who began by saying that He had at length the satisfaction to announce to me the receipt of the long expected answer from Constantinople, as well as of His Full Powers to negotiate, and conclude a peace with me.

\* Portugal. The French army entered Portugal in November.

“He then produced His Full Powers which consisted in a Letter written, as He informed me, in the Sultan’s own Hand, and which with some gestures of Devotion He kissed twice. Having read them to me, I of course proposed an exchange, but Ismail objected to this, alleging that He could not part with so sacred a Deposit, for that the communication of them fully established His authority to treat, and was therefore sufficient for the purpose of negociation. This gave rise to some conversation, in which I explained to Him that the exchange of Full Powers was the common practice upon such occasions, but as He professed Himself to be altogether ignorant of these formalities and appeared to have very considerable reluctance in giving them up, I begged that He would satisfy Himself about it by a reference to precedents, and that we might in the same time proceed to the business we were convened upon.

“This matter being thus disposed of, we proceeded to examine the Different points upon which our Treaty was to be built, when the Pasha observed that He saw nothing in all that I proposed that would meet with any objections from Him; He said, however, that His instructions authorized Him upon certain conditions only to sign the Treaty; these conditions were that the Treaty should remain secret pending the negociation on the Danube between Russia and the Porte, even if it were protracted till the end of the remaining seven months for which their armistice was concluded, but that whatever might be the result of that negociation, the Peace between England and Turkey should at all events be published at the expiration of that period.

“After remonstrating with Ismail Pasha upon what appeared to me to be the most inexpedient, uncalled for measure of secrecy I had ever heard of, seeing that there was no one article in the Project of Treaty I had submitted to Him that might not be published in every quarter of the Globe, I at length told Him that if after weighing the objections I should set forth to Him He still remained convinced that so much secrecy was necessary, I should not break off the negociation by withholding my assent to His Proposal.

“But these it seems were not all the conditions, nor do

I believe, Sir, that your astonishment, when I relate the next to you, will be less than mine when I heard of it, for from the genius of Man never proceeded a more uncouth, a more extraordinary, and a more preposterous idea.

"The proposal that was made to me was that *having signed the peace, I should withdraw from hence and sojourn in any of the Islands of the Archipelago I might think proper to fix upon until the negotiations between Russia and the Porte should be concluded.*

"I was, I own, not very much disposed to go into any great length of Discussion on this proposal, but having convinced myself, which I very soon did, that it proceeded not from any other motive than the fear of Drawing down the vengeance of France, which it was contended that the Publication of the Treaty of Peace with England, and the reception of Her Ambassador at Constantinople, would not fail to do, it appeared to me advisable rather to endeavour to correct the errors of the Turkish Ministers than to take offence at and resent them. Accordingly in the course of a long conference, having however in the very first instance totally rejected the proposal made to me, I believe I succeeded in proving to the Pasha the perfect inutility as well as impropriety of the Measure He had suggested to me.

"This Pasha finding me, as was natural, inflexible in my Determination not to listen to the above proposal, asked me whether I would consent to an Armistice for seven months, that is to say an Armistice which should last as long as the Danube negotiation, having concluded which I was equally to take up my abode in the Archipelago until, to speak in plain language, it should be convenient to the Turkish Government to receive me at Constantinople.

"This proposal, which was very nearly as absurd, and fully as inadmissible as the former, I also rejected, nor did the Pasha and myself part, until I had brought Him to own the utter fallacy of His own Arguments in favour of, and the validity of my objections to His Project.

"What benefit could in fact upon the face of the earth arise to them from the adoption of it? Is it reasonable to suppose that the French would be the Dupes of so shallow an artifice? and if they are determined, which Ismail has owned to me is the case, to oppose to the utmost the

conclusion of the Treaty in question, and my consequent reception at Constantinople, is it to be hoped they will oppose all this the less in seven weeks, seven months, or in any given period at which they can effectually interfere in it.

"The same reasoning I should suppose applies to Russia; if at the instigation of France the Emperor Alexander is to break off His negociation with the Porte on account of this Treaty, were it published now, would not the publication of it (even supposing that not to take place until after the conclusion of His own Treaty) be a sufficient motive for Him to commence a new War?

"The Truth is that the Turkish Government has every disposition to come into my terms, but has not courage to declare itself, nor is it less probable that the conclusion of this Treaty, if it does take place, will make no difference in whatever plans the French may have formed with respect to Turkey. Undoubtedly it is their wish, and perhaps their interest, to drive me from hence, and they have hitherto succeeded in frightening the Turks into the belief, as it would appear, that their total salvation depends upon their conduct on this occasion. . . .

"I have now further to inform you that the Flag of Truce arrived here yesterday from the Dardanelles, having on board Emin Effendi, a confidential Secretary of Ismail Pasha, charged with a Letter for me of which the enclosed is a Translation. I will here just remark that this Emin Effendi is, as I have been informed, a person of some experience in these matters, and one that Ismail Pasha has frequently called in for His advice at our Conferences.

"He informed me that He had been sent by the Pasha to make a fresh proposal to me for an Armistice of *two* months, during which period, having made choice of any place in this neighbourhood I pleased for my residence (by which I collected that he meant on the coast of Asia), Ismail Pasha and myself could occasionally meet and settle the conditions of a Definite Treaty.

"I told him that after all that had passed between us on the subject of the Armistice, I hardly expected that a new Demand of this nature would have been made to me.

"He almost confessed to me that the Porte had determined to make peace with England, but was most desirous



to *gain time*,—that the Pasha had been convinced of the truth of all I had stated to Him upon that Subject, but that he was particularly anxious to make a merit with His new Sovereign of having persuaded me to make this concession—and that He therefore hoped I would do him the personal Favour of acceding to the proposal He had made to me.

“I observed to Emin Effendi that however great my disposition might be to do everything consistent with my duty that might be agreeable to Ismail Pasha, still that in business of great national Importance, matters of personal Favour ought hardly to be brought into consideration. That in my anxiety to bring the negotiation to a speedy conclusion I had been actuated by the purest and most disinterested motives towards the Porte, that the more I reflected upon the Delays proposed to me, the more averse I felt to subject myself to them. I again repeated to Him (for He was present at my last conference with Ismail) the folly of supposing that France would be so easily duped, and that it was upon the whole impossible for me to play the Part required of me. He then asked me if any means occurred to me (a question Ismail had frequently put) by which the object for which I had been sent could be attained without exposing them to immediate danger.

“At length after a good Deal of Discussion, I informed the Effendi that I had fairly and candidly delivered my sentiments upon the Subject of Peace or War; that it therefore remained with His Government to decide it by adopting or rejecting my proposals. That after the most mature Deliberation, and as it would be seen, with the view only of alleviating the Porte from the Embarrassment it stated itself to be under with respect to France, I would now make one more offer.

“If therefore, I said, the Turkish Government is desirous to avoid at this particular juncture the publicity of the conclusion of a *Definite Treaty of Peace*, as well as that of receiving me at the same moment as the Ambassador of the Power with whom the Treaty has connected the Porte, I will consent to sign an Armistice for six weeks under the express stipulation that I should forthwith be invited by the Turkish Government to proceed to Con-

stantinople, in order there to negotiate the Definitive Treaty.

"With this proposal the Effendi took His leave, after having told me that a Tartar should be dispatched immediately with it to Constantinople, and that He doubted not that, if the Porte had not already come to the Decision of at once concluding the business and receiving me, this last offer would be accepted.

"It is however impossible, considering the immense Difficulties I have to contend against, to feel very sanguine as to the turn this business may ultimately take. Whatever the result may be, I have only to hope that His Majesty's Government will do me the justice to believe that I have spared no pains in the management of it.—I have the honour," &c. (Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the DUCHESS OF BEAUFORT.*

"THETIS," OFF TENEDOS, 25th Sept. 1807.

MY DEAR DUCHESS,—I had I own no expectation that you would have been at the trouble of writing to me, you may therefore judge how agreeable my surprise was three days ago on opening a Packet from England to find your kind letter of the 22<sup>d</sup> July—Kind indeed, I should be ungrateful not to say, as in the latter part of it you express the most charitable wishes for the salvation of my Soul, tho' you evidently appear to entertain some doubt whether your prayers will be attended to. This is manifestly one of the cases where the will must go for the deed. With regard to the complaint you make of *your Book* not having been read at the time I wrote, recollect that *one* of the reasons I alledged was that I had already read the work, & according to my apprehension no bad reason; but pray be comforted when I tell you that really & truly for your sake it has since that period undergone another perusal. But what then, my good Duchess, for after all these books and the like only tell you to believe things that you cannot comprehend, & things that it is not meant you should comprehend. They tell you for instance to believe, well & I do if you please believe, three to be one, & one to be three; I believe a Virgin to be a Mother of a Son & that very Son to be the Maker of the Virgin; I believe him

to have died who is alone immortal, & by the Death of our Saviour a Most Just God to have punished a most just person ; I believe that we have an eternal life begun in us, still that we have a death to pass thro', & the like—All I ask you is whether you or Doctor Beattie or Doctor any body else comprehend all this, because if you do, pray do me the Favor to explain it to me, & that quickly, seeing that I have very often the Impertinence to rack my Brain about it.

Poor Fitzroy \* is quite in the Dumps at having received no letter by the last arrival. Unfortunately I had already made him read D<sup>r</sup> Beattie, otherwise I should unquestionably have consoled him with a few pages of it. He is a most excellent Lad—I have the sincerest Regard for him—But indeed you have no idea of the wretchedness of our existence ; it is now I think about 17 weeks that we have not slept ashore, & to this moment, I don't know whether my friend Fitzroy can, but I know that I cannot guess what is to be the end of it all. We now & then get a walk on an uninhabited Island, which is the sum Total of our Recreations, & the winter months are approaching. Pray bestow a thought on us during your Xmas Gambols. For my part I rise at 6 in the morning, smoke the whole day long, & pray that I may be sleepy by ten at night. This I must admit is not much like the *Dissipation* of your life in London, or your more rational amusements in the Country, of which latter I should as you observe have had no objection to partake at the time you speak of. God bless you, my dear Duchess, I must take my leave as the Ship I am writing by is under weigh. I beg my best regards to the Duke & remain ever very sincerely and truly yours,

A. P.

*From the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Private.*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *Sept.* 25, 1807.

MY DEAR PAGET,—Your dispatches reached me this morning, and a ship being on the point of sailing for Lord Collingwood, I detain it by Telegraph in order that I may not lose a moment in sending you a formal approbation of this first exercise of your discretion.

\* Lord Fitzroy Somerset, afterwards Lord Raglan.—A. P.

I say the *first*; because it is hardly possible to conceive that in the state of affairs in the Mediterranean produced by the many changes which have taken place since you left England, there may not arise many cases in which you must act discretionally; and for which no instructions of mine, however voluminous, could sufficiently provide.

The new friendship between France & Russia will not last. But it will last long enough, & has lasted long enough, to put us to great inconvenience. I know *you* will approve of the operations off Copenhagen, by which a Northern Confederacy, an Invasion of Ireland, & the shutting of the Russian ports have been prevented. Russia trembled for Cronstadt, and has disavowed any Secret Articles injurious to England; a disavowal which no amicable application had succeeded in procuring from her.—Yours,

GEO. CANNING.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the EARL OF UXBRIDGE.*

"THETIS," OFF TENEDOS, 25 Sept. 1807.

MY DEAR FATHER,—I have as yet settled nothing, you will easily conceive the difficulties I have to contend against, so that I hope a great deal will not be expected from me. I have passed a cruel time, believe me, & it seems to me that I have done little more than learn to eat with my Fingers. I expect that our friend Edward will have enough on his hands ere long, as I understand that a Powerful French Army is on its march for the Invasion of Sicily. If I do not succeed here, it is probable that I shall go and take another look at him, & that would in all likelihood be in my way home. Lord Collingwood is gone from here with all the large ships except two, & with those my friend Admiral Martin will follow in a few days, so that I shall remain here in my Frigate. I hope they will amongst them keep a good look out below, for I have no fancy to be carried off by a French Line of Battle Ship or two, which would certainly be one way of putting an end to my Negotiation, which is what they are of course using every means to accomplish, but I am determined to hold on as long as I can. This is a very good Frigate, but she cannot move except under

double or close reefed Topsails; then she distinguishes herself particularly on a lee shore.

Surely party animosity was never carried to a higher pitch than it appears to be, as far as I can judge from the last Papers, but if the present Ministers act with Prudence nothing I imagine can shake them. I do not I own like the conduct of my friends the *Outs* according (to) the Idea I am enabled to form of it at this distance.

[A despatch from Sir A. Paget to the Right Hon. George Canning, on the 1st October, states that he went up to the entrance of the Dardanelles on the 27th September, and sent an interpreter to fix an interview with Ismail Pasha, when he should renew negotiations with all the additional force which the knowledge of the bombardment of Copenhagen would enable him to employ.]

*From Sir A. PAGET to Sir JOHN MOORE.*

H.M.S. "THETIS," OFF THE DARDANELLES,  
1st October 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,—I am extremely mortified, as you will easily believe, that you should have experienced so much disappointment at the delay, which has attended the return of the Troops from Egypt, but in my own justification (if any is necessary) I must call to your recollection that if the suspension of the order for the evacuation of that province was agreed upon by us for the purpose of facilitating my negotiation with the Porte, it was equally and mutually understood, that that postponement was entirely subject to any new order, which unforeseen circumstances might have obliged you to send to M. General Frazer; so little doubt indeed have I always entertained of such being the Terms upon which that answer was agreed to, that I have uniformly expressed myself to that effect in my Letters on the subject to the Secretary of State. There could be but one reason for inducing us to suspend Lord Castlereagh's instructions for withdrawing the Troops from Alexandria, and that is the benefit which might arise from that determination to the public service. If therefore you, who had well weighed and well understood the Subject, could foresee that some greater benefit than that

which we had proposed to ourselves, would be reaped by a more immediate return of the Troops, could there exist a doubt of the propriety, nay of the necessity of annulling our agreement respecting them? I refer you to Lord Collingwood for the anxiety of mind I have experienced on this Subject, and whenever we meet I will prove to you that had I followed *my own suggestions*, the order for the evacuation would have been sent *much sooner*. . . .

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir ARTHUR PAGET to Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

[No. 14.]

H.M.S. "THETIS," OFF THE DARDANELLES,  
6th October 1807.

SIR,—On account of the Weather, and the illness of Ismail Pacha, the Interview with Him, announced in my Dispatch No. 12, did not take place till yesterday.

It was impossible to be more struck than He appeared to be when I related to Him the important intelligence contained in your Dispatch No. 8.\* He earnestly desired to be allowed to make an extract from it, to which I readily assented, but having done so He told me that the information was of such a nature that He hardly dare take upon Himself to transmit it to the Porte, unless I would consent to communicate myself the same Details to the Reis Effendi, and to state to Him that it was at my request that the Pacha had made a Translation of them. He insinuated to me that He should thereby avoid the Danger which such a responsibility would expose Him to.

At the commencement of the conference, Ismail Pacha produced a Letter from the Reis Effendi, in which it is said that "three grand Councils had been held since the receipt of the last Dispatches from the British Plenipotentiary, that the results of these Councils had been transmitted to the Sultan, the usual Forms of which had occasioned the present Delay, but that in the course of three or four days the answer would be sent off to the Dardanelles. . . ."

It is hardly necessary to say that I employed every means which suggested themselves to me to persuade the Turkish Plenipotentiary to bring the negociation to a

\* About Copenhagen.

speedy and favorable conclusion. The Fact however is that He is not vested with the powers of so doing. . . .

From all He said respecting the internal Situation of Affairs at Constantinople, it is evident that the Country is more or less in a State of Anarchy. The Sultan is young, inexperienced, and obstinate. His Ministers are stated to be entirely a new Set of Men, unequal to business, and altogether ignorant of the Forms and practices established between Governments. Almost all the different public bodies claim a right of being consulted in matters of State. Jealousy and Mistrust are spread amongst them.

I have in short received such accounts both from Ismail Pacha, and other quarters, relative to the State of that Country, as have convinced me of the total inexpediency of staying here any longer in pursuit of an object for the attainment of which I have exerted every means consistent with His Majesty's Dignity and Interests; in consequence of which I have, as will be seen in the enclosed Letter, signified to the Turkish Government that if in twelve days from to-morrow the 7th Inst. I do not receive a satisfactory answer to my Demands, I shall consider my mission as terminated.

At the expiration of that time very nearly twelve weeks will have elapsed since my arrival at Tenedos, a period unquestionably more than sufficient for the conclusion of the Business I came upon, had I found the same Disposition in the Turkish Government which has prevailed on my part.—I have the Honor to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

[A copy of Sir A. Paget's letter to the Reis Effendi was enclosed. He begins by remonstrating once more on the slowness and appearance of bad faith of the Porte. He is now authorised to make the following communication :—]

“ Depuis le Traité conclu à Tilsit entre S.M. l'Empereur de Russie et le Gouvernement Français, il ne reste plus de motif à S.M. Britannique pour poursuivre la guerre, qu'à l'instigation et à l'appui de son Allié, Elle avait commencée contre la Sublime Porte; en conséquence S.M. n'a rien de plus à cœur que de mettre fin aux Hostilités, et de

renouveler les anciennes Liaisons avec le Gouvernement Ottoman.

“ Il resulte de l'accord intime qui vient d'être établi entre le Souverain de la Russie, et le Chef du Gouvernement Français, que la Sublime Porte se trouve menacée du plus pressant Danger, et Elle peut se convaincre que le projet d'acquérir une augmentation de Territoire et d'influence en Europe aux Depens de la Turquie, arrêté depuis si longtems par ces deux Puissances, et dont l'exécution n'a été différée jusqu'ici que par la guerre survenue entr'Elles, est au moment d'être effectué.”

S'il pouvait exister des Doutes là-dessus, les stipulations renfermées dans le 22<sup>ème</sup> Article du Traité de Tilsit, savoir “ Les Troupes Russes se retireront des Provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie, mais les dites Provinces ne pourront être occupées par les Troupes de Sa Hautesse, jusqu'à l'échange des Ratifications du Futur Traité de paix définitif entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane,” sont sans contredit de nature à les lever, puisque de cet article on peut tirer deux conclusions irrécusables ; 1<sup>o</sup>, que ces deux provinces ont été virtuellement soustraites à la Souveraineté de la Porte ; 2<sup>o</sup>, que la Russie et la France se sont appropriés le Droit d'en disposer à leur gré. Le moment de donner à ces Provinces un nouveau Maître n'est vraisemblablement pas très éloigné.

Tel est l'aspect fâcheux que présente à la Turquie, cette partie du Traité susdit qui a été publiée mais le Gouvernement Britannique a reçu les avis *les plus certains* que les articles *secrets* de ce Traité sont bien plus funestes encore pour les intérêts des Mussulmans, attendu que là il ne s'agit de rien moins que du démembrement total de la Turquie Européenne.

Il est superflu d'ajouter, que dans aucun cas S.M. Britannique ne se serait prêtée à des projets tellement extravagans et si injurieux à Sa Hautesse ; et en faisant part de ces desseins au Gouvernement Ottoman son Ministère n'a d'autre but, que celui de prouver par là son desir sincère de le sauver d'un péril aussi imminent, se persuadant que la Sublime Porte emploiera tous les moyens à Sa Portée pour s'opposer à un Coup qui entraînerait de si grands desastres.

Quelque soit le résultat de ces Enterprises, S.M. sera



en tout tems, et partout où les évènements pourraient amener Sa Hautesse, disposée à reconnaître le Gouvernement Ottoman, et de resserrer et maintenir avec Sa Hautesse les anciens Liens de leur amitié.

Quant à l'Egypte, S.M. Britannique invite Sa Hautesse à envoyer à Alexandrie une Garnison composée de Troupes *Turques*, et elle offre en même tems de co-opérer avec une Force Navale pour la Defence de cette Province contre toute attaque de la part des Français.

[Sir A. Paget goes on to state that he had placed in the hands of Ismail Pasha a translation of this important communication. His Majesty only required as basis of the Treaty of Peace that the political and commercial relations of the country should be re-established, as they were before the war. In the hope of accelerating peace, orders had been given for the evacuation of Alexandria and the raising of the blockade, which the Porte had already declared would without further negotiation restore the former alliance and friendship. He proceeds to point out the diminished wealth of the country through the war, and to warn it of future evil.]

D'un autre côté, vous aurez bientôt devant les yeux le tableau affreux des malheurs que vous ont préparés vos liaisons avec la France; votre territoire violé, vos provinces envahies, vos Sujets soustraits à leur obéissance, des insultes multipliées faites à votre Religion, enfin des insurrections et des révolutions très dangereuses tramées par des agens Salariés. Voilà à quoi sert un système de temporisation et de condescendance à cette puissance.

Je me résume et je conclus qu'il est du très grand Intérêt de la Sublime Porte d'accepter l'offre de la paix que je lui renouvelle, et que d'après ses propres aveux, rien ne s'y oppose à l'accomplissement de cette ouvrage salutaire. En conséquence je demande, 1°, Que les ordres les plus précis soient incessamment envoyés à Ismail Pacha, par lesquels S.E. se trouvera autorisée à conclure et signer avec moi un Traité de paix définitif sur la base et les conditions dont nous sommes déjà convenus. 2°, Qu'un Firman me soit en même tems expédié afin que je puisse me rendre à bord de cette Fregatte, avec les personnes attachées à ma Suite à Constantinople.

Quelque pénible qu'il soit, il me reste encore un Devoir

à remplir ; c'est celui de prévenir V.E. que, si à l'expiration de douze jours, à compter du 7 de ce mois, mes demandes ne sont pas satisfaites, je le prendrai pour un aveu formel, qu'à la voie de la négociation, la Sublime Porte préfère d'abandonner le soin de terminer cette guerre au cours des évènements qu'elle pourra amener, et je regarderai ma mission comme terminée.

Je prie V.E. d'agréer les assurances de ma parfaite considération. (Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

[In a despatch of October 8th Sir A. Paget expresses his doubts whether the Pachas in European Turkey could be induced to make any efforts against Russia and France if England offered them only the support which the presence of a naval force would give them.]

*From Sir A. PAGET to the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING.*

H.M.S. "THETIS," OFF THE DARDANELLES,  
9th October 1807.

MY DEAR CANNING,— . . . You will see by my last Letter to the Reis Effendi that I have felt myself compelled *at length* to demand a final Decision, whether they will or whether they will not receive me at Constantinople? I am satisfied in my own mind (and I trust that upon a consideration of the whole case, you will feel the same) that I should have gained nothing by submitting to protract the negotiation; if indeed I have anything to reproach myself with on that Score, it is the having too long put up with the singular Treatment I have experienced. It is difficult to suppose that the Turks will be either so base as to allow me to go away. On the other Hand, I can with equal difficulty bring myself to believe that they will receive me. There is every appearance that this question must be decided in the course of the ensuing ten Days, as the time I have given them to determine will expire on the 18th inst. Such is their nature that I must expect to receive in the meantime some evasive proposition, but I must also say that I hardly foresee a case which can induce me to relax in the alternative I have stated in the Letter above mentioned. They cannot know that the evacuation of Egypt and the

Departure of Lord Collingwood's Squadron were events which, at the moment they took place, other causes had led to. I have, as you will see, stated them to be points which for the Love of Peace I had conceded. I conclude therefore that both as to Time and Matter I have yielded as much as I could consistently with Dignity and our Interests. But had I every Disposition so to do, I would not prolong my Stay here, for towards the end of this month we may be looking for such weather as that the Ship can no longer remain in safety in this place. I have already proposed to Ismail Pasha to allow the Frigate to pass the First Castles, in order to get to a safer Anchorage (for a worse than this cannot exist), but it appears that it is not within the Limits of His power to accede to such a request, so that in that view also nothing can be more unpleasant and precarious than our Situation here.

I have applied for the release of Captain Leake, which the Pasha has almost promised me. He, I should think, would be a proper person to send to the Pasha of Janina, but I shall not promise myself much from His mission. The French will have had full Time to carry their point with Him, as they seem to do with everybody and everything else on the Continent. The Letters brought by the *Delight* give me the account of the Evacuation of Egypt, and the release of all our Prisoners, with four or five exceptions, and I am much gratified by learning from General Frazer, that the Pasha of that Province professes Himself to be so much disposed towards us. I have however great Doubts as to the Sincerity of such Professions. It will, I apprehend, be very difficult indeed to get to the Pasha of Smyrna unless we make peace here.

I am quite ashamed at having written so much without having thanked you for your very kind private Letter of the 14th August. I wish I could guess what your wishes are with respect to me in the event of the negotiation failing; I should, had Trieste been open (which I understand it is not) probably have gone to Vienna, and there have awaited your Commands; as it is, unless I should in the meantime or on my arrival at Malta, find anything from you to make me alter my plan, I should naturally return Home.

(Signed)      ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to CHEVALIER D'ITALINSKY.*

"THETIS," DARDANELLES, *Ce 9 Octobre 1807.*

MON CHER AMI,—Un Ambassadeur d'Espagne en parlant un jour de la revolution Française, disait que certainement Elle finirait de manière ou d'autre, et c'est précisément ce que je puis vous annoncer de ma negociation, mais je serais fort embarrassé de vous dire *le comment*. Tout ce que je sais c'est que j'ai déclaré le 7 de ce mois à ces gens, *san préface*, que si dans 12 jours mes demandes n'étaient pas satisfaites, je regarderais ma Mission come terminée, et que je quitterais ces regions. Mon Turc à moi est, comme vous dites très bien, une bête incroyable ; aussi il ne fait rien sans consulter son secrétaire lequel, à l'avantage d'être complètement sourd, réunit celui d'être poltron comme Arlequin. Je vous assure que c'est la mer à boire que d'avoir affaire avec des gens pareils. Je voudrais bien savoir si les Turcs etaient, comme ils le sont aujourd'hui, avant l'arrivée de Mahomet, ou si c'est à lui que nous sommes redevable pour ce complément de faiblesse et de fausseté. Ils savent pourtant, plus ou moins, que vous autres vous allez faire le démembrement de leur Turquie Européene. Ils restent pourtant là la bouche béante et indécis, comme s'il s'agissait du retour de leur prophète. Quels incroyables gens, Grand Dieu ! Croyez vous qu'ils entendent beaucoup aux *idols of the Tribe, Idols of the den*, ainsi du reste ? En attendant le premier Dragoman de la porte a eu la tête tranchée ces jours ci, et on prétend que la mesintelligence regne entre le Reis Effendi et Sébastiani, et que le premier doit avoir déclaré qu'il ne traiterait plus avec le Sieur Franchini. À présent je vous serais infiniment obligé si vous vouliez bien m'expliquer ce que c'est que l'âme, et où elle siège, et pourquoi l'aiguille de la Boussole a une direction septentrionale. C'est que dans le cas que ma negociation venait à manquer, je voudrais au moins pouvoir instruire mon Gouvernement relativement à ces deux autres petits objets ; en verité j'ai beau y réfléchir, je suis obligé de convenir que je n'en sais rien.

Adieu ; dans 8 jours environ je compte n'être plus ici. J'espère bien vous retrouver à Malte si mon sort m'y conduit.  
—Most sincerely yours, (Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From SIR A. PAGET to the EARL OF UXBRIDGE.*

"THETIS," OFF THE DARDANELLES,  
9th October 1807.

Oh, if you knew what I undertook in coming out here! I foresaw a great deal, but it turns out that I foresaw little. The Negotiation must now be over in ten days, as I have given them that time to decide upon my demands. Should it fail, I have at least the satisfaction of thinking that when the whole of it is laid before the Public, which in *this Instance* will I trust be done, you will not feel ashamed of me. One thing at least is certain, which is that I have acted with an unexampled degree of Temper and Moderation. At this moment therefore I know not whether at the expiration of the time I have mentioned Peace will be signed, or whether I shall be on my return home; I only know which for my own sake I wish. At all events it is some comfort to think that I shall in either case be no longer in this wretched situation, for the Winter is beginning to shew itself, & the Gales of Wind here are no joke. If we are driven from our Anchors by a N. Easter we can to be sure go to sea, but if that happens from the Westward we must pass the Batteries, & they would, I dare say, play away properly. This is therefore not altogether pleasant. . . . I have alas nothing to send you for your Princesses. These Turkish Negotiations used in former times to be profitable concerns, but I have found nothing but disappointment and vexation. I know not why we went to War with these People, neither credit nor advantage could arise from it; we should have done much better to have prevented it with Russia, but this is "*moutarde après souper*." All I can now say is that this will be my last errand of the sort. Good-bye, my Dear Father, for I must send this Frigate off.—Pray believe me ever your most Dut. & aff. Son, A. P.

*From SIR A. PAGET to the REIS EFFENDI.*

À BORD DE LA FREGATTE DE S.M.B. "THETIS,"  
À L'EMBOUCHURE DES DARDANELLES,  
Ce 19me Oct. 1807.

MONSIEUR,—Mes Lettres du 18 Septembre et du 6 de ce mois sont restées sans reponse, encore que dans le dernier

de ces deux offices j'ai indiqué à Votre Excellence le cas où je ne pourrais plus prolonger mon séjour ici.

Ce cas est arrivé. Le silence offensant du Gouvernement Ottoman m'impose la nécessité de mettre fin à ma Mission, et de m'éloigner de Ses Etats.

Je ne me permettrai plus aucune reflexion sur la conduite que la Sublime Porte a cru convenable d'adopter dans cette occurrence-ci. C'est à Mon Souverain à la juger. Le Gouvernement Ottoman sera seul responsable des suites.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération.  
(Signé) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the RIGHT HON. GEORGE CANNING.*

[No. 16.]

H.M.S. "THETIS," AT SEA, 22nd October 1807.

SIR,—It is with great concern that I have to acquaint you, that the negociation has been broken off by the Turkish Government.

It will have been seen by my letter to the Reis Effendi of the 6th Instant that I gave that Minister twelve Days to decide whether they would conclude the Treaty of Peace, the articles of which had been agreed to by the Turkish Plenipotentiary and myself.

On Wednesday evening the 14th October, Ismail Pasha was suddenly taken ill and died.

I fully expected that this event would have been seized as a pretext for delaying the negociation, but as I remained without any communication whatever from the Turks, I on Sunday the 10th Instant (the day on which the term expired) wrote to the Reis Effendi to announce to Him the termination of my mission, and have the honour to enclose a copy of that Letter.

The same night I received a message from the Capitan Pasha, desiring to see me the following morning.

At this Interview I was very soon relieved from the anxiety I had lately undergone, by receiving from the Pasha a verbal communication to the following Effect.

"That He had been instructed in a Letter written to Him by order of the Grand Signior, to avail Himself of the first opportunity to inform the British Plenipotentiary that however anxious the Sultan felt to renew the former

Ties of Friendship which subsisted between Him and His Britannic Majesty, still that His Situation with respect to Russia and France had become so critical, that He felt Himself compelled to decline the offer of Peace, which had been made to Him by His Majesty, until the negociation now pending with Russia should be concluded.

"That the Porte, however, does not consider itself at War with Great Britain, that the Sultan had therefore upon this occasion renewed His former orders to the Capitan Pasha that the British Flag should in no case be molested by Turkish Ships of War, and that in the event of any of the Latter being met at Sea by British Ships of War, they should forbear firing, and communicate their Instructions to the British Commander.

"Finally that at the expiration of four months, the Epoch at which the negociation with Russia would be terminated, the Sultan was determined to solicit the conclusion of a Definitive Treaty of Peace with His Britannic Majesty."

This communication, which strongly marks the pitiful feelings and conduct of those who made it, was, it is to be observed, received by the Capitan Pasha, many days previous to the Demise of the Turkish Plenipotentiary, Ismail Pasha. Whether the latter had also been instructed to break off the negociation, and had, for His own private reasons, taken upon Himself to suspend the execution of those Instructions is what I have not ascertained, but, generally speaking, I have too much reason to believe that in the conduct of that negociation He by no means acted with the Degree of Fairness and Zeal on which upon every occasion He professed to pride Himself.

With regard to the Capitan Pasha, I am bound to say, that as far as my occasional Intercourse with Him will enable me to form a Judgment, I found Him an upright, well meaning man, and so strongly impressed was He of the policy of re-establishing the former System between the two Courts, as well as of the weakness and perhaps the perfidy of the present Turkish Ministers that, previous to the appointment of Ismail Pasha, He actually proposed to that Plenipotentiary to take the business into their own Hands, and to conclude and sign a Treaty with me, an act the responsibility of which Ismail at once declined.

Nor have I better reason to be satisfied with the Treatment I experienced, independent of the immediate business of the negociation. Instead of being received in a suitable manner ashore, I was allowed to remain on board ship during the whole course of it, sometimes off Imbro, sometimes off Tenedos, and at others off the Dardanelles, according to the State of the Weather and Wind : nay, so little was it in the contemplation of the Turkish Government to afford me any personal accommodation, that incredible as it may appear, it is perfectly true, that the Frigate I am on board would not have been permitted, even in stress of weather, to have passed the Batteries at the Entrance of the Dardanelles. Upon the whole I could not have experienced greater Inhospitallity and Inattention among the most uncivilized people, and if I introduce these observations it is solely with a view of proving, in addition to the written Documents, that the negociation was conducted on the part of His Majesty with perhaps a greater Degree of Forbearance and Moderation than was strictly justifiable. . . .—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR PAGET.

*From Major-General the Hon. EDWARD PAGET to  
Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

MELAZZO, 16th October 1807.

The forerunners of the Egyptians are arrived at Messina & Syracuse, which has been the Signal of Preparation for another Embarkation and I am one under Orders. The Brigade of Guards & Six Battalions of the Line compose the force—with Major Gen<sup>l</sup> Wynyard Fraser, Oakes & Your Humble Servant. . . . Thank Heaven the News is completely confirm'd of the fall of Copenhagen. We have not yet the English Accounts, but the Danish translated into the Italian contain Every Thing one could wish or desire. After an incessant & dreadful Bombardment of five Days in which one fourth of the City of Copenhagen was laid in ashes, the Place Surrendered. Twenty Sail of the Line, Sixteen Frigates and in all 131 Sail of Pendants great & Small, with all the Naval & Military Stores in the Arsenal, have fallen into our Possession & to be removed without Loss of Time. Four Millions Sterling are



said to have been found in the Public Treasury, and the Amount of the Injury occasioned by the Bombardment is Estimated by the Danes at 86 Millions of Ducats. Terrible! It appears to have been in contemplation to burn the ships, but Lord Cathcart sent them word, if they did that he should deliver up the City to Pillage. We shall henceforth be dub'd the Nation of Saracens instead of the Nation of Shopkeepers. On the other hand, the accounts from Rio de la Plata are most calamitous. We know nothing however but from foreign journals which state that General Whitelocke attack'd Buenos Ayres with three columns. That Gen<sup>l</sup> Sir Samuel Auchmuty succeeded with His, but that the other two, under Gen<sup>l</sup> Lumley & Colouel Crawford, failed, *the latter laying down his Arms*. So much for the Military Exploit of this Hero, who was to perform such Prodigies. They further state that General Whitelocke offer'd to evacuate Monte Video *for permission* to retire unmolested, which was in the first Instance refused, but afterwards assented to. Finally it appears that we have abandoned South America *in toto*. How the Devil such a man as this could have been appointed to such a command has been subject of amazement to the whole army, for independent of his Manners which are coarse & brutal to the most insupportable degree, he is notoriously known to have the greatest antipathy to the smell of Gun Powder.

*From M. DE GENTZ to Sir A. PAGET.*

PRAGUE, le 15 Novembre 1807.

Depuis plusieurs mois un bruit sourd m'annonçoit la possibilité de votre arrivée à Vienne; hier on me dit que Vous étiez effectivement à Trieste. La chance est trop belle, pour que je n'essaye pas au moins de me rapprocher de Vous. Vous n'aimez pas les phrases; quelquefois même l'expression d'un sentiment vrai et profond ne produit pas sur Vous l'effet que l'on voudroit atteindre; mais quoiqu'il en résulte, il faut que je Vous dise, que notre séparation même m'a appris, que l'attachement que Vous m'avez inspiré a quelque-chose de particulier, et d'*unique*. Je n'ai jamais pu parler de Vous, je n'ai jamais rencontré Votre nom dans une gazette, sans éprouver l'emotion la plus

sensible; un mélange de respect, d'intérêt, et de tendresse, que je ne puis comparer à rien. Et lorsque Kraus m'a dit, que Vous aviez bien voulu lui parler de moi, dans des termes, qui m'ont paru prouver que je Vous inspirais encore quelqu' intérêt, je puis dire que j'ai tressailli de plaisir.

J'ai suivi Votre carrière publique avec une attention conforme à ces sentimens. Votre nomination à l'Ambassade de Constantinople—hélas ! pourquoi ne pouvoit-elle pas avoir lieu trois ou quatre mois plutôt !—m'a enchanté ; j'ai supposé que Vous en seriez content, et j'ai cru y voir le présage d'une infinité de bien. Je ne connois nullement les détails de vos négociations et de Vos démarches ; je ne sais pas même, si Votre départ actuel est l'annonce d'un mauvais succès, ou seulement la suite d'une suspension temporaire de Vos opérations. Tout ce que je sais, c'est, que si Vous n'avez point réussi, *personne* n'eut réussi à Votre place ; l'étendue des malheurs de l'Europe, l'asservissement total du continent, la situation générale des affaires de Votre pays—voilà les seuls écueils, contre lesquels Vous avez pu échouer ; car quant aux difficultés particulières et locales, je suis sur, que Vous les auriez toutes surmontées.

Dans aucun tems des constellations plus sinistres ne se sont réunies sur l'Angleterre ; et cependant je suis loin, très-loin de désespérer de son salut. Si la fermeté et le courage continuent à présider à ses conseils, si l'expédition contre l'Amérique Espagnole est reprise sous de plus heureux auspices, si on ne manque pas le moment favorable, pour transporter le Portugal au Brésil, si une force respectable et imposante est établie à l'entrée des Dardanelles pour surveiller, et pour mettre à-profit, le moment, où la France et la Russie entameroient quelque projet sur la Porte, l'Angleterre en sortira avec gloire. Ce ne sont pas les ennemis du dehors, c'est *l'Intérieur* qui m'inquiète et qui me tourmente. Que l'on me garantisse pour dix, ou seulement pour cinq ans, la vie précieuse du Roi, et l'impuissance permanente du parti qui (selon ma conviction intime) a été l'auteur principal de tous les maux de l'Angleterre et de l'Europe—et les décrets et les fureurs de Bonaparte ne troubleront plus mon sommeil.

- Vous savoir à Vienne, sans y être, sera pour moi une

terrible privation ; et pourtant, voilà probablement le sort qui m'attend. Il faut Vous dire que je me trouve dans une espèce d'exil honorable. Après avoir rendu à la cour pendant les derniers tems de mon séjour à Dresde, des services assez essentiels, qui, je crois, ont fait reconnoître que je n'avois pas mal fait de m'y établir, j'ai passé au mois d'Octobre dernier, au-moment même où la guerre a éclaté, quinze jours au quartier-général Prussien. Témoin de tous les actes de démente, par lesquels la cour de Prusse s'est précipité dans la gouffre de la ruine, initié dans tous les Secrets, qui ont précédé et préparé sa chute, j'ai fait les derniers efforts, pour concilier les intérêts de l'Autriche avec les intérêts communs de l'Europe. On m'a su gré à Vienne de la manière dont je m'étois conduit dans cette occasion épineuse ; mais, redoutant l'effet que pourroit produire mon arrivée après ces mêmes événemens, on m'a insinué de rester à Prague. J'y ai passé assez agréablement l'hiver dernier ; j'ai partagé ensuite la belle saison entre Teplitz et Carlsbad, où j'ai vu pendant cet été une quantité de personnes intéressantes, et la plus grande partie de mes amis des differens quartiers de l'Allemagne. À l'approche de l'automne le Cte. Stadion m'a écrit avec beaucoup de bonté, qu'il ne demandoit pas mieux que de me revoir à Vienne cet hiver, mais qu'il se reservoit "de concerter plus particulièrement avec moi *l'époque* où je devois m'y rendre." J'attends donc sa décision positive ; mais il ne me convient pas de presser cette décision ; et d'après plusieurs renseignemens que me sont parvenus, je ne crois pas, qu'elle arrive de si-tôt. On continue à craindre les observations, les conjectures, les critiques, auxquelles mon apparition à Vienne pourroit donner lieu ; et, quelque désir que je puisse avoir d'y aller, je ne voudrois cependant pas moi-même pour tout-au-monde ajouter par ma présence le moindre petit embarras de plus à la situation déjà assez difficile de cette cour. Ainsi je suis parfaitement résigné ; et je puis vous certifier que je supporterois avec calme la nécessité de rester à Prague, si *Votre* arrivée à Vienne n'emportoît pas trop la balance.

Je suis bien, qu'au cas, qu'elle se réalise, Vous y trouverez une quantité d'objets qui occuperont tous Vos momens, et sur lesquels je suis trop juste et trop discret de vouloir empiéter. Mais s'il Vous survient un quart-d'heure, que

vous ne sauriez mieux employer, veuillez de grace Vous souvenir de moi, et me dire quelque mot de bienveillance. Je ne puis y prétendre qu'à un seul titre ; à celui de la fidélité inébranlable, avec laquelle j'ai conservé les sentimens qui m'attachent à Votre personne et à Vos intérêts. Puissiez-Vous être aussi heureux et aussi satisfait, que Vous le méritez par Vos nobles talens, par Votre zèle pour le bien-public, et pour Votre grande et belle ame ! C'est là le voeu constant et ardent de Votre très-obéissant, très dévoué, et très fidèle serviteur

GENTZ.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the EARL OF UXBRIDGE.*

No date, but probably November 1807.

You will perhaps be surprised to hear that I am going to figure in another Court, as there is still one left open to us all, the Court I speak of, is nothing more or less than the Court of King's Bench. The fact is this. In the *Oracle* Newspaper of Friday last there was an Article about me in which it was stated that I had refused to go abroad untill three quarters of a year's salary was paid down—that, like my Employers, I possessed the weakest & most contemptible Talents,—that I thought of nothing but my own Interests & neglected nothing but my Duty—that Lord Grenville would not employ me, that Mr. Fox held me in contempt,—that the Country had already paid ten or twenty (I forget which) thousand Pounds for this last Mission of mine, besides Secret Service money, & that the nation would be well off if this Frolic of Sir Arthur's did not cost it One Hundred Thousand Pounds. In short the whole of the Article in question has been found so infamous & libelous that *without my knowledge* Government has taken the business up, & has ordered the Attorney General to prosecute the Editor, Publisher &c. & at dinner at Canning's yesterday I found them all as savage about it and as determined as you could wish. It is indeed too bad, & if the Jury do not find it a libel we had I believe better follow the example of the Americans, & abolish Juries. Most of all the Gentleman says is downright falsehood. I had *no salary*, & I really believe that the Bills I have drawn during the 7 months do not amount to more than seven or eight Hundred Pounds. On Secret

Service, not one Farthing was spent. I have a certain letter in my possession from Mr. Fox which will I think confute that charge. In short you may I think feel confident as to the Result of this business.

*From the Right Hon. GEORGE CANNING to Sir A. PAGET.*

[*Private.*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, Dec. 30, 1807.

MY DEAR PAGET,—I earnestly beg you to decide (& decide right) as quickly as you can. I am beset with applications—& some which I can answer only by saying that I *have* made the appointment.\*—Ever sincerely yours,  
(Signed) GEO. CANNING.

[*Private.*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 13, 1808.

MY DEAR PAGET,—We have received intelligence to-day which appears to prove a willingness on the part of the Turks to come to terms of peace. On this invitation the negotiation will probably be renewed. I hardly imagine that you will like a second trip to the Dardanelles. But I do not think it right to appoint any other person, without previously ascertaining your wishes.—I am, dear Paget, very sincerely yours,  
(Signed) GEO. CANNING.

\* There is nothing to show to what this refers, but whatever it was, it was not accepted.—A. P.

## APPENDICES



## APPENDIX I

### LORD PAGET'S LETTERS FROM THE PENINSULA : 1808

*From Lord PAGET to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

EGERIA, VIGO BAY, Aug 17th, 1808.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I believe I promised to write. As yet I have nothing interesting to relate. We have had some hard weather—always blowing & cold & sometimes thick & rainy. This is truly the most complete Corsair I ever saw. I did not think that an English Man of War could be so wanting in every thing. Barring 2 or 3 Individuals, I never met with such a mass of Ignorance & awkwardness. There are not 20 Seamen in the ship. We have been twice on board of other Ships—Once in a very critical situation, & our escapes have been most frequent. *Pour le mangaille—c'est inconcevable!* From eternal hairbreadth escapes our nerves are reduced to such a State, that Sleep has abandoned us. The whole thing surpasses credibility. But this *entre nous*.

What are our operations to be? I know not. Junot is our object, I suppose, but what then. We must have Spanish news from England, & I trust to you for all intelligence & even conjecture.

When I saw you, I had every prospect, as I thought, of a brilliant situation. I had seen the distribution by which it appeared that I was to command a most eligible Corps. It was composed of what Cavalry there was in the Expedition—some light Artillery, I believe, & Infantry, chiefly Light. All this is changed; I find myself destined to lead a division of Infantry—Pleasant! The fact is that by Moore's having two Generals above him, he is as a *douceur* complimented with the Reserve (with all the good things). This is natural enough—It is quite right, & God knows I am most fully aware that he is much more competent to such a charge than I am, but you will admit,



that having had this corps in expectation myself, I may without being accused of being unreasonable, feel a little uncomfortable. And the fact is that I really do feel so most completely. In short—Will they or will they not send out a good corps of Cavalry—If they do, they shall see if I like the Service—If they do not, I already foresee that I shall be *no where*, & that I had much better be any where else. I don't know that I should make a good *Chef de Cavalerie*—but I am sure, I shall make a very bad *Officier de Ligne*, for I detest the idea, & whatever one does not like, one does ill. I state all this freely to you, as I have done other things. . . . —Ever yours Affect',  
 PAGET.

Since writing the above, we are come to an anchor in Mondego Bay & disembark to-morrow (the 22<sup>d</sup>). Burnand is gone forward to join Wellesley—They have had a trifling affair—My speculation is that Junot will soon be glad to capitulate, in which case, our campaign will be very short—What next? Is Austria to fight? I suspect that Bonaparte finding himself likely to be foiled in Spain will attack Austria by way of getting out of *this* scrape. I am all for Cavalry Cavalry Cavalry—This won't do for me I see—I am *nowhere*.—Adieu.

ASTORGA, Novr 23<sup>d</sup>, 1808.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—Before this reaches you, you will have been in some measure prepared for all the disasters which already have occurred & which are still to take place. I will briefly touch upon the principal points. Blake, after several actions in which he once or twice had a sort of advantage, has been completely beaten & his Army totally dispersed. This was done with numbers inferior to his, but so managed that the French were as usual always the strongest at the points of attack. His Corps no longer exists, nor, from all the accounts that have reached me, is there a chance of assembling another in the Asturias, which the Enemy is overrunning. The Army of Estramadura which had advanced to Burgos is also beaten and dispersed. In a letter received from Col<sup>l</sup> Graham who has been with Castanos, it appears that his Army has not more than 20,000 Men & Palafox 10,000,




*Earl of  
Exbury*

*Marquis of  
Anchise*

*Duke of  
Cumberland*

*Hon. Berkeley  
Paget*

**PURCHASING PIPES AT IPSWICH BARRACKS BEFORE EMBARKING FOR THE PENINSULA**



& that none of these are equipped, many half naked, & that in fact they cannot be considered in a state to keep the field. I know of no reinforcements any where—The game therefore is considered as completely up. Our Government must have been most grossly deceived in regard to the situation of the Spanish Armies, the Resources of the Country & the Dispositions of the People.—We do not discover any *enthusiasm* any where. The country appears to be in a state of complete Apathy, & just in that which will make it a most easy prey. I have no doubts whatever that a junction of Moore's & of Baird's Corps is impossible. We cannot venture into the plain, till the arrival of the Cavalry, which will not be all come up till the 3<sup>d</sup> of Decr. Supposing the French did not till then advance in force between, it would still be a very hazardous operation, as they are immensely superior in that Arm—but this will not be the case. The Corps which beat Blake & that which fought at Burgos are now both unlocked & can now have no other object than to prevent this junction, & to fall upon one or both Corps separately. But even if we were to form the junction, we have now no ulterior object. There is no Spanish Army & altho' 30,000 Men, which we should be, might probably beat the first Corps that tried with us, still that could do no good, & there is *no salvation* for the *Spanish Nation*, take my word for it. It has not a Government to contend with the French—These Devils will, to a certainty, carry all before them. They have manœuvred in this Campaign *precisely* as I foretold. I gave them credit for the most rapid movements possible, when they did begin, & they have made them, but I own I did expect a better defence on the part of the Spaniards, altho' I had no doubt of the result being unfavorable to them.

Moore has written to say that the moment the French enter Valladolid, He shall fall back upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I have not the least doubt, therefore, that he is in full retreat. He has left it to Baird to consult his own safety, by retiring upon the most convenient point for embarkation,—conceiving all chance of junction at an end. In effect it is so, unless the French lay down & go to sleep for 10 days, which they are not in the habit of doing.

*Novr 24th.*

The Retreat is begun into a Position at Villa Franca, in consequence of Intelligence that the Enemy has concentrated a considerable force at Rio Sias, & of Blake & Romana, who are at Leon without troops, having desired that Sir David Baird might be apprised that the Enemy has pushed forward between him & Moore. The Rear Guard of Light Infantry remains here this night. I shall stay with it. The Cavalry is to come forward to cover the Front of the Infantry, & all I pray for is that the Enemy will allow our Infantry to remain sufficiently long in their Position to enable the Hussars to give them one brush.

S<sup>r</sup> J. M. knowing that we have no transports, suggested the possibility of the Cavalry march thro' Portugal. That however is deemed impossible. We are now a great deal further from it than the Enemy, &, from the nature of the Country, sh<sup>d</sup> be obliged to march back to S<sup>t</sup> Jago in order to get there, & so along the coast. In the mean time a Corps of Light Inf<sup>y</sup> would only have to cross the Mountains by a short Route & lay themselves across our Route, when unprotected by either Infantry or Artillery, we should cut a pretty figure in a very mountainous & intersected Country, unprovided with Magazines of any Sort. All we have to do therefore is to cover the Infantry of this Corps into the Passes, then to accompany it to Vigo, where we may either throw ourselves into Bayonne (a wall'd town I believe) or even transport the Horses to the Bayona Islands, where by means of the forage, which is on Board some Ships now at Corunna, we may exist until Transports are sent for us from England. But even this is uncertain if very closely & heavily pressed, we may be obliged to destroy most of the Horses & save the Men. Pleasant! How most sincerely do I rejoice that the Duke of York did not come here. An Angel could do us no good, & Mr Cobbett, & our Governors the Editors, would without hesitation have attributed all the disasters of the Spaniards to Him.

The Cavalry has a very harassing & difficult march,—are very ill put up, & tho' marching thro' a country with some resources, suffering from the want of faith in Spanish

Contractors & want of skill & Method in our Commissaries. Still we have managed *much* better than our neighbours. The Horses suffer a great deal in their feet, & I have been obliged to make the men lead them a great part of the way. Oh! we could have done well, I am sure we could, if we had had the opportunity. I am in despair. The fates are against us. The French have been too quick. Neither Moore nor Baird can help themselves. All we can do is to give the Foe a good Black Eye if he is impertinent in our Retreat. *Tout ceci me degoute du Gouvernement & du Service. Il n'y a pas d'honneur à gagner. On peut bien le perdre.*

10 o'clock P.M.

I am going to-morrow morning to try to find out Blake & Romana, to ascertain what are their intentions & what their means, & to endeavour to gain more certain Intelligence of the Enemy. . . .

Mills came by Benavento, where the Enemy was momentarily expected, but where he was not actually. They had patroled to within 14 Leagues of Madrid. If anything would but stop them for another ten days, We might still join Moore. I know not that we could even then do anything very material, but still we *might* fight a good battle, *we* might even catch hold of *Imperial Brother* in the scuffle,—we might retire into Andalusia, &, if the Spaniards are but a quarter as good as they have been represented to be, there might still be a slight glimmering of hope.—In much haste, Ever aff<sup>ly</sup> Y<sup>r</sup>, P.

*From Captain The Hon. CHARLES PAGET to Sir  
ARTHUR PAGET.*

. MY DEAREST ARTHUR,—This sad news from Spain has occasioned a great bustle here in getting all the Ships ready for Sea. I should suppose that things are so bad that we shall immediately recall our Troops. I should not be sorry to be sent to receive Paget, Edward, and Berkeley—& ensure their safety. . . . CHARLES.

Novr 26th 1808.

*From Lord PAGET to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

SAHANGA (?), Dec. 22, 1808.

You will be pleased to hear that I have had an affair with the French Cavalry, & have given them a good licking. It was with those lucky Rogues the 15th,—who always happen to be under my hand, when there is any thing to be done.

The following is the History :—Hearing that a French General with 700 or 800 Cavalry was at this place, I determined upon trying to catch them, & for this purpose, ordered G<sup>t</sup> Slade to march with the 10th and 7 Guns on our side the River, to make a Show and if possible push into the town, whilst I marched at 1 o'clock A.M. to get round the town with about 400 of the 15th & about 12 Men of the 7th. In the night my advanced Guard fell in with a Patrole of the Enemy, from whom 5 Prisoners were taken, but as the others escaped, I was obliged to push very fast, lest they should take the alarm & escape. I judged right, for having come to my point before daylight, I found the Enemy formed without the town. I judged them to be between 6 & 700 Men, but from the reports of Prisoners they must have amounted to 750. As soon as they could distinguish us, they made off in good order. I marched in column Paralell, but a good deal behind them, gaining however upon them. At length seeing they must be caught, they halted & formed; I pursued a little further to secure them, halted, wheeled into Line & charged, just as you have often seen us do at Ipswich. The French fired at us, & stood firm to receive us. We broke them & the result was several killed, 19 Wounded, 2 L<sup>t</sup> Co<sup>ls</sup>, 1 Capt<sup>n</sup>, 10 Lieu<sup>ts</sup> between 150 & 160 Men & 125 Horses & some Mules made prisoners,—Col. Grant, Aj<sup>t</sup> Jones, & 22 Men of the 15<sup>th</sup> wounded. The March & the attack were beautiful, nothing could exceed it, but the pursuit was sadly disorderly. I gave the Regiment a good scolding for it after the affair was over, & the answer they gave me was three cheers, & a request that I would accept as a token of their regard the two best Officers' Horses that were taken. You would be pleased, if you were to hear all they say about me. I

cannot write it. I am quite well & was not touched. I rode Harlequin,—he carried me admirably over the roughest & most difficult ground that can be imagined. The 18th have had two or three little affairs with the Enemy & acquitted themselves admirably. In the last, a Cap<sup>t</sup>, Sub<sup>n</sup>, & about 30 Men attacked 100, killed 20, & made 5 Prisoners. All this is very well, but Spain is gone, nor are the People worth saving.—Aff. Yours, .

PAGET.

BENAVENTE, *Decr. 28th*, 1808.

The Cavalry have been again successful,—a small party of the 18th took 12 Men the other morning, the same day Co<sup>l</sup> Kerrison, L<sup>t</sup> Crawford, & 2 Men of the 7th, after a long chase, came up with an Officer & 12 French Cavalry. They took all the Men—Kerrison in engaging an officer wounded him so desperately that he died before he could reach his supports, this Officer, in a desperate thrust, broke Kerrison's arm with the hilt of his Sword. On the 26th, hearing of a Party of Cavalry at Majorga, I took 2 Squadrons of the 10th & found 2 Squadrons of the Enemy without, & a small party in the town;—I advanced with one Squadron ordering the others to support,—they fired as we came thro' the gateway, & retired to some high ground. We attacked them again, they again fired, by which they killed two & wounded one Horse. They stood firm, we broke them, killed several, wounded 20, & took Prisoners, 1 Officer, 100 Men & 50 Horses. To-day about 30 of the 18th were attacked by a very superior force,—they were obliged to fall back, but they took an Officer & two Men. *We* are in the greatest favor. The Army is retreating & it is high time it should, for there are no Spaniards & lots of French.

We are all well but a good deal harrassed. PAGET.



## APPENDIX II

### LORD ANGLESEY'S LETTERS RESPECTING IRELAND: 1828-29

[THE following are the letters from the Marquis of Anglesey to his brothers Sir Arthur and Sir Charles respecting the Catholic question in Ireland, referred to in the Biographical Memoir under the heading of Lord Anglesey. Also a letter from Lord Anglesey to Lord Holland, and one from Sir Arthur Paget to Lord Anglesey:—]

*From the MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY to Sir A. PAGET.*

PHENIX PARK, *June 2d*, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I have just received your letter. I have not much time for pleasure writing, or you sh<sup>d</sup> have found me a better correspondent. What you say is, I believe, perfectly true. The very persons you name, have I suspect done the principal mischief, but I must add one to the list of firebrands, who I dare say surpasses them all—The Doctor!

I am in a distressing dilemma. All *my* friends are walking off, I hardly know why. Yet all are requiring *me* to stay behind. To have a Rear Guard is very well, if you can count upon support, but when quite abandoned, it alters the Case.

Between a disinclination to increase the embarrassments of the Government, at a moment when my retirement would infallibly produce much irritation here, & a horror of acting with inconsistency & appearing to acquiesce in arrangements which I wholly disapprove, I am in a very cruel position.\* I will some day shew you Copies of all

\* Lord Anglesey, as Viceroy for the Peel-Wellington Government, was supposed to represent an uncompromising hostility to Emancipation; but he soon became an eager champion of that measure and of many other reforms. He was of opinion that what Ireland needed was a great impartial Imperial



HENRY WILLIAM, MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY



letters I have written upon this Crisis \*—To the D. of W. —To Lamb—& To Huskisson,—These being more or less interested in what may be my determination, I shall of course not be wholly guided by Them. To Holland, however, who is independent both of the Ins & the Outs, I have stated my case. If under the present unpromising aspect, that excellent Man (in council with the real friends of Ireland such as little Newport, Doherty & I must add Lamb) thinks I can be of service in remaining here, I will do so. Every assurance has been given to me that there will be no change unfavourable to this Country, & I must say that both Parties upon this spot greatly encourage me to stay by Them under any circumstances, but if I find that the principles of my most esteemed friend (for so He really is) L<sup>d</sup> Eldon, & of my other good friend (whom you know I have always supported in His most unpopular moments) The Duke of Cumberland, are to be put in force; in short if we are to have an Ultra Tory, Anti-Catholic Cabinet, then nothing shall tempt me to stand It. This Country is in a deplorable state, but by no means in a hopeless one. It is capable of great things—of immense improvement. With encouragement, with care, with firmness, with Moderation, I am quite persuaded that it would make rapid strides in prosperity from the moment that the great question is satisfactorily adjusted. Even pending the final settlement, much good may be effected, provided a reasonable hope is kept up that the door to emancipation is not finally closed.

You may be assured that even the most violent of the Agitators are not in *fact* so violent as they would appear. They are amenable & practicable. I find no difficulty any where. Even on the other side, that strange man Sir Harcourt Lees & gang are tractable. They will all do anything here with good treatment.

'Tis a strange Country, however, & a strange state of society, but with immense capabilities. I am hard at work † with a variety of little projects of improvement, but

policy—public works, development of resources, and education. He predicted the fall of the Church Establishment.

\* The reconstruction of the Ministry.

† He took counsel far and wide; the enlightened Dr. Doyle was his friend, and he more than once consulted the political sagacity of the famous Smithfield salesmaster, Billy Murphy.

hitherto I have made no impression on the other side of the water. When I am quite decided as to the Course I mean to steer, I will let you know It.

I have not time to write to poor dear Charles who & whose family are now alas ! in dreadful distress. Nor to the Governor.\* Perhaps They will like to read this.—  
Ever affec<sup>d</sup> Yours,  
ANGLESEY.

PHENIX PARK, June 20th, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I promised to write when every thing was settled with regard to this Country. After much *pourparler*, it is directed that I remain here. The Ministers are anxious that I should not move. I am assured both by Protestants & Catholicks that They wish It, & all those valuable friends whom I have consulted being themselves wholly unconnected with the Government, desire me to retain my Post.

The next question has been,—the appointment of a Chief Secretary. My right of Veto was acknowledged, but yet I have not got a Man in whom I have confidence. I have most unequivocally stated this to the Duke of Wellington & to Mr. Peel. I demanded to have a safe practical man of business, yet after all, they have given me one who has every thing to learn. His scholarship, his taste, his literary acquirements are thrown away upon me. I can turn them to no account. In Sir George Clark whom I pointed out, I should have had a discreet, indefatigable workman, to whom I could have opened myself, & with whom I might have consulted. In L<sup>d</sup> F. Leveson Gower, who is appointed, I have a Man whose Manner is so cold, so rebuffing, so distant that it will be impossible to establish free & familiar intercourse, & then His Wife's Connexions are alone sufficient to make his appointment disagreeable, embarrassing, & even unsafe for me. I have written in the strongest terms both to Wellington & Peel my sentiments upon this head, at the same time, as I have no personal objection to the Man & am unable to urge His incompetency, I have assured Them that if, after having duly weighed my objections, they are still desirous to nominate L<sup>d</sup> Francis, I will receive Him & act with Him

\* General Sir Edward Paget, Governor of Sandhurst College.—A. P.

with as much zeal as if He was of my own appointing & that I will remain at my Post as long as I can hope to render effectual service. The result is that they *have* nominated Him & that they take, I think, great responsibility upon Themselves. I fear the Lady's family is intriguing, mischievous, gossiping & busy about the affairs of others, & this sort of Character is my aversion.

We were going on here remarkably well untill the late explosion took place.\* Both parties were moderate & well inclined to approximate,† & I had no doubt that Peace & Tranquillity wd have been preserved, untill the great question which (with such a course of prudent conduct) I doubted not would, at no distant period, be adjusted, had actually arrived. *Now* the aspect of affairs is a good deal changed. The Orange Party is elated with what they call a triumph; the Agitators are furious & are using very unmeasured language. The two great Days of Strife are approaching, & each Party is bent upon shewing its strength, and, if there is Collision, it will probably be pretty severe. In the mean time I have in a very quiet way taken every precaution that my means will admit of. I have fortunately got the goodwill & the confidence of some of the most influential Men of each, and if I have a little more good luck, the crisis may pass without mischief. But Vesey Fitzgerald's Election for Clare comes in very inopportunately.

We have still a sick House. Lady Louisa Cadogan continues in a very precarious State, and with Her want of Constitution, I fear it will go hard with Her. Ly. Anglesey has also been very ill, but Is rallying. Georgy

\* The Ministerial changes at the end of May.

† When Lord Anglesey succeeded Lord Wellesley he came to rule a country on the brink, as it seemed, of civil war. The Orangemen had made life intolerable for Lord Wellesley; not only had they publicly insulted him, not only had the famous "Bottle Riot" occurred in the theatre, but Lady Wellesley (a near relative of Jerome Bonaparte's wife) was hissed at and mobbed whenever she went publicly to Mass. The Orange rioters at the theatre were prosecuted, and of course acquitted; thereupon Lord Wellesley left Ireland in disgust. The country had been stirred into new life by O'Connell, and the great constitutional uprising of 1826 had made it clear that the Catholic voters, who had scarcely showed their strength in a single election since their enfranchisement in 1793, were now bent on seeking redress. The Catholic Association, nominally suppressed, ruled the people; meetings were held in Catholic chapels, and parishes were governed by Arbitration Courts popularly chosen. The climax was reached by O'Connell's election for Clare (July 5, 1828).

and Agnes went to England yesterday in high health and spirits. They have liked their sojourn here extremely. I am quite well and have not had pain \* the last 3 weeks. I am getting flesh fast. I ride from 7 to 9 every day and, besides that, I get as much exercise and sailing as I can, but I have too much indoors work for my taste.

We too are to have our Regatta. This warm-hearted people have made a considerable subscription, and Dublin Bay is to be a scene of much gaiety at the end of July.

I meditate a visit to Cork. I wish you would meet me there and return with me. I must however acknowledge that I can conceive nothing more improbable, unless indeed the faucy should take you to look after your young Cornet.†

I hope Ly. Augusta is quite well—to whom and to your children I beg my kind remembrances.—Ever affectly  
Yours,

ANGLESEY.

Pray send this to Edward.

*From the* MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY *to* Vice-Admiral  
Sir CHARLES PAGET.

PHENIX PARK, June 23rd, 1828.

MY DEAR CHARLES,—I have at this moment so much upon my hands and so many to watch, that I cannot pay you the visit I intend.

What the D. of Bedford has told you of O'Connell is too true. He is really unpractical. He is not to be depended upon from one day to another. He cannot depend upon Himself, for what He really means to do to-day, He is to-morrow induced to abandon, if He thinks He shall lose a spark of popularity by so acting. He quarrels with and abuses his best friends, and changes his tactics more suddenly than the weather Cock turns. I *know* He has perfect confidence in me. The subject of using my Proxy was naturally weighed on both sides of the water by the Sterling friends of the Catholics. By Holland, by Sir J. Newport, by Lamb and by various others on the one hand—By many of the Catholic Bishops and various others on this

\* Lord Anglesey was a great sufferer from *tic douloureux*.—A. P.

† Sir Arthur Paget's eldest son, Stewart, in the 7th Hussars.—A. P.

side and even (I happen to be certain of) by *O'Connell himself*, who said I ought not to give It,—that my line of conduct was the true one! Yet now He thinks it suits his purpose to proclaim a different feeling. I do assure you that to *me*, what He says is perfectly indifferent,—and what I think right I will do, and I will save His Cause in spite of Him, and whilst He is Himself marring It. I am convinced He can do me no harm.

Whilst writing, I learn that O'Connell has expressed his regret at having so talked at me, and I am assured that the language of the Meeting to-day will be far different from what it last was. But He has come to this strange determination,—To stand Himself for Clare!!! I knew yesterday that He thought of it. Now I know He means it, but still I do not assert that He will not change His Mind to-morrow. The fact is He is pretty well convinced that all opposition to Vesey Fitz<sup>d</sup> is hopeless, unless some great crisis is produced. O'Connell *may*, and probably will, succeed, and He will just sit until there is a Call of the House. In the mean time there will be rare work at Ennis, and I must look about me. Will you believe It? They sounded William\* as to whether He wd. stand and He very properly said He wd. never take another Step but by my sanction, and that he was sure I shd. object to that. The conduct of some of these People really looks like imbecillity.

Ld. Francis Leveson Gower is appointed Secretary here. I did not like the appointment but I am assured He will do very well, and I have had a most satisfactory letter from Him, and I shall receive Him with entire cordiality.

*From the MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY to Sir ARTHUR PAGET.*

PHENIX PARK, July 8th, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I have not time to tell you all that is going on, nor what I have done & the advice I have given, but I will send you, if not to day, in the course of a few days, a Paper & a letter or two which will put you *au fait* of my opinions. I send them under strict confidence, & I beg you to give your opinion freely upon the view I have taken. You will observe that the first im-

\* Lord Anglesey's second son, a captain in the Royal Navy.—A. P.



pression I received, & which has been daily strengthened, of the return of O'Connell, was that if He could be fairly seated, it would be a perfect Godsend, & would get rid of this odious question, which I in my conscience believe would be beneficial to all Parties & agreeable to most.

I do not think we shall come to Loggerheads at present. The Catholics have certainly used unjustifiable means & very disgusting & blackguard language, but they are now taking every pains to preserve tranquillity, & are preaching moderation & conciliation. They also know, I believe, that I do not mean to be an idle spectator of outrage.

If Government is wise & *is strong enough to be wise*, I think it is yet in time to avert further Evil, but if It attempts to keep things as they are, *I'll engage*, as they say here, that it will not do.\* The Orangemen too are terrible People to deal with. They are threatening all sorts of mischief for the 12th of July. In short, between the two factions, One is plagued to death here.—Ever affec<sup>d</sup> Yours,  
ANGLESEY.

P. P., July 11th, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I need not impress upon *you* that, as the Papers I inclose are Copies of communications I have made to the Government, You are not to be supposed to have seen them, but, in the present momentous crisis & upon the great overwhelming question, I like to know your opinion.

I am sorry to say that, bad as appearances were, previously to the Clare Election, They are now a great deal worse. The Agitators have displayed a power over the priests &, thro' them, over the People, that even Themselves were not aware of. They could not know their own strength. It is truly formidable, & there is a method & an organisation that is inconceivable. The Order preserved is truly astonishing. There was not one drunken man during the Election, & the Peace was not in the slightest degree broken. It is true, They were aware that I had drawn a Cordon around Them. That, together with the strong injunctions of the Agitators to be quiet, & even

\* The army was not to be relied on ; Catholic regiments cheered O'Connell, and Lord Anglesey reported that any attempt at repression would be very dangerous.

respectful in their demeanour, produced a quiet (in the midst of the most inflammatory language from the Hustings) that was never before known at a contested County Election.

Pray return the Papers.—Ever affect' Yours,

ANGLESEY.

I do not however apprehend immediate insurrection. The Agitators have no fancy to resort to the *ultima ratio rerum*. They think they can carry their points without It, but what w<sup>d</sup> have satisfied them a few years, or even a few Months ago, would be rejected with Scorn now, & the longer it is put off, the more difficult will be the question. My *private* speculation is, that the only chance of settling the question upon equitable terms for the parties, would be to raise a Rebellion, to put it down with a Master hand, & then to grant Concessions with reasonable grounds.

A.

RICH VIEW, KINGSTOWN, July 27th, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I just recollect that you asked my advice about sending your Boy Cecil to be educated with the Son of the Duke of Cambridge. As you give a very high Character of the Tutor, I should think it would be a desirable arrangement, as far as tuition & present disposal of time goes, but I am not sure if I think the companion of a Young Prince a very satisfactory situation. However I see no present objection to it, & as they will not be wedded, they may at any time separate. I have followed up those letters, which I am happy to find you approve, with other very energetic ones, & I am sure they will produce a deep effect & I hope even in the highest quarter. *There*, as you well know the real truth is so seldom told. I do not hesitate to tell you in strict confidence that *I* can settle the question upon much more advantageous terms than most people now think practicable.

*I know I can*, & I w<sup>d</sup> not say this, if I was not certain. How it is, I hardly know, but I have got hold of these people *surprisingly*, & unless the People on the other side of the water are *mad*, this great question may be satisfactorily adjusted early in the next Session. I would pledge my life that I made an arrangement that would be satisfac-

tory to *all* the Catholics & to *all but* the Ultra Orangemen, & I have converted several even of these. In short I really do see my way, if I am confided in & meet with fair play from the Ministers. I cannot enter into particulars, but you may rely upon it, that I have the game in my hand, if I am allowed to play it. But I sadly fear the D. of W. has not nerve to let me play it. He is temporizing, vacillating, & every minute lost is an advantage thrown away.

I am confident I shall be able to keep things quiet for the present. I calculate upon some cessation of the violence of agitation, & if that moment is seized to announce an intention of adjusting the question, all will go well. If that is neglected, the utmost irritation will be again excited, & those who will thus cause it must take the consequences.

Some day I will explain myself fully to you.

I saw Stewart the other day in high force. I gave Him a horse, & I presume He lives entirely with Him, for I have not seen Him since.—Ever aff<sup>ly</sup> Y<sup>r</sup>, ANGLESEY.

RICH VIEW, Augt. 2d, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I return Cobbett. We had Him in the Newspapers here several days.

All that will fall quite harmless upon O'Connell, & will not produce the slightest effect here.

You may have seen in the Papers that I have received O'Connell 6 days ago. I had no inclination to refuse Him, but at all events it would be indecorous not to give audience to an M.P., which, notwithstanding Cobbett, He is to all intents & purposes. No one can say He will not take the Oaths, & His having said that He will not, is no proof whatever of what he may do. I cannot detail to you our conversation. I took care to have a witness in L<sup>d</sup> Forbes. The ostensible object was a measure He wished to carry concerning a riot & death that ensued. I could not grant it, & he was easily satisfied. His Manner is most respectful & gentlemanlike. I am rejoiced that He came, as I am sure he went away fully convinced of the entire confidence I have in my resources, of my anxious desire for tranquillity, & of my determination to

put down insurrection from whatever quarter it might come. He *humbly* offered *His best assistance* in preserving the public Peace. All this is not to be talked of, for no one knows that any thing passed beyond what I at first stated.

But there is much of a most interesting character, of which I have minutes that I will shew you in entire confidence some day.

Every thing here looks wild & threatening, & I believe people are sadly alarmed both here & in England! Nevertheless, I calculate upon tranquillity, altho' I will not answer for it. Yet for this I w<sup>d</sup> auswer with my Head, that if I received *carte blanche*, I would in 6 months satisfy Catholic & Protestant, & lay the ground of making this perhaps the most flourishing Country of Europe. I talk in this way to you, but it would not do to quote me. I have not been well. If I am equal to it I sail for Carlingford on Monday.—Ever affec<sup>v</sup> Yours,

ANGLESEY.

Pray write all the Sailing News.

*From the MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY to Sir CHARLES PAGET.*

RICH VIEW, *Augt. 17th, 1828.*

MY DEAR CHARLES,—I returned last night. Nothing can exceed the enthusiasm with which I have been received every where. I have had some of the most *affec<sup>t</sup>* Addresses from the poorest & most disturbed *Villages*,—all swearing they are at my devotion.

I have settled everything about the Roads, & every body seems highly delighted. I rode over the Keeper Mountains, thought to be so terrific. There is nothing formidable in them. I have visited all the worst places of Tipperary, & am quite satisfied that if common justice is done, every thing will go well. But I have no doubt that the Premier will try to do every thing without me, altho' He takes His Cue from me, & I doubt if He will be as readily trusted as I sh<sup>d</sup> be.

I have some news to write about, but I have no time. If you can get a frank, send this to Arthur, for I fear I shall not be able to write, as I have so much on hand.

I inclose you all his interesting letters about the Cups.

Return them, for I want to shew them to William. He is not here. I will shew him your letter. I fear I must *not* again shew in the South untill I have been in the North, or all the Fat will be in the Fire.

The Ladies are better. I had a dreadful wetting in the Mountains. I turned to upon Pigeon & gave all my Companions such a dance as has surprized them, & as I fear some of their Nags will be the worse for. I never rode so hard. That Mare is miraculous.—Ever aff<sup>r</sup> yours,  
A.

Tell Eversfield he is a shabby dog. I will trouble him no further about his Twopenny Ha' top Sail. Shabby Dog!

I told Forbes to send the money. If he has not, it shall be sent to-morrow.  
A.

*From the MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY to Sir A. PAGET.*

PHENIX PARK, Oct. 19<sup>th</sup>, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—I have been much harassed lately & the little leisure I have had has been occupied at the Curragh. To put you a little *au fait* of late Events I send you a Copy of a letter I have hastily written to Holland, who is so honest & so kind a fellow that I often consult him upon public matters, & if you will also join your sage advice to that which I expect from Him, I shall feel much benefitted. You will have the goodness to consider the communication as confidential, for it would not do to let Old Westmoreland & the like behind the scenes.

I am interrupted.—Ever aff<sup>r</sup> y<sup>r</sup>,  
A.

*Copy of a Letter from Lord ANGLESEY to Lord HOLLAND.*

P. P., 19<sup>th</sup> Oct., 1828.

MY DEAR HOLLAND,—I have been too much occupied to write you lately. I must now shortly tell you what I have been about. The meetings, particularly in the South, have given such general alarm (and at least as much to the Catholics as to the Protestants) to all the best of the clergy, & even to some of the first of the Agitators, that I determined to put a stop to them. As my object was to

effect my Purpose in as mild a way, and with the risk of as little Resistance as possible, I caused it to be whispered that I had come to this determination, and that for the sake of the Catholic Cause, it would be prudent and wise that my Measure should not merely be acquiesced in, but approved. Shiel \* and one or two others took fright, saw evidently that they had gone too far, that they were in danger of losing all controul over the People, and therefore hurried down to the Association to anticipate the Proclamation. Many of the *vigorous* Gentlemen about me deeply lamented this Anticipation: *I* rejoiced in it. It secured Peace and Cooperation, which was worth the Sacrifice of the Honor & Glory of *Forcing* compliance. So far, so good. In the meantime, my friend (as he calls himself), Jack Lawless, was playing the Devil in the North,† and the Brunswickers were talking and acting with all the Violence & Intemperance of their peculiar Habits & Tastes. I apprehended collision at every Instant, & if any material outrage can occur, the poor Protestants of the South would have paid for the Imprudence of their Northern Brethren. Such Depositions came in of the inflammatory Harangues, and of the outrageous proceedings of Lawless, that this, coupled with his Declaration at the Association, (by whom he had been *recalled from his Mission*) that the Proclamation was not Law, and that he was ready to return & to act in defiance of it, determined me, very reluctantly, I promise you, to cause him to be arrested, &c., &c. There is much to be said for and much against this step. I tell you honestly, I do not like it. I am quite persuaded that he would *not* have gone back; He would not have resisted the Proclamation; That his Speech was a mere vapour, and intended to cover a pretty considerable display of the White Feather, which had been observed in him. Under that impression I would willingly have taken no notice of him. On the other hand, it might be considered as a matter of good Policy to shew the firm Determination of the Government to enforce the Proclamation. It might be necessary to shew the Protestants that, altho' for-

\* Shiel and Lawless were, after O'Connell, the leading men in the Catholic Association.

† By his September tour of agitation in Ulster.

bearing with the Catholics, I was not bending to their Violence—That the Govern<sup>t</sup> did not need Orange aid (no fun I assure you); & it would enable me to suppress this intemperate conduct & even to disarm them if necessary, without subjecting me to the accusation of partiality.

It is most certain, that infinite pains are taken by the Brunswickers to represent me as a warm Catholic Partizan, & I am aware of the absolute necessity of removing that impression, because if it makes much further progress, & is really credited in England, it will very materially injure the Catholic cause. By overlooking too the repeated misdemeanours of Lawless, I might be suspected of leaning to a man who had been in the habit of panegyrising me. Some of these considerations, together with the unanimous & strenuous opinion of *all* the authorities, that Lawless should be proceeded against, made me yield to the measure, and, having so yielded, I at once adopted it as my own act, & must take the consequences. To you I freely confess, that I am not satisfied with what I have done; I do not think it was necessary, & upon the whole, altho' I admit some good may arise from it, I doubt its general policy. Now tell me your opinion. Certainly there is a very large body of Catholics who rejoice in that man being taken to. They feel that he injures their cause. He is a thoroughbred republican, a separationist, & an old rebel, but I think He is harmless. The country is quiet, & I think I can keep it so, but alas! for how long & for what good, if emancipation is not soon granted? And I dreadfully fear that it will not be granted. And yet with what facility might the question be settled to the entire satisfaction of the Catholics, & to the security of the Protestants! The more I know of this country, the more I am certain that there is not the slightest danger in the most extended & liberal relief from all disabilities. I find the Catholics mild, moderate, & unaspiring. I confide even in the sincerity of the two great leaders. I am certain that O'Connell & Shiel may be depended upon. I am certain that they are sick of the present state of the country, & that they would gladly and zealously facilitate an arrangement. But they have been provokingly foolish in not stopping after the triumph of the Clare Election. There has been a furious reaction here & I believe in

England, & I do believe the cause has lost many friends. You must know more of this. What say you?

It is time for me to begin to think of the course I must steer in the event of the determination of the Gov<sup>t</sup> to resist the claims. My own feeling would be to quit my station immediately, & nothing but a very general desire on the part of the real lovers of Ireland that I should remain, in the hope that I might be instrumental in preserving tranquillity & in averting the frightful evil of my being replaced by a confirmed Brunswicker, would induce me even to delay for a short time my return. I must throw myself upon your kindness to bear me in your mind, (if the madness of the Higher Powers should determine them still to keep Ireland in misery) to collect for me the most disinterested & respectable opinions you can obtain as to the Line I should take, as well in regard to my own character, as to the interests of the Kingdom. I have been much longer than I intended, but I c<sup>d</sup> not stop. Believe me, very sincerely yours,

(Signed) ANGLESEY.

It is said that Lawless should have been apprehended sooner, or not at all. It is only within a week that the Depositions on oath were sent in, and, before that, nothing more was known at the Castle than was known by the Public.

*From Sir A. PAGET to the MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY.*

[Copy.]

27th October 1828.

MY DEAR PAGET,—Herewith I enclose a copy of your last letter to Ld. Holland which I have read with all the attention it calls for. Your statement of the affairs of Mr. Lawless is so clear and impartial that it leaves hardly anything to say upon it.

The state of this Empire, both internally and as to its foreign relations, has become so full of danger and disgrace that a single event even of such consequence as the arrest of Mr. Lawless did not, I confess, make so deep an impression upon me as it appears to have done throughout Ireland and this Country.

I have not had any accurate means of forming a judg-



ment on this affair,—my whole knowledge of it being derived from a very indifferent Newspaper. It may be that the period had arrived when it no longer became you to remain a passive spectator of the outrages that were going on. I own however, frankly, that I have regretted the measure. It has appeared to me that, however illegal and seditious the conduct of Mr. Lawless may have been, that of the Orangemen and Brunswickers has equalled, and indeed surpassed it, in violence and outrage. I should therefore have been better pleased with the proceedings in regard to this individual if similar ones had been directed against his opponents.

Here again it has struck me that the arrest came very late, rather an *ex post facto* measure. The tardy arrival of the Depositions on Oath did not indeed enable you to proceed against him sooner, but I think that their arrival at all might have spared you; because, however obnoxious and treasonably disposed Mr. Lawless might have shown himself for a moment at Ballibay,\* (I think the name of the place is) he appears *instantly* to have thought better of it, (Whether from a Mandate or not from the Association does not signify) and to have abandoned the enterprize, which enterprize gave rise to no positive mischief on the part of his adherents; whereas coeval with this tumultuous Assemblage, headed by Lawless, there was an insurrectionary movement of the Orange People, which led to the spilling of Blood,—a movement which does not appear to have attracted the attention of the Gov<sup>t</sup>, to the extent of visiting the Instigators of it with the same measure of Punishment which was awarded to the Chief of the Catholic Party. It has therefore appeared to me, as an act of judicial interference and Authority, to be an incomplete one, and not in accordance with the spirit of the Proclamation, which I have considered as one of the wisest and most Statesmanlike Documents I have ever read, because, independent of its merits as a composition, it was, in my views of it, levelled quite as much against the Orangemen as against the Catholics. Now, as I consider the Principles and the views of the former as very much the most pernicious and detestable of the two, the circum-

\* When the Protestants assembled in arms to prevent his entrance into Armagh.

stance of Mr. L.'s arrest would have been more palatable to me, if, as aforesaid, it had been possible to couple with it a similar act of severity towards some equally guilty Individual among the opposite Agitators.

With regard to the other,—five-hundredfold more important—question of your remaining in Ireland, he would be a bold man who would presume to offer a definite advice. This, however, I will, with the utmost deference, venture to say,—that nothing but the most extreme and desperate state of things ought to induce you to abandon that unfortunate Country to its fate. That this state of Things will arrive, I am by no means apprehensive of. I cannot feel much confidence in the D. of W. By this time His intentions about Ireland ought to be somewhat known, and I am afraid he does not know them himself. He has a difficult Battle to fight. If he supports you, well. If on the contrary he should so debase himself as to become the Tool of that ignorant Bigot the D. of N. and his infernal crew, then indeed there will be no option left to you. He will bring Things to such a Pass that neither you, nor any other honest independent Man, will have it in his Power to serve the State. But I would leave to them the odium of recalling you. I should not deprive them of that additional benefit. Neither Lord F. nor the Duke of Bedford are any the worse for having exposed themselves to their Anathema. I should therefore hope to see you stand by the Irish to the last moment. You have private as well as Public Interests to defend there, and if your pacific and conciliatory system, whereby I verily believe that Ireland might in a very few years become everything that by Nature it was destined to be, is to be put aside, and Fire, sword, confiscations, and proscriptions,—all which History and Experience have proved to be worse than useless, but which these accursed Brunswickers are beyond all doubt contemplating the perpetration of, are to be substituted for it,—why then it will be no discredit to you to be also put aside by a Sovereign who will be weak enough to yield to a faction base and flagitious enough to advise such measures. It must therefore be for the sake of Ireland exclusively that any Friend of yours could wish you to continue there, unless warmly supported by the D. of Wellington.

The day of temporizing is, I presume, gone by. Henceforth it must be conciliation and Prosperity, or the *optimum casibus, cetera praeliis, disco ex seditionibus*, an order of Things, which these brave Men of Kent would only however like to look upon from their own Dunghills.

It is really wonderful that there should exist such People in the same day as Lord Winchelsea (who with the exception of the D. of Newcastle must be the very greatest ass that ever breathed) and Lord Nugent for instance. I of course mention him in allusion to his excellent Letter.

I am afraid of fatiguing you with my tirades. I will not therefore further intrude them upon you. I need not say that I am edified with your able conduct and manly *exposé* to L<sup>d</sup> H., and I have the satisfaction to think, or at least hope, that my humble views of these important matters are very much in union with your own.—Ever  
Yr<sup>d</sup> affect<sup>y</sup>.  
A. PAGET.

*P.S.*—Since writing the above, which has been done somewhat in a hurry, I have again read your letter to Lord H., and am still more struck with the cogency of your reasoning on the principal subjects mentioned in it. If I have disputed a little the expediency of the arrest, I have still no doubt that I should have acted similarly. It is not, as you may imagine, that I set the value of a straw on Mr. Lawless, but such I own is my detestation of and contempt for the Brunswickers that I know of nothing so repugnant to my feelings and views as every measure whose tendency would be to further their intemperate Projects or to qualify their ill-directed Ambition.—I am really fearful of tiring you, so once more Yr<sup>d</sup>, &c.

A. P.

*From the MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY to Sir A. PAGET.*

PHENIX PARK, Novr. 1st, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—You take a very just view of the State of Party in this Country, & agree with my first view of Lawless's arrest—but I have had reason to alter my opinion in some respects. I find it works well. The

Catholics have taken it sensibly & acknowledge I could not do otherwise. To the Brunswickers it is rather a slap in the face, for it shews their interference is not wanted, & it will give me excellent grounds, if an opportunity presents itself (& if it does, you may be assured I will not overlook it) to serve them with the same sauce. There are plenty of People *ready* to make a case out against Them, but I doubt if it will be accomplished.

I have now a great project which haunts me. If I succeed, it will smooth many difficulties. You shall know in due time. I have had a delightful letter from Holland in answer to the one I wrote to Him. Would to God I had to correspond with Him as Home Secretary. Not that I have the least reason to object to Peel,—only, upon the great question, it is impossible to expect that I can get Him to adopt my views, & untill a Government does act upon those principles, no good can be effected for Ireland.

I *know* the Pope w<sup>d</sup> do anything reasonable. I still think I shall carry on the Country in Peace untill the meeting of Parliament, for I do not think any Party has a mind to quarrel with me *seriously*. God grant that common sense & common honesty may then prevail.—  
Ever affec<sup>d</sup> Yours,

ANGLESEY.

I have lately suffered dreadfully. The wear & tear of my Life bears hard upon me. I am rallying slowly.

A.

PHENIX PARK, Decr. 31st, 1828.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—What is known to a whole Cabinet & to The King is not long a secret. Indeed what I have to tell you need not be one, or if necessary to be so, it would be safe with you.

I received a letter from the Duke of Wellington yesterday announcing my recall, & I expect it immediately.

If the Duke had consulted my own personal comfort & my honor & character, he could not have acted more kindly by me, but I have been so kindly—so generously treated in this country,—I feel myself so bound up & identified with it,—I am so interested for Its People,—that I cannot but deeply regret, upon public grounds, my departure at this juncture.

The moment is, or will very soon arrive, when it will be necessary the public should be in possession of the whole course of my conduct. In the meantime, my friends must know the facts which have led to the occurrence, & when they know them, I think they will not disown me.

The *break up* turns upon 4 Letters, two of which are from the Duke to me, & the other two are my answers. I will get them copied & send them for *your own eye* alone, in the first instance. I suspect that His Grace has been much disappointed at my not having hurled my appointment at His head upon the receipt of his first letter, but I determined to give Him the *benefit* of effecting His object, & I would give Him no help.

I am interrupted. Gosset will finish this.

A.

The letters alluded to are long, & cannot be copied in time to accompany this. But as you will be anxious to know the *weight* of the *accusations*, they are, generally, of partiality to the Catholics, of associating with Members of the Catholic association, & of not having turned out of the Commission of the Peace O'Gorman Mahon, for his conduct at Ennis, and particularly of having paid Lord Cloncurry \* a visit.

Lord Anglesey's Answer was temperate, argumentative and firm.

The tone of the second letter was still more impertinent, & *unsuitable* to the person to whom it was addressed than the first, and unquestionably was intended to provoke a *resignation*, but it failed. A reply very much to the same purport as the first was returned. Five weeks were allowed to pass without any notice whatever being taken of it, which pause I attribute to the indisposition of the Duke to saddle His own back with any mischief which might accrue to this unfortunate country in consequence of Lord Anglesey quitting the Gov<sup>t</sup>. His Grace therefore would have preferred a *resignation* to a *recall*, which he flattered Himself would be accomplished by the impertinence of his last letter. He was disappointed, and it took 5 weeks before He made up his mind to the recall.

\* A member of the Catholic Association.

It will be very generally ascribed to *feelings*, which one would rejoice to believe could not exist in a great mind. The press of to-day's business must plead my excuse for this hurried sketch.—Yours, my dear Sir, very faithfully,  
R. GOSSET.

PHENIX PARK, Jan. 27th, 1829.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,—It is most gratifying to me to observe that you see every thing thro' the same medium that I do.

You must take a little patience about what I promised to send to you.

I am rejoiced to find that my letter to Curtis \* is so much approved. I hear of it from every quarter. Even *Sir Harcourt Lees* pays me high compliments.

The enthusiasm here w<sup>d</sup> beggar description.

Observe this said letter has nothing to do with the recall. It c<sup>d</sup> not. The recall was announced before it could have reached the King. How truly you see the advantage of my not resigning. You were quite right. There is not the least doubt the Duke calculated that His first letter w<sup>d</sup> disgust me, & his 2<sup>d</sup> decide me. But I would not take the Bait.

I sh<sup>d</sup> tell you that the letter to Curtis was entirely private. I did not even direct it myself; & I made Gosset explain that it was confidential. It was to pacify the public mind that I consented to its being put forth. It was thus. They dreaded the consequences of the first ebullitions upon hearing of the Recall. Persons came to me in dismay. The Ass<sup>n</sup> was to meet the next day. The most violent Resolutions w<sup>d</sup> have been adopted. The whole Country w<sup>d</sup> have been in a blaze.

I could not address the public. I c<sup>d</sup> not communicate with the Association. It struck me that the advice contained in that Letter, which was complimentary to the Duke, admonitory to the Catholics, friendly to their cause, altho' in some respects perhaps not quite palatable as con-

\* In December, Wellington, in a letter to Dr. Curtis, the Catholic Archbishop, advised the Catholics "to bury the question (of Emancipation) in oblivion." Dr. Curtis sent the correspondence to Lord Anglesey. He at once replied that he, on the contrary, thought the question pressing, and that the time for concession had come.

veying a censure for unnecessary violence, yet holding out hope & shewing the warmth & sincerity of a sincere advocate—it struck me, I say, that the exhibition of this letter might have a good effect, & I really saw no other mode of conveying my sentiments.

The effect as you will have seen was most powerful & effective.

I have not another moment.—Ever affec<sup>y</sup> Yrs,      A.

THE END











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